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PREFACE
"Our army has quietly melted away into peaceable

citizens," Benjamin Rush wrote several months after the

American war for independence.

They have, he wrote,

"returned to their former occupations and now form
of the yeomanry of our country."

a

part

Unlike many revolutionary

struggles, the American Revolution did not end in military
tyranny, with the military subverting the civilian govern-

ments or undermining the revolution.

For the most part, the

American military forces upheld Congress and the state
governments, as well as the goals of their revolution,

thereby preventing what the American revolutionaries feared

^ost--anarchy and military tyranny.

"Perhaps no Army in the

world," William Livingston observed early in 1783, "has ever
the
paid a more sacred regard to the civil authority than

of the
American Troops have done throughout the whole course

war."

Several months later, William Gordon wrote George

ending "without
Washington that he was rejoicing the war was
have in any one instance
my ever hearing or knowing, that you
„1
power.
civil
the
upon
encroached
set at defiance or

v

The reasons why the American military forces did not

subvert the civilian governments and undermine the American

Revolution are varied and inter-related.
tion

I

In this disserta-

have attempted to explain and analyze them by focusing

primarily on the civil-military relationship.

It is by

understanding the dynamics of that relationship that we can
better appreciate why Benjamin Rush, William Livingston,

William Gordon, and the other American revolutionaries were
pleased with the conduct of their military forces during the
war, and the fact that they had peacefully disbanded.
to a large extent,

So,

this dissertation is a study of the civil-

military relationship, especially with respect to the most
important aspect of it.

That aspect is the process by which

the civil and military revolutionary leaders kept their

revolution from being undermined by anarchy and military

tyranny--how they preserved the American Revolution.

Thus,

the
this dissertation is primarily an analysis of how

and
revolutionary leaders controlled their military forces

civilian control.
why those forces remained subordinate to
In each chapter

I

have explained and analyzed, in

relationship, the various
the context of the civil-military
and
institutional, organizational, political,

ideological,

of the Reverend William " Gordon.
T
^ 18,
iQ
i^eriierb ui.
1/Bj, "Tetters
June
1-7-70 i7qq
PMHS 63
PTlHb
1770-1799
Revolution
American
the
of
Historian
(October 1929-June 1930): 492.
,
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personal factors that contributed to keeping the military

subordinate to civilian control.

In doing so,

I

have

attempted to explain why civil supremacy was so important to
the revolutionary leaders, especially with respect to

preventing anarchy and military tyranny.
Basic to understanding the civil-military relationship is an understanding of the ideological basis of the

American Revolution.

At the ideological heart of the

American Revolution was the fear of power.

2

Because the

military possessed the ultimate physical power, they were
feared and distrusted by the American revolutionary leaders

throughout the war.

The basis for this fear and distrust

is explained in the first chapter.

The next two chapters

discuss how the fear and distrust was translated into policy,

particularly with respect to the size and length of service
selection
of the Continental Army, reliance on the militia,
supremacy.
of military leaders, and insistence on civil

American
Because of their fear of military power, the
that
revolutionaries developed an institutional structure

military forces.
allowed them to control and direct their
state levels, is
This structure, at both the national and

detailed in the fourth and fifth chapters.
°^^the American
Bernard Bailyn, "The Central Themes
Stephen
Revolution: An Interpretation,"
^^^^^^
Hutson, eds., Essays_on_^he_^e^^
for the I^^^itute ot
university of North Carolina Press
1973), p.
Earlv American History and Culture,
Early

(^"^niU
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The sixth chapter presents an assessment of the way
the military leaders kept the army under control.

They

realized that a well-disciplined army was not only necessary
to defeat the foreign and domestic enemies, but would be

less likely to threaten the lives, liberties, and properties
of their fellow citizens.

Despite the efforts to keep the military under
control, there were times during the war when they not only

challenged the civilian authorities but also posed
to the success of the Revolution.

a threat

This was due, to a large

degree, because the military came to be dissatisfied with
the American governments and people,

reasons.

for a variety of

These reasons are discussed in the seventh chapter.
In the eighth chapter

I

have explained how the

threatenmilitary's dissatisfaction often resulted in their

properties of
ing and violating the lives, liberties, and
the American people.

Additionally, as is discussed in the

ninth chapter, the military, often as

a result of their lack

frequently interfered
of faith in the civilian governments,
These
affairs.
with or involved themselves in civilian
aspects, as they
actions by the military had their negative
but, as is frequently
raised the specter of military tyranny;

participation
explained in this dissertation, the military's
positive side.
in civilian affairs also had a

viii

The real testing of the civil-military relationship

took place during the summer and fall of 1780 and the following winter, and again during the winter of 1782-1783 and the

following spring.

It was during those periods, as is

discussed in the tenth and eleventh chapters, that the
civilian governments were most threatened by the military,
as certain civil and military leaders believed the military

should play a larger role in national affairs.

These

leaders believed that Congress and the state governments

were incapable of marshalling the necessary resources of the

continent to ensure military victory, as well as to compensate the military and other public creditors.

Why the

military did not undermine the civilian authorities during
these critical times is analyzed in the last three chapters.

Also discussed in those chapters is how the military forces
were used by the civilian leaders to uphold the civilian
governments, as well as to ensure their peaceful re-estab-

lishment at the end of the war.
One would think that two hundred years after the

American war for independence ended that this dissertation
why the American
would not be necessary, in that the question
subverting the
military did not undermine the Revolution by
addressed and
civilian governments would have been fully
Neither has the civilBut it has not been.
answered.
covered.
military relationship been adequately
ix

In part,

this lack of analysis of the civil-military relationship

accounts for the lack of explanations given for the success
of the American Revolution.

only winning the war.

And by success,

I

do not mean

The American revolutionaries believed

their revolutionary struggle could only be judged successful
if it was conducted and concluded without the military

subverting the civilian governments
action ensured military victory.

,

even if such military

As Elbridge Gerry informed

Joseph Trumbull, "It is the fixed Determination of Congress
to preserve the civil above the military and the authority
of that will not be surrendered,

should it be necessary to

disband the army in preserving the

sam.e."

3

Until about twenty-five years ago most books dealing

with the American war for independence addressed civil and
military themes separately.

And when the two themes were

combined the focus was primarily on the question of why

America achieved military victory.

Rarely did they address

the question of why the American Revolution

v/as

not under-

mined or subverted by the American military forces.

Those

scholars who attempted to answer this question did so in
American
terms of explanations involving the conservative
importance
revolutionary ideologies. Rarely was the role and

^Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, March 26, 1777,
Joseph Trumbull Papers, CSL.

X

of the civil-military relationship acknowledged except in

cursory way.

a

4

During the past twenty-five years scholars have
begun to analyze the American war for independence in ways
rarely, or not fully, attempted earlier.

In doing so,

they

have provided us with many valuable insights into both civil
and military aspects of the Revolutionary War.
to the civil-military relationship,

Minis

Samuel P

,

.

VJith

respect

scholars such as VJalter

Huntington, Daniel Boorstin, Arthur A.

Ekrich, Jr., and Louis Smith, during the 1950s began discussing the war from a standpoint of the relationship of the

country

'

s

armed forces and its government and people

Although they raised important questions about that relationship during the war, pointing out its im.portance to

understanding the war and the revolution, they did so in

a

general way, not going into specifics, other than to detail
the American fear of standing armies and their reliance on
the militia

5

A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections
on T he Military Struggle for American Independence (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. xi xiii; James Kirby
Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The
Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington
Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1982), pp. 210-212.
"^John Shy,

,

^Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American
Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956);
The _Soldier and the State: The_Theory^^
Samuel Huntin
Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap
pF¥^ of the Harvard University Pr^s, 1957); Arthur A.

^n,

xi

During the 1960s, scholars continued to acknowledge
the importance of the civil-military relationship in under-

standing American history, but that relationship during the

Revolutionary War remained virtually ignored.

Marcus

Cunliffe's book on civilians and soldiers in early American
history, for example, only devoted two pages to the Revolu-

tionary War.
A new military history school developed during the
1970s and with it came more attention to the civil-m>ilitary
This school can

relationship during the Revolutionary War.
be traced back to Don Higginbotham

'

s

1971 work The War of

Ame r can Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and

Practice, 1763-1789

."^

According to John Shy, Higginbotham

'

s

work, more than any previous general account of the Revolu-

tionary War, attempted to relate the military and non-military
segments of the war.^

Subsequent works by John Shy, John

of the
Ekrich Jr., The Civ ilian and the Military: A H i storyUniverAmerican Antimilitar ist^fTidition (New York: Oxford and
rigSG) T.nni.s SmithTTmerican Democracy
sitv
Press 1951)
Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago E_xperience
D^HTiirjrB5^Fstin, Tj2e_^mericans The Colonial
(New York: Random House, 19 5 8)

Pr^

r

:

.

^e

Martial
^Marcus Cunliffe, Sol diers and Civili ans
(Boston: Little, Brown and
s pirit in America 1775-1865
pp. 40-41.
Company, 1968)
,

(New York: Macmillan Company,

1971).

The Military
^John Shy, "The American Revolution:"Stephen G.
War
conflict Considered as a Revolutionary
Essays^the_American
S^tz and ?ames H. Hutson, eds
Revolution p. 122n 1
,

.

,

.

,

xii

Ellis, John Todd White, Charles Royster, Jonathan Gregory

Rossie, Lawrence Delbert Cress, James Kirby Martin, Mark

Edward Lender, Richard H. Kohn

,

and Higginbotham addressed

aspects of the civil-military relationship during the

Revolutionary War.

9

For the most part, these historians continued to

discuss the civil-military relationship in terms of the

standing army controversies and the reliance on the militia.
But they also began discussing the actual dynamics of the

civil-military relationship in terms of civil supremacy and
3-31; John Shy, A People Numerous and
Armed: Reflections on the Milit a ry Strug g le for American
Independence op. cit. John Ellis, Armies in Revolution
(Nev; Yorkl Oxford University Press, 1974); John Todd White,
"Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory and Military Practice during the American Revolution." Ph.D.
dissertation, George Washington University, 1978; Charles
Royster, A Re volutionary People at War The C ontinental Army
and American Charac ter 1775-178 3 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early Am.erican
History and Culture, 1979); Lawrence Delbert Cress, Ci tizens
i n Arms: The Army and Mi lit ia i n Amer ic an Society t o the War
of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respect1982)
able Army: The Military Ori gin s of the Republic, 1763-1789
op. cit.; Richard H. Kohn, E agle and Sword: The Fed eralists
and the Creation of the Mi li^tary Establis hment 17 8 3-180 2
Military
Don Higginbotham,
(New York: Free Press, 1975)
Leadership in the American Revolution," Leadership in the
Ame rican Revolution Library of Congress Symposia on the
American Revolution (VJashington DC: Library of Congress,
Over National
1974), pp. 91-111; Don Higginbotham, "The Debate 1775-1815,"
Military Institutions: An Issue Slowly Resolved,
The^Ame rican
William M. Fowler, Jr., and Wallace Coyle, eds
Revolution: Changing Perspectives (Boston: Northeastern
Jonathan Gregory Rossie,
pp. 149-168
university Pre ¥i',T981)
(Syracuse:
The Politics_of Command in the^^ican_Revolution
Syracuse "University Press, 1975)

Ibid., pp.

;

,

:

,

;

,

,

;

,

.

;

,

xiii

,

military subordination.

Their efforts, nevertheless, were

limited in both scope and depth.

As John Shy wrote in 1973,

referring to the civil-military relationship, "basic research
In 1976, he wrote "the

in this direction has hardly begun."

debated questions are not very good ones, and truly good

questions are yet to be debated seriously."

Martin and

Lender, in 19 82, wrote that the new military history of the

Revolutionary War has addressed many new subjects, but "there
is still much left to be learned."

"Thus," they added, "all

of us have an obligation to keep raising new questions and

working

v;ith
I

^
extant documents.

..10

hope this dissertation has raised and answered

important questions regarding the civil-military relationand has
ship during the American war for independence,
war was
contributed to a better understanding of why that

Revolution
conducted and concluded without the American

being undermined by military tyranny.

There are more ques-

before we finally
tions to be asked and answered, however,
Revolution, unlike so
have a firm grasp on why the American
succumb to military tyranny.
not
did
revolutions,
other
many

iee^aTi'o^bTd

.

,

p

.

211.
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To a large degree, this means analyzing the civil-military

relationship more fully from an institutional, organizational,
and personal perspective, particularly at the state and local
level.

This dissertation,

I

believe, can be the starting

point for others to evaluate further this important subject.

This dissertation, which has taken longer to write
than it took the American revolutionaries to win their

Revolutionary

V7ar,

would not have been completed without the

help and encouragement of many people.

Particularly merit-

ing my thanks are my colleagues at the National Archives

and Records Service, especially Mr. Jack Saunders, Dr.

Michael Kurtz, Dr. Sharon Gibbs Thibodeau, the members of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation Appraisal Task Force,

and the staff of the Accession and Disposal Branch of the

Washington National Records Center, all of
me to finish this dissertation.

v;hom

encouraged

A special note of thanks is

due Mr. John P. Butler, compiler of the index to the papers
of the Continental Congress, who kept alive my interest in

the American Revolution.
I

owe

a

debt of gratitude to the staffs of the

various manuscript repositories and libraries where

I

did

staff and
my research, especially the inter-library loan

Massachusetts
Miss Melinda Mcintosh of the University of
library.

Miss Mary M.
A special debt of gratitude is owed

Wolfskin of the Library of Congress, who was
XV

of great help

and encouragement during the latter stages of completing

this dissertation

My mother and step-father, Lexie and Thomas McCraney,

warrant more thanks and gratitude than words can express.

I

am sure finishing this dissertation will be thanks enough
for them.

Also warranting my thanks is my typist

,

Mrs

.

Mary

Ann Steed, who saved me from making many errors of omission
and commission

.

Needless to say

,

any remaining errors are

my responsibil ity
I

could not conclude this preface without thanking

my dissertation committee

,

especially Dr

.

Win f red Bernhard

who patiently guided me through the doctoral program, and
Dr.

Hugh Bell, who, among other things, suggested the title

of this dissertation
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ABSTRACT

Preserving the Revolution

Civil-Military Relations During
The American War for Independence
1775-1783

February 1984
James Gregory Bradsher, B.A., Oregon State University
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor VJinfred

E.

A.

Bernhard

Explained and analyzed, in the context of the civil-military
relationship, are the reasons why the American Revolution
was not undermined by an American military tyranny.

The

early chapters are devoted to explaining the ideological
and historical background of the American revolution with

respect to American fears of power, anarchy, standing armies,
and military despotism; the American's faith in their

militia; and their insistence on civil supremacy being the

guiding principle of the civil-military relationship.

Also

detailed is how the Continental Army was created, structured,
of it
and maintained so as to minimize the possibility

subverting the civilian governments.

Additionally addressed

and political dynain the early chapters are the personal

mics of the civil-military relationship.
xvii

How the

Continental Congress and state governments controlled and
directed their inilitary forces, as well as how the military

controlled themselves, is detailed in the middle chapters.
Also included in these chapters is an analysis of the military'

s

often critical opinion of the civilian governments

and the American people; explanations for those instances

when the military threatened and violated the lives,
liberties, and properties of their fellow citizens; and a

discussion of the military's frequent involvement in and
interference with the civilian governments and the political
process.

The last chapters are devoted to an analysis of

the civil-military relationship during the last four years
of the Revolutionary War, when it was most severely tested,

and when the American Revolution was most susceptible to

being undermined by

a

domestic military tyranny.

Special

attention is given in these chapters to the factors which
prevented the Continental Army from subverting the civilian
governments, particularly during the last year of the war.

Also included, in the last chapter, is an analysis, in the

context of several contemporary works on civil-military
affairs, of the reasons for the American Revolution not

being undermined by the American military forces.
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CHAPTER

I

A CONSERVATIVE AND JEALOUS GENERATION
At the time of the American war for Independence

there was no definable 'American mind,' as Americans shared
no common ideology; nor one set of political, social

religious, or economic beliefs.

They lived in different

geographical regions, which were in some respects, more

closely tied to England than to one another.

The American

colonists, nevertheless, particularly those identified as
Whigs, on the eve of the revolutionary struggle, found the

"things that divided them were negligible and the things
that united them were fundamental.""'"

Understanding what

the fundamental things that united them were, will enable
us better to understand not only the nature of the American

Revolution, or at least how the Whigs perceived it, but

will also enable us to understand the operation of the

civil-military relationship during the war and how the
during
American military forces were controlled and directed

Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason: How
^En^D^ten^
Europe Imagined and Amer ica_Rean zed_the
138-lJy.
(Garden~Clty, New York Anchor Books, 1978), pp.
-""Henry

2

the war, and how and why the revolution did not result in a

military tyranny
Probably the most fundamental belief shared by the
American VJhigs in 1775 was, in James Burgh's words, that
"the people can never be too jealous of their liberties."^

This idea was not limited to the American VJhigs but could
be found also in some American Tory circles, as well as

among the English Whigs.

So pervasive was it during the

era of the American Revolution that Samuel Adams was

prompted in 1783 to observe that his was an "Age of Jealousy."
"Jealousy," stated Adams, who was one of the greatest pro-

ponents of jealousy as
of publick Liberty."

a

public virtue, "is the best Security

His cousin, John Adams, also acknowl-

edged the importance of jealousy in the political arena

Preparing notes for an oration in the spring of 1772, he
wrote "The only Maxim of
trust no Man

1

iving

,

a

free Government, ought to be to

with Power to endanger the public

Liberty" and that "Liberty, under every conceivable Form
of Government is always in Danger."^

Burgh

,

Political Pi squisitions

,

3

:

311

^Samuel Adams to John Adams, November 4, 1783,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:288; Samuel Adams to
Elbridge Gerry, April 23, 1783, ibid., 302; John Adams
Diary, Spring 1772, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:59, 58,

Americans during the era of the American Revolution
were constantly reminded about the misuse of power.

Addi-

tionally, they were warned not to undervalue their liberty.

Eternal vigilance, Patrick Henry told them, was the price
of their liberty.

Americans were indeed vigilant, so much

so that their vision was often limited, particularly with

respect to actions by the British ministry after 1765.
Their belief in the misuse of power by the British ministry
was a major factor in the development of the conviction that
they were conspiring to deprive the Americans of their lives,
liberties, and properties.

This conviction (and, by the

early 1770s, a fear) is important to the understanding of
the ease with which many Americans in 1775 turned out to

defend their liberties.

This fear of conspiracy, as well

as jealousy of power, also is important to understanding

the mental framework under which the revolutionary leaders

operated.

It is especially crucial to explaining how the

revolutionary governments and military forces were organized
and functioned during the war.

4

The conviction that the British ministry was

conspiring to deprive the Americans of their lives.
^Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New
Hampshire 9:846; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to
Letters o f
Bradsha^TT December 8, 1765, Field, Unpublished
Th^
Charles Carroll o f Carrollton p. 101; Gordon Wood,
Hill:
Creati^iT^ the American Re^blic 1776-17^ (Chapel
of
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute
41-42.
Early American History and Culture, 1969), pp.
[

,

]

liberties, and properties, began around the time of the

Stamp Tax debate, and increased with each successive ministerial action.^
there

hardly

v/as

According to Gordon Wood, "By the 1770
a

piece of Whig writing,

not dwell on this obsessive fear of

a

.

.

.

's

that did

'Conspiracy.'"^

The

British ministers were not plotting to overthrow the libert
of the Americans during the decade before Lexington-Concord

Their policies, however, were seen in that light by many

Americans

.

It is not essential to recite all the British

policies and the American responses to demonstrate how and

why Americans came to their point of view, for there have
been numerous works written on that subject.

The special

relationship between the British ministry and army, as it
was perceived in America, particularly in Massachusetts,
however, needs to be discussed.

This is because the ten

year observation and reflection upon the perceived conspira
torial design to overthrow their liberties by force of arms
left

a

deep impact on the American Whigs, especially with

regard to how they controlled their own military forces

during the war,
^John Adams Diary, March 6, 1774, Butterfield,
DAJA, 2:90; John Adams Autobiography, ibid., 3:290; John
Ma^s to Abigail Adams, July 6, 1774, Butterfield, AFC,
1:125.

^Gordon Wood, The Great ion_o^he_A^^^
1776-1787, p. 39.

5

Despite warnings between 1766 and 1768 that, if the
ministry sent an army to enforce unconstitutional legislation, Americans would regard the move as an infringement
of their rights and a serious grievance, an army was sent
to Boston late in 1768 to protect the Customs Commissioners.

To many American

substantial proof of

a

^-Jhigs

the sending of an army was

conspiratorial plan on the part of

the ministry to have a "standing army and swarms of crown

officers, placemen, pensioners and expectants, co-operating
to subdue America to the yoke" and "to keep the whole conti-

nent in subjection."

g

Already they had witnessed what the

army had done in New York City, where periodic battles had

Speech of Benjamin Franklin before the House of
Commons on February 13, 1766, Leonard W. Labaree et al.,
21 vols. (New Haven:
eds., The Papers o f Benjamin Franklin
13:142; A Report of the
Yale University Press, 1959-1978)
Record Commissi oners of the City of Boston Containing the
Boston~Town "Records 1758 to 1769 (Boston: Rockwell and
Churchill, 1886), p. 263; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to
[Edmund Jennings?], September 28, 1765, Rowland, The L ife
of Charles Carroll of Carrollton 1737-1832 with his Correspondence and Public Pap ers 1:73; Same to same, September 30
1765, in ibid., 74; Thomas Cushing to ?, May 9, 1767 MHSC,
4th ser., 4:348; The New-Hampshire Gazette August 5, 1768.
,

,

,

,

,

,

^Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule pp. 13 and
64; see also ibid., p. 6; John Wentworth to Dr. Becham,
August 9, 1768, Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire p. 1;
The Massachusetts House of Representatives to Dennys De Berdt,
1768 Cushing Writings of Samuel Adams 1:146;
January 12
"Determinatus" is The Boston-Gazette, and Country "Journal
August 8, 1768; The Boston-Gazette, and Country Jouriral,
September 26, 1768; Carl Bridenbaugh, Mi tre and Scep trej_
Transatlant ic Faith, Ideas, Personalitie s, and Po liti^
288.
1689-1775 rNew"York: Oxford University Plress, 1962), p.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

6

taken place during 1766 and 1767 betv/een soldiers and
citizens.

Before 1768 ended, they would also learn of the

death of two citizens in Annapolis at the hands of the
Royal Marines and of the St. George's Field massacre outside

King's Bench Prison in London where
fired upon by British regulars.

9

a pro-VJilkes

crowd was

It is not surprising then

to find a Boston town meeting in June 1768 declaring "every

person soliciting or promoting the importation of troops
should be pronounced an enemy to the town and province, and
a

disturber of the peace and good order of

both.""'"^

The British army arrived in Boston during the late

summer of 1768 to Mather Byles's pun that the colonist's

grievances had been "red-dressed.
army had become

Within months, the

nuisance and a threat, as guards were

a

placed about the town, the Boston neck fortified, and the
The New York Journal, or, the General Advertiser
October 23, November 6, 20 (supplement), 1766, March 26,
The New-York Gazette, June 5, August 14,
supplement)
1767
September 25, 1766; Elihu S. Riley, "The Ancient City." A
History of Annapolis, in Maryland. 1649-1887 (Annapolis:
Record Printing Office, 1887), p. 164; and John Shy, Toward
Lexin gton: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of
the American Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University
p. 395.
Press, 1965)
,

;

(

,

The History of Massachusetts:
(Boston: Henry Barry, 1857), p. 356.

•-^John Stetson Barry,

The Provincial Period

'"'John Adams Autobiography,

3:289.

Butterfield, DAJA,

citizenry challenged at night by the guards.

"""^

Many

Bostonians questioned whether the use of force was a very
suitable means of changing their sentiments, believing the
insolent use of military power always had been despised by
people who retained a just sense of liberty; believing also,

with James Burgh, that "Good government is
keep the peace
army."

13

,

surer way to

a

than keeping up a formidable and expensive

John Lathrop, minister of the Old North Church,

preached that government established by the sword should
fall, and "in its stead another might be established, more

agreeable to the great nature of man, and constant with the
great ends of society."

14

As to the charge by the Customs

Commissioners that Boston was ruled by
in The Boston-Gazette

,

an editorial

a mob,

and Country Journal on September 12,

1768, denied their existence, warning that "in a free

country

I

am afraid a standing army rather occasions than

prevents them

.

Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule pp. 11, 16,
34; Richard Gary to ?, July 24, 1769; A. L. Elwyn, Papers
Relating to Public Events in Massachusetts Preceding the
American Revolution (Philadelphia: T. K. and P. G. Gollins
for the Seventy-Six Society, 1856), p. 122.
,

Political Disquisitions 2 348; see also
Dickerson, Boston "under Military Rule pp. 29 34 62;
"Vindex," The Boston-Gazette, and Gountry Journal
December 5, 12, 1768; "Shippen," in ibid., January 30, 1769;
Samuel Adams to Dennys De Berdt, November 6, 1779, Gushing,
Writ ings of Samuel Adams 1:446.
""^Burgh,

,

,

:

,

,

,

,

in Ola E. Winslow, Meetinghouse Hill
(New York: Macmillan Gompany, 1952), p. 277.

•'"'^Gited

1630-1783

8

Mobs did exist before the army arrived, but not in
the numbers and frequency as they did once the army arrived.

These mobs, generally gathered to taunt the soldiers during
1769 and 1770, created an explosive situation.

Thomas

Povmall told Parliament in February 1769 that "The people
of that country and the King's troops are

against each other."

.

.

.

set in array

The sword was yet to be drawn, he told

them, but the hand was upon it.

"The word for action is not,

indeed, yet given; but mischief is on tiptoe, and the

slightest circumstance" he predicted, "would in a moment
throw everything into confusion and bloodshed."

15

His pre-

diction of bloodshed came in the form of the "Battle of
Golden Hill" in New York City in January 1770 and the
"Boston Massacre" in March 1770.

1

This shedding of blood convinced many Americans
that the ministry intended to enslave them, even though
the troops were removed from Boston and the Townshend Acts

repealed.

After all, as it

v/as

frequently emphasized, the

""^Cited in John Stetson Barry,

Massachusetts: The Provincial Period
^^

,

The History of
pp. 380-381.

The New York Journal, or, the General Advertiser
January 18 (supplement), January 25, February 8, March 1
(supplement), March 26, 1770; Parker's New-York Gazette;
Th^
or, the Weekly Post Boy, January 22, February 5, 1770;
Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, February 19, 1770
Lee R. Boyer, "Lobster Backs, Liberty Boys,
(supplemelTt)
Golden Hill and
and Laborers in the Streets: New York's
1973):
Nassau Street Riots," NYHSQ 57, no. 4 (October
(New York:
281-308; Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre
22.
W. W. Norton and Company, 1970), p.
;

,

British army still remained in force on the continent, out
of Colonial control, and ready for the next step in the

conspirator's plans. 1

One T^erican Whig, who in particular

went to great lengths after 1770 to convince others of the

danger posed by the army still remaining in the colonies,
and of the existence of
Adams.

1

a

ministerial plot, was Samuel

Besides writing letters to other Whigs and

establishing

a

committee of correspondence in the fall of

177 2, he carried on a newspaper campaign under the name of

m

"Candidus"

The Boston-Gazette,

a nd

Country Journal

1

9

,

Perhaps the most important source for publicizing the

belief of

a

conspiracy and the dangers of

standing army

a

during the decade before the war were the annual Boston

Massacre sermons, which were begun

m

1771.

20

17

Thomas Cushing to Benjamin Franklin, November
L
Elwyn Papers Relat ing to Public Events in
17 7 0, A
Massachusetts Preceding the America n Revo lut ion p. 171
and Count ry Jo urnal
'^Tndex"," " The~Boit'on"Ga zette
"17
Dicker son, Bosto n under
68
December 57~~12, T9'7~^6^7
Militar y Rule p. 29.
.

.

6,

,

,

,

;

,

;

,

"^^Samuel Adams to Arthur Lee, July 31, 1771, Cushing,
Writings of Samuel Adams 2:190; Same to same, October 31,
lT71 ibidT"! 266-267 ; Same to same, September 27, 1771,
ibid., 235; Samuel Adams to Henry Marchant, January 7, 1772,
ibid., 308.
,

,

19

August 19, September 23, October

7,

1771

March 5 1773 Butterfield,
DAJA, 2:79; Samuel Adams to John Dickinson, April 21, 1774;
Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:104; John Adams to
Jedidiah M^e, January SV'iSle, Adams, Works__of__ John^^^^
10:230; "Mentor" in The _Bo s^on__ E ven i g - Po s t February 11,
of the Cit y of
17 70; A Report of _the7"Rec ord Comm i ssioners
"^^John Adams Diary,

,

,

,

10

Referring to the whole Whig arsenal of literature
against standing armies and citing contemporary instances
of tyranny, the first three sermons, given by James Lovell,

Joseph Warren, and Benjamin Church, detailed how the British
army in their midst was a threat to their liberty.

The

fourth sermon, delivered by John Hancock and most probably

drafted by Samuel Cooper, was perhaps the best example of

bringing together the two themes of standing armies and
conspiracies.

By the time the fifth sermon was given by

Joseph Warren in March 1775, it was not very difficult for
him to demonstrate that the military in their midst was

truly the sword of a conspiracy.

21

Printed sermons, appeals

from the pulpit, pamphlets, and letters to editors augmented
the massacre sermons in the propaganda war the five years

previous to the war.

22

Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777
pp. 47-48
(Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887)
,

.

Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in
America, pp. 17-38; Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the
American Revolution 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 19 7.

^^John Adams' notes for a Braintree oration sermon,
Spring 1772, Butterfield, DAJA 2:58; Alice Baldwin, The New
England Cl ergy and the American Revolution (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1928), pp. 113-114; Philip
Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution 1763-1783
194-245; John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts^
pp
Prelude
The Provincial Period, p. 439; Arthur M. Schlesinger,
1764-1776 (New
to Independence: The Newspaper War on B ritain
103-106;
York- Vintage Books; A Caravelle Edition, 1965), pp.
A Letter to aFriend^
T W. A. Bostonian [Charles Chauncy]
ips
Giving a Concise but jus t, representation of the hardsh
,

,

,

11

Boston town meetings, the Boston Committee of

Correspondence, and the Massachusetts House of Representatives during 1772 and 1773 also insisted the army in America

was the result of
liberties.

23

a

conspiracy to undermine their

In May 1773 the town meeting informed their

representatives to the General Assembly that "standing
armies have forever made shipwreck of free states and no

people jealous of their liberties ever patiently suffered

mercenary troops to be quartered and maintained within their
populous cities" and "We cannot therefore but resent those
standing troops within our capital cities, appointed executioners of tyranny, and prepared instruments to massacre
the defenceless citizens, at the nod of any master who may

have authority to appoint or discharge, reward or punish
This armed force they argued was going to be used

them."

by the ministry to complete "their infernal plan of enslav-

mg

America.

and s u f erings of the late ac t of the Bri tish-Parliament
(Boston Greenleaf s Printing Office, 1774).
'

:

23

A Report of the R ecord Co mmissi one rs of t he City
of Bo ston Containing the~Boston Town Records, 1770 through
1777
pp. 84, 101, 106; Boston Committee of Correspondence
to Elijah Morton, June 19, 1773; Cushing, Writings of Samuel
Adams, 3:42; Massachusetts House of Representatives Petition
to the King, June 23, 1773, in ibid., 47.
,

^^A Report of the R ecord Commissioners of the City
of Bosto n Containing the "iBoston Tow n Records, 1770 through
1777, ^~133.

12

This "infernal plan" appeared all that more

apparent when the Ministry responded to the dumping of the
tea in Boston harbor by a series of coercive measures,

culminating in the appointment of General Thomas Gage as
Governor of Massachusetts and the arrival of additional

military forces to support him.

Shortly after their arrival

during the first week of September 1774, Gage had the Boston
neck fortified and began seizing gunpowder and cannon from

colonial magazines.

Bostonians reacted much the way they

had in 1768, as they were, in Samuel Adams's words, once

again "threatened with that great evil

,

"

a

standing army.

Hannah Winthrop believed "the dissolution of all government
gives a dreadful prospect" and expressed her fear that "the
troops give an horrid prospect of an intended battle."

Agreeing

,

Joseph Warren reported "the troops are availing

themselves every opportunity to make themselves more
formidable

,

and render the people less able to oppose them"

and stated "the treatment which we receive from the soldiery

makes us think they regard us as enemies rather than as
fellow subjects

"

25

.

^^Samuel Adams to John Dickinson, April 21, 1774,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams 3:104; Hannah Winthrop
to Mercy Warren, September 27, 1774, "Warren-Adams Letters,"
MHSC, 72 (1917): 33; Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams,
September 29, 1774, Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of
Joseph Warren (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1865),
pp. JsT^^TsT-' see also John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 5,
Butter fie Id, AFC 1:12 5.
177 4
,

,

,

13

Conventions held in Massachusetts during August and
September expressed their fears that Britain was attempting
"to execute their wicked designs by military force."

2

c.

The

best known convention, held in Suffolk County produced, by
the pen of Joseph Warren

,

the Suffolk Resolves, which

explained how Boston came to have her streets ^'thronged with

military executioners" and set forth the workings of the
27

The Reverend Gad Hitchcock

perceived British conspiracy

.

of Pembroke, Massachusetts,

in a May 1774 election sermon,

stated "Our danger is not visionary

,

but real

;

our conten-

tion is not about trifles, but about liberty and property."
"If

I

am mistaken in supposing plans are formed and executing,

subversive of our natural and chartered rights and privileges,
and incompatible with every idea of liberty,
is mistaken with me.'"

28

'all America

Indeed, the Massachusetts Whigs

were not alone in their fears of

a

conspiracy and the belief

the army was to be the sword of that conspiracy.

Their

beliefs and fears were also shared by others in New England.
In New Hampshire, John Sullivan, as "A WATCHMAN,"
of British
in a broadside addressed "To the Inhabitants
of
^^Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Co ngress
620,
Massachusetts, p. 657; see also ibid., pp. 612, 616,
624, 644-6T5T
^'^Ibid.,

pp.

602,

603-604

.

Clergy
2^Cited in J. T. Headley, The Chaplaj^n5_aiid
Charles Scribner, 1864), p.
of the Revolution (New York:

14

America" on the day before Christmas 1774, warned that
standing army had been sent to enslave America. 2 9
that year

a

a

Earlier

town meeting in Coventry, Connecticut, expressed

its belief that "by coercive measures, and military force,"

Boston would be dragooned into compliance "with the arbi"^^

tary will of the British ministry

The clerk of the

Connecticut Committee of Correspondence believed the acts
against Boston were "part of the general System, as one

Operation of the general plan long since concerted, for
Subjugating the Colonies, and rendering their Lives, and
properties, subservient to the Will

&

Pleasure, of a British

Parliament, or rather of their Ministry."

was not limited to New England.

31

This prospect

In Alexandria, Virginia,

on October 24, 1774, Nicholas Cresswell recorded in his

diary that "The New Englanders by their canting, whining,
insinuating tricks have persuaded the rest of the Colonies
that the Government is going to make absolute slaves of
them.

„32

^

p

.

^Hammond

Letters and Paper s of John

,

S ullivan

51

^^Hinman, A Hist orical Colle ction

,

p.

75.

Deane to the Committee of Correspondence
1774 Ford, Samue^lachley JVebb 1:28;
of Boston, June 13
committees
see also Deane s letter to the various colonial
ibid., 1:25.
of correspondence, dated June 4, 1774,
^•'"Silas

,

,

,

'

^^Nicholas Cresswell, Jour n al _ ol_Ni c hola s__Cre s s we 11
1774-1777 (New York: Dial Press, 1924), p. 44.
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With respect to Virginia, Cresswell's observation
had great validity.

George Washington, for instance,

believed the ministry was "pursuing

a

regular plan at the

expense of law and justice to overthrow our constitutional
right and liberties."

"Is not the attack upon the liberty

and property of the people of Boston," he asked

a

Tory

neighbor, "a plain and self-evident proof of what they are

aiming at?"

33

Many Whigs in Virginia shared Washington's

feelings concerning what they considered, in Richard Henry
Lee's words, "a Systematic plan of despotism.

"

'^'^

Elsewhere

in the colonies belief in a conspiracy, aided by a standing

army, was just as strong.

35

In September 1774

,

as the first

33

George Washington to Bryan Fairfax, July 20, 1774,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 3:321; and Same to
same, July 4, 1774, ibid., 228.
,

^^Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams, April 24 1774
Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee 1:108; see also Same
in ibid., Ill; Edmund Pendleton to
17 74
to same, June 23
Joseph Chew, June 20, 1774, Mays, Letters and Papers of
Edmund Pendleton 1:93; Adam Stephen to Richard Henry Lee,
August 27 1774 Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry
Lee, 2:208; Broadside of An Association signed by 89 members
oF~the Late House of Burgess [May 27, 1774] in Schreevan,
Revolutionary Virginia, 1:97; Resolution of Fairfax County,
129
July 18 1774 ibid.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

"^^Baltimore Committee of Correspondence to Committee
of Correspondence at Norfolk and Portsmouth, June 17, 1774
Purviance, Baltimore Town during the Revolutionary War
July 13, 1774, [Anne
p. 153; Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge,
Izard Deas, ed.], Correspondence of Mr. Ralph Izard, of
South Caro lina, from the year 1774 to 1804 with a short
203
Memoir (New York: Charles S. Francis and Company, 1844), p.E.
Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia 1:52; Stephen
Lucas, Portents of Rebellion: Rhetoric and Revolution
,

,

;

,

m
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Continental Congress met in Philadelphia to discuss the
colonial fears and concerns, Thomas Willing

resident of

a

Philadelphia and future member of the Continental Congress,
wrote "I am no great Politician but as an American

I

both

See and feel the chains which are prepared for me.""^^

The first Continental Congress shared and expressed
the fears and concerns of the American colonists, particu-

larly with respect to the sword of the conspiracy, the

standing army in their midst.

Thomas Jefferson, one of the

Virginia delegates, had already during the summer written
A Summary View of the Righ t s of Bri tish America, which

served as instructions for the Virginia delegates to the
Congress.

Jefferson stated that "single acts of tyranny

may be ascribed to the accidential opinion of the day; but
a

series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period,

and pursued unalterable thro' every change of ministers,
too plainly a deliberate,
us to slavery."

37

systematically plan of reducing

Congress, agreeing with Jefferson's

Philadelphia, 1775-76 (Philadelphia: Temple University
pp. 96-125.
Press, 19T6)
,

^^Thomas Willing to General Frederick Haldimand,
Willing
September 20, 1774, Thomas Willing Balch, ed
Letters and Papers edited with a Bi ogra phical E ssay of
.

(Philadelphia

Thoma^l^TllTmg^^oFT^
Allen, Land,~a'nd Scott, 1922), pp. 43-44
37

,

.

Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:125.

17

interpretation of events, declared their belief in

conspiracy to overthrow their liberties by
army

a

standing

a

38

General Gage, understanding the feelings of the

colonists towards his occupation of Boston, attempted to

minimize the presence of his army, assuring the Provincial
Congress that "Britain can never harbor the black design
of wantonly destroying, or enslaving, any people on

earth."

39

Nevertheless, Boston was considered an armed

camp and suffered many of the ill effects of the occupation, much as it had between 1768 and 1770.
3R

Ford, JCC,

40

1:63-73, 82-101.

39

.

•

Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts, p. 20; see also Abigail Adams to John Adams,
October 16, 1774, Butterfield, AFC 1:173.
,

^^Same to same, September 14, 1774, ibid., 151-152;
Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, [January 25, 1775],
ibid., 179-180; Abigail Adams to Edward Dilly, May 22,
[1775], ibid., 201; Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat
Paine, September 27, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS,
Same to same, October 16, 1774, ibid.; Samuel Adams to
Richard Henry Lee, March 21, 1775, Gushing, Writings of
3:206-206; John Andrews to William Barrell,
Samuel Adams
"Letters of John
August 1, 1774, Winthrop Sargent, ed.
Andrews, Esq., of Boston, 1772-1776," PMHS (1864-1865),
8:333-335; Same to same, October 2, 1774, ibid., 371; Same
to same, October 2, 1774, ibid., 381; Same to same,
January 2, 1775, ibid., 392-393; Same to same, January 21,
Colonial
1775, ibid., 395-396; Philip Padleford, ed.
Panorama 1775: Dr. Robert Honyman s Journal for March and
April (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1939),
^T~TT; [John Boyle], "Boyle's Journal of Occurences in
Boston 1759-1778," NEHGR 35 (January 1931): 7; Thacher,
Military Journal of the 7\merican Revolution, p. 12.
,

,

,

'
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Boston alone did not feel the presence of the

British army during the six months previous to the
outbreak
of the war, as Gage frequently sent troops into Boston's

environs.

These forays caused great alarm and provided

more fuel to the Whig argument that Britain intended to
rule by military might.

4 1

The Massachusetts Provincial

Congress protested what they considered Gage's aggressive
actions, believing that if he did not cease he would find

himself embroiled in

a

civil war.

They did not have great

expectations of Gage relenting, as they were convinced the
army was garrisoned upon them with the "express design"
of executing "acts of the British parliament utterly sub-

versive of the constitution of the province" and "enforcing
submission to

a

system of tyranny."

A December 30,

1774,

Boston town meeting echoed similar beliefs, being utterly

convinced the army, the tool of the ministry, was set on

overthrowing the liberties of 7\merica.

So did John Adams,

as "Novanglus," in The Bo ston-Gaze tte, and Co untry J ournal

on February 6th and 13th,
in Boston late in 1774,

1775.

In a pamphlet published

Charles Chauncy stated the design

of Britain to enslave Massachusetts and the North American

Knollenberg, Growt h of the American
Revolu^tion 1775-1776 (New York: The Free Press 1975)
^^'T8"5-'186; Elwin L. Page, "The King's Powder, 1774,"
NEQ 18, no. 1 (March 1945): 83-92.
^''"Bernard

,

19

colonies was "so obviously visible."''^

Many,

majority of Americans, agreed with Chauncy.

if not a

Many more

would be convinced after Lexington and Concord.

About two months after the war began, the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress, responding to Gage's
proclamation of pardon, stated the British ministry had
for several years been executing a plan to enslave America,

adding it "is

a

proposition so evident, that it would be

an affront to the understanding of mankind to adduce proofs

m

support of it."

4 3

Other legislative bodies and indivi-

duals were, however, more willing to elaborate the steps
by which the ministry had intended to enslave them, and
4
thereby justified war and eventual independence. 4

42

Lincoln, Journal s of Each Prov incial Congress of
Massachusetts, pp. 31, 69; A Repo rt of the Record Commis sioner s of the City of Boston Containing the B oston To wn
T. wT A. Bos ton i an
Record's, 1770 t hrough 1777, pp. 209-212
A Lett er to a F riend, Giving a Concise
[Charles~Chauncy
but just, representat ion of the hard ships and sufferings
of tHe late ~a ct of~the Br itish-Parlia m ent p. 24; see also
26
ibid
p
;

]

,

,

.

.

,

.

'^^Lincoln,

Massachusetts

,

p.

Journals of Each Pr ovincial Congres s of
344.

'^'^Oration given by Peter Thacher on March 5,

1776,
at Watertown, Massachusetts, Niles, Principles and Acts of
the Revolution in America p. 24; Resolution of Maiden,
Massachusetts, May 27, 1776, ibid., p. 157; Charge to
Charleston's Grand Jury on October 15, 1776, by Judge William
Henry Drayton, ibid., p. 82; Charge to Charleston's Grand
Jury on April 23, 1776, by Judge William Henry Drayton in
Gibbe s Do^ume^n tary J^istory_ of_the Am erica n Revolution,
,

,

2:187-10 8"; Proclamation by Governor Jonathan Trumbull,
June 18, 1776, Hoadly, Public Recor ds of the Colo ny_of
Connecticut, 15:451; Hinman, A_J^storical Collection, p, 175;

20

American jealousies of their liberties had helped
to conjure up a conspiracy during the 1760s and events

during the first half decade of the 1770s confirmed it,

especially after the introduction of the Coercive Acts
during the summer of 1774.

By that time most Americans

were asking fundamental questions regarding what the con-

spirators desired of them, their status within the Empire,
and how to prevent the conspiracy from coming to fruition.

Timothy Matlock, when asked during the summer of
1783 why he had fought during the revolutionary war,

responded simply, "Liberty and Property. "^^

Liberty, for

most Americans, as well as Englishmen, was understood in
the Lockean sense, that is, liberty was equated with the

These were the things the

right to life and property.

Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island p. 4 3; Moultrie,
Memoirs of the Revolution 1:52-53; Preamble of South
Carolina s March 26, 1776 Constitution in Hemphill, Extracts
from The Jou rnals of the Provi nci al Con gress of South Carolina I TTS^I 7 7 6 p~. 257; ~Ba r tie 1 1 Records of Rhode Island,
7:388; Fourth New Hampshire Provincial Congress to Governor
Wentworth, June 8, 1775, in Bouton, Doc uments and Records
Relating to New Hampshire 7:509-510; Virginia's Constitution of June 1776, Boyd, Papers of Thom as Jefferson 1:378;
The Declaration of Independence as adopted by the Continental
Congress, July 4, 1776, ibid., 430-431; Benjamin Rumsey to
William Rumsey, June 3, 1776 in James F. Vivian and Jean H.
Vivian, eds., "'A Jurisdiction Competent to the Occasion':
A Benjamin Rumsey Letter, June, 1776," MHM 58, no. 2 (Spring
,

,

'

,

,

,

,

,

1972)

:

152.

^^Cited in Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the
Alfred J. Morrison, trans, and
Confederation [1783-1784]
^dTr"2"vors. (Philadelphia: William J. Campbell, 1911), 1:65.
,

21

American ^Vhigs desired from society, and these were the
things they believed the British ministry was attempting
to deprive them of, particularly so by the end of 1774.
By that time, according to Theodorick Bland, the colonists

had the choice of contending for their liberties or giving

them up to "arbitrary Power. "^^

Philip Schuyler, shortly

after the war had begun, wrote the Americans had a choice
of being ruled by a military despotism, or fighting for

their rights and freedom. 47

Throughout the war it was

repeatedly stated the goals of the colonists were to protect
their liberties and properties.

4 8

Four years into the war, in Dunlap's Pennsylvania
Packet, or, the General Advertiser

,

on July 3, 1779,

Benjamin Rush, as "Leonidas," wrote that liberty was the
initial goal of the American struggle, not independence.

Independence, however, he believed was necessary now to
4

DAJA

f\

John Adams Diary, September
2:125.

,

6,

1774, Butterfield,

"^^Philip Schuyler to John Cruger, April 29
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ensure that liberty was obtained.

Rush was correct about

independence not being an initial goal of the revolutionary
struggle.

In his autobiography, he wrote that "Not one man

in a thousand contemplated or wished for the independence
of our country in 1774."

49

Most Americans in 1775--certainly

before the outbreak of the war, and to

a large

degree after-

ward--en joyed and basked in their place within the British
Empire, as they were perhaps the freest and wealthiest

people in the world.

Despite their decade long dispute

with the mother country, Americans, for the most part, were
proud to call themselves subjects of the crown.

constitutional dependence they accepted

;

however

A
,

what they

took to be the undermining of that dependence and the

replacement of it by unconstitutional subjugation, they
opposed, actively so beginning

m

the 1760s.
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Just as independence was not desired by most

Americans in 1775, neither was war.

"The Idea of taking

up Arms against the parent States," Samuel Ward reported

late in 1774

,

"is shocking to Us."

That fall, George

Washington stated "it is the ardent wish of the armest
^

^Corner

,

Autobiography of Benjamin Rush

,

^"^Baron De Kalb to Due de Choiseul, March

Kapp, Kalb

,

p.

p

.

119

2

,

1768

,

64

^^Charles Carroll of Carrollton to [Edward] Jennings,
May 29, 1766, Field, Un^ublish^^
ton,

D.

117.
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advocate for liberty, that peace and tranquility upon

constitutional grounds, may be restored, and the horrors
of civil discord prevented." 52

Americans hoped for peace

during the winter of 1774-1775, many still believing that
it was not too late to accommodate their dispute with the
53
^
,

.

ministry

This desire for a peaceful accommodation was due

primarily to the fear many T^ericans had that with war
would come

tv;o

things they greatly feared:

military despotism, both of

a

anarchy and

domestic variety.

We must

remember the ^Vhig leaders, who for the most part were

members of the colonial elite, did not desire
either their social or political environment.

a

change in
They were

basically conservative men, content with their deferential
society.

They were planters, doctors, lawyers, well-to-do

artisans and farmers, and college graduates.

54

They were
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the conservative ruling class, many of whom sat in the

colonial assemblies.

55

War for these men meant the

possibility of change in their status.

"The Powerful

People" observed one Maryland merchant-planter, "love Ease
and are not fond of Change, especially those that are

uncertain and tend with danger."
possibility of

a

56

Cromwell imposing

War also meant the
a

government upon them

worse than that they labored under.

might be unleashed

—a

mob

v/ho

,

A war also meant a mob

if not creating a state of

stable political and
anarchy, would at least undermine the

social structure of colonial America.
minds in 1774The farthest thing from the Whig's
domestic political order.
1775 was that of undermining the
at home" debate in most
There was no real "who should rule
such debate took place, it
where
even
and
colonies,
of the
as the American Whig leaders
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were, at least until the war began, satisfied v;ith their

place both in America and within the Empire.

desired

a

They simply

return by the British ministry to the salutary

neglect that dominated the colonial relationship prior to
George III assuming the throne.

According to

in Westmoreland County, Virginia,

a

convention

"That so far from

endeavouring or desiring to subvert our ancient, and to
erect

a

new form of government, we will, at the risk of our

lives and fortunes, support and defend it as it existed,
and was exercised until the year 1760."

Justifying their

meeting, the First South Carolina Provincial Congress stated
they desired neither innovation, alteration, or independence

Their concern was only with stopping the repeated arbitrary
acts of a wicked British ministry.

"The universal claim

is," Joseph Reed told the Earl of Dartmouth,
to the state we were in 1763, though

"to be restored

line drawn at that

a

period includes some of those laws to whose principles and

binding authority we are now opposed.

"^"^

that these Whig

It is understandable, therefore,

leaders desired
the ministry.

a

peaceful resolution of their dispute with

It is also understandable that they would

T^e _Comm it te es
^"^Richard Barksdale Harwell, ed
and_Fincastle_^ocee_dings_of^^^^
of Safety of Westmoreland
State Library Public51IHt^rc^iniTtti^i-1774
^^5ns;n5TnrTRTHhS^d Virginia State Library, 1956)
.

,

,

:

Hemphill, Extra_ctsJronLthe^^^^
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Provincial Congresses of__Soutj2__C_arolHia J^^^^
1774.],
[October
15,
Dartmouth,
jB-^h-R^id-t^^the-E^Firof
Reed, Joseph Reed_, 1:83.

pp.

4

0-41;

employ moderate means to achieve
grievances.

redress of their

a

Thus, beginning in the 1760s,

a

carefully

controlled and directed protest, put forth in constitutional
terms, was utilized by the Whig leaders.

The protest,

beginning with the non-importation associations formed as
a

result of the Stamp Act, and continuing with the estab-

lishment of committees of correspondence during the early
1770s, was generally led by

a

relatively conservative group

They believed that by orderly means, within

of Whigs.

framework of political association

,

a

their grievances could

be safely redressed

Some forms of mob protest, if not necessarily

encouraged, was acceptable to the

VJhig

leaders, if they had

59
part in directing the actions of the mob.

This form of

protest was, however, little used, for it frequently got
out of control and resulted in the destruction of property.

Additionally, many Whigs opposed mob actions, since mobs
only served as an excuse for the ministry to send more
^^Gordon S. Wood, "The Democratization of Mind in
the American Revolution," in Leadership in the Americaji
Revolution Paper^s_ presented at the Third Libr^^j^y_gi
on the Ame rican Re vo3ajtj^_^_^^
Conq"re¥s"~Sympo '^^
introd'uction by Elizabeth Hammer Kegan (Washington:
Library of Congress, 1974), pp. 63-88.
:

,

^^Pauline Maier, From Resistance to R evolution:^
Colonial Radical_s and the Developmen t of America n O.PPgsiz.
tIorr"to Britain, T76"5^17 7 6 (New York: Vintage Books, 1972),

pp^T^TsT"
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troops to America.

As the colonial protest escalated after

the announcement of the Coercive Acts, concern about mob

violence increased.

50

John Adams, although calling for the

people to arm themselves, nevertheless desired they remain

peaceful in their protest.
a

"Brutus," in Virginia, raised

voice against rashness and unchecked violence

arguing

,

prudence and moderation would give greater weight to their
protest.

Anthony Benezet,

a

Quaker leader in Philadelphia,

also argued for moderation, stating they should protest "as

reasonable men

[

,

as Christians."

]

Joseph Warren desired

the Whig leaders to "restrain everything which tends to

weaken the principles of right and wrong, more especially
with regard to 'property.'"
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The Whig leaders responded to Warren's plea by

calling on the people to restrain themselves in their
Even the creation of the Continental Congress

protest.

^^Samuel B. Webb to Silas Deane, October 10, 1774,
Ford, Samuel Bla chley W ebb 1 :41-4 2
,

John Adams to Richard Cranch, September 18, 1774,
Butterfield, AFC 1:160; John Adams to Abigail Adams,
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TNoFt Hampton: Press of Gazette Printing Company, 1902),
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.

was

a

move by the Whig leaders towards controlled and

moderate protest
During the summer of 1774, despite the calls for
a

non-violent response to the Coercive Acts, random and

organized acts of violence against both persons and property
took place, particularly in Massachusetts, v;here Tories and
IVhigs sparred with one another,

citizenry.

as well as the soldiers and

These confrontations were not limited to

Massachusetts.

In Nev; Hampshire in mid-December,

upon

learning that British troops were on their way to garrison
Castle William and Mary, the fort at Newcastle, well

organized and directed mobs assaulted the fort, removing
gunpowder and cannon.

A similar seizure of powder

v;as

made in Charleston, South Carolina, in April 1775, about
three weeks before news arrived regarding the war having

begun in Massachusetts.

Mob activities also took place

at the Westminster Court House in the New Hampshire Grants

Journals of Each Pr ovinci~ al Co n gress of Massachusetts
Walker, New H ampshire' s Five Provincial
pp. 7 0"^ 650^651
Congresses p 15 Charles Z Lincoln The Co n stitutional
Histor y of New York 5 vols. (Rochester: Lav/yers
1:51-53.
Co-Operative Publishing Company, 1906)
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Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine,
September 13, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS; Herbert
James Henderson Pj^t^l.Pgl.i t ics__in _ the Conti nental Congress
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(New York: McGraw-Hill,' 1974)
,

,

,
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activrties^in Massachusetts between August 1774 and
February 1775
^
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as Tory Vermonters who supported New York's claim
to that

land fought New Hampshire VThigs.

Violence occurred in

other colonies as well, thereby contributing to the

unsettled state of affairs in the colonies.
This unsettled state of affairs prompted John Adams
to describe the times as "very discouraging."^^

His wife,

Abigail, late in August 1774, described the colonial

situation as being unsettled, stating "The Rocks and quick
Sands appear upon every side." 6 8

As 1775 began, Whigs

found themselves with a very volatile situation, as mobs
and anarchy reared themselves from the unrest, and the

threat of war loomed as

real possibility with each British

a

army excursion into the Boston hinterlands. 69
66

Theodore Cracket and Martin Andresen, "Fort
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Many Americans believed a peaceful solution could
be found to end their grievances with the mother country.

But most Whigs believed the conspirators in England had
no thought of compromise or accommodation with the colonies.

These Whigs agreed with John Adams, that by the time of the
Tea Party the die had been cast and the "people have passed
the river and cut away the bridge.

""^"^

With the arrival of

the army during 1774 and early 1775, the Whig belief in the

intentions of the ministry was confirmed.
It was not only the American Whigs who believed a

conspiracy had begun.
believed that

a few

iMany

Tories and British officials

radical Whigs were responsible for all

the unrest, and that they were conspiring to have the

British North American colonies independent.

These American

conspirators, it was believed, had begun agitating for

American independence as much as twenty years beforehand,
sowing the seeds of rebellion primarily in Massachusetts.
One British officer, in Boston during the summer of 1774,

suggested that it would "require

a

great length of time,

much steadiness, and many troops, to re-establish good
Colonial Panorama 1775: Dr. Robert
Padleford, ed.
Honyman s Journal for March and April p. 41.
,

,

'

"^^John Adams to James Warren,

Adams

,

Works of John Adams,
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:

333

.

December 17, 1773,
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order

government" in the colonies as

&

damage done by radical

I'Jhigs.

a

result of the

7

Thus, as 1775 began, many Americans and Englishmen

believed the other was attempting to subvert the English
constitution, and that war was

a real

possibility as

a

These beliefs were most deeply held in Massachusetts,

result.

particularly in Boston, which by the fall of 1774 had become
a

fortified garrison, and

a

powder keg, much as it had

during the winter of 1769-70, prior to the massacre.

Gage

had attempted to calm the people, by keeping military

movements and actions to
one Bostonian,

a

minimum.

He realized,

as did

"The spirit of the people want calming."

72

Nevertheless, he also realized that the presence of his
army needed to be maintained, if the radical leaders were
to be awed into submission.

To do this he periodically

sent the army into the hinterlands, both as exercise and
to familiarize them with the terrain should war begin.

One such foray in September almost resulted in war, as

thousands of militia, believing that war had indeed begun,

converged on Cambridge and Worcester, ready to retaliate.
Earl Percy to Edward Harvey [?], August 21,
Charles Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters of H ugh Earj^
1774
(Boston: Charles E
Percy fr^om_Bo^on_and J^\^^
Goodspeed 1902), p. 36.
'^"'"Hugh

,

ber 13

,

^^Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, SeptemRobert Treat Paine Papers, flHS.
1774
,

should that be necessary.

This demonstration of force by

the Americans led one British officer to remark "this

country is now in as open
was in the year M5."

Boston

v;ere

a state of

rebellion as Scotland

This officer suggested affairs in

"in the most Critical Situation imaginable."

"Nothing less," he believed/ "than the total loss or

conquest of the

Colonies must be the End of it.

indeed is disagreeable

,

7
absolutely necessary." 3

Either

but one or the other is now
Gage, agreeing, early in 1775

called on Lord Dartmouth to request the ministry take
decisive action, suggesting

a

respectable force be put into

the field and the most obnoxious radical Whig leaders

seized

^^

About the time Gage was making his request, the
Earl of Chatham, in the House of Lords, called for the

removal of the British army from Massachusetts because, he
argued,

"the very first drop of blood will make

that will not easily skinned over."

75

a

wound

On the other side

"^^Hugh Earl Percy to the Duke of Northumberland,
September 12, 1774, Charles Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters

York 1774-1776 p. 37
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"^^Thomas Gage to Lord Dartmouth, January 17,

John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts^
Provin cial Period 2:498.
,

^^Cited in ibid., 502.

l^ie

1775,
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of the Atlantic in Boston, Joseph Warren agreed.

"If once

General Gage should lead his troops into the country, with

design to enforce the late acts of Parliament," he predicted,
"Great Britain may take leave, at least of the New-England

colonies, and, if

I

mistake not, of all America. "^^

Once Gage's soldiers tightened their grip on Boston
and began venturing into its hinterlands, the Whig belief
in a conspiracy increased,

would soon take place. 77

as did their belief that a war

On January 17,

Chronicle and London Advertiser carried
dated December

1774,

8,

1775, The Morning
a

letter from Boston,

stating "This country is now in open

rebellion; but we have not yet come to the last act, that
of fighting.

"^^

With war

a real

possibility, the conspiracy all

that more apparent, Americans during the surimer of 1774

began preparing for armed conflict.

The Continental

Congress, in mid-September, endorsed the Suffolk Resolves,
7 fi

Joseph Warren to Arthur Lee, February 20, 1775,
Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warre n, p. 418
Joseph Reed to Mr. DeBerdt, September 26, 1774
Reed, Joseph Reed 1:81; Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren,
[February 3, 1775], Butterfield, AFC, 1:183; William Eddis
to ?, March 13, 1775, Aubrey C. Land, ed., Letters from
America: William Eddis (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 100; Extract of a letter
from Boston, November 8, 1774, in The London Chronicle
January 12 1775 cited in Margaret Wheeler Willard, ed
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Ibid.
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6
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which suggested Americans begin military
preparations, and
at
Richard Henry Lee's urging, on the third of October,
recommended the individual colonies attend to the organization and discipline of their militia.
take place, it was argued,

a

Even if war did not

disciplined militia was needed

to quell the domestic convulsions which grew with intensity

and number during the fall and winter of 1774 and 1775.^^

Many colonies and individuals, congressional

endorsement notwithstanding, began turning their attention
to military preparations particularly with respect to

forming independent military organizations, as well as

organizing and/or disciplining their militia.

During the

late fall of 1774 and throughout the winter most colonial

provincial conventions and congresses encouraged and made

preparations for war.

80

Even where the provincial bodies

did not formally encourage military preparations, such
79

Ford, JCC, 1:31-36; 39, 53-54, 54n.; John Adams
to Abigail Adams, October 7, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:165.
80

The Nev/port Mercury November 7
Bartlett,
1774
Records of Rhode Island 7:262-264; Schreevan, Revolutionary
Virginia 2:374-375; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial
Congress of Massachusetts pp 3 3, 41, 71; Massachusetts
Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War: A Compilation
from the Archives 17 vols. (Boston State Printer, 1896Force, American Archives 4 th ser.,
1 :x-xii
1908
1:1031-1033, 1118, 1182; Bernard Knollenberg, Growth of the
American Revolution 1766-1775, p. 178.
,

,

,

,

,

,

)

,

;

.

:

,

;

35

preparations took place, as militia units began improving
themselves and independent military bodies were formed.
These military preparations reinforced ministerial
and Tory beliefs that the radical Whig leaders desired a
The Pennsylvania Journal, and Weekly Adve rtiser
December 28, 1774; ibid., March 29, 1775; Selsam, The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 pp. 74-75; Charles" H.
Lincoln The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvan ia 17601776
Publications of the University of Pennsylvania Series
in History, no. 1 (Boston: Ginn and Company for the University of Pennsylvania, 1901), pp. 210-212; William P. Clarks,
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vol. 7 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), p. 42;
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Rutland, Papers
Columbia University Press, 1942)
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military solution and, therefore, they must
be stopped
before a full-scale revolutionary war began.

On April 16,

1775, Gage received a letter from Lord Dartmouth
telling

him to act decisively with the "rebels."

Gage interpreted

this to mean he was authorized to seize the main
colonial

military stores at Concord, as well as prominent radical
Whigs, such as John Hancock and Samuel Adams.

Therefore,

on the nineteenth of April, Gage marched a large portion
of his army to Concord.

At Lexington they were greeted by

the militia, who sttod their ground before them.

Shots were

fired, men fell dead in greater numbers than had in the

streets of Boston five years previously.

It was not a

massacre, it was war; the American Revolution which had

begun in the minds of many Americans during the 1760s as
they came to believe the British ministry was conspiring
to undermine their liberties and properties, became now
a

war for the preservation of their lives, liberties, and

properties, and eventually, their independence.

Joseph Warren, by the evening of the nineteenth,
in his capacity as head of the Massachusetts Committee of

Safety, with the assistance of General William Heath, was
of the City Government, in June, 1832 (Providence: Knowles
and Vose, 1843), pp. 248-249; Paul Francis Gleeson, "The
Newport Light Infantry," RIHSC 33, no. 1 (January 1940): 1
,

o n

Alden, "Why the March to Concord?" AHR
(April 1944): 446-454.
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attempting to give direction to what was

a

chaotic situation,

as thousands of militia poured into eastern Massachusetts.^^

By the evening of the twentieth, approximately

twenty thousand militia had formed themselves into a loose

chain around Boston.

Not all these men were under control

of military or civilian leaders, as they had simply appeared
on the scene in small groups or as individuals.

The Committee

of Safety compounded this problem that evening by calling
on towns to send more men, not specifying particular units.
On the twenty-first, realizing the need to organize and

control the military force in Massachusetts, the Committee
of Safety formally created an army of eight thousand

Massachusetts militia to serve until the end of the year.
On the twenty-second, the Provincial Congress resolved

that a voluntary army of almost twenty thousand be raised
to serve until December, and the next day, the Provincial

Congress decided

would be needed.

a

combined colonial force of thirty thousand

Joseph Warren, who was already in his

capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Safety, attempting
to give direction to the assembled military forces, was on

the twenty-second, elected President of the Provincial

Congress.

To assist him, Generals Ward and Thomas were

^^Allen French, The First Year of the American
Revolution (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1934)

,

p.

48

.
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named senior major generals.

A month later, Artemas Ward

was appointed commander-in-chief of the
assembled colonial
forces, and during mid-June, Massachusetts
appointed three
more major generals, John Whitcomb, Joseph Frye
,

and

Joseph Warren, to assist in controlling the military
forces.
The other New England colonies during late

^'^

April

and May responded to Massachusetts' call for assistance.

Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire sent twentythree thousand soldiers, under the capable direction of

Nathanael Greene, Joseph Spencer, Israel Putnam, and John
Stark, to the seige of Boston.

OC

This enthusiasm and support was not confined to New
England.

A martial spirit, which had risen during the

winter, increased in intensity throughout the colonies,

with the result of thousands rushing to arms.^^
84

.
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Another result of this martial spirit was
several
unwanted armed confrontations. In New York City,
for
example, in June, when the Royal Irish Regiment
was attempting peacefully to leave the city, Marinus Willett
and an

armed mob stopped them and carried off their supplies
and
arms, maintaining the city committee's permission for them
to leave peacefully did not include the removal of their

Earlier Willett, John Lamb, and Isaac Sears had

arms.

a

mob break open the city's arsenal without proper authorizaA similar incident occurred in Connecticut, where,

tion.

at New Haven,

late in April, Benedict Arnold, at the head

of the Second Company of the Governor's Guard,

forced the

city's selectmen to turn over the city's powder and ball
to him,

or else have it taken by force.

In Virginia,

during

April, the militia took matters into their own hands and

attempted to force the issue of the Governor's authority
"Colonel Robert Lettis Hooper: Deputy Quarter Master
General in the Continental Army and Vice President of New
Jersey," PMHB 36, no. 1 (1912): 66; Benjamin Rush to Thomas
Ruston, October 29, 1775, Butterfield, Letters of Benj amin
Rush 1:91; Thacher, Military Journal of the Ameri can
Revolution p. 16; David Ramsey, The Hi story o^f the American
1:253;
Revolution 2 vols. (Trenton: James J. Wilson, IsTI)
Report by M. Bonvouloir in Philadelphia, December 28, 1775,
Durand New Mat er ials for the History of the Ameri can
Revolution pp 2~, 9l George Gilmer to Thomas Jefferson,
Papers, Military and Political, 1775-1778, of
[1775]
"
George Gilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,' Albemarle County, Va
VHSC, new series, 6:103; Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston,
May 11 1775, Saunders, NCCR, 9 1246
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over the colony.

They were persuaded from the use of arms

at the last moment by the intervention of Edmund
Pendleton

and other Whig leaders.

These military related activities frightened many,
if not most, colonists who hoped for a peaceful resolution

of their grievances.

"Why raise a military spirit," asked

one prominent Tory, "that may furnish unmanageable adven-

turers on this side of the water unfriendly to a province
in which you and

I

have something else to lose?"^^

North-Carolina Gazette on the twelfth of May raised

The
a

question that was frequently asked when it stated "The
'Sword is now drawn' and God knows when it will be

sheathed."

In Massachusetts, where thousands of armed men

87
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from various colonies had gathered, Whig
loaders were quite
concerned about military-civilian confrontations
and about
the possibility of a Cromwell rising from
out of the ranks.
Samuel Adams was most concerned, primarily
because his

colony was the seat of war.

From Philadelphia he reminded

one Massachusetts Whig leader that "It is always
dangerous
to the liberties of the people to have an army
stationed

among them, over which they have not control."
he observed,

"History,"

"affords abundant instances of established

armies making themselves the masters of those countries,

which they were designed to protect."

Most Massachusetts

Whig leaders shared Adams's concerns, especially because
so many of the troops in their colony were not under their

control, and because the army,

according to John Trumbull,

"if it deserved the name,"

"was an assemblage of brave

enthusiastic, undisciplined country lads," with "officers
in general quite as ignorant of military life as the

troops

,,89

So as to get a better hold on the military forces
in their colony,

the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on

May 15, 1775, ordered that

a

committee be appointed to

89

Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775,
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prepare an application to the Continental
Congress desiring
that body to take some measure for "directing
and regulating
the American forces."

The following day their report to

that effect was adopted, and an appeal was formally
made
to Congress requesting they assume responsibility
for the

control and direction of the army gathered around Boston.
In making this appeal, Joseph Warren reminded
Congress of

the various reasons for the necessity of such a measure,

stating "as the sword should, in all free States, be

subservient to the civil powers; and as it is the duty of
the Magistrates to support it for the people's necessary

defense, we tremble at having an Army
of our own countrymen)

(although consisting

established here, without

power to provide for and control them."

a

civil

Ten days later,

in a personal appeal to a member of Congress, he wrote that

"unless some authority sufficient to restrain the irregu-

larities of this army is established, we shall very soon
find ourselves involved in greater difficulties than you

m imagine.
can well
•

•

..90

Congress, receiving Massachusetts' appeal on the
second of June, did not immediately act upon it, as other
90
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questions regarding the war itself had to be answered
first.
On the fourteenth, Congress authorized the first Continental
troops: ten companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania,

Virginia, and Maryland, who were to serve one year.

Ethan

Allen and Seth Warner, representing Vermont's Green Mountain
Boys, appeared before Congress later in June and, although

that body did not adopt them as

separate Continental unit,

a

nor endorse their plan for an invasion of Canada, recom-

mended to the New York Convention that these troops be
employed by them under officers of their own choosing.

As

Congress was now taking an active role in directing military
affairs, it was suggested they remove themselves from

Philadelphia to Boston to give immediate direction and
control to the military forces there.

Realizing this was

neither practical nor necessary. Congress rejected the
suggestion.

They did, however, on the fifteenth of June,

resolve to appoint

a

commander-in-chief of the Continental

forces, who would take direct control of the Continental

Army

91

Because the main body of the army apparently was
to be in Massachusetts at the seige of Boston, most New

England delegates to Congress preferred

a

New Englander

105; Ward, The
91
104
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be appointed commander-in-chief.

Their first choice was

Connecticut's Israel Putnam, a well-known veteran
of the
French and Indian War and currently active at

the seige of

Boston.

Another New Englander considered

a

likely candi-

date, if by no one other than himself, was John
Hancock.

Philip Schuyler of New York, who, like George Washington
of Virginia,

served on all four military committees of

Congress during May and June, was considered by many

northerners as a good choice. 9 2
Not all New Englanders were so narrow in their

provincial loyalties that they could not conceive of
appointing a southerner commander-in-chief of a mostly

northern based and soldiered army.

Elbridge Gerry, Joseph

Warren, and James Warren, realizing the importance of

demonstrating that the colonies were indeed bound by the
same cause, agreed they could accept a non-New Englander,

such as the professional soldier Charles Lee, or George

Washington, a southerner with military experience.

93

Lee,

the preceding year, had been, with Israel Putnam, named

one of the two "greatest military characters of the present
^^Ford, JCC, 2:53, 79-80, 90.
93

James VJarren to John Adams, May 7, 1775, "Warren
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age."

94

Thus, by mid June when a vote was taken for the

commanding general, three men stood the highest in the

estimation of the delegates.

They were:

Washington, Lee,

and Putnam.

Putnam, though thought of highly by many delegates,
suffered in their estimation because at age fifty-seven he

was considered too old for active campaigning.

Additionally,

Putnam suffered because of his lack of presence in

Philadelphia where he would be able to lobby personally,
as Lee and Washington were able to do.

Lee,

a

pensioned

British officer, was generally liked by most of the delegates

.

However

,

many considered him too politically radical

to be trusted with command of a revolutionary army.

factor hindering Lee

'

s

Another

chances of selection for the top

post was the fact he was not

a

native.

Nevertheless, Lee

made certain his presence was felt by the delegates, as he
frequently drilled regiments of Pennsylvania militia.

95

As the time approached for voting, it appeared that

Washington had the fewest disadvantages, and most probably,
the greatest advantages.

Washington

v;as

known to many of the delegates, in

one of his numerous roles in colonial society, such as

^^The Boston_-Ga^zette^_an^

August 22,T7T4T

^^George Cuthbert to John Dalling [1776], "Notes
and Documents," PMHB 64, no. 2 (April 1942): 209.
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soldier, squire, planter, legislator, and
member of the
First Continental Congress. One of his early
champions,

Benjamin Rush, when Congress met, quickly made
certain that
more was known about him, by having reprinted in

Philadelphia's newspapers, part of the Reverend Samuel
Davies's 1755 sermon which predicted the then Virginia

militia major Washington would serve his country substantially in the future.

To demonstrate his willingness to

serve in a military capacity, Washington attended every

session of Congress in his militia uniform.

Additionally,

he was placed on all four military committees appointed

during April and May.^^

At forty-three, Washington was just

the right age, neither too old for field duty, nor young

enough to be foolish.

He seemed perfectly mature enough

for the responsibility that must surely be that of the man

selected to command the colonial military forces.

He was

modest, discreet, amiable, virtuous, and as a Connecticut

delegate observed,

"Sober, steady, and Calm."

Being a

southerner was an important consideration for the southern

delegates who preferred one of their own, as well as some
96
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northern delegates, who desired to demonstrate the
cause
of New England was the cause of all America.

Washington's name was the only one offered in
nomination, and he was unanimously elected.
ing day,

The follow-

the sixteenth of June, having been officially

informed of his selection, Washington appeared before

Congress and told them he did not want the five hundred
dollars a month salary that had been voted him, as he did
not wish to profit from the cause of liberty.

He asked

and received, however, the promise he would be reimbursed
for his expenses, which he would present at the termination

of hostilities.

99

After the selection of Washington, Congress
proceeded to the selection of his major subordinates.

Although some desired Charles Lee to be his chief deputy,
it was believed that a New Englander should have second

place.

But instead of selecting Putnam, Artemas Ward,
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then commanding the troops at the seige
of Boston, was

chosen.

Charles Lee, because of his experience, was
given

the third spot.

Putnam was chosen next, because Connecticut

had supplied so many soldiers and Philip Schuyler
was chosen

fifth to stimulate a patriotic spirit in New York.'^'^^
On the twenty-second of June, eight brigadier

generals were selected.

Seven of them were from New

England, and the eighth, Richard Montgomery, was from New
York.

Horatio Gates,

retired British major on half pay,

a

and a resident of Virginia, was selected Adjutant General

with the rank of brigadier general

Although only Gates, Lee, and Montgomery could
actually be called veterans, John Adams wrote his wife
that "Our Army will have

a

Group of Officers, equal to any

service."

a

month later from Braintree that

She responded

the appointments of Washington and Lee gave universal

satisfaction.

Another Braintree resident reported that

everybody applauded the appointment of Washington. 10 2
On the twentieth of June, V7ashington was directed

by Congress to enforce discipline, to retain as Continental
JCC,

"'"^'^Ford,

'^"Ibid.
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103,
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troops those soldiers that had already enlisted,
and

authorized him to increase his army to
exceeding twice the size of the enemy.
now under some direction and control.

a

number not
The army was

Congress and the

colonies now turned their time and attention to the

direction and form of governments.
Besides voicing their concern about an unchecked

military force in their midst and a desire for continental
control and direction of the military forces in their
colony, the Massachusetts Whigs also expressed their concern

about the collapse of the hitherto legitimate governmental
authority.

This concern was not exclusively that of

Massachusetts, as it was voiced throughout the colonies,
for it was all too well known from the Whig understanding
of history, that in the confusion accompanying revolutions,

mobs and the military often gained the upper hand and
established their own forms of tyranny over life, liberty,
and property.

It was partially because of these fears

and the desire to keep the colonial protest moderate during
1774 and 1775, that the leading Whigs attempted to control

the protest by directing it by and through the committees,

conventions, and provincial congresses.

Although these

bodies were of an indefinite tenure, vague in their
authority, and irregular in their mode of functioning, they
1 {)'>,

Ford, JCC,

2:100
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represented, for the Whigs at least,

responsible means

a

of controlling and directing their protest.

War, however,

necessitated strengthening these revolutionary bodies
so
as to prevent a governmental vacuum.

Therefore, there was

great interest expressed in legitimizing the revolutionary

authorities in their assembled bodies.

It must be remem-

bered that the Whigs saw government as the ultimate guarantee
of social order, which was something they,

for the most part,

desired to remain unchanged; and believed that liberty could
only prevail within the context of stable political institutions.

Liberty, their desired goal, required order;

order, law; and law, government.
and stable,

Government, legitimate

therefore, was the key to not only waging a

successful war with Great Britain, but also preventing

domestic anarchy and military tyranny.

Domestic anarchy and military tyranny were indeed
great concerns to most American Whigs during the early
stages of the war, particularly with respect to the need
for establishing legitimate governments.

John McKesson,

of New York, worried that unless the New York government

began properly to function, the mob would direct matters
"at their pleasure," and that happening would induce the

Continental Congress "to put the Colony under military
government, directed by

a Ma jor-General

and an army."

Another New Yorker expressed similar fears.
Liberty," wrote Alexander McDougal

1

,

"I

fear

"is in danger from

the licentiousness of the people on the one Hand, and
the

army on the other."

"The former," he believed,

"feel their

own Liberty in the extreme, and we are too fond from our
Zeal to encourage the latter, for the advancement of the

Public Safety, to connive at many undue exertions of their
Power, which may in the end be fatal to

us."''"^'^

Even more than the fear of military tyranny early
in the war, was the fear of anarchy;

a

fear that had been

ever present from the first colonial protests of the early
1760s.

It is not surprising then to find many Whig leaders

calling for the establishment of stable and legitimate

governments as a means of limiting the possibility of
anarchy taking place.
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"The great necessity of going

into matters of government as soon as possible," according
to John Langdon, was to do so "before the people's minds

are too much poisoned with that levelling spirit, and while

subordinating to the Powers that Rule (more especially as
104
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it's of the people themselves)

is put in their minds.

In New York,

"A Free Citizen" in the ConstitutJ^nal^

on April 24,

1776,

stated is government was not firmly

established the "ungovernable fury of
unleashed upon them.

a

mob" would be

Several weeks earlier, John Adams

wrote General Heath that "Government must be assumed or

anarchy reign, and God knows the consequences

."

"""^^

The consequences, as was earlier mentioned, was the
fear that eventually the military would be forced to do

that which the civil government was originally designed for
and therefore result in the loss of liberty by all Americans,

much as it had happened in England the previous century under
Cromwell and the Ma jor-Generals
stated between 1774 and 1776

.

.

This belief was constantly
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Probably the colony most concerned about forming
a

government was Massachusetts, whose leaders were
anxious

about being occupied by an army not completely of their
own
making, as well as being concerned about the potential
for

mob violence.

Besides appealing to Congress in May to

assume control and direction of the army, the Provincial

Congress asked Congress what type of government they should
establish.

ments for

Congress debated the question of forming governa

week before recommending on June

9,

1775,

that

Massachusetts adopt a provincial assembly and council based
on their old colonial charter.

Acting upon this recommenda-

tion, Massachusetts, during July, adopted such a government

New Hampshire and South Carolina also asked Congress for
advice, and were told during the first week in November to
go ahead and establish a form of government suitable to the

people of their respective

colonies."'"''"^

Because of the

concern expressed during the winter of 1775-1775 by the
other colonies about their respective forms of governments.
Congress, after long debate, on May 10, 1776, told the
1
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provincial governments that where government was insufficient
to exigencies of affairs,

they were to adopt such governments

"best conduce to the happiness and safety of their consti-

tuents in particular, and America in general."

A preamble,

penned by John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Richard Henry
Lee, explained the resolution was necessary for the

"preservation of internal peace, virtue, and good order,
as well as for the defence of their lives,

properties

liberties, and

•

With congressional approval for government forming
in May and a declaration of independence proclaimed in July,

Whig leaders eagerly turned their energies and attention to
forming new governments.

The first task in each colony was

the agreement upon a constitution or acceptance of the

existing colonial charter, for by doing so they would
legitimat i ze the governments which would give direction and
control to the war effort.

The desire to form governments

quickly under new constitutions or existing charters was
not unanimous amongst the Whig leaders, for some believed
that since the war would be either won or lost on the battlefield, their energies could better be directed to the use

of the sword rather than the pen.
-^^^Ibid.,

4:342

,
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learned that the Maryland delegates to Congress
returned
to their colony to help draft a constitution,
he wrote
Gates that all America seemed to be much too caught
up in
constitution making, calling it the fruit of a
premature

declaration.

"We are disputing about liberties,

Priviledges, Posts, and places, at the very time we ought
to have nothing in View but the securing those objects
and

placing them on

a

footing as to make them worth contending

for amongst ourselves hereafter." 1

^
1

O

Most Whigs, however,

believed that formally forming governments would not only
help prevent anarchy and military tyranny, but would enable
them to better direct military affairs, thereby enhancing
the chances of winning the war.

"Nothing will tend more

to Endure Success in the prosecution of the War," argued

Caesar Rodney, for "there is nothing so conducive
114
War, as a well Regulated Government."

[to]

.

.

.

Therefore, many

colonies proceeded to establish governments on sure

political foundations by adopting written constitutions
By the summer of 1777, ten states had adopted constitutions,
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and two had agreed to retain their colonial
charters,

it

is somewhat ironic that the state most
concerned about

government

f orming--Massachusetts--did

constitution until 1780.

not adopt its

During the interim it had relied

on its colonial charter as the basis for its
revolutionary

government

These relatively hasty fashioned constitutions, and
the governments elected under them, were not, as a rule,

referred to the people as a whole for approval.
a

Although

democratic impulse had been awakened during the decade

and half before the war, as many people became involved in
the political arena for the first time and gained confidence
in themselves to govern, most Whig leaders, with their fears

of anarchy and mob rule as well as their heritage of

deferential politics, were not too enthusiastic about widespread popular participation in government.

The Whig

leaders, even before the war, had attempted to keep all

control and direction of all protest in their hands.

But

with the establishment of committees, conventions, and

congresses during 1774 and 1775, the base of political

authority and participation was greatly broadened.

By the

spring of 1775, at least seven thousand men had served on
those bodies; thereby, as

a

result, giving the revolutionary

;
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governments

a

good stable manpower pool from which to draw

once the war began.

"'""^^

For the most part, the Whig leaders were able to

keep political power in their hands and to write constitutions and form governments under them much as they desired,

despite the governmental process becoming slightly more

responsive to public opinion and the geographic shift of
power in some states.

Government may have gone from

a

basis upon the King's will to that of the people, but that
did not mean the people could be trusted.

during the American war for

They were not,

independence."''"'"^

The constitutions for the most part were relatively

conservative in nature and content.

In many instances

colonial charters were simply rephrased to reflect the

changed political condition

.

Rhode Island and Connecticut

did not even bother to write new constitutions, simply

Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Penn, May 20, 1774,
Force, American Archives 4th ser., 1:342-343; John Adams
to John Lowell, June 12, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams
9:393; John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, ibid.,
378; James Kirby Martin, Men in Rebellion, Higher Governm ental Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution
pp~. 10-11
Rutgers University Press 1973)
(New Brunswick
Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783 (New
York: New Viewpoints, Division of Franklin Watts, 1973),
pp. 116-117, 22, 448-449; David Ammerman, In the Common
C ause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774"
p";^
Gerlach, Prologue to I nd ependence p 233
109
,

,

:

,

,

,

,

;

.

•

Jackson Turner Main, Pol itical Parties Be fore
th e Constitution (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1974),
pT*245; Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775"^"^^

1783, p.

450,

'
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forming new governments under their existing
colonial
charters.

Similarly, the whole legal system was held

intact in several states, as colonial laws and
English

common law remained in force where it did not conflict
with
the newly framed constitutions

"^"^"^
.

Just as continuity with the past was held with

respect to the forms of government established under the

constitutions and the laws remained basically the same, so
did much of the leadership, as many of the colonial elite

took positions in the new governments.

Even many funda-

mentally conservative leaders, some of whom became Tories
eventually, early in the war accepted election to the

revolutionary governments on the theory that, as Governor
Franklin stated,

"It is, perhaps, best that Gentlemen of

117

Ibid., p. 212; William C. Morey, "The First State
Constitutions," AAAPSS 4 (July 1893-June 1894): 201-232;
William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of the State
Constitutions of the American Revolution," ibid,, 9 (JanuaryJune 1897): 380-420; W. F. Dodd, "The First State Constitutional Conventions, 1776-1783," APSR 2, no. 4 (November
545-561; Lundin, Cockpit of the Re volution, pp. 258,
1908)
267; Dorothy Rita Dillon, The New York Trium vir ate; A Study
of the Leg al and Political Careers of Wi lliam Li vingston,
John M o rin Scott and Wil Tiam Smith Jr., Columbia University
Studies in History, Economics and Public-Law, no. 548 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 146; Deborah
Downs, "The New Hampshire Constitution of 1776: Weathervane
of Conservatism," HNH 31, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 164-175;
Ethel K. Ware, A Co nstitutional History o f Geo rgia, Columbia
University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law,
no. 528 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), pp. 5354; Minutes of the Provincial _Con^gross an d the Counci l of
Safety of the StaFe^of New~Je"rsey (Trenton: Naar, Day and
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Property and Sense should mix among these People,
as they
may be a means of preventing their going into some
Extra-

vagances.

,,118

in Delaware,

for instance, the Assembly,

attempting to represent both the Whig and Tory complexion
of the state, selected John McKinly their first chief
executive. 119 Although the upper houses did become some-

what more representative in both function and composition,
the membership of most of them remained much in the hands
of the elite who had held positions in the colonial govern-

ments.

This was, in part, in keeping with the desire to

maintain an aristocratic representation, thereby providing
for a better balance in the newly established governments.''"^^

The other branches of government remained to a large extent
in the hands of the people, or the same class of people,

who had held political office before the war.

It has been

estimated that over 20 percent of men holding higher office
during the colonial period assumed positions in the
118

Governor VJilliam Franklin to the Earl of
Dartmouth, June 5, 1775 New Jersey Archives 1st ser
10:604
,

,

.
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.
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Thomas Rodney to Caesar Rodney, February 16,
1777, Ryden Letters to and From Caesar Rodney p. 128.
,
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Jackson Turner Mam, The Sovereign States,
1775-1783 pp. 195-197; Jackson Turner Main, The Upper
House in Revolutionary 7\jnerica 1763-1 788 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 236; James LaVerne
Anderson, "The Virginia Councillors and the American
Revolution: The Demise of an Aristrocratic Clique," VMHB
82, no. 1 (January 1974): 56-74.
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revolutionary government.

Similarly, it has been estimated

that of the higher officials elected during the revolu-

tionary war--that is, the governors, lieutenant governors,
secretaries, treasurers, attorney generals, judges of

superior courts, and councillor s--at least 50 percent had

held seats in the lower houses of the colonial governments.^^"'"
Even in Pennsylvania, which probably had the most radical

change in personnel, 30 percent of the men elected to its

various bodies in 1776 had prior office-holding experience
For the most part, the change from colonial status
to statehood was effected with order and regularity, as a

great continuity was maintained with the past. 12 3

During

the 1790s, Alexander Hamilton supposedly told a French

visitor that "In Europe they always speak of the American
Revolution, but our separation from the mother country

cannot be called a revolution.
121

There have been no changes

m

Rebellion, Hig her
James Kirby Martin, Men
Government al Leader s and th e Coming of the American
Revoluti on, pp. 13, 14, 16,^36'," 407~52; Patrick J. Conley,
"Revolution's Impact on Rhode Island," RIH 34, no. 4
122
(November 1975)
:

12 2

Robert Gough, "Notes on the Pennsylvania
Revolutionaries of 1776," PMHB 96, no. 1 (January 1972):
p.

101.
12

3

So
David Ramsay, Ram£ay_^_I^sjtory
C arol ina fro m it s Fi r s t _S e ttl ement _in _l_67Q_to_the Year
18 08, 2 vols. (Newberry, 'South Carolina: W. J. Duffie,
1858"), 1:148.
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in the laws, no one's interests have been
interfered with,

everyone remains in his place ." "'"^'^

Although forming governments and creating an army
were of major importance in the minds of the whig leaders,

particularly as constructing each carefully would prevent
anarchy and military tyranny, just as important to many was
the necessity of not only keeping the government and mili-

tary virtuous, but the people themselves.

Virtue, meaning

the willingness to sacrifice individual self-interest to

the greater good of society, was widely believed by the

Whigs to be the essence of the republicanism they sought
to obtain.

125

"Virtue, my young Friend," John Adams wrote

William Tudor, "Virtue alone is or can be the Foundation
of our new governments, and it must be encouraged by Rewards,
in every Department civil and military."

tion of

a

"The only founda-

free Constitution," he wrote a minister,

"is pure

m

124

Robert B. Douglas, trans, and ed., A
Cited
French Volunteer of the VJar of Independence [Charles Albert
More, Chevalier de Pontigibaud] (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 189 8)
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John Warren, "An Oration, Delivered July 4th,
1783... in Celebration of the Anniversary of American
The Rising Glory of
Independence," in Gordon S. Wood, ed
p. 56;
America 1760-1820 (New York: George Baziller, 1971)
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Security of Republican Liberty?" referred to in Edward J.
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Virtue, and if this cannot be inspired into
our People, in
a greater Measure than they have it now,
They may change
their Rulers, and the forms of Government, but
they will
not obtain a lasting Liberty -they will only
exchange Tyrants
,

and tyrannies."

The Reverend Samuel McClintock certainly

agreed.

"Virtue," he wrote

basis of

a

republic."

a

member of Congress,

"Without it," he added,

"is the

"we shall

be in a worse state than if we had remained as we were,"

Samuel Adams, agreeing, wrote late in 1775 that "Virtue is
our best Security

."

"^^^

These beliefs about virtue were shared by just about
all Whig and Tory political leaders in America, particularly

the former.

The revolutionary generation, well-read in

classical and Whig literature, were ever conscious of the
role of virtue in history, especially in Roman history, but

even more so in their recent history.

By the 1750s many

Americans, particularly those visiting Albion, believed the

government

,

and to a lesser extent

,

the people

,

had lost their virtue and had become corrupted.
12 6

of England

This belief

John Adams to William Tudor, November 14, 1775,
William Tudor Papers, MHS; John Adams to Zabdiel Adams,
June 21, 1776, Butterfield, AFC 2:21; Samuel McClintock
to William Whipple August 2, 1776, Jere R. Daniel,
Experiment in Republican ism New Hamp shire Politics and
the American Revol_ution^ ^Zi^^llZ^i (Cambridge Harvard
UniveFi^iFy Press
1970), p. 123; Samuel Adams to James
Cushing Writ ings of Samuel
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grew during the 1760s and, by 1770, it was

a

generally held

view in America that England was so corrupted
that the
process of the dissolution of the Constitution
and

the

Empire had begun.

The presence of the standing army in

America was just another evidence of that taking
place for,
after all, James Burgh had told them that standing
armies

always grow where there is an increase in corruption
and

decrease of attention to

1

iberty

"'"^'^
.

Just as the Puritans one hundred and fifty years
before them, Americans in 1775 to

a

large extent believed

England had gone too far down the road of corruption,

particularly because of the conspiratorial designs of its
leaders, to be returned to a state of virtue.

Therefore,

to most Whigs it was only a matter of extricating America

from the yoke of tyranny, by the most peaceful means

possible.

War, however, changed the peaceful means into

those of military conflict.

In either case, by 1774,

American Whig leaders had become more concerned about
12

7

Ernest Cassara, The Enlightenment in Amer ica
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975), p. 1707 ChaFle's' Carroll
Bradshaw, November 21, 1775,
of Carrollton to
Field, Unp ublished Letters o f Ch a rles Carro l l of Ca rrollton,
p. 97; James Bowdoin to Samuel Adams, December 9, 1775,
"Correspondence between Samuel Adams and James Bowdoin,"
PMHS 12 (1871-1873): 228; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of
the American ^f^publd^c 1^7 7 6-1 7_82, p. 32; Burgh, Political
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keeping the American people

froi.

becoming corrupted and

losing their virtue, than trying to save
England from herself
John Adams in the spring of 1772,
preparing notes
for an oration, noted that it was an
unalterable truth "that
the People can never be enslaved by their
own Tameness,

Pusillanimity, Sloth or Corruption."

"The Preservation of

Liberty," he wrote, "depends upon the intellectual
and moral
character of the People." His young friend, as noted
earlier, William Tudor, also learned this lesson.
a Boston

audience on March

5,

17 79,

Before

he reminded them that

before a nation is completely deprived of freedom, "she must
be fitted for slavery by her vices."

held by most Americans.

This view was widely

General Greene, for instance, noted

in his journal during the summer of 1783 that morality and

religion were the great pillars of good government.

"Ruin

the morals and corrupt the manners of any people," he

wrote,

"and they will soon become the fit instruments of

tyranny and despotism." 128

More was just done than talking about the need for
virtue.

Beginning during the summer of 1774, as conflict

with England seemed all the more likely, besides often
12 8

John Adams Diary, Spring 1772, Butterfield,
DAJA, 2:58; Niles, Principles and Acts of_the Revolution
in America, p. 37; Nathanael Greene's Journal for
September 3, 1783, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 3:504.
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putting the debate in moral tones, efforts
were made to
fortify the people's virtue.
The Association established
by the First Continental Congress, for example,
urged the

colonies to adopt provisions to discourage extravagance,

dissipation, and to ban such things as horse racing,
gambling,
billiards, dances, places, and any type of frivolity.

Com-

mittees and conventions throughout the colonies complied,
many having previously done so.

During the winter of 1774-

1775, these bans were so generally adhered to, that by the

time the war began, one colonist reported Americans were

under

a

great influence of moral rectitude.

During the war

itself, as will be discussed later, great interest and con-

cern was constantly expressed about the state of the virtue
of the American people.

The Whig leaders knew that good

government, a virtuous people, and

a

well-directed and

controlled army were necessary for victory over both domestic
and foreign enemies.

It was assumed that if any of those

three factors faltered, anarchy and military tyranny would
result; the things they feared even more than

a

military

12 9
defeat at the hands of the British army.

1
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CHAPTER

II

FEAR OF STANDING ARMIES AND

FAITH IN THE MILITIA
After the initial adoption and organization of the
army in Massachusetts, and the selection of the cominander-

in-chief and his subordinate general officers, Congress,
as discussed earlier,

arena.

turned its attention to the political

This concern about politics, however, was not long

lasting nor complete, as serious questions about the army
had not been sufficiently addressed or answered.

For the

most part, these involved the nature of the army and its
length of service.

Both related directly to the nature of

the conflict and to the colonial fear of standing armies,

even those of their own making.

accepted belief that too small

It was a generally
a

force would be defeated

before the colonists had a chance to petition for redress
of grievances, and too large a force had the disadvantage
of making the ministry believe that the colonists were

unwilling to compromise and desired
independence.

Too large

a

a

full-scale war and

force also had the disadvantage

of making the impression on most Americans that Congress

66
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desired

a

full-scale war and independence.

Another important

consideration concerning the size of the army was the belief
held by most Americans that

a

large army would pose

to American liberty, particularly if the soldiers,

a

threat

long

enlisted, thought of themselves as, and indeed became, professionals.

Thus Congress initially decided upon

a

relatively small army, not to exceed twice the size of the
enemy, to serve a year.

The colonial governments also

limited their military enlistments, in most instances to
the end of 1775,

in the belief,

and apparent hope, that the

war would be peacefully resolved by then.

Washington, by September, realizing that the war

would probably not be resolved by the end of the year and
that his army would soon disband on him, began urging

Congress to provide for

a

new army before the time of

enlistments of his present army expired
sizeable army, enlisted for

a

.

He preferred a

long enough period so he would

not constantly have to recruit and train it.

meeting with

a

However, after

committee of Congress who came to camp in

October, and receiving the advice of his general officers,
as well as civilian leaders who frequently visited the army,

Washington agreed to the one year enlistments, accepting
the arguments that it was not safe to enlist an army for

longer period, nor would it be likely he could find men

a
wlio
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would enlist for

longer period."^

a

Congress, after talking to the committee after its

return from Washington's camp, provided in November for an
army of slightly over twenty thousand, to be enlisted for
one year beginning January 1, 1776.^

Congress believed

they were doing the right thing in limiting the size of the
army, and its length of service for it was widely believed

that a large, long enlisted army would bring with it more

disadvantages than advantages.
By 1775, most Americans believed standing armies,
long enlisted and not subject to proper restraints, to be
a threat to liberty.

"A standing Army,

They agreed with Samuel Adams that

however necessary it may be at sometimes,

is always dangerous to the Liberties of the people" and

"that standing Armies are formidable Bodies in civil Society
&

the Suffering them to exist at any time if from Necessity,

&

ought never to be of choice.""^

This attitude had

developed first in England during the seventeenth century,

expanded upon and codified in Whig literature during the

Washington to Hugh Mercer, September 26,
4:121.
1776, Fitzpatrick, Wri^tings_^f J^ashin^
"'"George

^Ford, JCC,

3:321-322.

^Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7 1776, in
"Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 72 (1917): 197; Samuel Adams
to John Scollay, April 30, 1776, Cushing, Writings of
Samuel Adams, 3:287.
,
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eighteenth century, and transported to
America as part of
the intellectual baggage/ Americans,
by
1775,

English kinsmen, had

a

like their

long heritage of fearing standing

armies and a wealth of literature upon which to
draw to
justify and reinforce their fears.

Fears and concerns about standing armies began
in

England early in the seventeenth century, as the
soldiers
of James

I

and Charles

to English liberties.

I

were perceived as

a

serious threat

Parliament responded to the fears

and concerns by providing in the 1628 Petition of Right

prohibitions against the peacetime quartering of troops in
private homes and martial law trials of citizens.

During

the Civil War concern about standing armies increased,

especially after the introduction of the New Model Army,
Pride's Purge, and rule by the Major Generals.

Concern

about the military continued during the Restoration period.
When Clarendon was impeached in 1667, the first charge

levelled against him was that he desired
army.

a

larger standing

Between 1674 and 1677 Parliament adopted numerous

checks against a standing army, and during the Exclusion
Crisis

(1678-1681)

attempted to disband the army.

apparent interest in using the army as

a

James II

tool to coerce his

4

"Answers to Mr. Mason's objections to the new
Constitution, recommended by the late Convention," by
Marcus [James Irdell] (Newbern, North Carolina: Hodge and
in Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution
Willis, 1788)
,

p.

363.

,

's

^
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subjects renewed intense opposition to the standing army,

especially after he had given command to Irish Catholics
and diverted funds from the militia.

This concern about

the standing army was one of the factors causing the

Glorious Revolution in 1688.^
This revolution was for many Americans in 1775 the

central event in English history.

Besides establishing

Parliamentary supremacy, Parliament established the principle in the Declaration of Rights that "the raising or

keeping a standing army within this kingdom in the time of
peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament is against
law."

This principle was reaffirmed by Parliament in the

1689 Mutiny Act.

This principle was not lost on the

Americans, especially during the 1760s, as their concerns

grew about a standing army in their midst.

Interest in standing armies continued during the
1690s, as a whole body of anti-standing army literature

flourished.

Among the most notable were Sir William

Temple's Observations on the United Pro vinces (1690) and

Viscount Robert Molesworth's Acco unt of Denmark, An Account
of Denmark as it was in the year 1692

(1693)

.

The debate,

Burgh, Pol_iti_caj^ Disquisitions 2:355, 426; Lois G.
Schwoerer, "No Stan ding ArmiesjJ|_,"" pp. 3, 18-32, 62-63, 71-72,
,

95,

136,

146.

^Ibid., pp. 137, 147, 152.

;
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and thus the literature, increased after
peace was concluded

with France in 1697 and the size of the
peacetime army was
decided.
Between the fall of 1697 and the spring
of 1699,

England was engulfed by a pamphlet war on the need
for and
size of a standing army in peacetime."^ John
Trenchard wrote
the best-knovm pieces against standing armies in a
pamphlet,

co-authored with Walter Boyle, entitled "An Argument
Showing
That a Standing Army is Inconsistent with

a

Free Government,

and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the

English Monarchy"

(1697),

and in his "A Short History of

Standing Armies in England"

(1698)

Although not as intense as during the late seventeenth century, debate continued frequently in England

during the eighteenth century, producing

a

wealth of anti-

standing army literature by Andrew Fletcher, Catherine
Macaulay; Henry St. John, first Viscount Bolingbroke

William Blackstone; and James Burgh.

Perhaps the best known

works produced during the eighteenth century against standing armies were those by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,

particularly their "Cato's Letters" which were published
in The Lo ndon Journal between November 5,

1723;

1720,

and July 27,

and Joseph Addison's play, Cato, A Tragedy (1713),
7

Ibid., pp. 4, 155-187; Lois G. Schwoerer, "The
Literature of the Standing Army Controversy, 1697-1G99,"
HLQ 28, no. 3 (May 1965): 187-212.
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which opened in Anierica in 1749
and in book form went
through fourteen editions between
1767 and 1787.
Probably
the best known work in America was
that of James
Burgh.

His P^tical_Di^quisiti^^^^

Errprs,_Defects,_and J.bus_es

,

upor^j;acts_and^i^
Ancient and_Modern, was published in three
volumes in
Philadelphia in 1775 and was frequently
cited in colonial
newspapers and pamphlets.^
It was not only from the English writers
Americans

developed their interest in and concern about standing
armies.

They also had in their possession

a

wealth of

literature regarding the military produced by the
classical

writers such as Scipio and Livy.

A good nuinber of Americans

were aware of the conspiracies of Tarquin and Cataline,
and even more, of those of Julius Caesar, as well as of
8

Schwoerer, ^o_St_an(Ung_ArmiesJV;_ pp. 190-19 6
Burgh, Polit i^l_pd^squisa^ion^ 2 344 Andrew Eliot to
Thomas Hollis, June 28, 1770, "Letters from Andrew Eliot
to Thomas Hollis," MHSC
fourth series, 4 (1858): 452;
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(Chapel Hill: University of North Carol ina^risi",~"r9 65T,
p. 24; Frederic M. Litto, "Addison's 'Cato' in the
Colonies," WMQ, third series, 23, no. 3 (July 1966):
440-477; John Adams to James Burgh, December 28, 1774,
Adams, Work s of John Adams
9:351; Charles H. Lincoln, The
Revolut lonary Movement in Pennsylvania 17 60-1776, pp. 2 30^
231; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, " James~^Burgh and
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the fact that more than half of the
Roman emperors were

overthrown by the military.^
Americans also developed their

ov^n

literature

against standing armies during the eighteenth
century
although, for the most part, this literature
relied upon
the seventeenth century English Whig literature
of

Harrington, Coke, and Sidney, as well as that of

Machiavelli .^^

Contemporary history also played an important part
in conveying Americans to the belief,

expressed by Burgh,

that "When a country is to be enslaved, the army is the

instrument to be used.

The example of Sweden in 1772

being taken over by the military was well known in America.
The best source Americans had to draw upon to

convince them of the danger of standing armies was the

British army in their midst after 1768.

It was this army

which convinced many Americans that England intended them
9

Louis B. Wright, Traditio n an d the Founding
Fathers (Charlottesville: University Press~6F~vrrgTriia
1975), pp. 106-116; Charles F. Mullett, "Classical
Influences on the American Revolution," The Classical
Journal 35, no. 2 (November 1939): 97; Burgh ,~ PoITtTcal
Disquisitions 2:430.
,

^^Schwoerer,

"No Standing Armie si" p.

19 6.

"'"^Burgh,
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''^Ibid..

370.
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ill-will and helped focus the constitutional debate with

England
As early as December 1766, after a temporary visit

by British troops to Boston the previous month

was expressed about

a

,

concern

more permanent body of troops being

introduced into that, or any, metropolis.

"Virtue and

liberty," Samuel Adams wrote, would be threatened and the

body politic v;ould be greatly injured if indeed any army
came to Boston on

a

permanent basis.

"'"'^

Large numbers of British troops did come to Boston
in 1768 and, by the summer of 1769, had become the source

of heated debate, as they were viewed as an unnecessary
evil."'"^

a

At the time of the general election. May 31, 1769

,

committee headed by James Otis remonstrated the Governor,

stating the Council had declared the military unnecessary,

reminding him that "the experience of ages is sufficient
dangerous, and
to convince, that the military power is ever

1766,

-'^Samuel Adams to Dennys De Berdt, December 10,
also
Gushing, Writings_of Samuel_^dams 1:112; see
to GhristSpher Gadsden, December 11, 1766,
,

Samuel Adams
ibid., 108-111.

1769,
-^^Samuel Cooper to Thomas Pownall, May 11,
"Letters of Samuel Cooper to
Frederick Tuckerman, ed
(January 1901).
Thomas Pownall, 1769-1777," AHR 8, no. 2
ibid., 314; Notes prepared
same to s;me, July 12, 1769
30?
of 1772 by John ^^arns in
for' an oration during the spring
Dickerson, Bos ton_und_er
his diary, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:58;
Military Rule, pp. 39, 43, 47, 79.
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subversive of free constitutions," and asking
the fleet
and soldiers be removed from their city,
especially during
the session of the Assembly >^
In June, when Governor
Bernard did not remove the army, the House adopted
of resolutions declaring the establishment of

a

set

a

standing

army in peace without their consent was "an invasion
of the

natural rights of the people" and its continued presence
was "unconstitutional" and

a

"dangerous innovation, mani-

festly tending to enslave the people.

""'"^

The troops

nevertheless remained, suffering physical and verbal
harassment throughout the winter of 1768-1769 as passions
about their presence increased unabated.
the Boston massacre of March

5,

The result was

1770.

The day after the imassacre, the Boston town meeting

asked Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson to remove the
troops,

stating they were "obnoxious to

free people and

a

Massachusetts House of Representatives to
Governor Francis Bernard, May 31, 1769, in Bradford,
Spee ches of the Governors of^_Ma_ss^achu setts 1765-1775,
pp. 166-167; The House of Representatives Resolution of
May 31, 1769, is in ibid., p. 168.
''"^The

^^Resolution of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives June 29, 1769, ibid., p. 178; a similar
resolution was adopted on June 21 17 69, ibid
p. 174
,

,

.
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abhorrent to

a

free constitution

The troops were

removed, leaving behind reinforcement to
the belief that
living in peace with a standing army was
impossible
"Let it be the DETERMINED RESOLUTION of
every Man," wrote

'Consideration' in Th e New-Hampshi r^_Gazette on
March 23,
1770, "that a standing Army shall 'never' be permitted

in

AMERICA, without the free consent of the House of
Commons,
in the province where they reside."

The line over which

the ministry could not cross was now drawn in the mind
of

many colonists.

A determined resolution did indeed greet

the next occupation of an American city, Boston, in 1774.

When large numbers of British troops were introduced
into Boston during the summer of 1774 to enforce the

Coercive Acts,

a

great protest was raised.

The Provincial

Congress quickly informed Gage of their displeasure.
must surely know, he was told, "that barely keeping

He
a

standing army in the province, in time of peace, without

consent of representatives, is against law, and must be

considered as a great grievance," and that their "lives.
1

A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City
of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through
1777 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), pp. 3-4.
19

Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis, June 28, 1770,
"Letters from Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis," MHSC, 4th ser.,
4:452; John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British
Army i n the Coming of the Tunerican Revolution (Princeton:
376.
Princeton University Press, l965)
p
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liberties, and properties" were greatly endangered
whilst
under the cannon of his standing army.^°
The Massachusetts Whigs were not alone in
protesting
the occupation of Boston.

Throughout the colonies many

individuals and legislative bodies expressed opposition,

generally reminding the ministry and its royal representatives in America that keeping a standing army in the

colonies during peace, without the consent of the legislatures

,

was unconstitutional

21

Concern about standing armies did not end with the
shots fired at Lexington and Concord.

Two months into the

war, when a negotiated settlement seemed possible,

resolutions and statements regarding standing armies were
incorporated into such documents as the Virginia Resolutions
on Lord North's Conciliatory Proposal and the Rules and

Orders of Rhode Island

'

s

Army of Observation

22
.

Fears and

concerns about standing armies were codified during the war
in the colonial declarations of independence

,

constitutions

20

Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts pp. 42-43, 43.
,

2

Richard Cresswell Journal September 16 1774
Saunders, NCCR 9:1067; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of
Georgia 1:49; J. Thomas Scharf History of Delaware 1609(Philadelphia: L. J. Richards and Company,
2 vols.
1888
,

,

,

,

,

1888)

,

1

:

217

.
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Boyd, Papers of Th o mas Jefferson
Records of Rhode Island, 8:340.

,

1:172; Bartlett
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and bills of rights, which frequently
contained prohibitions
on peacetime armies without the consent of
the legislature.^^

Fears and concerns were also frequently expressed
in wartime

orations, sermons, and pamphlets, including the annual

Boston Massacre orations.
war's end.

Nor did this concern cease with

Richard Henry Lee, early in 1784, discussing

the possibility of a standing army during peace, wrote James

Monroe that he agreed with the latter
the consequence of standing armies

liberty.

's

"that so many plausible

arguments are ever at hand to support
&

the termination of

v;as

"It is really unfortunate for human freedom,

safety, and happiness," he wrote,

reason

observation that

a

system which both

experience prove to be productive of the great
23

Proceedings of the Convent ion of De 1 aware State
Held a t New-Castle on Tu esday t he Twenty-Sevinth'" of ~Augi^
1776 (wTlmington James Adams," 1776), p. 2 07n^rnutes~oF~the
Convention of 1776, Hazard, Penn sylvania Ar chives third
series
10:770; Saunders NCCR" ^ 10 lO^OT; Bouton Documents
and R ecords Relating to New Hampshire 9 856 WalFon^
Record s of Vermont 1:95; Rutland, Papers of George Mason,
1:288; Esther Mohr Dole, Mar yland Duri ng the American
Rev olution (Baltimore Waver ly Press, 1941), pp. 107, 110;
Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, eds.. The Popul ar Sources
of Pol itical Authority Documents on th e Massach use tts
Constitution of 17 80 (Cambridge Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press 1966), p. 446; Lewis Preston Summers,
17 7 6 -17 8 6, Washi ngton County
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Being "the Fir st^ bay_of G^enera
May 307 TTSl"
G iri~and B. Edes' and Sons, 1781), p. 65.
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human evils-Slavery "^^
.

^he Confederation Congress agreed

with Lee, establishing in June 1784 only an
eighty-man army,
stating that in time of peace standing armies
were inconsistent with principles of republican government,
dangerous
to the liberties of a free people,

and generally converted

into destructive engines for establishing despotism.

The revolutionary generation continued the debate
on the necessity of standing armies during the 1780s and

1790s before finally resolving in 1796 to rely henceforth
on the militia, the bulwark of the republic.

This policy

would remain in force, during peacetime at least, until
the twentieth century.

At the time of the ratification of

the Constitution, as well as at its drafting, the size and

role of the military were carefully scrutinized and the

resulting debate produced numerous proposed amendments as

many ratifying conventions and individuals believed the

military should be more carefully checked. 27

Standing

25

Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, January
17 84, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2:287.

5,

^^Ford, JCC, 26:524, 538-540, 551-553.
27

m

.

Elliot, The Debates
the S everal S tat e Conventions 1:328, 336; 2:545, 552; 3:112, 379, 380, 381, 401,
588, 611, 660; 4:244; Luther Martin to the Maryland
Legislature, January 27, 1788, ibid., 1:371; Max Farrand,
The Re cords of th e Federal Convention of 1787. rev. ed
ed
iNew Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 2:329,
4 volsT
640; Richard Henry Lee to George Mason, October 1, 1787,
Rutland, Pap ers of George Mason 3:998; Richard Henry Lee
1787 Ballagh, Let^ters
to WillianTshippen, Jr., October 3
2:442n.; "Brutus" in The New-York
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armies,

"Brutus" wrote in Tl;^Gw-York_Jourr^^^

Register on January 17, 1788, were dangerous
to the
liberties of the people, "but I presume it
would

be useless

to enter into a labored argument,

of America,

a

to prove to the people

position which has so long and so generally

been received by them as a kind of axiom."

A major part of the axiom was that if
standing
armies were to exist, they be enlisted for only
period.

28

a

short

American Whigs, for the most part, in 1775 were

Journal, and Weekly Reg ister, January 10, 1788; "Federalist
#41," by James Madison, Jacob E. Cooke, ed
The Federalist
[by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander HarnilTon]
(Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1961),
p. 271; "The Objections of the Hon. George Mason to the
proposed Federal Constitution. Address to the Citizens of
Virginia." A broadside printed by Thomas Nicholas, n.d.,
in Ford, Pamphlets on the_Constitujtion
p. 331; "An
Examination into the leading principles of the Federal
Convention proposed by the late Convention held at
Philadelphia. With Answers to the principal objections that
have been raised against the system.
By a citizen of
America"
(Philadelphia: Prichard and Hall, 1787), in ibid.,
p. 52; "Observations On the new Constitution, and on the
Federal and State Conventions. By a Columbian Patriot,"
(Boston: n.p., 1788), in ibid., p. 10.
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Burgh, Poli tical Disquisi tions, 2:344; Robert
Morris to George Washington, December 23, 1776, Burnett,
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Austin, Elb r idge Gerr y, 1:208; March 4, 1782, Boston
massacre oration by George Richards Minot in Niles,
Principles and Acts of th e R evolution in America p. 55;
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convinced their safety rested in an army
enlisted for
limited period, generally meaning one
year.

a

Two decades

after the war David Humphreys, reflecting
on this limited
enlistment period, wrote that the "honest, but
unexperienced rulers, were so much more alarmed at the
very name
of a standing army to be raised from their
own countrymen,

than they were at the ravages of the enemy, as
to neglect

levying soldiers for the war until our cause was reduced
to extreme danger

.

29

Humphrey's observation was indeed accurate, as the

military were greatly hampered by limited enlistments early
in the war.^^

Montgomery's unsuccessful attack on Quebec

was unadvisedly attempted on the night of December 31, 1775,
simply because his army's term of enlistment was up the next
day.

31

Washington and the other generals complained about

Montgomery's defeat and the fact that their own army, in
the middle of a seige, would be soon disbanding, stating
29

David Humphreys to Governor Trumbull, September 23,
1803, David Humphreys, The Miscellaneous Works of David
Humphreys (New York: T. and J. Swords, 1804), p. 362.
"^^Pierce Butler to [Arthur Middleton?]
March 21,
1776, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of
Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of
Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926): 140.
,

31

Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, December 5,
1775, Force, American Archives 4th ser., 4:188-190; George
Washington to President of the Continental Congress,
February 9, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:315.
,
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they knew of no other example in history of such a thing

happening.

Washington also complained that short

enlistments were hurting his attempts to discipline his
army, which in turn hampered any attempt to take Boston or

prevent defeat should the British army attack.

Montgomery's defeat and Washington's complaints
about the size and state of his army prompted some members
of Congress to contemplate the possibility of extending the

term of enlistment, or at least, making military service

more attractive, thereby getting one year re-enlistments
at the beginning of the year.

In January 1776,

the subject

of enlistments was raised in Congress, with the suggestion

of three years or for the war enlistments being made.

northern colonies

,

The

adamantly opposing either suggestion

caused the debate on enlistments to be curtailed

.

But

debate on the pressing subject of enlistment could not be
put off for long, and in late February in was renewed with

vigor.

Some delegates v;anted an army enlisted for the war;

others for a year

;

still others for a limited period

generally set at three years.

John Adams was not opposed

32

ibid
208
1776
Same to same January 4
Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, Box 1, WLCL.
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^^George Washington to Joseph Reed, February 1,
Fit zpa trick, Writings of Wash^^g jgjl^ 4:300; George
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to some soldiers being enlisted for the war, but did not

believe the whole army should be.

Roger Sherman was opposed

to any soldiers being enlisted for the war, believing it

not only dangerous, but putting those enlisted into
of slavery.

a

state

James Wilson, realizing that compromise was

needed, suggested the least dangerous system be adopted,

which he stated to be the fixing of the number of men needed
for each campaign be enlisted only, and only for that

campaign.

34

This debate produced no system, as no agreement

could be reached among the delegates as to the safest means
of enlisting their army.

Learning that no decision had

been made, and quite disappointed about Congress's apparent
lack of backing the military in their needs, Charles Lee

wrote Washington that the New England delegates believed
that "by means of a shorter engagement the whole country
v;ould be soldiers

.

A curious whim this

fill their heads with such nonsense?"

.

Who the d-1 can

He suggested

Washington impress upon Congress the absolute necessity for
longer enlistments
Richard Smith Diary, January 19, 1776, Burnett,
LMCC, 1:319; James Duane, Notes on Debates, February 22,
ibid., 360-361; John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield,
1776
DAJA 3:371, 388.
,
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^^Charles Lee to George Washington, February 29,
Sparks Corre^spqndence of tJ}e_Ame^r i£an_^ev^^
177 6
1:158; cf. John~Adams to '"'Samuel""H Parsons, August 19,
Hall Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 46
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,

,

.

,

,

84

Washington had no immediate reason to
make such
request, because in mid March the British
evacuated

a

Boston,

and the need for

a

large, long enlisted army disappeared.

This situation was short-lived, however, as

a

large British

army arrived off New York late in June and
American forces
in Canada were forced to retreat.

Interest in the state

of the army was thus renewed both in and out of
Congress,
as many believed that the war was to be prolonged
and

therefore a large, long enlisted army would be needed.
This became even more necessary once the resolution for

independence had been introduced in Congress in June and
declared in July.

Debate was renewed on the enlistment

question, and late in June Congress agreed to offering a

bounty of ten dollars to induce men to enlist, and provided
for a three year enlistment.

Congress did not rely

completely on longer enlistments to improve America's

military capacity, deciding earlier in June that temporary
troops could be raised for limited periods to meet emergencies.

Thus, a ten thousand man "Flying Camp" was authorized

by Congress to serve until December

1,

1776.

This force,

under an officer appointed by Washington, was designed to

protect New Jersey and Philadelphia, while Washington and
the main army remained in New York.

36

36

Elbridge Gerry to Horatio Gates, June 25, 1776,
Burnett, LMCC 1:506; John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons,
June 22 1776 Hall, Samue l Hold en Parsons p. 45; Ford,
JCC, 4:412-413; 5:418, 483, 508.
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On August 21,

1776, Washington's ari.y was
soundly

beaten on Long Island and within
weeks Manhattan fell.
Enlistments waned, as the American
forces retreated. A
ten dollar bounty was all but
meaningless as an inducement
for enlistments, particularly with
inflation making
substantial state bounties seem all that
more attractive.
Washington, who had been somewhat hesitant
and circumspect
in his appeals to Congress for a more
permanent and regular
army, in September appealed for a longer
enlisted
army, one

that could be enlisted for the war, thereby
making it

subject to the discipline needed to defeat the
British army
in what was increasingly appearing to be a
protracted
37

struggle.

"The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the

Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote," he wrote
Congress, but for the lack of one ruin would result.

His

general officers expressed similar beliefs, as they began
their own lobbying campaigns.

Mercer, who Washington

appointed commander of the "Flying Camp," wrote Congress
that "Enlistments for a short period is the bane of military
37

George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 2, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Wri tings
of Washing t on 6:5-6; Same to same, September 24, 1776,
ibid
George Washington to Philip Schuyler,
109
September 4, 1776, ibid., 11; George Washington to Lund
Washington, September 30, 1776, ibid., 137.
,
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George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, ibid., 112.
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service/' maintaining that "numbers and
discipline must
prevail." Heath wrote one member of Congress
that victory
would only happen when America had a regularly
enlisted and

disciplined army, which, he stated, could not be
achieved
as long as Congress and the states relied
upon the militia

and short enlistments.

Similarly, Greene argued that with

an army engaged for the war, disciplined, and properly

officered,

"everything is to be expected. "^^

Many members of Congress sympathized with the plight
of the generals, particularly after the report of

a

commit-

tee of Congress placed the blame of the Canadian setback on

short enlistments, and as Washington retreated before the
enemy, with his force diminishing in size on

a

daily basis.

Yet, John Adams reported that Congress, because of the fear

many members had of

a

would not provide for

large, long enlisted standing army,
a large,

well-disciplined, long-

enlisted, and well-compensated army; at least not at the
39

Hugh Mercer to the Continental Congress,
Sepgember 4, 1776, Force, American Archives 4th ser.,
2:158; William Heath to John Adams, July 20, 1776, MHSC
7th ser., 4:11; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene [?],
September 28, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael
Greene 1:303.
,

,

,

"^^Ford,

JCC,

5:617.
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present time. 41

Adams underestimated, somewhat, the

willingness of his fellow congressmen to compromise their
principles and fears to practical realities, especially
after the declaration of independence.

was punishable by death.

Treason, after all,

Thus, during the late summer of

1776 more delegates were willing to accept, and in some

cases demand, that Congress adopt three years or for the

war enlistments, with proper inducements to assist recruit-

mg. 42

One delegate, shortly after learning of the Long

Island defeat, explained that it might have been a good and

proper idea at the beginning of the war to have had long
enlistments, but they did not because they had no money,
provisions, nor government.

Now they had all three, and

it was, he suggested, necessary to have a long-enlisted

army.

43

Noticing the change of attitudes of his fellow

delegates, Elbridge Gerry informed Joseph Trumbull that
41

John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, August 19, 1776,
Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons p. 46; John Adams to William
Heath, August 3, 1776, MHSC 7th ser., 4:14-15; John Adams
2:61.
to Henry Knox, August 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC
,

,

,

^^North Carolina Delegates of the Continental
Congress to the North Carolina Council of Safety, August 10,
1776, Saunders, NCCR, 10:740; Arthur Middleton to William H.
Drayton, September 14, 1776, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator,
"Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton: Signer of the
Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926):
144

.

^^Josiah Bartlett to [Nathaniel?] Folsom,
September 2, 1776, "Declaration of Independence," HM, 2d ser.,
5, no. 5 (November 1868): 213.
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"Congress seems now determined to have an Army of some

Duration and to give sufficient Bounties for the purpose;
I

wish it had been sooner acceeded to, but We must move

with the Waters."

44

Early in September,

a

committee of the whole

suggested raising ninety regiments for

a

unless sooner discharged by Congress.

five year period

One delegate,

believing this necessary, wrote the Governor of his state
that "the liberties of the country

.

.

lished but by a large standing army."

.

cannot be estab-

Another wrote his

Governor that "a powerful army of regular troops must be
obtained, or all will be lost." 46

After two weeks of debate.

Congress on September 16, 1776, decided to raise eightyeight battalions to serve for the war.

47

The President of

Congress, in a circular letter to the states, explained this
44

Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, September 12,
2:84.
1776, Burnett, LMCC
,

45
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decision, stating that "Without a well disciplined
Army,
we can never expect success against veteran Troops;
and it
is totally impossible we should have a well
disciplined

Army, unless our Troops are engaged to serve during
the

war

.,48

Before this enlistment policy could be implemented.

Forts Washington and Lee were captured and Washington's
army suffered defeat at White Plains.

Morale declined and

with it, so did recruits, despite the encouragements and
efforts by Congress, the States, and individuals to spur

men to the colors.

4 9

Also hampering enlistments was the

bounty war waged betv;een Continental and state recruiters.
The state recruiters had a decisive advantage, as they were

able to offer higher bounties for less time in service than

their Continental counterparts.

Additionally, Congress had

cut the avenue off for those who desired to enter the

Continental Army for

a

short time, when they only provided

for the war enlistments.

To ameliorate this latter diffi-

culty, Congress offered an option of

a

three year enlistment.

48

President John Hancock to the Several States
(Circular), September 24, 1776, Burnett, LMCC 2:99.
,

49

John Adams to Abigail Adam.s, October 8, 1776,
Butterfield, AFC 2:140; President John Hancock to the
Rhode Island General Assembly, October 9, 1776, Bartlett,
Record s of R hode Island 8:31, 32; Nicholas Cooke to William
Ellery", November 30, 1776, Staples, Rhode Island in the
Continental Congress, p. 102.
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with all the benefits earlier offered except
the one hundred
acres of land.^° The other difficulty, that
of the bounty
war, was not subject to such quick solution,
as the
states

were adamant in their desires to protect themselves
first
before concerning themselves with the safety of the
continent as

a

whole.

The states, besides maintaining a regular militia

establishment, also raised what were known as State Troops.
These soldiers were generally raised to defend the state

where they were raised.

They were paid and equipped by the

states; engaged for full-time service for a fixed period of
time, ranging from three months to three years, depending

upon the state and the time during the war in which they

were raised.

Unlike the militia, they often received a

bounty for their service; and they took orders from the
state governments, not from the Continental Congress or

Continental officers.

Not all state troops fit this com-

posite description, for some were not paid, but lived off
plunder; some served under Continental officers; some were
not required to serve full time and some served outside

their state.

Very few state troops, indeed, fit the

description just given; but neither do they fit either the

description and definition of militia or Continental
soldiers.

The exact number of such troops that served

^°Ford, JCC, 6:944-945.

.
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during the war is unknown.

However, the ficjure must have

been considerable for many states provided for such troops
as a regular part of their military establishment

While the states bolstered their own defense at the

expense of the common good during 1776, Washington faced

very critical situation as the year came to
army was almost non-existent.

a close,

a

as his

A week before Christmas he

wrote his brother that unless every nerve was strained "the
game is pretty much near up." 52

He placed the blame for

this state of affairs on short enlistments and the insist-

ence of the states upon relying on the militia.

Washington did more than just complain to his
brother.

He set about planning some sort of an offensive

to catch the British off guard, thereby giving some credence
to hopes of eventual victory.

Additionally, he began lobby-

ing the civilian leaders for a larger, more permanent army.

Fred Anderson Berg, Enc yclopedia o f Continenta l
Army Units Battalj^ons, Regiments and Independent Corps_
THFrrrsburg Pennsylva"nia Stackpole Books, 1972), pp. 117119; Albert E. Van Dusen, Conne ct icut (New York: Random
House, 1961), p. 150; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History
of Georgia, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company,
Chandler, Rev?!^
rs 8 3T,~Tr2 8 1
P- 63
3:25; Peele, Lives_of_Dist ingui^hed_!^rt}^
:

:

,

;

George Washington to John Augustine Washington,
December 18 177 6 Fitzpatrick, Wrrting£_o£JVash d^g
6:398
,

,

.

^^Ibid., 398; George Washington to Lund Washington,
December 10, [-17], 1776, ibid., 347.

"
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He informed them that he did not lust for power but
needed

more troops, enlisted for the war, because short enlistments
and the militia were not remedies for the critical situation
in which the new states found themselves-

He was joined

in his lobbying by General Greene, who informed one Governor

that "Short enlistments has been in a great measure the

Source of all the misfortunes that we labour under."

Greene

realized that Congress in the beginning of the war "by
attending to speculative principles rather than real life
their maxims in War have been founded in folly,"

However,

he believed that Congress "in time will be as able

Politicians in military matters as they are in civ[i]l

Governm [e] nt

.

55

Their complaints fell on deaf ears, particularly
after Washington's successes at Trenton and Princeton, for
it appeared Washington,

supported by temporary forces, would

be able to win the war that spring.

Besides,

it was

frequently argued, large, long enlisted, armies were ever
dangerous, and expensive.

Thus, rather than taking active

measures to assist Washington with his forthcoming spring
S4

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, December 20, 1776, ibid., 402; George
Washington to Governor Nicholas Cooke, December 21, 1776,
Bart let t, Reco_rd^ of Rhode Isla nd, 8:113,

^^Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, December 21,
1776, Sho\^an, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:375.
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campaign. Congress resorted to expedients, which they

believed were safer and cheaper.
The major expedient was calling on the states to

draft their militia to fill up the Continental battalions,

something that General Lee had suggested during the fall
of 1776, when the army was desperate for men.

Congress in

April 1777 suggested a militia draft and the following
year recommended that such drafts be for nine months

By the time Congress had made their recommendation

service.

about

a

draft, both Massachusetts and New Hampshire had

already adopted procedures for drafting militia.

Many believed that

a

56

draft would cause many to

join the Continental battalions and receive a bounty, rather

than being drafted and receiving nothing.

57

This did not

happen, as men refused to serve, even if drafted, or, if

they did serve, were more willing to join
a larger

bounty and

a

a

state unit for

shorter term of enlistment.

"Drafting

^^Charles Lee to James Bowdoin, November 30, 1776,
"The Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 323-324; Ford, JCC
7:262-263; 10:200; John Henry, Jr., to the Speaker of the
Maryland House of Representatives, H. R. Nicholas, March 6,
16:528; Bouton, Docum e nts
1778, Browne, Mairylaj2d_Arc^^
8:760; Jonathan
and Record s Relating to N ew Hampshire
Smith, ~'^^Uovj Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the
Revolution," PMHS 15 (October 1921-June 1922): 350, 350-351,
,

357

.

177 7

^^Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, April 29,
Lee Memoi r of the Lif e of ^iclwd_Hen^r>^L^ 2:38,
,

"

.
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in any shape is so unpopular a measure," Washington was

informed late in 1778 by Edmund Pendleton, "that our

Assembly have laid it aside and depend for recruiting our
Regiments upon high bounties only, which
as

fear will fail,

I

'tis difficult to reach the Point of avarice now in

fashion

.

Besides being unpopular with most Americans, it was
also disappointing to V7ashington and the other military

Most states were unwillinci to draft for more than

leaders.

and several states only required three months

a year,

service

59

.

.

Addi t lonally

.

,

another complaint lay with the

fact that some drafted militia were not incorporated into

Continental battalions and thus served under their own

officers

,

frequently of their own choosing

shortcomings of the militia drafts,

Washington called

a

a

.

Despite the

system of which

waste of time, men drafted often pro-

vided the strength the army needed to get through another
campaign, particularly in the south late in the war.

Even

^^Edmund Pendleton to George Washington, December 22,
JPapers^jo£_Ed^
1778 Mays, Lette£S_ai2d
"
1:276-277.
,

^^George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, May 17,
1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 96; Clark, NCSR
12:574-577 661-663; Hugh F. Rankin, The J^qrtli_Caro^^
Contine ntals (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
p. 246; Jonathan Smith, "How Massachusetts
Pre'ssT 1971)
1921Raised Her Troops in the Revolution," PMHS 55 (October
354
June 1922)
,

,

:

1
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Greene, who generally opposed using militia
in any form,

urged the southern states to fill up their
Continental

battalions by the militia draft.
In addition to calling for a draft,
Congress also

requested, as they had no authority to require, the
states
to send militia to the assistance of the Continental
forces.

Often Washington and other general officers were delegated
the authority to make such calls.

requested service for
months.

a

These calls usually

limited period, generally three

In several instances, the states complied,

sending

their militia where they were needed for periods ranging
from one month to

a

year.

6

Another expedient Congress resorted to was calling
for volunteers, either individually or by units.

Throughout

the war voluntary or independent military units were formed
in most states, often at the suggestion of state authori-

ties, but generally as a result of military necessity.
60

George Washington to William Livingston, June 18,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:28; Nathanael
Greene to Abner Nash, December 15, 1780, Greene, Nath anael
Greene 3:88.
,

711-712; 10:88,
414
8 666-667
309-310; 11:684; 15:1108, 1331; 20:58, 635, 720. Circular
to the States from Washington and the Congressional
Committee at Camp, June 2, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Wr itings of
Washington, 18:468-470; James B. Jackson, "Our Forgotten
no. 1
RegTm'enTtT^The Second Delaware Militia, 1780," DH 9
(April 1960): 7-8, 10, 13, 18, 44; Jonathan Smith, "How
Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the Revolution," PMHS
55 (October 1921-June 1922): 349-350, 356-361.
^"""Ford,

JCC,

3

:

324

,

;

:

,

,

,

,
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Congress in the spring of 1778 called on "young
gentlemen
of property and spirit" to form volunteer troops
of light

horse to serve until the end of that year.^^

Volunteer

light horse units were frequently employed during
the war,
as young men established such units in Virginia, North

Carolina, and Maryland.

63

Volunteer infantry units were

also formed, frequently for frontier defense, but they also
saw duty during major campaigns, such as in Rhode Island

m

1778.

64

Besides the volunteer units, many individuals

served as volunteers, frequently as aides-de-camp, such as
62

63

Ford, JCC, 10:213-215.
,

...

The Virginia Gazette (Dixon-Hunter)
April 20,
1776; The Maryland Gazette May 28, 1779; The Maryland
Council to General George Washington, July 10, 1780, Browne,
Maryland Archives 43:218; [Amos Blanchard]
The American
Biography: Containing Biographical Sketches of the Officers
of the Revolution, and of the Principle Statesmen of the
Period, to which are added the Life and Character of
Benedict Arnold, and the Narrative of Major Andre (Wheeling
Virginia: F. Kenyon, 1833)
Peele, Lives of
pp. 291-292
Distinguished North Carolinians pp. 60-61; Edward McCrady,
The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1901), p. 615; Edward
McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution
1780-1783 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1902), p. 13;
Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental
Army, p. 187.
,

,

,

,

;

,

,
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Ezekiel Price Diary, August 4, 5, 7, 1778, "Items
from an Interleaved Boston Almanac for 1778, Being a Diary
of Ezekiel Price," NEHGR 19, no. 4 (October 1865): 334
Patrick Henry to George Washington, March 29, 1777, Sparks,
Correspondence of the American Revolution 1:361; Thwaites
The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777 p. 225; Evans,
Thomas Nelson, pp. 73-77; Coleman, St, George Tucker p. 49.
;

,

,

,

.

.
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James Monroe and St. George Tucker.

Members of Congress,

as will be shown in a later chapter, also served as

volunteers
While Congress relied on expedients as the safest
and cheapest means of v;aging war, Washington suffered

military setbacks during 1777 and 1778.

He and the other

generals blamed these setbacks on the civilian leaders who

preferred to rely on short term enlistments and short term
troops, rather than filling up the Continental battalions

General Wayne told the chief executive of Pennsylvania that
the salvation of his state depended upon filling up their

Continental battalions and not relying upon substitutions
Similarly, General Greene told John Adams that in order for

Congress to be feared, loved, and respected both at home
and abroad, the army must be established in its full force.

67

Washington often wrote public officials about the problem
Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National
Identity (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), pp. 33,
33-34; Stevens, A History of Georgia 2:130.
,

^^Baron De Kalb to Comte de Broglie, December 25,
1777, Kapp, Kalb pp. 138-139; William Heath to George
Washington, March 21, 1778, Wade, This Glorious Cause
1780,
p. 127; Mordecai Gist to Robert Munford, October 24
"Letter of Genl. Gist to Col. Munford," MHM 4, no. 4
369
(December 1909)
,

,

,

:

^^Anthony Wayne to Thomas Warton, February 10, 1778,
Hazard, Pennsylvania Ar chive s, 1st ser., 6:251; Nathanael
Greene to~^ohn AdamsT^May 7, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg,
and
"The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene
John Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 52.

,

,

,

of temporary expedients and short enlistments,
telling the

chief executive of Pennsylvania, for example,
that "No man
dislikes short and temporary inlistments more than
I

do.

No man ever had greater cause to reprobate and even
curse
the fatal policy of the measure than

have."^^

I

Washington was realistic enough to realize that
Congress did not intend for him to lose the war, but at the
same time he knew Congressional policies based on fear of

standing armies and military tyrannies might result in

military defeat.

He believed Whig jealousies of standing

armies and fears of military conspiracies were, under proper
limitations, proper because "standing Armies are dangerous
to a State,"

However, as he reminded

friend, America was

a

at war, where the American soldiers were "Citizens having

all the Ties

cases

.

.

Therefore
Congress

.

,

,

,

and interests of Citizens

and in most

totally unconnected with the Military Line."
he believed

Army

,

in one interest;

same End."

,

&c

.

,

"We should all be considered

as one people

embarked in one Cause

,

acting on the same principle and to the

The army, he maintained, was not

unreasonable powers in calling for

a

larger,

68

aiming at
longer

George Washington to Joseph Reed August 2 2
1776, Fitzpa trick. Wri tings of Washing ton 16:152; see
also George Washington~to the President of the Continental
17:127.
ibid
177 9
Congress, November 18
,

,

,

,

.

,

,

.
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enlisted army, nor were they "naking strides,
dangerous,
or subversive of Civdl Author ity

."

Many civilian leaders agreed with Washington and
his generals that the army should be made more numerous
and

permanent, because the army and its leaders, had demonstrated they could be trusted.

7D

Besides, as one member

of Congress wrote the chief executive of his state,

"the

danger of meeting an enemy disciplined and hardy with new
troops every campaign is alarming
a large,

'^'^

Yet, opposition to

long-enlisted army, remained strong.

Throughout

the war the figure of a Cromwell with a well-disciplined

army at his comraand lurked in the imaginations of many
Whigs.

72

"I

should despair of our cause," wrote one of

those who feared the army,

"if our country contained 60,000

men abandoned enough to enlist for three years or during
69
17 78

,

George Washington to John Banister, April 21,

ibid.

,

10 :290,

290-2 91,

291,

292.

70

John Page to Arthur Lee March 12 17 78 Lee
Life of Arthur Lee 2:323; Robert Morris to the Commissioner
"The Deane
1777
for American affairs in Europe March 28
Papers," NYHSC 20 (1888): 34; James Madison and Theodorick
Boyd,
Bland to Thomas Jefferson, [January [23?]
1781]
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 4:436.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

71

1778

,

Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph Reed, February 25,
Burnett, LMCC, 3 100
:

72

Boston massacre oration of March 5, 1779, by
William Tudor, Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution
in America, pp. 37-40.
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the war."^^

if the militia and other temporary
expedients

were not sufficient to assist Washington, it
was argued,
certainly the French army would once it arrived
in

force.

"^^

Washington, who was somewhat unwilling to make
an
issue out of the size and duration of his army
during

1779

,

began to vigorously lobby in 1780, hoping he could
persuade
the civilian leaders of the necessity of giving
him a more

permanent and well-supported army.

In 1779,

he had not

done so because Congress, he realized, needed to get its

own house in order before it could properly respond to his
pleas.

Additionally, Congress in 1779 was making some

attempts on their ovm to get men to enlist, although not
for as long as V7ashington would have desired.

But in

1780, with the appearance of the French army, Washington

believed that with

a

well-disciplined American army, the

allied forces would be able to defeat the British.

Using all the old arguments in 1780

,

he explained

that short enlistments were expensive; hurt prisoner of war

exchanges; resulted in military setbacks; and that disci-

pline was hampered as the officers were forced constantly
7 3

Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October
Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Ru sh, 1:157.

1

,

1777,

Elbridge Gerry to George Washington, January 12,
1:306.
17 80, Austin, Elbr idge_Ge£ry
,

"^^Ford,

JCC,

13:388

.

101

to be drill instructors,

spending half the year getting the

troops into the field, and the other half in discharging
them.

With a raw and undisciplined army, engaged for a

short period of time, he believed America was neither

ready for the purposes of offense or defense, and that the

British would continue to be tempted to keep fighting.
Only "Regular troops," he told Congress,
the exigencies of modern war." 7 7

"are equal to

"In a word," he believed,

"short enlistments has been the primary cause of the

continuance of the War, every evil which has been experienced in the course of it."

78

Greene joined Washington in lobbying for
permanent army.

79

a

more

He told Governor Burke that "Short

76

George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, July 18,
17 80, Fitzpatrick, Wri tings of Washington, 19:195; George
Washington to Samuel Washington, August 31, 1780, ibid.,
481-482; George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, July 10, 1780, ibid., 143-149; Same
to same, August 20, 1780, ibid., 408-410.
77

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 15, 1780, ibid., 20:49.
78

George Washington to Samuel Washington, August 31,
1780, ibid., 19:482; see also George Washington to Fielding
Lewis, May 5 [-July 6,], 1780, ibid., 31.

^^Nathanael Greene to William Greene, September 5,
1780, RIHSC 6 (1867): 266; Nathanael Greene to Lewis
Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis
Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 468; Nathanael Greene to Thomas
Sim Lee, November 10, 1780, Browne, Maryla nd Archives 45:176;
Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8, 1780,
Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 2 (December 1823): 374.
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enlistments are the bane of service," and Governor
Nelson
that "Short enlistments are dangerous, and can give
no

permanent security."

"Don't be deceived, and trust your

liberties to a precarious force," he told Governor Nash.^°
"Nothing can save this country but a good permanent army,"
he wrote Knox, as well as the President of the Continental

Congress and Governor of North Carolina.

This observation

seemed all the more valid after the defeat at Camden.

Washington believed if Congress would support him
by drafting the militia into the Continental Army to serve
the remainder of the war, or at least three years, he would

be able, with the help of the French, to subdue quickly the

British forces on the continent.

A shorter period, particu-

larly less than a year, he called "inadmissible." S 2

Washington had civilian support in his desire for

more

a

80

Nathanael Greene to Thomas Burke April 8 1782
Nathanael
Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1)
Greene to Thomas Nelson, Jr.
Johnson, Nathanael
[1781]
Greene 2:183; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 15,
1780 Greene Nathanael Greene 3:88.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

8

Nathanael Greene to Henry Knox, December 1781 [80],
ibid., 3:545; Nathanael Greene to the President of the
Continental Congress, December 1, 1780, ibid., 547;
Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 15, 1780, ibid., 88
George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 19:408, 411

t

,
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permanent army. 83

Even Samuel Adams,

a

prime mover in the

process of conjuring up fear of standing armies, believed
it was wrong to carry on the war with temporary and

expensive drafts of militia.
Congress, on October

O

A

3,

1780, adopted a wide-ranging

program to reorganize the army.

Besides reducing the army

to fifty regiments of infantry. Congress called on the

states to fill up their lines for three years or for the
war, but stated that one year enlistments were acceptable.

The program was sent to Washington for his comments, which
he immediately provided.

He was understandably upset.

Two months earlier he had told Congress short enlistments,

particularly one year enlistments, were "inadmissible."
Besides informing members of Congress and friends of his

opposition to congressional encouragement and acceptance of
83

Nathaniel Peabody to Josiah Bartlett, August 6,
5:313; William Gordon to Horatio
1780, Burnett, LMCC
Gates, October 5, 1780, "Letters of the Reverend William
Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799,"
440; John Hancock
PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930)
inauguration address of October 25, 1780, reported in The
Independen t Chronicle. And t he U niversal Advertiser
November 4, 17 80.
,

:

O

A

Samuel Adams to James Warren, November 20, 1780,
Cushing, Writi ngs of Samuel Adams 4:221.
,

^^Ford, JCC, 18:893-897; Samuel Huntington to
George Washington, October 4, 1780, Burnett, LMCC 5:404;
George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, October 11 1780, Fitzpatrick, VJri ings of
Washington, 20:157-167.
,

,
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short enlistments, he sent

a

circular to the states giving

reasons why he opposed short enlistments.

He explained to

Jefferson that "\Vhile we preserve in the system of short
enlistments we shall experience misfortune and disgrace,
and ultimately,

if it is persisted in we shall most probably,

lose the cause in which we are engaged. "^^

He confided in

John Mathews that his appreciation of congressional

jealousies of standing armies had previously kept him from

expressing his sentiments, but his silence would now be
"criminal" as "we are tottering on the brink of a precipice."

87

Mathews and Duane explained to Washington that

Congress had given great weight to his views in their
deliberations, but the desire for economy and the necessity
of having short enlistments to enable those whose enlist-

ments would end on January

1,

1781, to re-enlist under terms

86

George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, October 10,
ibid., 186; Circular to the States, October 18, 1780,
1780
ibid., 205, 207-208; George Washington to James Duane,
October 4, 1780, ibid., 117; General George Washington to
John Mathews, October 4, 1780, ibid., 113-114; George
Washington to Horatio Gates, October 8, 1780, ibid., 137;
George Washington to William Fitzhugh, October 22, 1780,
ibid., 246-247; George Washington to George Mason,
October 22, 1780, ibid., 242.
,

George Washington to John Mathews, October
1780

,

ibid

.

,

115

.
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favorable to them, had prompted Congress to
encourage one
year enlistments.^^
Initially, Washington hoped Congress and
the states
would reject one year enlistments in favor of
three year or
for the war enlistments.

unlikely.

By the end of 1780

,

this seemed

Benjamin Lincoln reported from Massachusetts,

v;here he had gone to lobby,

that the state would raise

troops for three years, but not for the war.^^

Reports

from other states were just as discouraging, if not more
so.

Congress would not change their policy either.

Washington, instead of complaining, resigned himself to work
with what he had and hoped the French army could bail

America out of the critical situation they found themselves

Washington did not push Congress on the issue of

in 1781.

the army because Congress, much to his approval, was attempt
ing early in 1781 to improve itself in its executive

functions, which he believed would enable them to better

provide for the army.

Washington, it is true, did not

complain to Congress, but he was nonetheless displeased
88

James Duane to George Washington, October 10,
1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:414-415; John Mathews to George
Washington, October 17, 1780, ibid., 422-423; Same to
same, October 30, 1780, ibid., 432.
89

November
p.

51,

[

Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington,
], 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book, vol.

BPL.

2,
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with congressional policy regarding the army, and
frequently
shared his displeasure with family and friends.
By limiting the size and duration of the army, the

civilian leaders believed that the likelihood of
tyranny would be lessened.

a

military

They also adopted two other

measures to ensure that they would not be faced with

a

Cromwell.

The

The first was reliance upon the militia.

second was the insistence upon civilian control of the

military, be they militia or Continentals.
The first American troops at Lexington and Concord

were the militia and minutemen of the surrounding area.

Within several days, they were joined by militiamen from

Massachusetts and the neighboring colonies.

Initially, it

was assumed that they would, numbering over twenty thousand,
be sufficient for a seige of Boston until the British

ministry withdrew the soldiers and Coercive Acts once they
realized the resolution on the part of the colonies to
resist both.

The militia, it was also assumed, were adequate

to prevent domestic anarchy and to keep the Tories in their

place.

Additionally, it was believed the militia were the

safest and cheapest means by which to fight the British, as
^^George Washington to John Parke Custis,
February 28, 17 81, Fitzpa trick. Writin gs o f Washington,
21:319; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, March 25,
1781, ibid., 375; George Washington to Fielding Lewis,
June 28, 1781, ibid., 22:283; George Washington to Richard
Henry Lee, July 15, 1781, ibid., 384.

.
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well as the internal enemies.

"The sword, in the hands

of free citizens," Jonas Clark stated in the 1781

Massachusetts election sermon, "is the protection of
society; and the safety and defence of a people truly
brave,

truly free,"

92

Echoing a similar belief several years

earlier, Benjamin Rush expressed the desire of many by
stating,

"The militia began, and

I

sincerely hope the

militia will end, the present war."
Americans during the eighteenth century

reared

v/ere

in the belief that a well-regulated militia, composed of

the so-called gentlemen freeholders, was not only the

natural strength but the only stable security for
state.

94

a

free

Even Greene, who came to be highly contemptuous
91

Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7, 1776,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams 3:250; Samuel Adams to
Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775, ibid., 230; George Mason
to Martin Cockburn August 5, 1775, Rutland, Papers of
George Mason 1:245; George Mason to George Washington,
October 14, 1775, ibid., 255-256; Hemphill, Journals of the
General Assembly and House of Representatives 1776-1780
pp. 64, 67-68.
,
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,

,
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Jonas Clark, A Sermon Preached Before his
Excellency John Hancock, Esq.; Governor ;... May 30, 1781
p.

,

65
93

Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October
Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush 1:157.

1777,

1,

,
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February 2, 1775;
The Virginia Gazette (Pinkney)
The New-York Gazette: and the Weekly Mercury December 26,
1774; Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, from
4 70
p
1776 to 1792 (Dover: James Kirk and Son, TsW
March 23, 1775 resolve of the Virginia Convention, Boyd,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, l:161n.; Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies " p. 194
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of the military ability and character of the militia,

admitted to Jefferson that the militia were the "Great
Bulwark of Civil Liberty." 9 5

Benjamin Rush believed the

militia, when "properly commanded and led" wore "the best
troops in the world, especially in
ours."

96

a

war and country like

So strong was this belief in the safety and

strength of the militia, it was codified in most state

constitutions and other fundamental declarations, as well
as in the Articles of Confederation.

97

It was a faith that

existed just as strong after the war, codified not only in
the Constitution, but was the premise upon which the

American military establishment was based for over
century.

98

95

a

Forty years after the war, John Adams stated

Nathanael Greene to Governor Thomas Jefferson,

November 20, 1780, Boyd, Pap" ers of Thoma s
^
4:130-131.

J efferson,

96

Benjamin Rush to Horatio Gates, February
Butterfield, Lett ers of Benjamin Rush, 1:199.

4,

1778,

97

P r o c e e di ngs o f the Conve nt i on of the De la\^^ are
State, p
19; Minu tes o f t he Provincial Cong ress and the
Council of Safet y'of the State of New Jersey, p". 4 36 ; Bouton,
9:856;
Document's"" an"d Record s Rela ting to~ New Hamps h ire
.

,

of New York,
Lincoln "The Constitu tiona l History
Cha'rles "Z
"
1:186; Esther Mohr Dole, Mary land Duri ng the Amer ic^an_Revolution, p. 110; Richard Henry Lee to ' James Monroe January 5,
1784, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Le e, 2:287.
.

,

,

^^Richard H. Kohn, Eagle a nd Sword: The FederaUsts
and the Creation of the Mil^itary Estab lishme nt in T^ erica,
"A
1975), pp. 54-138
ry83-r8q27'CNew ^orkrTre"e
Democ"fa'tTc Federalist" in The Pe nnsylvania Packet_, ^a_nd
General Adverti ser October 23 "17 8'7 'william H. Riker,
'
SoT di e Fs" of th e S t at es_: _ Th e _Ro le _ o f_ the N a t i o n a 1 _G u a r d__i n
American "Democracy (Washington, D.C.': Public Affairs Press,
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;
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that "neither schools, nor colleges, nor town
meetings have

been more essential to the formation and character
of the

nation than the militia. "^^
This faith in the militia developed early in

America.

From the first settlement, the primary organized

defense against external and internal enemies was the
militia.

This was more so during the seventeenth than

the eighteenth century, before the British regulars had

appeared in any significant numbers.

The early militia

organizations were developed in each colony on much the
same lines as those they had left behind in England
By 1671 almost every colony had

a

formally organized

These militia were adapted to the peculiar

militia.

environment and circumstances of each colony; although in
1957), p.

9;

January 27,
Conventions

,

3:380, 384,
the militia,

Luther Martin to the Maryland Legislature,
1788, Elliot, The Debates in the Several State
1:371; for debate in Virginia, see ibid.,
400, 588; for proposed amendments concerninq
see ibid., 1:328, 335; 3:659; 4:245.
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John Adams to W. H. Sumner, May 19, 1823,
[William H. Sumner], Inquiry Into the Importance of the
Mil itia to a Free Commonwealth: In a Letter from William H.
Sumner,... to John Adams... with His Answer" (Boston Cummings
and Hillard, 1823), pp. 69-70.
:

^^*^Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States
Army (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 3-12; Douglas
Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History o f the
British Colonies in North 7\jnerica, 1607-1763 (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1973)
pp. 1-41.
,

"'^'"Lois

G.

Schwoerer,

"No Standing Armies

!

"

,

p.

14,
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most colonies they were subject to royal authority in
the
form of the Governor who, acting as commander in chief,

issued commissions and directed the disposition of the

militia in his respective colony.

Generally, militia

service was compulsory for all males between 16/18 and 45/60,

depending upon the colony and the time.

consisted of muster days:

Training usually

two to four days in the spring

on a compnay level basis and two to four days in the autumn
on the battalion level.

As a rule, during peacetime, these

musters were not taken seriously.

Besides

a

few short

drills and musketry practice, most muster time was spent
in food and drink as many viewed these gatherings as social

events.

Actual service was usually limited to duty within

the colony, keeping with the English precedent of not

allowing trainbands to be taken outside of their counties
except if England was under actual invasion. 102
102

Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Seventeenth Century 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company,
1904), 2:375-400; Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies
in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1924), pp. 496-526; Leon de Valinger, Jr., Colonial
Military Organization in Delaware 1637-1776 (Wilmington:
Delaware Tercentenary Commission, 19 3 8), pp 22-23, 34-42;
W. Roy Smith, South Carolina as a Royal Province 1719-1776
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1903), pp. 171-182; William P.
Clark, Official History of the Militia and the National
Guard of the State of Pennsylvania, From the Earliest Period
of Recor d to the Present Time, 1:1-16; John W. Shy, "A New
Look at Colonial Militia," WMQ, 3d ser., 20, no. 2 (April
"Training Day in New
1963): 175-185; H. Telfer Mook
England," NEQ 11, no. 4 (December 1938): 675-697; Douglas
Edward Leach, "The Military System of Plymouth Colony,"
ibid., 24, no. 3 (September 1951): 342-364; Robert W. Kenny,
,

.

,

Ill

With the introduction of British regulars into
the

colonies in greater numbers during the wars of the
eighteenth
century, reliance on the militia declined.

Years War, however, there was

a

During the Seven

revival in militia training

and utilization, and the development of "Alarmist" companies,

which were the progenitors of the minutemen.
1763,

With peace in

interest in the militia declined once again, but

a

decade later, the militia once again regained popularity,
as it appeared the militia were America's first line of

defence against the British should war begin.
began,

Once the war

it became a rather quickly established belief amongst

most Whigs that the American militia were among, if not the
best soldiers in the world.

This belief became fixed in

the minds of many Americans, and remained relatively undis-

puted for over

a

century.

"The Beginnings of the Rhode Island Train Bands," RIHSC
25-38 Jack S. Radabaugh, ^The
33, no. 2 (April 1940)
Militia of Colonial Massachusetts ," MA 18, no. 1 (Spring
1954): 1-18; Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military
Policy," ibid., 22, no. 2 (Summer 1958): 75-82; Allen French,
"The Arms and Military Training of Our Colonizing Ancestors,"
PMHS 57 (October 1941-May 1944): 3-21; Louis D. Scisco,
"Evolution of Colonial Militia in Maryland," MHM 35, no. 2
(June 1940): 166-177; E. Milton Wheeler, "Development and
Organization of the North Carolina Militia," NCHR 41, no. 3
(July 1964): 307-323; The Essex Gazette January 31,
February 21, 1769; Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia
as a Social Institution: Salem, Massachusetts 1764-1775,"
MA 37, no. 4 (December 1973): 125; Douglas Edward Leach,
Arms f or_Empire A_ Mil itary _History_of the^Bri tjLjh_^ol_onies
T?i~N6rth ^e rjc"a"T6 0 7 - 1 7"6 3 p". "2 3'; ' Ru s s el 1 F. IVeigley,
pp. 13-28.
pTTsboriT'of _ the JJnl ted" St^^
,

:

;

,

:

At a meeting of citizens in
on August 10,

a

park in New York City

1814, Marinus Willett told the gathering that

he was living witness to the fact that the
American militia

were equal to the contest with British regulars.

militia he stated,

"I

double mine; and

have routed and pursued

a degree these

I

With the

have met them when their numbers were
them."''"^-^

To

were the exaggerated words of an old man

reflecting on past glories, hoping they

v/ould spur on a

patriotic spirit in the current generation to meet the
British regulars again as confident militiamen.
a

There was

touch of truth, however, to his statement, as Willett

was a relatively successful officer leading the militia

during the Revolutionary War.

Other officers also had

successes with the militia, as at times the militia fought
well, although it was generally in conjunction with

Continental troops.
The militia behaved admirably at the battles of

Bennington, Oriskany, Saratoga, King's Mountain, Cowpens,

Springfield, and during numerous minor encounters during
the southern campaigns.

militia was justified.
"I

nT

104

m

.

.

Thus, to a degree, faith

the

Nevertheless, problems existed in

Willett, Marinus Willett

,

appendix 10, p. 152.

The His tory of South Carolina
in the Revolut ion 1775-1780, p. 7 04; Robert C. Pugh, "The
Revolutionary Militia in the Southern Campaign," WMQ 3d
ser., 19, no. 2 (April 1957): 154-175.
"""^^Edward McCrady,

,

,

,

,
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using the militia.

Some of the more obvious, i.e.,

plundering, lack of discipline, and the quality of
the

militia officers, will be discussed in
the others,

later chapter;

a

involving their worth, real and imagined, need

to be discussed here in order that we may understand the

militia in the context of their time, not as Marinus Willett
had, forty years after the fact.

A major problem with the American militia during
the Revolutionary War was that they often operated under

inadequate, narrow, and provincial laws that made it very

difficult to even mobilize the militia.

Even when a

mobilization was called for, that was no guarantee the
militia would turn out, particularly when such calls were
made at times when the militia preferred to protect their
own homes or during the planting season .'^^^

Silas Newcomb to William Livingston, October 4,
1777 William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1)
Philemon Dickinson to William Livingston September 16
24 4-24 5; Drayton
177 7, Sedgwick William Livingston pp
Memoirs of the American Revolution 2:125; Edward McCrady,
The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780
p~.
331; William P. Clark, Official History of the Militia
and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania from
the Earliest Period of Record to the Present Time 1:25;
Benjamin Lincoln to James Lowell April 12, 1779 / Benjamin
Lincoln Letter Book, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (MicroJames Innes to Thomas Jefferson, October [21?]
film Reel #3)
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 4:55; Lachlan
17 80, Boyd
Mcintosh to George Bryan, December 29, 1778, Hazard,
Pennsylvania Archives 1st ser., 7:132.
,

;

,
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,
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It was also difficult, once the militia
responded

to mobilization calls,

local area.

to force them to remove from their

The militia laws additionally made it

difficult, if not impossible, for the militia of one
state
to come to the assistance of another state.

"'^'^

And even

David A. Bernstein, "William Livingston: The Role
of the Executive in New Jersey's Revolutionary War," in
William C. Wright, ed.. New Jersey in the American Revolution I I, Papers Presented at the Fourth Annual New Jersey
History Symposium, December 2, 1972, Held by the New Jersey
Historical Commission at the State Museum Auditorium
(Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1973), p. 15;
Pierre Van Cortlandt to George Clinton, August 13, 1777,
Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 2:218; Robert
Benson to George Clinton, August 20, 1777, ibid., 232;
Petition of the Non-Commissioned Officers of the 1st Battalion of Minutemen of New York on behalf of themselves and
privates, January 30, 1776, Calendar of Historical
Manuscripts 1:225; Ward, The War of the Revolution 2:715;
James R. Gilmore (Edmund Kirke)
The Rear Guard of the
Revolution (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889)
pp. 287-288.
,

,

,
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Patrick Henry to Henry Laurens, November 23,
1778, Henry, Patrick Henry
3:205; Benjamin Harrison to
Greene,
Nathanael
January 21, 1782, Mcllwaine, Official
Letters of the Governors of Virginia 3:132; Benjamin
Harrison to William Irvine, August 21, 1782, ibid., 301;
Drury Ragsdale to Nathanael Greene, February 3, 1782,
Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolution 1:79; Thomas
Stone and J\ Rogers to the Maryland Council of Safety,
June 15, 1776, Browne, Maryland Archives 11:492; Agnes
Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American
Revolution (Cleveland: Winn and Judson Press for the Western
Reserve University, 1904), pp. 100, 103; John Archer Silver,
"The Provisional Government of Maryland," pp. 26, 42; Allen
Bowman, The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army
(Washington, D.C.: American Council of Public Affairs,
1943), p. 114n.l; Saunders, NCCR, 10:196-208; 12:347;
Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, June 27, 1781, Greene,
Nathanael Greene, 3:555-556.
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when the militia were mobilized, and allowed to leave
their
states, a problem existed with respect to their length
of

Most states limited field duty to

service.

a

fixed number

of days per tour of duty, often as few as ten days at a
108
time

Because of the limitations placed upon them by
these restricting militia laws, military leaders constantly

complained they could not always use the militia when, where,
and how they were needed most. 109

Often at crucial times

the militia enlistments or terms of service terminated and
108

Mathias Williamson to William Livingston,
September 15 17 76 Selections from the Correspondence of
the Executives of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786 (Newark:^
Newark Daily Advertiser Office for the New Jersey Legislature, 1848), pp. 9-10; Edward McCrady, The History of South
Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780 p. 401; Hugh F.
Rankin, Th e North Carolina Continentals p. 347; The
Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council to George Washington
May 15, 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives 1st ser.,
6:481; Circular of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive
Council to the County Lieutenants, October 13, 1779, ibid.,
7:748
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Lachlan Mcintosh to George Bryan, December 29,
ibid,, 132; John Stark to George Washington, June 5,
1778
1778, Stark, John Stark p, 160; Nathanael Greene to Jacob
September 28 1776, Showman, Papers of General
Greene[?]
Nathanael Greene 1:303; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke
December 4, 1776, ibid., 363; Nathanael Greene to George
Washington, December 1776, ibid., 366-267; Opinion of
Nathanael Greene given George Washington December 3 1777
Worthington C. Ford, ed.. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777
(Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1897), p. 252; Max
Convention of
The Records of the Federal ~'~
Farrand ed
~~
2:330
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they departed the field, despite the pleas
of those that

remained behind

.

'^"'"^

But even when the militia were used, many
times
they were quite deficient as they were generally
not well

prepared for battle, nor well lead into it.

As was stated

earlier, the colonial militia were, for many decades,

regarded as more of
system.

a

concept of defense than

regular

a

Most colonies did not seriously train their

militia.

Nevertheless, great faith was placed in them as

the proper and sure means of defense, even when they

demonstrated they were inadequate in the field, and examples
of them being so were numerous.

Washington and others

blamed the disastrous campaign of 1776 on the militia.

The

militia were also faulted for the failings of the Rhode
Island campaign of 1777, the American defeat at Minisink
in 1782

,

the losses at Boundbrook in 1777

1779, where,

and Norwalk in

,

in the latter two instances, the militia

deserted in the face of the enemy.

The militia also fared

poorly during the Danbury raid in 1777, and during the

Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr.
December 31 177 5 Nathanael Greene Papers vol 1
WLCL; William Moultrie to Charles C Pinckney February 10
1779 Moultrie, Mem oirs of the American Revolution 1:310;
Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash March 31 1781 Greene,
Nathanael Greene, 3:213.
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southern campaign, most notably at Camden, Guilford Court
House, and Blue Licks

Governor Jefferson was informed that the militia
in the south had one goal in mind,

that being to avoid

action, as "Their greatest Study is to Rub through their

Tower [tour] of Duty with whole Bones."

General Lincoln

told the President of South Carolina that the militia were

undependable

,

as they spent all their time trying to get

out of service.

Washington complained late in the summer

of 1780 that "'No Militia' will ever acquire the habits

necessary to resist

a

regular force."

Richard Henry Lee

earlier observed that "for sudden exertions the militia
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, September 17,
17 76, Showman, Pape rs of General Nathanae l Greene
1:300;
Greene
to
George
Nathanael
Washington, March 18, 1781,
Greene, Nat hanael Greene, 3:198nl; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress, September 24, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:110; George
Washington to^iiliam~Heath7 July 14 1779 ibid., 15:423;
William Gordon to Horatio Gates, October 5, 1780, "Letters
of the Reverend William Gordon: Historian of the American
Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930):
March 21, 1776,
440; Pierce Butler to [Arthur Middleton?]
Joseph W. Bernwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon.
Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence,"
SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926): 140; Richard Henry Lee to
Patrick Henry, Septem.ber 15 1776, Ballagh, Letters of
Richard Henry Lee, 1:215; Bodley, Our First Great West,
p 20 87"^ernon Leslie, The Battle of Minis ink: A Re volutionary Wa r Engagement in the Upper Del aware Valley, 2d
(Middletown, New York: T. Enmett Henderson,
and enlT^ed
1976)
p. 148; Benedict Arnold to Alexander McDougall,
April 27, 1777, Wallace, Traitorous Hero, p. 188;
Nathaniel N. Shipton, "General ~ Joseph Palmer: Scapegoat
for the Rhode Island Fiasco of October, 1777," NEQ 39, no. 4
(December 1966): 498-512.
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certainly do well, but they cannot bear the
continued
discipline of Camps and campaigns.""'"-'-^
Yet faith in the militia persisted.

Besides the

belief in the dependability and safety of the militia,
many
civilian leaders believed they were cheaper to use than
a

regular military establishment

^"^^
.

Military leaders

constantly complained to these civilians of the high cost
of keeping the militia in the field.

Greene complained

112

Edward Stevens to Thomas Jefferson, February 8,
1781, Boyd, Papers of JIlpmas_Je
4:562 Benjamin
Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 15, 1779, Benjamin
Lincoln Letter Book, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3)
George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 15, 1780, Fitzpatrick,
Writin gs of Washi ngton 20:50; Richard Henry Lee to Patrick
Henry '"January 9 1777 Ballagh, Letters of " Richard Henry
Lee, 1:248.
;
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Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, June 16, 1781,
Reed, Jose ph R eed
2:354.
,

114

Nathanael Greene to George Washington,
September 11, 17 80, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:211;
Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed7 SeptembeF~T9 1780, ibid.,
343; George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, December 20, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Wri tings of
Washington, 6:402; Same to same, March 26, 1777, ibid.,
7:319; George Washington to Daniel Brodhead July 4, 1780,
ibid., 19:119; George Washington to John Parke Custis,
February 28, 1781, ibid., 21:319; Benjamin Lincoln to John
Rutledge, July 24, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book,
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Nathanael
Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780, "Letters
to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 7 (1876): 468, 469; Lewis
Morris, Jr. to Lewis Morris, Sr., December 29, 1780, ibid.,
475; Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8,
1780, Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 12 (December 1823): 374
Thomas Conway to the Supreme Executive Council of
Pennsylvania, August 17, 1777, "Letters Colonial and
Revolutionary," PMH3 42, no. 1 (1918): 79-80.
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that the militia,

"like the locusts of Egypt, have eaten

up everything, and the expense has been so numerous,
that
it has ruined the currency of the State."

southern governor that

"I

He told one

think it an endless task to

attempt to arm and equip all your militia.
of arms and ammunition as

Such a waste

have seen in different parts

I

of this state, is enough to exhaust all the arsenals of

Europe

Greene believed the use of militia was more than
just a waste of money.

He believed it "the greatest folly

in the world to trust the liberties of a people to such a

precarious

defence.""'""'"^

Other officers shared this opinion,

particularly after the disastrous campaigns of 1776 and
1777.

117

General Wayne and his chief subordinates called

the militia a mere "passing cloud" that should not be

Greene to Joseph Reed, January 9, 1781,
Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:345; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash,
February 9, 1781, Hugh Talmage and Albert Ray Newsome, The
History of a Sou ther n State Nor th Car olina, rev. ed
University of North Carol ina~Press 1963),
(Chanel "hTTI
"^''"^Nathanael

:

:

p

.

22 6

,

.

^Nathanael Greene to James Varnum,
William Johnson, Nath anael Greene, 1:397.
117

[1781?]

,

Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr.,
September 6, 1776, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC,
(1876): 442; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan
8
Trumbull, Sr., July 11, 1777, MHSC 7th ser., 2:78; Same
to same, July 22, 1777, ibid., 2:86; Thomas Conway to the
Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, August 15, 1777,
Hazard, Pennsyl vania Archives, 1st ser., 5:523; Arthur
St. Clair to The President of the Continental Congress,
1:428.
Smith, The St. Clair_Papers
,

,

.

relied upon. 118
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General Stark, although successfully

commanding militia forces during 1777, stated he
could not
put any dependence upon them.^^^ Heath told Washington
"It is vain to trust the militia. "^^0

^^^y^^^^^^^

^^^^

to this opinion very early in the war and became one
of the

more outspoken critics of the militia system as it existed
during the war.
By the summer of 1776, Washington believed, as he

told Congress, the militia should not be relied upon,

because "To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly,
resting upon a broken staff."

"To attempt to carry on the

War with Militia against disciplined Troops," he later told
Congress,

"would be to attempt what the common sense and

common experience of Mankind will pronounce to be impracti121
cable."
To the states he sent a circular during the fall
118

Anthony Wayne Daniel Brodhead James Chambers
Richard Hump ton Francis Johnston Walter Stewart Thomas
Hartley et al. to the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of
Assembly October 30, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania ^Archives
1st ser., 5:724; Anthony Wayne to Richard Peters, April 12,
Stille Anth on y Wayne p. 124
1778
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John St ark

,
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1776, MHSC

,
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,

John Stark to Meshech Weare, June
p.

8,

1778,

Stark,

172.

William Heath to George VJashmgton, December 28,
7th ser.,

4:49.

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick,
Writings^ o^Wa_sh3^ngton, 6:110, 110-112; Same to same,
August^ToV 1780",' ibid., 19:412.
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of 1780 telling them the idea of carrying
on the war with

militia was "chimerical," declaring

"I

never was witness

to a single instance that can countenance
an opinion of

Militia or raw troops being fit for the real business
of
fighting." 122 He told his brother "the dependence
which

the Congress has placed upon the militia has already

greatly injured and

I

fear will totally ruin our cause.

""^^^

General Lincoln joined Washington and Greene in
lobbying the civilian leaders to stop relying on the

militia and to put their faith and money, as well as their
enlistment energies, in regularly enlisted Continental
soldiers.

124

It would be misleading, however,

to suggest

that most critics of the militia wanted to do away with
them.

From the beginning of the war, the militia were seen

by many whigs as a useful force, serving as escorts, guards.
122

Circular to the States, October 18, 1780, ibid.,

20:209.
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George Washington to Jack Washington

September 22, 1776, ibid., 6:96; also see his letters to
Lund Washington, December 10 [17], 1776, ibid., 347 to
same on September 30, 1776, ibid., 137; to John Augustine
Washington, December 18, 1776, ibid., 398; to the President
December 20, 1776, ibid., 402;
of the Continental Congress
and to Gouverneur Morris, May 8, 1779, ibid., 15:25.
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Benjamin Lincoln to the President of the
Continental Congress February 13 17 79 Benjamin Lincoln
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Ben j am in Lincoln to President Rawl ins Lowndes
3
January 12 17 79, ibid
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and in other limited duty, as well as, when trained

adequately, serving in conjunction with Continental

troops

125

Because of the apparent usefulness of the militia,
as well as the reality of the states being unv/illing to

not rely on them, some Continental officers believed the

militia should be better prepared for the tasks they should
be expected adequately to handle.

One officer. Baron von

Steuben, took an especial interest, primarily because of

his general interest in the discipline in the Continental
Army.

In April 1779,

he informed the executives of several

states he had devised a plan of general principles and rules,

which he enclosed, whereby, if adopted and applied, would
enable the militia to be more effective

,

particularly upon

those occasions when they acted in concert with the

Continental troops.

12G
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George Washington to Robert Howe, August 9, 1779,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 16:67; VJashing ton s
Circular to the"sFatis7 October 18, 1780, ibid., 20:209;
Robert Carter Nicholas to the Virginia Delegates in Congress
November 2 5, 1775, Boyd Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:268;
Elbridge Gerry to [Samuel Adams], October 9, 1775, Austin,
Elbridge Gerry, 1:117; Samuel Adams to James Warren,
January~77~r7T6 Gushing Writings of S amuel Adams, 3:251.
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von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, April 20,
1779, Revolutionary V7ar Collection, BPL; Baron von Steuben
to Jonathan Trumbull, April 20, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser.,
2:389-390; Baron von Steuben to Joseph Reed, April 20, 1779,
Hazard, Pennsylvania A_rchives, 1st ser., 6:325; Baron von
,'
Steuben to^Geofge Clinton April 20, 1779, Hastings, Public
Papers of George ClJjn ton 4 738-739
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Other officers, unlike Steuben, believed the
problem
did not rest completely on the lack of discipline.

The

major problem, they argued, were the militia laws
which made
it difficult, and frequently impossible, to utilize
the

militia to their best advantage

"^^"^
.

Hoping that the states would correct their deficient

militia laws, Washington, beginning in 1779, appealed to
Congress to request the states to put their militias on

a

more respectable footing, and under such regulation as would
enable them to assemble rapidly when called into service

.

'''^^

The states did not quickly nor adequately respond to the

calls made by Washington and others to improve their militia
laws and the militia.

Some civilian leaders did not

attribute the deficiencies of the militia to the militia
themselves nor the laws governing them, but to the general
officers, including Continental generals

,

who led them

12 9
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William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of
the State Constitutions of the American Revolution," AAAPSS
(January- June 18 97
411 Brunhouse The Counter9
Revolution in Pennsylva nia p 39 John R. Anderson "The
M i 1 i 1 1 a" Law"rn~Re vo lu t i on a r y Nev; Jersey," PNJHS 76, no. 4
(October 1958): 282; ibid., 77, no. 1 (January 1959): 9,
Richard Dallam to Thomas Sim Lee January 16 17 81
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Browne Maryland Archives 4 7 20-21
)
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:
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;
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George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, May 25, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings
15:143-144.
of W as hington
,

John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 15, 1777,
Butterf ield, AFC, 2:354.
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Others, also unwilling to directly face the
problems of the

militia, debated the civil rights question regarding
the
raising of the militia and their service. "^^^

Such debate

caused General Moultrie to tell the President of the South

Carolina Senate that "by contending too much for the
liberties of the people you will enslave them at last;
remember, my friend, it has alv;ays been the maxim of all

communities, to abridge the people of some of those

liberties for

a

in the future."

time,

the better to secure the whole to them

Similarly, Governor Harrison told his

legislature that "Our fears of despotism seem to be carried
too far for a time of War and may in the end deprive
of that Liberty we are contending for

abject slavery."

&

[us]

bring on us the most
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Random militia successes, particularly early in the
war,

convinced many Whigs that the militia, as constructed

and used, was indeed the bulwark of the country's defense
and, therefore,

the state legislatures were lax in changing

their militia laws and state executives were frequently lax
"1

-3

Q

Charles C. Pinckney to General William Moultrie,
February 3, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs o f the Ameri can
Revolution 1:299-300.
,
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William Moultrie to Charles

Pinckney,
February 11, 1779, ibid., 311-312; Benjamin Harrison to
the Speaker of the House of Delegates, May 6, 1782,
Mcllwaine Of f icia]_L£ttGr s_jDf_the_Gave£nors^_o^^
3:217.
,

C.

"
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enforcing them.

This was especially true after the militia

success at Bennington in 1777.

TOO

The defeat of the militia

at Camden, however, awoke many to the dangers of relying

on the militia.

The greatest defenders of the militia

realized that unless the militia system was improved, not
only would military defeats continue, but the proponents
of a large, long enlisted standing army, might be able to

do away with the militia system completely

This was

.

something the ardent Whigs did not desire.

Forty years

after the war, John Adams expressed the Whig view held by

most of the revolutionary generation, that being that
"Whenever the militia comes to an end, or is despised or

neglected,

shall consider this union dissolved, and the

I

liberties of North America lost forever.
132

James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, August 31, 1777,
Gardiner Warre n-Gerry Corresponde nce p 79 Nathanael
Greene to Joseph Reed, March 18T"T7 81 Hugh Talmage Lefler
and Albert Ray Newsome, The History of a Southern State:
North Carol ina rev. ed., p. 226.
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VJilliam Gordon to Horatio Gates,

October 5,
1780, "Letters of Reverend William Gordon: Historian of
the Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1920-June 1930):
44 0; James Madison and Theodorick Bland to Thomas Jefferson,
Boyd Papers of Thomas Jeffe_rson,
[January 23? 1781]
4:436; James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, August 31, 1777,
Gardiner Warren-Gerry C orrespondence p 79 James Warren
1777, "Warren-Adamis Letters,"
to John Adams August 10
349.
MHSC, 72 (1917)
,

,

,

,

,

;
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,

,

:

1823,
Sumner, May 19
Inquiry Into the Impor tance_of_the

^^"^John Adams to W.

H.

[William H. Sumner]
Militia to a Free^ Commonwealth
SumKer7'>"7Tto~John" Adams, ^^^i th_PU s^nswer
,

,

,

p

.
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,

Seeing the militia under so much
reproach, and

desiring to maintain it as the safeguard of
the liberties
of America, many state leaders by mid war,
and many more
by 1781, were calling for their state legislatures
to enact
more effective militia laws, for as Governor Hancock
told

the people of Massachusetts in his 1780 inauguration
address,
it was the militia upon which "the safety of the
Commonwealth
naturally rests." 135 Similarly, in Virginia, a committee

of the House of Delegates late in 1782,

better militia law, stated "that

a

in calling for a

permanent body of

disciplined citizens is the only safe defence of any
republic."

136

The state legislatures responded in many

instances to the demands for improving the militia
135

.

laws."^^"^

m
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Convention March 8 17 77, Hastings Publ ic Papers of George
Clinton 1:655; William Livingston to George Washington,
May 8 1779, Sparks Correspondence of the American Revolution, 2:295-296; Thomas Burke's Address to the North
Carolina General Assembly, June 9, 1781, Clark, NCSR
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John R. Anderson, "Militia Law in Revolutionary
Jersey," PNJHS 77, no. 1 (January 1959): 20; Alexander
Hamilton to John Laurence, [December 12, 1782], Syrett,
Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:212; Edmund Randolph to
Hutchinson Papers of
Jamei'l-TaMsoF,~nNovem
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Despite the satisfaction the Continental officers

must have felt with the improved militia system beginning
in many states by 1780,

there existed the ever present fear

that Continental battalions would be neglected and not

filled up.

With the British occupying New York, Charleston,

and several other major cities in 1780 and 1781, it was

obvious to many that only successful seiges could be undertaken by troops that could be depended upon to remain at

their posts in a disciplined manner for an unlimited period.

Only Continental troops fit this description, it was
argued.

13 8

Simultaneously with the call for an improved

militia came reminders of the limitations of the militia.
Greene believed, as he told Jefferson, the militia could
serve some useful purpose "if they are not depended upon
as a principal but employed as an Auxiliary," reminding him

that "if you depend upon them as a principal the very nature
of the War must become ruinous to the Country.

"

In a

similar vein Washington told the Governor of Rhode Island
that the militia were only good for

1

ight parties to

skirmish, as they lacked firmness which was only acquired

James Madison

,

5

:

308

.

Henry Knox to George Washington, Draft, May 23,
1780, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel ^5); George
Washington to the Cominittee of Cooperation of Congress,
18:418;
J:^^ shing ton
May 25 1780 Fitzpatrick, Writings
George Washington to Daniel Brodhead, July '4, 1780, ibid.,
19:119.
,

,

,
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by habits of discipline and
servicp
service.

"ti mean
^
not to

detract

from the .erit of the .ilitia,"
he wrote, "their zeal
and
spirit upon a variety of occasions,
have entitled them to
the highest applause; but it
is of the greatest
importance
we should learn to estimate them
rightly." Despite the
questioning of the nature and value
of the militia, Joseph
Reed frankly admitted to Greene,
"we must give up the
contest or cherish the militia "l^^
And to a large degree,
the militia were cherished, often
at the expense of military
efficiency. American Whigs feared any
military body, even
their own militia.
But of all military bodies, the
militia
seemed the safest, as they were civilians
temporarily
.

in

uniform, unlike the Continentals who, in
many instances,
were professional soldiers or, after several
years of
service, became so.
A primary concern of the civilian leaders
during

the American Revolution was ensuring their revolutionary

war was won without resorting to or resulting in
tyranny.

a

military

This concern, as discussed in this chapter,

translated into actions that impacted on the size, complexion,
and leadership of the military.

It also impacted, as will

139

Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, November 20,
17 80, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jef ferson
4:131; George
Washington to William Greene, October 18, 1780, Bartlett,
Rh ode Island, 9:250; Joseph Reed to Nathanael
Greene, June 16, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:355.
,
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be shown in the next chapter, on
how the civilians controlled
the military, particolarly with
respect to ideological and
personal controls

CHAPTER

III

CITIZEN SOLDIERS, CIVIL-MILITARY
CONNECTIONS
AND CIVIL SUPREMACY
The American revolutionary leaders
believed that
among the best means of ensuring their military
would not

subvert the revolution would be to make sure the
military

remained subordinate to the civilian governments and
leaders.

To accomplish this,

the revolutionary leaders

placed great emphasis on the quality, character, and conduct
of their officer corps.

To a large extent, this meant

carefully selecting their military leaders and ensuring
they adhered to the concept of civil supremacy.

Early in the war, Charles Lee told

a

delegation of

Massachusetts civilian leaders at camp that American
liberties depended upon the quality and character of the
army, and that depended on their officers.

About the same

time, Nathanael Greene wrote the chief executive of Rhode

Island that "without a good set of Officers the Troops will
be little better than a lawless Bandittie or an ungovernable
Mob."'^

Most American revolutionary leaders did not have to

Lee to the Commissioners from Massachusetts
at Camp, November 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC
308; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke,
5 (1873)
-''"Charles
:
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be told about the importance of
their officer corps, for
they realized that the officers
would have a primary

responsibility for preventing anarchy
and military tyranny,
as well as assuring military
victory.
It

is not surprising,

therefore, the civilian leaders
demonstrated great interest
and expressed concern about the
selection and promotion of
their officer corps.

The revolutionary leaders desired
officers who
shared the same beliefs and goals as
themselves, who would
exert themselves in preventing any form of
anarchy or
military tyranny, and who would subordinate themselves
to

civilian control.

The best method to select and promote

officers who met the above criteria, it was generally
assumed, was by giving that responsibility to the legislative bodies.

It was believed they were best suited to

judge the quality and character of their fellow citizens.

Besides,

it was argued, that by selecting and promoting the

officers, they would have more control over them.

Some soldiers, however, objected to the selection
of their officers by the legislative bodies, believing they

should themselves select some, if not all, of their own

officers.

2

With respect to company grade officers, this

October 11, 1776, Showman, F^pers_^fJJathanael Greene, 1:313.
2

The Maryland Gazet te, July 18, 1776; Growl, "Maryland During and After the Revolution," p. 34; David Curtis
Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776, pp. 166-169.

.
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procedure had been adopted in several of the
colonies before
3
the war.
Realizing that to recruit and maintain a sufficient army some compromises were necessary, several

provincial legislative bodies and early state legislatures
provided for company grade officers to be elected by
their
men.

Although allowing for such

procedure, the North

a

Carolina Provincial Congress reserved to itself the exercise
of a veto of the selections made.

Several colonies allowed

field grade officers to be elected by the company grade

officers, and Pennsylvania allowed for the selection of its
two Flying Camp generals by a committee composed of soldiers
and officers.

At the other extreme, New Hampshire once

allov7ed field grade officers to appoint company grade

officers.

Most colonies, however, reserved to the legisla-

ture the selection of the field grade and general officers,
and in many of the colonies the selection of company grade

officers was the responsibility of either the legislature
or a local civilian authority,

safety

such as a committee of

^

3

Ibid., pp. 157, 159, 161; Lincoln, Journals of Each
Provincial Con gress of Ma ssac husetts pp. 33-34, 35.
,

Comm onwealth History of
^Albert Bushnell Hart, ed
Massachusetts, 5 vols. (New York: States History Company,
Saunders, NCCR, 10:196-209 Clark,
138
192 7-19X077^: 72
NCSR, 23:981; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the
Council of Safety'of'the State of NGW_Jor5ey, pp. 180,
r87^8 8",'~T9T~555'; Hoadly, PuiSl ic_ Records jof_the__State^_o^
Connecticu_t 1 108-109 Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin,
[edsTIT The Popular Sources of Political Autho£it>^_Docum_e^
.

,

,

:

,

;

;
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The initial selection of the
field grade and company
grade officers were thus the
responsibility of the colonies
to appoint, not that of the
Continental Congress. This
meant the army Washington commanded
during 1775 was composed
of officers selected by either
the legislative bodies or
the soldiers themselves.
Unimpressed by the quality of his
officer corps, Washington informally
suggested to several
members of Congress that he be given power
of appointment,
subject to the veto of Congress. He also
formally requested
Congress allow him to appoint inferior officers
of the staff

departments.^

Although Congress granted his request, his

on the Massachuset ts Cqnstitu^tjj^n
1780, pp 46-48William P. Clark, Of f rcial Jii^tory_6rTh¥ Militia
and the
r
1 Guard of the S t a t e_o^ Pen n sy l^nii"^ F "ofT tFe
Earlie st PerTod_of _Record_to__tj2e_Pfp<;pnf- TTme'r~rr90T
Arthur J. Alexander, "Pennsyrv^HTa s Revolutionary Militia "
P^^HB 69, no. 1 (January 1945): 21
Christopher Ward, The
De]^war^Conti^Ten^
(Wilmington: Historicil"
Society of Delaware, 1941), p. 6; William Gustavus Whiteley,
5ll^B^o]jutjX)narY_Sol^^r^^
(Wilmington: James and
Webb, 1875), p. 10; Kenneth Coleman, Th^ American Revolution
Georgia 1 763-1789 (Athens: University of Georg la^Press^
1958), p. 82; Hemphill, Extracts f rom the Journals_o_f the'
Provincial Congresses of South_Ca_r_ol ina 1 7 75-1 7 7 67~p'7"'T6 3
Drayton, Memoir s o f the "Am erican _ Re vol^ution7~rTT6 3 Bouton,
Docu m ents and Records Rel aH n g_to_ J^ev^JiaiTrpsh ire, 8:337;
Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The^^rajns i^t ion_in_V^
from
Colon y to Commonwealth, pp. 14 2-14 5; Edmund PendTetoiT^to^
William Woodford, December 24, 1775, Mays, Letters and
Paper s of Edmund Pendleton 1:141; George MFsorT to Martin
Cockburn, July 24, 1775, Rutland, Papers of George Mason
1725 - 1792
1:241.
'
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George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 20, 1775, Fitzpatrick, VJri tings of
Washington 3:351; George VJashington to Richard^^Henry Lee,
August 29, 1775 ibid., 451; George VJashington to Caesar
Rodney and Thomas McKean, August 30, 1775, ibid., 457.
,
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suggestion was not taken up by Congress until
October 1775,
when the question of appointment of the
officers of the two

New Jersey regiments precipitated a debate.

James Duane

suggested Congress have the responsibility, after
consulting
the military, for appointing and promoting all
officers.

Others agreed, believing the union of the colonies
depended
upon breaking down provincial distinctions.

These arguments

were countered by those that maintained it was safer to
leave the responsibility with the individual colonies for,

after all, soldiers would not enlist unless they had some

part in the selection, or at least knew the officers who
v;ould be

appointed over them.

Congress avoided making

a

decision, by simply selecting the officers specifically

nominated by the New Jersey Provincial Congress.

Neverthe-

less, discussion continued on the subject of officer

selection throughout the first winter of the war.
It was not, however,

until September 1776, that

Congress made provisions for selecting and promoting the

officers that would command the large and relatively long
enlisted army they had just authorized.

At that time,

Congress decided that generals would be selected, promoted,
John Adams Diary, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:202-204;
Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, February 28, 1776,
Burnett, LMCC 1:367; Minutes of the Provincial Congress
and the Counc il of Safety of New Jersey pp. 212-213; Ford,
,

,

JCC,

3:285^8 9

.
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and cc^issioned by Congress
and that all other
Continental
officers would be selected by
the states and commissioned
by Congress.
The military would be given
7
no say in the
selection process, as it was
considered "dangerous to the
publick liberty." At least that is
how John Adams explained
it to several Continental
generals.^

Washington and other officers questioned
the wisdom
of Congress and the state governments
with respect to
promotions.^ Initially, officers were
promoted within the
regiments in their respective state lines.
This lead to

many unqualified men being raised to positions
of regimental
command through the attrition process within
their regiment.

Realizing this was

problem, Congress late in 1778 recom-

a

mended to the states they promote regimentally to
the rank
of captain, and then in the line of the state to
the rank
of colonel.

The following June, Congress told the states

they should make promotions within their respective lines.
The Board of War, after hearing numerous complaints from the

military about this latter system, suggested unsuccessfully
7

Ibid.,

5:762-763.

g

John Adams to General Nathanael Greene, June 22,
177 6, Adams, Work s of John Adams, 9:404; John Adams to
Samuel H. Parsons, June "22
i'776, ibid., 405
,

9

.

John Sullivan to Henry Laurens, January 20, 1778,
Hammond, Letters andJPapers of John Sullivan, 2:16; Ford,
JCC 6 104"3-1044 John Adams "to' John Winthrop, October 2,
i776, MHSC, 5th ser
4:295.
,

:

;

.

,
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during the sunrner of 1780 that Congress
rescind their
previous suggestion to the states as it
had resulted in
much confusion in the military. The
Board of War, supported
by Washington, desired a uniform system,
preferably
one that

provided for promotions within the line.

Finally, on May 25,

1781, a plan acceptable to the military was
adopted.

It

called for promotions to Major General by
seniority; to
brigadier general by brigade; to all other grades

by line;

and to officers of units not attached to any state,
by

regiment^ 10
Selection and promotion of general officers were

problems that faced Congress, the states, and the military

frequently during the first three years of the war.

The

revolutionary leaders believed that well-qualified generals
would be the best instrument for controlling the officer
corps, who in turn could control the army.

Therefore, great

care was exercised in their first selections, and all sub-

sequent promotions to and promotions of general officers.
At Baltimore, during mid February 1777, Congress debated
at great length the best method by which generals would be

selected and promoted.

It was suggested that major generals

Ibid., 11:1157-1158; 14:779; 17:607, 670;
20:539-540; George Washington to John Sullivan, December 17,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:488; Same to
same. May 11, 1781, ibid., 22:70; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1780,
ibid., 20:502.
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be appointed by Washington and the
other generals.
Richard
Henry Lee liked the idea, believing
the military were in
the best position to judge the military
merits of each
other.
Most members of Congress, however,
were adamant in
their opposition to letting the military
have any say in
the selection.

John Witherspoon argued that he had once

made the mistake of letting the seniors at
Princeton elect
their commencement honormen
This had resulted in
much

.

confusion and ill-feeling.

in stronger terms,

Rush,

stated that if the military

in a sardonic manner,

Benjamin

were allowed to make the choice of the generals he would
"move immediately afterwards that all the civil power of
the continent may be transferred from our hands into the

hands of the army,

&

that they may be proclaimed the highest

power of the people."

Agreeing, John Adams stated he was

distressed that some members of Congress were so disposed
to idolize an image which their own hands had molten;

they paid superstitious veneration to Washington.

that

[Note:

this was just six weeks after his victories at Princeton

and Trenton.]

"Altho'

Adams remarked,
superior.

I

honour him for his good qualities,"

"yet in this house

In private life

I

I

feel myself his

shall always acknowledge that

he is mine.

It becomes us to attend early to the restrain-

mg

„11

our army

Weit Mitchell, "Historical Notes of Dr.
Benjamin Rush, 1777," PMHB 27, no. 2 (1903): 139, 140.
'"'S.

2

3

138

During the debates it became obvious
that Congress
did not, for the most part, desire the
military participating in the selection and promotion of
their generals,
and that they desired the interests of
the states be adhered
to whenever possible.
Therefore, a compromise method of

promoting generals was adopted on February
19, 1777.

it

was later referred to as the "Baltimore Resolution."

it

provided for the selection and promotion of general
officers
to be done by Congress, with them giving due regard
for line

of succession, merit, and quota of troops raised and to be

raised by each state.

1

The "Baltimore Resolution" did not end discussion
on the procedures of selecting and promoting the general

officers, for many civilian leaders desired more latitude
in the rewarding and punishing of officers for demonstrating

their merit and for exercising control over their soldiers.
The best way many believed was by annual elections.

Annual

elections had been suggested frequently earlier in the war. 1
12

Francis Lewis to the President of the New York
Convention [Abraham Ten Broeck, February 18, 1777], Burnett,
LMCC 2:261; Thomas Burke's Abstract of Debates, February 12
19, 1777, ibid., 261; James Wilson to Arthur St. Clair,
February 20, 1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers 1:383;
Elbridge Gerry to Henry Knox, February 7, 1778, Austin,
Elbridge Gerry 1:243; Gouverneur Morris to George
Morris 1:170;
Washington^ hlay 27, 1778, Sparks, Gouverneur
^~
Ford, JCC, 7:131-133.
,

,

,

,

1

3

Petition of the Privates of the First Battalion
of Militia, in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, [March 1776],
Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. 8:7438-7439.
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During April 1775, in Fairfax
County, Virginia, George
Mason reminded his fellow citizens,
in his remarks at the
selection of officers for an
independent company, that in
Rome the troops had lost their
loyalty and attachment to
the Republic and gave it to
certain generals. The way to
avoid this in America was annual
elections.
This would,
according to Mason, prevent undue
influences
of cabals.

During the debates in Baltimore, John
Adams and several of
the delegates suggested that annual
elections be adopted
as a means of controlling the military.
"For my Part,"
John Adams wrote his wife, "I will vote upon
the genuine
Principles of a Republic for a new Election of
general

Officers annually, and every man shall have my
Consent to
be left out, who does not give sufficient Proof
of
his

Qualifications."^^

Their suggestion of annual elections

was raised again during the fall of 1777 after several

military defeats.

"There is but one way," Benjamin Rush

wrote John Adams,

"of producing such a change in your army

as will rectify all the disorders which prevail in it.
is by electing your general officers annually.

It

In no other

14

"Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax
Independent Company," circa April 17-26, 1775, Rutland,
Pap ers o f George Mason 1725-^17 92^ 1:230-231.
,

Adams to Abigail Adams, February 21, 1777,
Butterfield, AFC 2:166; see also John Adams Autobiography,
Butterfield, DAJA 2:371; John Adams to Nathanael Greene,
[March 1777], Burnett, LMCC, 2:300.
''"^John

,

,

14

way will you ever purge
the ar.y...l6

0.

such a suggestion

was deeded by .any as a way
of removing Washington,
it was
not pursued with great
vigor by its proponents
after
the

winter of 1777-1778

.

Despite the frequent calls
during the first three
years of the war for better
officers, the revolutionary
leadership, for the .ost part,
was satisfied with their
officer corps.
In many respects the
officers selected
during the first several years
of the war were men who met
the criteria established by the
revolutionary leadership,
as was discussed earlier in this
chapter.
They were men
who reflected and shared their beliefs
about society and
government, who desired neither anarchy
or military tyranny
in any form.

America did not have
talent available in 1775.

a

wealth of military leadership

Therefore, factors other than

military experience were considered in the
selection of the
officers. Among the primary qualifications
considered was
16„

Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 31, 1777
Butterfield, Letters of Beni amin_^sh 1:163; see 'also
Same to same, October 1, 1777, ibid., 157.
.

17^

James Lovell to Samuel Adams, December 20, 1777
Burnett, LMCC, 2:593-594.

the personal character of an
individual

The military

.

leaders certainly considered
this an important consideration.
Washington believed that when
past military service
was not a factor in the
selection of an officer,
the

criteria used should include
the consideration of
whether
the individual "has a just
pretension to the Character of
a Gentleman, a proper sense
of Honor and some reputation
to lose."
General McDougall agreed,
believing the officers
selected must be those "who have
a Sense of Honor and
whose
class in Life is respectable."
General Jethro Sumner
desired officers "whose birth, family
connections and
property bind them to the interests of
their country."
"It is a matter of the utmost
Importance," George Clinton
wrote the chief executive of New Jersey,
"to have

our army

officiered by young Gentlemen of Property,
Sense
A corollary to character was wealth,
for it

&

Spirit."'

was believed

18

Williain

June 3,
History
Shaffer
for the

,

John Adams to William Tudor, July 23 1775
Tudor Papers, MHS; John Adams to Abigail
Adams,
1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:6; Edmund Randolph,
of Virginia, ed. with an intro. by Arthur
H
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia
Virginia Historical Society, 1970), p. 227.
19

George Washington to Patrick Henry, October 5,
1776, Fitzpatrick, Wri^ings_^ JVashing ton
6:167; Alexander
McDougall to Robert Yates, October 21,~T776, Calendar of
^L^2£i.9^1_!l?nu scripts, 2:11; Sunmer quoted in PhiTli^"
Russell, Nor th Carolina in_the Revo l^utio nary War (Charlotte:
Phillips Russell, 1965)
p. 31 ;"George Clinton to William
Livingston, January 13, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of
"
George Clinton, 1:545.
,
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that men of property would
give dignity to the officer
corps and they would be .ore
likely to lay down their
arms
when they were no longer needed
by Congress and the
states.

Numerous men of property and
standing did indeed
join the patriotic ranks.
In Philadelphia,

for instance,

John Adams reported in 1775 that
the city's regiments were
"under Officers consisting of Gentlemen
of the very first
Fortune and best Character in the Place.The best known
of these regiments was even nicknamed
the "Silk Stocking
Company" because of the gentility of its
membership. Many
of its officers were later commissioned
as Continental
off icers.
Similar reports were made about
the sons of

the southern gentry becoming officers.

In Alexandria,

Virginia, when the local revolutionary committee
met in
January 1776 to choose the officers for a new company,

twenty-one names were put forth, all from the first
families
of Fairfax County.

22

Frequently young men of wealth and

20

The New York Provincial Congress to the New York
delegates in the Continental Congress, June 7, 1775,
Berthold Fernow, ed
New York _in_the_Revolut ion (Albany,
New York: Weed, Parsons and Company, Pr in ter s", TS 87
pp 7-8
.
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,
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21

John Adams to Isaac Smith, Sr., June 7, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC, 1:212, Brunhouse, The Counter^Re volution
ij}_Pennsylvania p. 24.
,

22

Nicholas Cresswell, Jou r nal of Nicholas Cresswell,

1774-1777, p. 137.
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position who were not selected or
did not choose to serve
early in the war, joined later
as the war n.oved southward,
often serving at their own expense.
It was not just the wealthy young
southern and

Philadelphia men of wealth and social
standing that served
as officers, for many older northern
men of wealth and
standing also served.
One example was Elias
Boudinot.

During the spring of 1777, Washington
asked him to become
the Commissary General of Prisoners.
When Boudinot said
no, Washington told him that "if Men of
Character

ence would not come forward

would be lost-[.]"

&

&

Influ-

join him in his Exertions all

Being thus influenced, Boudinot reported,

and realizing such a position would allow him to
keep an eye
"on the Military Power

Civil Authority,

I

&

prevent its Incroachment

,

on the

consented to accept the Commission ."

Many of the wealthy New York land-owning families, including
the Van Rensselaers and Livingstons, also supplied numerous

officers
Besides including men of wealth and social standing,
the revolutionary officer corps also included many of the
23

Evans, Thomas Nelson pp. 76-78; Henry P. Johnston,
The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis 1781
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1881), p. 36n.2.
,

24

1:239

9.

Thomas Scharf, History of Dela ware 1609-1888,
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educated and professional class.

The officer corps counted

an,ong

its number hundreds of college
students, graduates,
and faculty. 26 professionals,
such as doctors, also served
as line officers, not just in
their professional capacity.
Among the doctors who held military
command were John

Brooks, David Cobb, John Thomas,
Arthur St. Clair, Edward
Hand, Hugh Mercer, Henry Dearborn,
William Irvine, James
McHenry, James VJilkinson, John Beatty,
John Hazlett, and
Theodorick Bland.

And just as the revolutionary leaders
attempted to
procure the wealthy, educated, and socially
acceptable as

officers, they also attempted to dissuade and
prevent those
they considered socially inferior from receiving
commissions
In North Carolina,

for example, the Provincial Congress,

although allowing the soldiers to select their company
grade
26

Henry P. Johnston, Yale and Her_Honor-Roll in the

^^^^_^?Y£lytion,

pp.
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16,

3 6V

3

8-39

,

84',"~341-34 2 /

Anson Phelps Stokes, Memq ri^al^_qf^_Eminent Yale Men: A
Biographical Study of Stu dent Lif e_^nd 7uHIv|FsItyVJnTl u e n c e
During the Eig hTeenth__and_J^jj-iet_eenth^
2 vols'."
(New Haven: Yale University Press ,'"1914
2:29"0; William H.S,
Demarest, A_H_i story of Rut gers College_J/7_66_-192 4 (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers College, 1924]~r'pp. 101-138;
Samuel Davies Alexander, P£incetqn_ColJ^ge_Dur ing the
Eighteenth Century (New York': Anson D. FT^RandoIph^and
Company, 1872), pp. 149-193; Albert J. Beveridge, The Life
of Joh n Marsha ll
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
4 vols.
1916-1919), l:l55n.3.
)

,

,
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Toner, The Medical Men of the Revolu;^ion,
p. 107n.l.; Louise C. Duncan, Med i cal Meir~in""the 'American
Revolution 1775-1783 (Carlisle Barracks, "Pen n s yTv a rTi a
Medical Field Service School, 1931), p. 36.
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Officers, retained to themselves
the right of v. to.
Durxn g
1778, the Rhode Island General
Assembly denied General
Sullivan's request that four
non-commissioned officers be
cominissioned, because of the
opposition of the Rhode Island
officers who believed the four men
were their social
inferiors.
The influential Van Cortlandt
family, during
the fall of 1775, was able to
dissuade one man from accepting his election to a captaincy;
and another New Yorker,
in a deferential manner, declined
election to a captaincy

because he believed he had neither the
education or
experience to hold such a position.
At his Roxbury, Massachusetts, camp early
in August
1775, Connecticut militia colonel John Chester
asked a

friend whether he should make the most advantage
of his
current militia commission, being a judge, or having
served
as a member of the assembly, with respect to
obtaining a

commission in the regular Continental establishment.^^

A

specific answer to his question could not be located;
however, as a general rule, considerable regard was given

prior legislative experience or current political standing.
28

William Greene to John Sullivan, October 30, 1778,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island 8:473; Otto Huf eland,
Westchester County during the American Revolution 1775-1783
p. 67; [John P. Becker], The Sexagenary, or Reminiscences
of the American Revolution (Albany: W. C. Little and
0. Steele, 1833)
p. 22.
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Many members of the colonial
governments were
selected early in the war to serve
as military leaders.
Washington, for example, had served

for a long period in

the Virginia House of Burgess.

Lord Stirling served on the

New Jersey Governor's Council prior
to the war and Samuel H.
Parsons had served in the Connecticut
General Assembly for

thirteen years before the war.^°

Political leaders, such

as Patrick Henry, Lachlan Mcintosh,

Samuel Elbert, and

Alexander McDougall, were often made senior
military
officers over more qualified men, simply
because of their
political standing.

It is interesting to note that when

Lord Stirling was appointed a general in 1776
before him,

McDougall complained loudly until Philip Schuyler and
John
Jay informed him that the promotion had been made
for
political reasons and was not meant to be an improper

reflection upon his honor or his military ability.

^"^

Local

political leaders were also appointed to military positions,
for it seemed that such natural leaders would be more than
30

Parsons

,

p

.

Ditmas, Stirling
.

18

,

p.

6;

Hall, Samuel H olden

,

31

Champagne, Alexander McD ougall, pp. 35, 91, 107,
111, 238n.; Henry, Patrick Henry
1:312-313; Jenkins,
Button Gwinnett, p. 72.
,
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able in giving direction
and exercising control
over their
neighbors under arms.^^

Political considerations were
observed throughout
the war.
Washington frequently obtained
promotions
for

officers because of political
necessity."
considerations were important

Political

factors for Congress, as well

as for the provincial congresses
and early state legislatures in the selection of the
military officers. One person
complained during July 1776 that
most of the inferior

officers in his colony selected
during the first months of
the war were "the creatures and
absolute dependents of the
governing party." 34 Similarly, Washington
complained late
in 1776 that the states were appointing
officers
"not fit

to be Shoe Blacks from the local
attachments of this or

that Member of Assembly. "^^

And when they did not select

previous political leaders, they selected
themselves.
32
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It was only natural that many
of the revolutionary

leaders, who served in their provincial
revolutionary bodies
during 1775 and 1776 would become
officers, often completely
leaving behind their positions in the
civilian governments.
The New Hampshire Provincial Congress
provided from
its membership numerous military
commanders including John
36
stark.
Similarly, many members of the

revolutionary

organizations of Massachusetts during 1774 and
1775 went
on to distinguished military careers.

These included

Generals William Heath, Artemas Ward, John Paterson,
and

Benjamin Lincoln.

^"^

In Vermont,

sixteen of the twenty-eight

men who served on the Council of Safety would serve in the

military 38
.
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Many members of New York's
provincial conqrcsses
served as military leaders. Among
them were Alexander
McDougall, Robert G. Livingston,
Abraham Ten Broeck, Walter
Livingston, Richard Montgomery, and
Nathaniel Woodhull.^^
In one listing of members of the
provincial congress,

forty-two of the two hundred twenty-six
had
next to their name/°

a

military title

of the twenty-eight men of Rockland

County who served in the provincial congress
and/or the
state legislature, nine served as militia
officers and three
as Continental officers.'*"'"

Many members of the New Jersey Provincial
Congress

played major roles in leading the colony's military
forces
in the field as military cominanders.

These included Willinm

Maxwell, William Winds, William DeHart, Nathaniel Heard,

Charles Stewart, Ephraim Martin, Philemon Dickinson, and
39

Frank Bertangue Green, The^_ History of Rockland
County (New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, TS 8Gl ;^pV^4 -75
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Elijah ClarK.^^

Pennsylvania had .any officers
who served
for varying periods of ti.e
during the war in the
Association, the Flying Camp, and
in the Continental ar.y,
who
served during the first two
years of the war

in the legisla-

tive and constitutional bodies
of the colony.
A:.ong them
were John Nixon, Thomas Hartley,
Henry Haller, John Bayard,
Anthony Wayne, William Irvine, Samuel
Miles, and Daniel

Brodhead/3

Of the twenty-five members
of the first

Committee of Safety nine later served
as military officers,
including Anthony Wayne, William Thompson,
and John

Cadwalader.

Of the thirty-four men who
served in the second

Andrew M. Sherman, Historic Morristown,
New
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Publishing Company, 1905), pp. 152-T73;
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Committee of Safety fourteen served
as military officers.
Further south, Delaware and
Virginia Provincial Congress
members John Haslet, William
Woodford, and William Christian
also served as military officers/^
The deep South

'

s

experience was similar, as civilian

leaders in the provincial bodies became
military officers.
Many of the early military leaders in
North Carolina, both
Continental and militia, served initially in
the provincial
congress and/or one of the several committees
of safety.

Among them were Benjamin Williams, Griffith
Rutherford,

Jethro Sumner, Isaac Gregory, Robert Howe, and
Gideon Lamb.^^
Like their northern neighbor, many South Carolina
military
leaders served in the early provincial and early
state
44
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(May 1940)
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legislative bodies before becoming
officers.^^ Many of
Georgia -s leaders in its
provincial congress and
co^ittee
and councils of safety became
military leaders. These
included Samuel Elbert, Joseph
Habersham, John Martin and
Lachlan Mcintosh.

NO

Early in the war. General Greene
expressed his hope
popular prejudices nor family
connexion
will influence"

the elections of tne
the orticers.
offirPrQ

-u^
He

was ^to be disappointed
,

Often when a political leader did
not hin^self serve in the
military he was able to obtain a
cominission for a family
member or a protege.
John Hancock, for example, got
his
former clerk, William Palfrey, appointed
paymaster of the
Eastern Department and his brother, Ebenezer
Hancock,

appointed deputy.

New Jersey Lieutenant Ebenezer Elmer

reported in his journal early in the war that
he obtained
Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate

^

48,
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Historical Collections of Georgia pp. 214, 215- Peel
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'The Life and Service of the Honorable Major Gen.
Samuel
Elbert of Georgia," MH, extra no. 13 (1887): 9 28; Charles
Colcock Jones, "A Biographical Sketch of the Honorable
Major John Habersham of Georgia," ibid., extra no. 2 (1886):
236-237, 239; Charles C. Jones, Biographical Sketches of
the Delegates f rom_Georgia_jt o the Continental Congress
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1891), p. 114
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his commission from the New
Jersoy Provincial Congress
on
the recommendation of one of
its members, his uncle,

Theophilus Elmer. 50

although Greene and some
otherl
objected to such practices, most
revolutionary leaders
believed that various forms of
nepotism were a deterrent
to military tyranny.
In every state, by blood
or by marriage,

civilian

leaders had relatives and in-laws
serving in the military.
In Georgia, Governor John Houston
had a brother who served
as a continental surgeon; another
who served in the state
legislature; a son-in-law, Lachlan
Mcintosh, who served as
a continental general; and his
father-in-law, Jonathan Bryan,
served in the Council and as vice-president.
Bryan had two
sons who served in the state legislature
and another who
served as a Continental officer.
George Walton, who served as chief executive
of
Georgia, as

a

member of Congress, and as

a

Continental and

^Herbert S. Allan, John Hancock Patriot in Purple
(New York: Macmillan Company, 194 8")\
""p7"27r7~''5^rFar~Kipt^
During an Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer
Elmer
Lieutenant
the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in
the Continental Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias'
Dayton
Printed from the Original Manuscript," PNJHS 2, no 3
;

m

(1847)

:

98.

^'"Edith Duncan Johnston,

The Houstons of Georgia
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1950),
pp. 209, 234,
298-299, 319; [Isabella Remshart Redding], Life and Times
of Jon^_han_ Bryan^_1^08-i;^88 (Savannah: The MornXng New's"
Print, 1901), pp. 79-80."
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n^xlitia Officer, had a
brother who served in
both Congress
and in the state government.

was the Habersha.s.

Another active Ceorgia
fa.il,
Joseph served as a .e.ber
of
the

executive council and speaker
of the assembly, as
well as
a continental officer.
His brother, Ja.es,
also served
as speaker of the assembly.
Their brother,
John, and

brother-in-law, Samuel Elbert,
served as Continental
officers
South Carolina had several
prominent families
supplying both civilian and military
leaders.
Charles
Pinckney, who served in various
civilian positions including
stints in the privy council and
senate, had a first cousin,
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who
served in the state legislature and as a Continental officer.
The latter 's fatherin-law was Henry Middleton and his
brother-in-law was
Arthur Middleton, both civilian leaders.
Another brotherin-law was Continental and militia
officer Daniel Horry.
Horry, who also served in the senate,
had two brothers who
served as Continental officers and in
the state legislature.
The Middletons, who both served in Congress
and in the state
government, by marriage were real ted to Edward
Rutledge, who
also served in Congress and in the state
legislature. His
52
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the Honorable Major John Habersham of Georgia,"
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two brothers, John and Hugh,
both served in the state
government, the former as chief
executive and the latter
as speaker of the House.
Another active family were
the
five Huger brothers.
Isaac was a Continental
general and
a member of the state
legislature; Daniel was a member
of
the House and council; John was
a militia officer,
a member
of the council of Safety, and
Secretary of State; Francis
was Deputy Quartermaster General
of the Southern Department;
and Benjamin was a Continental
officer.
The Gadsdens were
also active, with Christopher serving
as a Continental
general, member of Congress, and as
Lieutenant Governor.
His son, Thomas, was a Continental
officer and his son-inlaw, Thomas Ferguson, was a member of
the House and the
53
privy

council.

North Carolina had several families who were
active
in both civilian and military affairs,
particularly the
Ashes.

John served as

a

member of the Committee of Safety,

Provincial Congress, State Treasurer, and militia
general.
His sons, John, Jr., and Samuel, were Continental
officers.
His brother, Samuel, who served in the military and as
chief
judge, had three sons who served as Continental officers.
53
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of the Senate of Sou t h Carolina pp. 23 9, 241-24 2
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John Ashe-s brother-in-law,
aa„,es Moore, served
in the
Provincial Congress and as a
Continental general. Moore
brother, Maurice, who served
in the Provincial
Congress,
had two sons, and a brother-in-1
utner
law wT.^
who served as Continental
officers. Maurice Moore's
son-in-law was Continental
general Francis Nash, whose
brother was Abner .ash, who
served as governor, in the Provincial
Congress, Council of
Safety, senate, assembly, and as
a member of Congress.
Their father was a member of the
Committee of Safety. other
active North Carolina families were
the Hawkins, Joneses,
•

m

Sumners, Blounts, and Brevards.

John Brevard, who was

active in state government, had six
sons who served in the
military, and by marriage they were
related to Generals

William Lee Davidson and Thomas Polk.

William Blount, who

served in the Continental Army before
serving in the state
legislature and Congress, had two brothers
who served as

Continental officers.

Continental General Jethro Sumner

had two brothers who served in the senate and
two others
who were active in the military. Their brother-in-law,

Elisha Battle, also served in the senate.

Jones both served in Congress.

The latter

Willie and Allen
's

sons-in-law

were Colonel William Richardson Davie and militia General
Thomas Easton.

Benjamin Hawkins, who served in the House,

aide-de-camp to Governor Nash, and in Congress, had
brother, Philemon, who was

a

a

militia colonel, who served
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in the Provincial Congress,

the assembly, and on
the

governor's council.

Many Virginia families also
had family members
serving in military and civilian
positions.
This was

especially true of the Lees and
Randolphs.

Richard Henry

Lee had four brothers, Francis
Lightfoot, Thomas Ludwell,
William Arthur, and a brother-in-law,
William Shippen, Jr.,
who were active in civilian affairs.
His second cousin and
nephew-in-law. Light Horse Harry Lee, was
the cousin of

civil-military leader, Theodorick Bland.

Bland and Thomas

Jefferson were fourth generation Randolphs.

Also related

to the Randolphs were Light Horse Harry
Lee, John Marshall,

State Treasurer Robert Carter Nicholas, and
Speaker of the
Senate, Archibald Gary.
The latter's sons-in-law included

militia Colonel Thomas Mann Randolph and Continental
Captain
54

Leora McEachern and Isabel M. Williams, eds
l^lmington-NewJianover _Sa f ety_Commi ttee Minutes 1774-1776
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^i?:^y_pf__:yil_Son^_of_the_ r|vo1u
(RaleT^T"^ubIIi"hed
by the Society, 1899), pp. 9-12; Ashe, Biographical History
o^North Carolina, 1 45-47 50, 194-195, 4 04~2T3 W-IFeT
3:299; 4:46, 51-52, 252, 254-255; 5:19-20, 140-141, 143-146;
8:18-19, 23, 25-27; VJheeler, His torica l Sketc hes of North
Carolina, 2:237-241 William H. Masterson, WilTiam^Tount
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954"),
pp. 29-45; Kemp P. Battle, "Career of Brigadier-General
Jethro Sumner. One of North Carolina's Revolutionary
Officers," MAH 26, no. 6 (December 1891): 423 Merritt B.
Pound, Benjamin H a wk i n s - 1 nd i a n _Agen t (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1951), p. 3.
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carter Page, son of state leader,
John Page.
The latter
brother, Mann Page, who served
in Congress and the state
legislature, had as a son-in-law
Continental Colonel George
Baylor.
Joseph Jones, a state leader and
•

meiriber

of

congress, had as nephews James Monroe,
John Marshall, and
Thomas Marshall, the latter a captain
in the Virginia
state regiment, and by marriage was
related to General
William Woodford. Governor Patrick Henry's
brothers-in-law
included General William Campbell and Colonel
William
Christian, and his son-in-law was Colonel
Samuel Meredith.
Governor Thomas Nelson, who also served in the
military,

had three cousins serving as Continental officers
and a
brother who served in the state legislature. Member
of

Congress and state leader, Edmund Pendleton had

a

nephew

and an adopted son serving as Continental officers.

On the

Virginia-North Carolina frontier Evan Shelby, general of
the Virginia militia and a member of both North Carolina

and Virginia legislatures, had

a

son,

Isaac, who served in

both state's militia and state legislatures.^^
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Brock, Archibald Gary pp. 6, 47, 121, 122; Thomas
Boyd, Light-Horse Harry Lee (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1931), p. 10; Jonathan Daniels, The Randolphs of
Virginia (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
1972), Genealogy chart, pp. 95, 99; Conway, Omitted Chapters
of History p. 36; Oliver Perry Chitwood, Richard Henry Lee:
Statesman of the Revolution (Morgantown: VJest Virginia
University Press, 1967), p. 211; Curtis P. Nettles, George
Washington and the American Independence (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1951)
p. 124; Stewart, William Woodford
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Maryland Governor Thomas Johnson,
who served in
congress and as a general of the
militia, had four brothers
serving in the militia.
John Hanson, who served in
Congress,
was related to Colonel Robert
Hanson Harrison, Washington's
military secretary, and to members of
Congress

^

Daniel of

St.

Thomas Jenifer and Thomas Stone.

Hanson's three sons

served in the Continental Army, one of
whom, Alexander Contee
Hanson, served as private secretary to
Washington

Delaware and New Jersey had numerous
families with
their members serving in military and civilian
positions.
George Read, who served as chief executive of
Delaware and
as a member of Congress, had two brothers who
served in the

military and two brothers-in-law who were active:
Bedford as
a

a

Gunning

Continental lieutenant colonel, and George Ross,

member of Congress.

Provincial Congress and

Ephraim Martin, who served in the
a

member of the council, had

a

son

Papers of John Marshall (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1974), p. 312n.4; Thomas Perkins Abernethy,
From Frontier to P lantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier
Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1932), p. 20; Evans, Thomas Nelson pp. 61, 127; Robert Leroy
Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund Pendleton (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), pp. 86, 150,
239; Draper, King's Mountain
pp. 383, 412, 414; Scharf,
History of Maryland 1:450-451.
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^^Ibid., 452-454; Jacob A. Nelson, John Hanson and
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Publishing Company, 1939), pp. 113-114; J. Bruce Kremer,
John Hanson of Mulberry Grove (New York: Albert and Charles
Buni, 1938)
pp. 40-41.
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Who served as a Continental
officer. Many of .3„
.erseys
delegates to Congress had
relatives who served in the
n,ilitary.

Por example, John Witherspoon
had three sons who
served as military officers;
and Willia. Livingston,
who
also served as the chief
executive, was related by
birth
and marriage to the New Yor.
Livingstons, who provided nany
military officers. His son,
Broc.holst, was a Continental
Officer, whose brothers-in-law
were John Jay and Lieutenant
colonel William Smith Livingston.
William Livingston's
nephew was Continental officer
Matthew clarkson and his
brother-in-law was General Stirling,
whose brother-in-law
was state leader John Stevens.
Stirling's son-in-law was
William Duer, who served in Congress
and in the New York
legislature. 5 7
57
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Pennsylvania's delegates to
Congress also had
relatives serving in the military.
Frederick Muhlenberg's
brother was General John Peter
Gabriel Muhlenberg, and John
Armstrong, Sr s son served as a
Continental Officer. James
Wilson and George Ross had as their
brother-in-law Mark
Bird, who was a militia lieutenant
colonel and Deputy
Quartermaster General. John Dickinson's
brother,
.

'

Philemon,

was

a

militia general, as well as

a

member of Congress.

The

Dickinsons were cousins to Colonel Lambert
Cadwalader and
General John Cadwalader. The Dickinsons
and Cadwaladers,
by marriage, were related to militia
General Samuel Meredith,
as were members of Congress George Clymer
and militia

Colonel Henry Hill.

Another member of Congress, Edward

Biddle, had as brothers, Owen Biddle, who served
as Deputy"

Commissary General of Forage and as

a

member of the Board

of War; and Charles Biddle, Vice President of the
state;
and Clement Biddle, who served as Commissary General
of

Forage and Quartermaster General of Pennsylvania.

brother-in-law was Peter Scull, who served as

a

Their

Continental

officer and later, Secretary to the Board of War.^^
The Traitor and the Spy p. 161; Edward Brockholst Livingston, The L i vingston s of Livingston Manor, pp. 525-526.
,
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James Haltigan, The Iri sh in th e Americ a n Revo lut^ion an d t heir Early Influence in the _Colonies (Washington, D.C.: Patrick J. Haltigan", 1908)", pp.~2"d2
236-237;
Edward W. Hooker, The Fighting Par son of t he American
Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg
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One cannot discuss the civil-military
family
relationship in New York without mentioning
the Livingstons.
Philip Livingston, Second Lord of the
Manor, had five
children: Robert, Peter, Philip, William,
and Sarah, who
themselves, their spouses or their children
were active
during the war.
Robert's son, Peter, was a militia colonel
and member of the assembly; another son,
John, was an aidede-camp to Governor Clinton; another son, Henry,
who was
a

militia lieutenant colonel; and his daughter
married James

Duane, whose son-in-law was Major William North.

Peter was

President of the Provincial Congress.

a

of the Provincial Congress,

Congress.

Philip was

member

the senate, and the Continental

His son, Henry P. Livingston, was an officer in

Washington's Life Guards.

William Livingston was

of Congress and Governor of New Jersey.

mentioned earlier.

a

member

His children were

Sarah Livingston was the wife of Lord

Luth eran C lergyman, Mili ary Chiefta in and Pol it ical Leader
(Philadelphia: Edward W. Hocker, i936), p. 133; FirgiTson,"
Paper s of Robert Morris 1 261-262n 9 Kirkland, Letters
on the American Revolution, l:91n.8; Wharton Dickinson,
"Philemon Dickinson: Ma jor-General New Jersey MilitiaRevolutionary Service," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 420;
Charles Biddle, Auto biography of Charles Biddle, Vice^;;^
President of the S upreme E x ecutive CounciT~of ~Pennsy"lvania
1745-1821 (Philadelphia: E. Claxton~and Company, 18~83T, p. 74
David R. B. Nevin, Con tin ental Sket ches of Distinguished
Pennsylvanians pp. 169-170; Morton L. Montgomery 7~H istor y
of Berks Co unty, P enns ylvania
in the Revolu tion
from 1774
to 178 3, pp. 212, 268-269; James Ripley Jacobs, Tar nish ed
vrarr i or: Ma j r -Gene ral James VJil k inson (New York: Macmil Ian
Company 19 3 8)", P 59T
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Stirling and their son-in-law
was Willia. Ouer.
Then there
were the related cousins,
Judge Robert R. Livingston
of
Clermont, Robert G. Livingston,
and Henry Livingston
of
Dutchess county.
..dge Livingston had three
sons and three

sons-in-law active in cxvil and
military positions during
the war, including Colonel
Henry Beek.an Lxvingston;

.ember

of Congress Robert R. Livingston;
militia Major John R.
Livingston; Major General Richard
Montgomery; Dr. Thomas

Tillotson, Physician Surgeon of the
Northern Department; and
Morgan Lewis, aide to Gates, and
Quartermaster General
of

the Northern Army.

The latter's father, Francis
Lewis, was
a member of Congress.
Robert G. Livingston had three
sons
in the military:
Robert G. Livingston, Jr., who was
a

Continental colonel and member of the
Provincial Congress;
Gilbert R. Livingston, a Continental officer;
and Henry

G.

Livingston, a brigade-major and aide-de-camp
to Lord
Stirling.
Henry Livingston of Dutchess County had two
sons,
Henry, Jr., and Robert H., who were Continental
officers.

Another New York family actively involved

in civil-

ian and military affairs, who by marriage were
related to

Philip Livingston
59
TJ^v ingst on
A_ Go dchil d

("The Signer"), were the Van Rensselaers.

Edwin Brockholst Livinqston, The Livin gstons of
Manor pp. 515-535 545-556 22 7-229 BaxteF,"
of Washington, p. 98.
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Their military involvc.ont
is evidenced by the
fact that
twelve of then, served in the
northern campaign of 1777.
Pierre Van Cortlandt, who by
marriage was related to the
Livingstons, served as chairman
of the committee and
council
Of safeties, member of the
Provincial Congress, President
Pro Tern of the senate, and
Lieutenant Governor.
His son,

Pierre, and son-in-law, Abraham
Van Wyck, were Continental
officers. Other active New York
families were the Morrises,
McDougalls, Clintons, Schuylers, and
Gansevoorts.
Peter
Gansevoort, a Continental colonel and
militia general, had
a brother, Leonard, who was
a member of the Provincial
Congress; his brother-in-law, Jacob
Cuyler, was also a

member of the Provincial Congress and
Deputy Commissary
General of Purchases; his uncle, Volkert P.

Duow, was Vice-

President of the Provincial Congress.
member of Congress and

a

Philip Schuyler,

major general, had as

a

a

son-in-law

Alexander Hamilton, and his brother-in-law was
John Cochran,
Director of the Military Hospitals.
Schuyler's mother was
a

Van Cortlandt, his wife a Van Rensselaer, and he
was

related to the Livingstons
60^^ ^
Ibid., pp. 68, 409, 451; Van Rensselaer, Annals
o^the Van R enss elaers, pp. 217-219, 548; Henry B. Di"^7i^,
Westches ter-Cou nty, Ne w York _Durjmq_the_A^
p. 105n.7; Koebling, Th^e Jour nal of th e Reverend Silas"
Constant, p. 430; Alice"'P. Kenney, The Ga hsevoo3rj:T"oF~Albany:
i^ic i an s_Jji_th^ Upp er Hud son Valley
Sy r a cu sel
Syracuse University Press, 1969), pp. 8 97~9"2 93, 119;
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Governor and General George
Clinton's brother was
General Jan.es Clinton, whose
son, Alexander,
was a

continental officer.

George Clinton's
brothers-in-law

included a .ilitia lieutenant
colonel and Christopher
Tappan, a state leader and
.ilitia .ajor. Tappan s
son,
Peter, was a Continental
officer.
Clinton was also related
to .ilitia colonel Charles
DeWitt, who also served
in the
Provincial Congress, Council
of Safety, and the Assembly.
Major General Alexander McDougall,
who also served in
Congress, had two sons who were
Continental officers. His
brother-in-law was Daniel Roberdeau
of Pennsylvania, and
his son-in-law was the Judge
Advocate of the an.y, John
Lawrence.
General Lewis Morris, who also
served in
Congress, had two sons who were
Continental officers.
His
half brother was Gouverneur Morris.
•

New England also had

a

large nuinber of families who

were involved in civil and military
affairs, especially in
Connecticut.
Silas Deane had as a father-in-law
militia
General Gordon Saltonstall; his oldest
step-son was Colonel
Samuel B. Webb, whose father-in-law was
John Jay; and
his

youngest step-son was John Webb, who served as
an aide-decamp to Generals Greene and Howe, and whose
father-in-law
6

Ibid., pp. 53, 161; Bliven, Under the Guns,
Champagne, Me^xander__ McDougall, p. 1787 MorrTs',^ J^hn p. 119;
Jay,
l: 325n.5, 7; Baxter, A_Godchi_ld ofJVashingt^
pT^'ITT
Kirkland Lettjrs_on^the_Amerf
2 24n 3
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was colonel aohn Chester
of the Connecticut
State Hegi.ent
Roger Sherman had three
sons who were Continental
officers
and Ceorge Wyllys, Secretary
of State, had two sons
serving
as continental officers
and another as a militia
officer.
Militia Major General Jabez
Huntington, who served in
the
assembly, had four sons in
military service, including
Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer
Huntington and General Jedediah
Huntington, whose father-in-law
was Governor Jonathan
Trumbull.
Jabez Huntington's brother-in-law
was Colonel
Experience Storrs, who served both
in the militia
and the

Continental army.

Governor Trumbull's three sons,
Joseph,

Jonathan, and John, were Continental
officers, the latter
two serving on Washington's staff.
His son-in-law, William
Williams, was a member of Congress. ^2
Massachusetts,
James Warren, Sr., President of the
Provincial Congress and
later Speaker of the House, had a son
who was a naval
officer.
His father-in-law was James Otis, whose
son-in-law
was Benjamin Lincoln, and whose sons,
James Otis, Jr., was
a naval officer and Samuel Alleyne
Otis was a member of the

m

state Board of War and Deputy Clothier General.

The

Ford, Samuel Blachle ^^_Webb l:xxvii-xxx, 178n,,
212-213n.; 3:268; Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 62; Johnston,
Yale a nd Her Honor--R^on_ij2^ the Amer ican Revolution
pp. 8,
24, 265; Humphreys, L^fe ami _Times_of Davjjd_ Humphreys,
1:135;
Seymour, A_^gres_sive_ Hi sjx)ry pp. 56',' 53, "177"^ '^tFc'"
Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 1, 2n., 166n.; Trumbull,
^ZHI^tll£D_T£]i^HH' PP- 17 0-176.
,

.

167

President of the Massachusetts
Board of War, Sa.uel Phillips
Savage, had two sons serving
as Continental officers
and
another who was a major of the
South Carolina militia.
Massachusetts Board of War member
Jonathan Glover, who was
also a mender of the legislature
and colonel of the militia,
had as a brother General John
Glover.
Member of Congress
Robert Treat Paine 's brother-in-law
was Lieutenant Colonel
David Cobb, who served as an aide-de-camp
to

Washington."

Governor Samuel Ward of Rhode Island,
who also served in
Congress, had a brother, Henry, who was
Secretary of State;
a son,

Samuel, who was

a

Continental officer who served as

an aide-de-camp to Washington, and whose
father-in-law was

Governor William Greene; and

a

son-in-law. Colonel William

Greene, whose cousin was Nathanael Greene.

Governor

William Greene's cousins included Nathanael Greene
and
Griffin Greene, Paymaster of the First Rhode Island
Regiment.
General Greene's brother, Jacob, was

a

member of

a

county

Committee of Safety; his brother-in-law, William Littlefield,
was

a

Continental officer; and his cousin was Colonel
6 3

Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb 2:247n.; Francis S.
Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of
Massachusetts pp. 385, 497; Samuel Savage Shaw, [pri.
"Adams-Savage Correspondence, 1776-1785," PMHS 4 3 (October
1909-June 1910): 328-329, 328n.2; George AthiTT Billias,
General J oh n Glover and His xMarble hoad Mariners (Now York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1960), p. 6 07~ Ral pF 3av o 1 Two Men
of Taunton in the Cour se of Human Even ts 1731-1829 (Taunton,
Massachusetts: Davol Publishing Company, 1912), pp. 176-177.
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Christopher Greene, whose
son-in-law was Continental
Captain
Thomas Hughes. Governor
Nicholas Cooke's sons-in-law
were
Lieutenant Colonel Jere,„iah
Olney and New York militia
Lieutenant Colonel Asa Waterman.
Deputy Governor Bradford's
son. Major Willia. Bradford,
was an aide-de-camp to
General
Lee.
state leader and militia
Major General Joshua Babcock
had two sons who served as
Continental officers.
New
Hampshire chief Executive Meshech
Weare had a son serving
as a Continental officer and
Vermont's Chief Executive
Thomas Chittenden had a son-in-law,
Matthew Lyon, who served
In the continental Army as
Paymaster of the Vermont troops,
secretary to the Governor and Council,
and Assistant State
Treasurer
'

o.
83-84,
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Potter, The Military History of the State
of New-Hampshire, From Its Settlement, in 1623, to the
Rebellion, in 1861: Comprising an account of the St irring
Events Connected therewith: Biographical Notices of man
y
of the Officers Distinguished Therein: and Notes Expl ana"torv
of the Text (Concord: McFarland and Jenks, TR66), p. -^n?n.;
James Haltigan, The Irish in the /American Revolution a nd
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Although many of the officers
were from the educated
and wealthy class of colonial
society, for the most part,
the officers were men who were
selected because
of their

popularity with their neighbors who,
in many cases, elected
them.
This often meant men of simple and
respectable means.
A Frenchinan observed that "by far the
greatest part of the
American officers are farmers and farmers'

sons of independ-

ent or easy

f ortunes

.

"

^

^

Another Frenchman observed the

American officers corps "is composed of
deserving and prosperous artisans, well-known and respected
merchants,
and

farmers, beloved and revered by their neighbors

"^"^
.

These

observations were particularly true of the middle and
New
England states, which produced most of the Continental
officers.

Innkeepers and tavern owners, who were generally

66^
,
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popular in their co„u.unities

,

often became officers,

particularly as colonels and
generals.
George Weedon; Jethro Sumner;

A^onc, the™ were

John Greaton; Henry Haller;

and Israel Putnam who, in
addition to being
kept a tavern.

a

farmer, also

Because the American revolutionary
military officers
were, for the most part, a
reflection of civilian
society,

it is understandable that they
shared the same goals with
respect to their struggle with Great
Britain.
There were

some exceptions, of course.

Some openly avowed Loyalists

joined the American military forces
during 1775 and 1776
simply to prevent anarchy until the
dispute with the mother

Artillery Company of Massachu setts 1638-1888
4 vols
(Boston: Aitred Mudge and Son, 1895-1901)
2 -68-69
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Biographical Sketches of the Generals of the Continental
Army of the Revolution (Cambridge: John wn ^nn ^r.r^ g^n
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country could be resolved within
the fra.eworK of the
.„pire
However, when the colonies
declared themselves independent,
these officers left military
service.
Some so-called
•Sons of Liberty also became
officers.

Early in 1777, a

former Boston Sons of Liberty leader,
Paul Revere, wrote
another colleague that he found but
few of their former
friends in the army.
Those that did join were generally
of
the moderate disposition."^"^
What were the goals they shared?

American soldier fighting?

Why was the

Before setting out from

Philadelphia in July 1775 to the scene of
battle in New
England, James McHenry made out his will,
explaining he was
off to war "to defend the liberties of
Americans

and mankind,

against the enemies of both."

McHenry was not the only

soldier to put his participation in the revolutionary
war
in such moral terms, on such a high plane.

During the

summer of 1777, General Parsons stated he was fighting
to

maintain the right of humanity and to vindicate the liberties
of freemen.

Timothy Pickering, later that year at Valley

Forge, told his wife that "the cause of America
as the cause of humanity."

I

consider

Even Washington expressed his

'^^"Diary of James Allen,

Esq., of Philadelphia,
9, no. 2 (1885): 186.

Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB
71

Paul Revere to Colonel [John Lamb], April 5, 1777,
Elbridge Henry Goss, The Li fe of Colonel_Paul__Revei^, 2 vols.
'
(Boston: Joseph George Cupples ,' 1891
1:280-28X7
)

,
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belief that the A:.erican forces
were fighting for the
essential rights and liberties of
the present generation,
and for millions yet unborn.
"Our cause," he told James
Warren, "is noble, it is the cause
of Mankind. "^2
The soldiers were more likely
to see the war in
terms of the Whig rhetoric of the
day.
Officers frequently

reminded themselves and their soldiers
they were fighting
to protect American rights, liberties,
properties and
lives
The officers also believed that
whatever sacrifices
they made in terms of life and property
was necessary to

ensure that the lives, properties and liberties
of their
neighbors were safe against British tyranny.
Early in the

James McHenry s will dated July 29, 1775 in
The
James_McHenry_Papers, 2 auction catalogs (New York! Park^
Bernet Galleries, Inc., 1944), 2:56; Samuel H. Parsons
to
Samuel B. Webb, August 21, 1777, Webb, Samuel B. Webb,
p. 2 6 3; Timothy Pickering to Mrs. Timothy PickerTHg~
December 13 1777, Pickering, Timothy^ickering 1:196;
George Washington to James Warren, March"~3l7~Ty79 Fitzpatrick. Writings of Washington, 14:313, 312-313; 'see also
George Washington to the Ministers, Elders, Deacons and
Members of the Reformed German Congregation of New York City
Nov. 27, 1783, ibid., 27:249.
'

,

,

,

73

General Orders, ibid., 5:424; Orders by Robert
Howe
Francis Marion's Orderly Book, June 28, 1777, Gibbes,
Docum entary History of the American Revolution 2:61; Campbell, Orde rly Book, p. 2; "The Orderly Book of Colonel
William Henshaw, October 1, 1775, through October 3, 1776,"
PAAS 57 (April 16, 1947-October 15, 1947): 120; Philip
Schuyler to David Wooster, July 3, 1775, Gerlach, P hilip
Schuyler, p. 284; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln,
September 28, 1779, [copy]
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5)
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war, .enc. .n,...„

^^^^^^

realized "if we succeed
amends for my lost
time.

t
I

am

m

no fp^r^ear r^-p
of making ample
i

•

If
-Lr

we fail
fail, anything
in this
Country is not worth
a thought
g'^t. "
simii
i
Similarly
General Wayne
wrote Ms „i,e .H.t
...e
o. U.er., e.n„o.
.e

Co.cest an. .est Spi.its o.
tMs

:ana is ..t a tri.Un,

Consideration for the
tne Kich
Rir^h t
Inheritancerespite these expressions
•

of

f

.]

ia
"''^

they fou.ht, there

were those K.,i,s who
often g.estionea the
motives of the
^xlitary.
^o .onths into the war Greene
wrote that the
American soldiers desire,
only to devote themselves
..0 ar.s
not for the invasion of
other Countries
but for the defence

Of our own; not for the
gratification of our own
private
interest, tut for the
Publick security." .
,ear and a half
later, Greene wrote the
Governor of Rhode Island,
"so.e

-ongst

you,

am told are uncharitable
enough to charge
the ar.y with a design of
protracting the war for their
own
I

private advantage."
the truth.

He said nothing could
be further fro.

Nevertheless, in early 1781,
Thornas Sumter

i;^f°™-^=-e^^
1

777

T.-i

y

Tilghman to James Tilghman,
February 22

1^
,

personal glory and private gain
were

uuiie

/,

LIU, stille,

An_thony Wayne, pp.

66-67.
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th. goals Of .any of

Ms

fellow soldiers."

„ost soldiers

'

however, simply wanted to
end the war as soon
as possible
.nder honorable conditions,
so that they could
return to
their peaceful .cans of
profit.
Few indeed envisioned
becoming professional soldiers.
Most si.ply saw themselves
as temporary soldiers,
citizens with a military duty
to
perform.

William Blackstone, in his
Commentar i_es_^n_th^ La^
oOBgland, wrote that in free states "a man
puts not off
the citizen when he enters
the camp, but it is because
he
is a citizen and would wish
to continue so that he
makes
himself for a while a soldier. "^^
This was certainly true
of the American soldiers during
their revolutionary war.
Washington certainly always considered
himself a citizen
first.

"When we assumed the Soldier,"
Washington told the

New York legislature in June 1775,
the Citizen."

"we did not lay aside

Three years later, he told a friend that
the

Continental soldiers were "Citizens having
all the ties,
and interests of Citizens," and that
they should
be

75

Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., July 14
1775, Showman, Paper s__of_ General J^jUiana^
99.
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January~237T77 p
7
Bartlett, Records of Rhode_Island 8:117; Thomas
Sumter to
Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1781, "Letters to General
Greene and Others," SCHGM 16, no. 3 (July 1915): 98.
,
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England,

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
(Oxford: Clarendon Press r7 6 5~-r769rr~rrT3
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considered, with Congress, as having
"einbarked in one
Cause... and [with] the same End."^^
The French minister
reported to Vergennes early in 1779 that
Washington
was

constantly setting forth the principle that
one must be
citizen first and an officer and soldier
"^^
afterwards
.

a

But

Washington was not the only one making such
statements.
At a meeting held in

a

park in New York on August 10,

1814, Marinus Willett told a gathering that the
favorite

toast of the revolution was "May every Citizen be
and every Soldier a Citizen
^
toast.

80

"^^

This was indeed

a Soldier,

popular

a

This sentiment the military not only shared

amongst themselves but also reassured the civilian leaders
they were citizens first, and foremost.

Knox early in 1778

during the so-called "Conway Cabal" wrote Elbridge Gerry
it was true that some persons who were and had been in the

army wished to have their power perpetuated at the expense
77

George Washington to the New York Legislature,
June 26, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Was hington 3:305;
George Washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778, ibid.,
11:291.
,

78

March
p.

7,

Conrad Alexandre Gerard to Comte de Vergennes,
1779, Meng Despatches and Instructions of Gerard
,

79
p.

,
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Second Lieutenant [Thomas? Blake s Journal
E.g.,
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of the liberties of their
fellow citizens,

"but it is by

no means the sentiment or
wish of the army in general,
who

consider themselves only as
citizens in arms, and who would
rejoice to return to private life
were the independence of
America established." Almost five
years later, General
St. Clair told the army's
committee then at Philadelphia
they should "remind Congress that
when they took
up arms

it was not with a view to make a
profession."

He stated

that if most of the officers and
soldiers had known the war
would have lasted so long they would
have not engaged in
the armed forces.
There was little exaggeration in this
statement, for most believed the war would
be of only short
duration
The military, except for a few would-be
professionals
and glory seekers, desired nothing more than
to return to

their civilian status with no other reward than the
appro-

bation of their fellow citizens for having done their duty.^^
"We are Soldiers ambitious only to restoring the violated

Rights of Citizens-and these secured," General Schuyler wrote
the first summer of the war,

"We are to return instantly to

81

Henry Knox to Elbridge Gerry, January 4, 1778,
Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:239; Major General Arthur St. Clair
to Alexander McDougall, Colonels Matthias Oaden and John
Brooks, December
], 1782, Smith, The St.'ciair Papers,
[

1:574

.
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Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., May
],
"Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 455.
[
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the Business

&

Employments of Civil Life."^^

Washington certainly desired,
from the first week
of his command, to return to
the peaceful banks of
the
Potomac.
On his way to Cambridge
he addressed the New
York
legislature on June 26, 1775. He
told them he desired the
war to end as soon as possible,
stating "we shall most
sincerely rejoice with you in that
happy hour when the

establishment of Ainerican Liberty,
upon the most firm and
solid foundations, shall enable us
to return to our Private
stations in the bosom of a free,
peaceful and happy
country."

By the end of that summ^er,

in hot and humid

New England, Washington told Congress
"there is not a Man
in America, who more earnestly Wishes
such a Termination
of the Campaign, as to make the Army no
longer

necessary."

As the war lengthened into years, and
Washington remained

hundreds of miles from his beloved Mount Vernon,
his desire
to return home increased.
By the summer of 1779, he

confessed to Joseph Reed "the first wish of my Soul
is to
return to that peaceful retirement, and domestick ease

and

happiness from whence

I

came."

Two years later, he told

John Armstrong that he panted for retirement,

"for those

domestic and rural enjoyments which in my estimation far
surpasses the highest pageantry of this v^orld."
83 ^

.
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By the

.

Philip Schuyler to David Wooster, July
Gerlach, Philip Schuyler pp. 284-285.
,

3,

1775,

•

fall Of 1782, Washington
ha. only been ho.e
one ti.e in

There is not a Man in
America,"
a/
ne told
he
to]d .a m
^
.
New England
minister late inn 1782
"^->.
=
that
more Fervently wishes
for
Peace, and a return to
private life than I do."^^
other
officers shared these
sentiments.
+-

During the second month
of the war, Greene
told
his wife that he would
rather be home than be a
soldier
Greene's desire to return
to his fa.rly and
friends in Rhode
island increased the longer
he remained away.
He told a
cousin during the su^ner of
1780 that "No pleasure
is equal
to domestic happiness" and
his desire for the war
to
end

so he "might return to my
dear fireside."

extremely happy,

"

"i

should be

he told his wife the following
spring,

the war had an honourable close,
and

little family about me."

I

"if

on a farm with my

During the mid summer of
1781, he

told her his desire for the war's
end and his retirement to
their home, "where love and softer
pleasure are to be found."
When Gouverneur Morris suggested
to Greene that he really

.^^^^e Washington to the New York Legislature,
June 26
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3-305rT^t
A
I
George
Washington to the PreiidiKt-^FTh^C^tlHiFtal
Congress, September 21, 1775, ibid.,
3:511; George
Washington to Joseph Reed, July 29, 1779,
ibid
16-9George Washington to John Armstrong, March
26, '1781; ibid
Washington to William Gordon, October 23, "
inli
JT'''^^
25:288; see also Washington's Circular of
""rioA'
t
May
4, 1782, ibid., 24:234-238.
'
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enjoyed the military life
Greene responded by
y lite, rrr^^^no
telling him
that he was "truely domestic."
-The more I am in an
army
and the more I am acquainted
with human nature," he
wrote
Morris, "the less fond I am
of political life.-^^
"I wish for nothing
more," General Wayne wrote
late
in 1778, "than an opportunity
of returning to my
'Sabine

field,' with safety to my
country and honor to myself."
Late on a cold December
1777 night Jedediah Huntington
wrote
home that he hoped "God in his
Great Mercy" would restore
peace to the land so "that I may
return To the Duties and
Joys of Domestick Life." The
following summer he wrote "I
most ardently hope for a speedy
End to the War and I think
it seems to be the wish of
almost everyone." it certainly
was the feeling of Timothy Pickering.
During the summer
of 1777 he told his young bride that
he hoped the war would
be brought to a speedy finish so he
could "return to the

arms of my beloved."
85
i-7-7t:

1775
82;

Later that summer, he told her that

Nathanael Greene to Catherine Greene, June

ou
Showman,

52l^Papers_o^^eneraljga^^
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Nathanael Greene 2
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297; Nathanael Greene to
1781, ibid., 3:209; Same to
351; Nathanael Greene to
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when he joined the
campaign.

86

A™y

he thought the war would
last one
^^^^

Evidence of the desire to be
citizens first was the
fact that so few officers and
soldiers served the whole war.
Yet many believed they had an
obligation to serve in a
civilian capacity if they did not
serve in a military one.
Thus, numerous revolutionary
leaders served in civilian
positions once having left military
service.
And frequently
officers served in a civilian capacity
while serving in the
mil i tary
Many revolutionaries moved frequently
between

civilian and military positions.

Examples in the northern

states are numerous, including such leaders
as Benjamin

Lincoln, John Sullivan, Thomas Mifflin, Joseph
Reed, Philip

Schuyler, George Clinton, Alexander McDougall,
Caesar Rodney,

John Dickinson, Philemon Dickinson, and Thomas
McKean.^"^

^^Anthony Wayne to Joseph Reed, December 28, 1778
Moore, Anthony W ayne, p. 75; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez'
Huntington, December 10, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC
20 (1923): 386; Same to same, June 10, 1781, ibid., 2 0:409;
Timothy Pickering to Mrs. Rebecca Pickering, June 3, 1777,'
Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); and Same
to same, June 23, 1777, ibid.
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Benjamin Lincoln pp. 221-228; Lawrence Shaw Mayo, John
Langdon of New Hampshire (Concord: Rumford Press, 1937),
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The southern states probably
had .ore individuals
.oving
back and forth between
civilian and military
positions,
primarily because of the lack
of numerous leaders.
Such
not only strengthened the
ties between the civilian
and the military, but
reinforced civilian virtues
and goals.
Besides desiring the officer
corps be as .uch as
possible a reflection of the
civilian revolutionary leadership, it was the universal
desire of the revolutionary

™ent

leaders that the military would
subordinate themselves to
the^ivilian leadership, to the principle
and practice of
"Biographical Sketch of Colonel Thomas
Har?le; ""oTtt Pennsylvania Line,"
PMHB 25, no. 3 (1901)^nf^n^'
M
I
303-306; Morton
L. Montgomery, HistoF^f
Berks County

Penr^ania,_in_tl^

Schar f Hi|tor^_o£2hilade2phi¥7-lT^^
j^;eph
Reed, pp. 66-67
82
120, 122^23
125, 129
147
lJ§^^
178-179; Frank Bertangue Green, The_History
of Rockland
C2^nty pp. 74-75; Henry B. Dawson,
Weitchiitii^bunt^ New
York, During_^he_American
Revolution7-^T09^TIT-cbiistH
Thoma_s_McKean, pp. 13^7-145^7-217; New
Jer^e^ ArcMve^,
2d ser., 2:128nl; Offutt, Patriotic
MaF^iiTdT-B 210"^
Christopher Ward, 11ie_Dela{:^iF^-Cb:HtTHiKt^I^1776-1783
111p
John A. Munroe, Federaliit:p¥l aware
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,1775-18T5~rN¥vrBFunswick
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"Revolutionary
Diary of William Lenoir," JSH 6, no. 2 (May
1940): 250n.5;
Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina,
2:56-57,
99, 101, 162, 165; Ashe, Biograph ical History of North
Carolina, 4:392-395; 5:75- /6, 467-468; 7:2-4; Lyman
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^^^P^^r King's Mountain p. 4 78; Reynolds, Biographical
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civil supremacy.

The question of civilian
control was
raised frequently in the
years preceding the war
and would
be constantly during the
war itself.

When asked to remove the
troops from the Boston
metropolis during 1769, Governor
Bernard responded that he
had no authority over the
King's troops.
This brought a
response by the Massachusetts
House of Representatives that
the civil power must have
control over the military.
This response was to be expected,
as if in a knee jerk
reaction, because the American
colonists firmly believed
in Cicero's dictum "Cedant arma
togae," i.e., let arms yield
to law.
The colonists knew their classical
history, as well
as the history of the preceding
two centuries.
They knew
that whenever the military was not
checked by civilian
authority, military tyranny was instituted.
A meeting of
delegates of New London and Windham Counties
in Connecticut
rhetorically asked, "What subdued the Roman &
Grecian

Republicks, An Army not under the Control of
the civil

Magaistratel" 90

Most Americans had, to varying degrees

Francis Bernard to the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, May 31, 1769, Bradford, Speeches of the
Governor_o^Mas sachusetts 1765^:1775, p. 168T~Th^Miiii^usetts House of Representatives to Francis Bernard, June 13
1769, ibid., pp. 169-170.
90

Memorial to the Connecticut General Assembly from
the delegates of New London and Windham Counties, September
1774, CHSC, 20:215.
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after

.no„Xea,e o. t.e ae.a.es
in .„,,3na conce.ni.,
parliamentary control of
t.e .iUtary.
..en .ore ;.eri.ans
.new the story of .ow
Cro.weU ana the Major
Cenerais ruiea
England in a tyrannical
fashion.^^ By the
institution of
the coercive Acts, .ost
;^ericans were, as discussed
earlier, aware that the
military of the King
co.ld very
easily duplicate what had
happened in England a
century
before. They, at least many
Whigs, believed
that the

Ministry was using the military
xn the colonies as the
sword
of their conspiracy to
usurp them of
their freedom and

liberty.

Governor Bernard's lack of
control over the
military was just another proof.
it is not surprising
then,
that during 1774-1775 the
Whigs included among their
charges
against the Ministry its attempt
to render the colonial

governments subordinate to the
military.
Jefferson, in his
A^Su™^ri^view^f_t_he_^R^^

British- America during the summer
of 1774, stated the British
imposed a standing army upon them
of soldiers "not made up
of the people here, nor raised by
the authority of our laws"
and that the King had "expressly
made the civil subordinate
to the military."

He wrote that "Every state must
judge

for itself the number of armed men
which they may safely
trust among them, of whom they are to
consist, and under
91

Schwoerer, ;;No_Jtandijig_Armie^

pp.
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3,

34,

71.
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What restrictions they
are to be laia." similar
views were
expressed by Virginia in
declaring itself independent
and

again in the Declaration
of Independence ^2
.

Once the war began, the
revolutionary leaders
continued to express a concern
about controlling the military.
In their declarations,
constitutions and bills of
rights, they stated the
necessity for keeping the
military
under strict subordination
to, and governed by,
the civilian
governments
It cannot be emphasized
enough that the revolutionary

leaders truly believed that for
their revolutionary war to
be successful, the military
would have to be carefully
controlled by the civilian governments;
that civil supremacy
would have to be genuinely accepted
by the military.
As
will be demonstrated later, the
revolutionary leaders, being
realistic and by no means totally dogmatic
about civil
supremacy, would, at times, compromise
their beliefs regarding civilian control.
Civil supremacy would be a dynamic
concept.
Nevertheless, they were adamant about such
92

431.

Boyd, Papers__o f _Th oma s Jeff erson, 1:133,
134, 378,
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E.g., Proceedings_of_the_ Conve^^^
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Bouton, Document s a nd_J^ec5r_ds^
Hampshire
Saunders, NCCR, 10Tld04; Walton", Re^?di~of ^"^ont
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co^p.cises being temporary

in nature and
punishing

unauthorized violations to
the principle and
accepted
practices of civil supremacy.
TO a large extent the
American concept of
civil
supremacy was an extension
of their jealousy of
pov.er
As
was discussed earlier, the
revolutionary leaders were
a very

lealous people, very conscious
of their rights and
liberties
and very knowledgeable of
how precarious their
freedom was
When the military either
assumed or was given too
much power.
The military existed to win
the war, but it was for
the
civilian governments to assure
the revolution itself was
successful

Just how jealous were the
civilian leaders during
the warp The answer is:
very jealous
.

On the one hand

they did not desire the military
to be raised too high in
the eyes of their fellow citizens
as the true saviors of
the country and on the other hand
they did not desire the

military to usurp any unauthorized
power nor violate the
established tenets of civil supremacy.
With respect to the military being raised
too high,
Abigail Adams informed her husband early
in the war that
"every man who wears a cockade appears of
double the
94

Chevalier De La Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes
January 28, 1781, Durand, New Materials for the
History 'of
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importance he used to, ana
and
>

subaltern in the Ar.y.-^^

I
i

fp<:.i
^ respect
feel
a
for the lowest

^^^^^^ ^^^^^

^^^^^^^

war was long lasting, such
attitudes would prevail
and the
military would eventually
iJ-y ce
be "sniapt to „consider themselves
as a Body distinct from
the rest of the Citizens."
Therefore, he warned Ja,.es Warren,
the military "should
be

watch [ejd with

a

jealous Eye."

m

the same vein, he

observed
have

good Opinion of the principal
officers of
^'^^^"^ ^^^"^
Patriots
as
well as
I
Soldiers; But
rf this War continues,
as it inav for
years yet to come, we know not
who
r^ay succeed
them.
Men who have been long
governed by miUtarv
and^HablL i^Iy
lose the Spirit
loL^'the
sp?rlf a'd
and Feeling of Citizens.
And even
Citizens having been used to admire
the HerSism
^^-^^ have Sisplayed
pWed and ?rr'v"'
to look up to them as their
Saviours
"° surrender
R?aht^ for the Protection of which to them thos^
Rights
against an
Invader, they had employ [e]d and
paid them. 96
I

a

The military were indeed watched with

a

jealous eye, often

to an extreme degree.

One example of the extreme to which some
civilian

leaders went in their jealousy of the military
being shown
too much preference was in the matter of a
toast. Throughout
95
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the war, whenever toasts
were offered in Whig
gatherings
precedence was always given
to the United States
and the

continental Congress before
General Washington and
the Continental Ar.y.^^ But even
in complying with
this standard
priority, a difficulty arose
in the course of one
such
series of toasts.
At a dinner party at
Paneuil Hall during
the sunder of 1778, toasts
were offered by the military
and

civilian leaders in attendance.

UnUed States, and

The first, given to the

the second, given to the
monarch and

kingdon of France, were both
followed by thirteen-gun
salutes.
The third toast was offered
for Congress.
The

officer in charge of the cannon
looked to John Hancock for
approval before giving the salute.
Hancock shook his head
^
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happened after the fourth
toast was offered
to the arr„y
and navy of Prance.
But in^ediately after
the fifth toast
to Washington and the
American .r.y Hancoo.
waved his hand
eagerly in signal for the
salute to
.

be given.

It was

Afterwards, Ja.es Warren as.ed
Hancock why Congress was
not
treated to the highest marks
of respect and distinction
that
a salute indicated.
Hancock replied that Congress
had been

included in the salute given
the United states.
Warren then
asked why were not Washington
and the ;^erican Ar.y
included
in the same salute to the
United States.
He told Hancock
he held Washington and his
ar„,y in the greatest
respect,

but if they were held up against
Congress, they should be
disbanded. Warren informed Samuel
Adams of the incident,
leaving it to him to "say whether
this was oweing to no
principle, or to a wish to distinguish
the Military above
the Civil, or to Contrast himself
with Men he had represented
as Inimical to the General and Army.''^^
^^^^ receiving

Warren's letter, Adams wrote him the
incident was probably
not worthy of notice.
However, "Things which detach
[e)d

and by themselves are justly considerfe)d
as Trifles[,J

light as Air, when they are connected with and
made Parts
of a great Machine, become important and
do good or Hurt."
James Warren to Samuel Adams, September 30, 1778,
Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 73 (1925): 48-49
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Ada.s believed it very wrong to
show any partiality to the
military. Such preference, he
believed, put Congress in
an awkward situation.
He told Warren:

While they are exerting their
utmost Influence on
'°
Authority
the several States over
of\reTelerlTllT
the Military, there are
some Men, even in that State
Respect shown to them than to the who'^^ould less
Creatures which
they have made
Tyrants have been the scourges and
Plagues of Mankind; and Armies their
Instruments!
^ne Time may come when the Sins
may be punish [e]d by a standing Army; of America
will surely come when the Body of the and that time
People, shall
be so lost to the Exercise of common
and Caution, as to suffer the Civil toUnderstanding
stop
^ the
Military Power. 99
'

.

.

•

.

.

•

This was just one example of the extreme to
which some

civilian leaders expressed their concern about
perceived

violations even to the spirit of civil supremacy.
Scholars now studying the American Revolution have

often remarked about the extreme degree to which concern
about civil supremacy was exhibited by the civilian leaders
and how this hampered the war-making efforts by the military

Almost one hundred fifty years ago, Jared Sparks stated
"The army suffered throughout the war from this trembling

timidity of the civil fathers, this fearful distrust of the
strength of purpose and self-control of the leading agent
Samuel Adams to James Warren, October 20, 1778,
ibid.,

57,

58.
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Of their will.. .100

^^^^
inilitary expressed concern
about the often extreme
degree
to which the civilians were
jealous of the military and
fearful of its power.
John Laurens, for one, wrote
his
father, at the time a member of
Congress, that he wished
to see "all odious distinctions
of jealousy laid aside, for
we are all citizens, and have no
^ 0^

separate interests

Most Americans, however, believed
that despite the difficulties it created, jealousy was
necessary in a republic,
for

a

power unchecked was tyranny.

"The jealousy between

the army and the body politic," according
to John Adams,
"is not to be dreaded; it only shows
that the spirit of

liberty is still alive and active in the
people. "^^^
At times, jealousy of the military was
carried to
extremes. As a result, the military were often
stifled in

their efforts by adherence to the accepted tenets
of civil
supremacy.

Nevertheless, the civilian leaders demanded

compliance with it, from the beginning of the war until
the
end.

Early in the war, Elbridge Gerry informed Joseph

Sparks, Gouverne£r_Morr^is^, 1:232-233; see also
Louis Smith, Ame£ican_Democracy_and_Mi^
A Study
of C ivil C ontrol of tjie_Jj.jJ,tarv_Po\^_j.n_th^
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951)
p. ITsT
101^
John ,Laurens to Henry Laurens, April 11, 1778,
Simms, The_Army Cor£esponden
of Colonel John Laurens, p. 157
102^ ^
John Adams to Baron Van Der Capellen, January 21,
1781, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:357.
,

,
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Trumbull "it is the fixed Determination
of Congress to
preserve the civil above the military,
and the authority
of that will not be surrendered,
should it be necessary to
disband the army in preserving the same."^^^
Later, another
member of Congress wrote his state's assembly
that Congress
was "careful to admit no Idea of Power in
the Military

Order Repugnant to, or interefering with the
Civil authority,
nor insolence to the Civil Magistrate of any
State to pass

with impunity

""'"^'^
.

Congress constantly reminded the military of their

desire for them always to subordinate themselves to the

civilian leaders.

During the summer of 1777, Congress

resolved that it "will, on all occasions, discountenance
and punish any indecent behaviour of any officer or

officers in the Continental service, towards the civil

authority of the several states."

The following year

Congress informed the chief executives that if any officer
acted badly towards them or the state governments to report
them to Washington or the commanding officer of the department.

During the spring of 1779, Congress resolved "that
103

Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, March 26, 1777,
Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 1, CSL: see also Elbridge
Gerry to George Washington, January 13, 1778, Burnett, LMCC
,

3:34.
104

Thomas Burke to the North Carolina Assembly,
[August 1779], ibid., 4:368.
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any disrespectful and indecent
behaviour of any officers
under the appointment of Congress,
to the civil
authority of any State in the Union,
will be discountenanced
and discouraged. "lO^ These were not
idle threats.
.

.

.

,

Despite some critical commentary by
the military
with respect to civil supremacy, as a
general rule, most
American soldiers accepted civilian control
of the military
as necessary for a successful revolution.
Washington

certainly accepted the necessity of civil supremacy.

m

replying to an address by the city magistrates of
Philadelphia late in 1781, he stated, "As I have ever considered
a

due support of Civil Authority essential to the
preservation
of that liberty for which we are contending,

I

have from

duty as well as from inclination endeavoured as far as
possible, to avoid the least violation of
to John C. Fitzpatrick, Washington,

According

it.''^^""

"By training,

by

association and by custom was an earnest and honest believer
in the right and justice of constituted authority."

recent historian, Richard

B.

A more

Morris, observed that "If any-

one doubted his devotion to republican institutions and his
105

Ford, JCC,

8:656; 10:139-140;

13:413.

Washington to the Magistrates of the City
of Philadelphia, December 17, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington 23:394.
"'"^^George
,
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frequent corru.ents on that score
and his decisive actions
Morris stated that "In his handling
of Congress and
his deference to their judgment,
he [referring to Washington]
showed himself a master politician."
A Washington biographer
of fifty years ago observed that
Washington "held Congress
always and most scrupulously in reverence"
and "Nothing in
Washington's life is more heroic than the
deference with
which he treated this congress "^^^ So
was Washington
.

really

a

master politician, really heroic, in his
dealings

with Congress?

Not so much as he was

a

realist, understand-

ing the necessity of civil supremacy and a
strong central

government if the American Revolution and war for
independence were to be successful.

Therefore, in both

word and deed, Washington was ever deferential and
subordinate to Congress, from the day Congress commissioned
him till the day he resigned his commission.
It was expected by Congress, when they gave him his

instructions on June 25, 1775, that he would keep Congress
abreast of his activities and rely on them for all decisions
of a political nature.

107

.

.

Congress, realizing however they

Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself p. 208;
see also p. 284; Richard B. Morris, Seven Who Shaped Our
Destiny: The Founding Fathers as Revolutionaries (New York
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973)
p. 7"0~^
,

,

,

Ibid., p. 68; John Corbin, Th e Unkno wn Washington Biographic Origins of the Republ ic (New YoTkl Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 206, 205.
:

"

could not foresee all possibilities,
informed Washington
they were leaving .any things
to his prudent judgment,
which they hoped would reflect
the opinion of councils
of
109
These instructions were generally
agreeable to
Washington.
He saw the necessity of
keeping Congress
informed.
All one has to do is look at
Washington's
correspondence to see how often he
formally wrote Congress
and informally wrote its members.
The same source also
demonstrates how frequently he corresponded
with the chief
executives of the various civilian entities,
informing them,
encouraging them, and asking their support.
Even in picking
his aides throughout the war, Washington
frequently selected
men who either by birth or politics were
able to
share his

views informally with the civilian leaders.

With respect

to councils of war, Washington accepted the
Congressional

instructions almost too literally.

During the first year

of the war, Washington made few tactical or strategic

decisions without consulting his general officers and whatever civilian leaders who could be compelled upon to offer
advice.

So much did he depend on them, Congress finally

told him he did not have to rely on such consultations if he

could more properly make a decision himsel f
109

.

-"""^^

Ford, JCC, 2:100-101.

"^""^Ibid.,

5:602;

7:196-197, 201; 8:663.

Washington,
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however, preferred the advice of others.

Throughout his

military, and subsequent political
career, he disliked
making decisions without consultation,
or without knowing
the exact limits of his authority.
He told Joseph Reed
early in the war he was not fond of stretching
his powers,
stating if Congress would say "'This far
and no farther you
shall go,' I will promise not to offend whilst
I continue
in their service."

with respect to not making political

decisions Washington completely agreed with Congress's
instructions.

As Washington told Philip Schuyler late in

the war, he had always made it a point "not to interfere
in the civil Concerns of the Continent or the Legislatures,

except where they are intimately connected with Military

Matters

"""""^-^
.

Washington was basically true to his word.

Washington constantly referred questions of

a

political nature to the civilian authorities rather than
acting upon them in a unilateral manner.

This was especially

true of his dealings with Tories and British emissaries

'"'''^
,

With respect to his contacts with British officials,

Washington was always careful to ascertain that the enemy
George Washington to Joseph Reed, March 3, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washin gton, 4:367; George
Washington to Philip Schuyler, February 6, 1782, ibid.,
23:488.
112

Bradley Chapm, The American Law of Treason:
Revolu t ion ary and Early Nationa l Origin s (Seattle: Univer
sity of \vashington Press, 1964 ), pp. 55-56.

s
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understood that he was subordinate
to Congress, for they
were the legitimate authority
of the continent.
Thus,
whenever the British contacted hi.
to negotiate, he referred
them to Congress, notifying
Congress of their approaches
Additionally, when Jacob Duche attempted
to have Washington
negotiate a settlement with the British,
Washington
.

did not

bother to respond.

Instead, he simply forwarded Duche

letter to Congress for their consideration

'

Washington

.

also referred questions of retaliation
to Congress, believing
such questions were as much, if not more,
political than
military. 115 This was especially true of
the Asgill affair.

Late in March 1782, New Jersey militia
Captain

Joshua Huddy was captured and hanged by a "refugee
partisan
force."

Washington and his council of officers recommended

retaliation if the British did not turn over the guilty
113^

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, March 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick Writings
of Washington, 6 427-42 8
Same to same, August 5, 17 82";;
ibid., 24:466; Same to same, August 28, 1782, ibid., 25:71,
71-72; George Washington to Sir Henry Clinton, May 31, 1778,
ibid., 11:496-497.
,

:

.

;
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Jacob Duche to George Washington, October 8, 1777,
Sparks, Cor£espondenc_e_ o^f _the_Am
1:448-458
George Washington to the "President 'of "the^Contlnental
Congress, October 16, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings_of
Wash ington, 9:382-383; [J. M. Butler], Washing ton^t_Vaney
Forge: Toget her wi t lljth^e_Duch^e_Cor re spond^
Phil ad e IphTa
J. M. Butler, 1858)
ppl 45-77; Ford, JCC," 5:530; 6:886-887
Graydon, Memoirs pp. 428-433.
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George Washington to Nathanael Greene, December 15,
1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23:391.
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party.

Congress agreed.

Hazen to select by lot

On May

3,

1782, Washington ordered

captured British captain, who
was
an unconditional prisoner.
None being found, Washington
a

had

Hazen pick any British captain
prisoner.

The choice fell on

twenty year old Charles Asgill,
who had surrendered with
Cornwallis, thus covered by a
prescribed treatment
of

officers so captured.

This bothered Washington, but
he

decided to go ahead with the execution
unless Congress could
be persuaded to stop it.
Understanding Washington's dilen^a
and being persuaded by the French
Minister to intercede
on

Asgill

behalf. Congress ordered Washington
to release

-s

Asgill.

Washington was relieved by Congress's
decision,
especially since he firmly believed, as he

told Congress,

Asgill

-s

release was of such a political and
international

nature that it was out of his purview

"^^

Congress desired Washington to give strategic
and
tactical direction to the Continental armies,
always keeping
in mind the reasons why they had been raised.

They did not

George Washington to the General and Field Officers of the Army, April 19, 1782, ibid., 24:136-137; George
Washington to Moses Hazen, May 3, 1782, ibid., 218; Same to
same. May 18, 1782, ibid., 263-264; Same to same, June
4,
1782, ibid., 305-306; George Washington to the Secretary at
War, June 5, 1782, ibid., 319-320; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress, April 20, 1782, ibid.,
144-145; Same to same, August 19, 1782, ibid., 25:40-41;
George Washington to James Duane, September 30, 1782, ibid.,
222-223; Ford, JCC, 22:217-218; 23:715, 718-719, 829n.,
845-847, 965n.
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expect him to turn to themselves or the
state governments
for military advice, and when they
gave him extraordinary
grants of power they expected him to use
it fully.
On both
accounts they misjudged Washington, who was,
as already
indicated, quite reluctant to act without
advice or to

overstep the bounds of what he considered his
proper relationship to private property, private citizens,
and civilian
governments. Washington continually called on
Congress for
strategical advice.

During the late summer of 1776, for

instance, Washington queried Congress whether or not he

should burn New York City upon evacuation.

Late in the war

he was still seeking advice, asking Congress where the main

western fortification should be located and whether or not
they wanted troops stationed in the Wyoming

Valley."'""'"^

"Don't

forget to urge Congress to resume the power of appointing
all military Officers" Benjamin Rush reminded Richard Henry

Lee early in 1777, less than

a

month after Washington had

been given dictatorial powers by Congress. 118

Rush need

not have worried, for Washington disliked grants of
117

George VJashmgton to the President of the Conti
nental Congress, September 2, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washin gton
6:6; George Washington to William Irvine
December 18, 1781, ibid., 23:396; George Washington to
James Potter, October 26, 1782, ibid., 26:301-302.
,
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Benjamin Rush to Richard Henry Lee, January 6,
1776 [1777], L. H. Butterfield, ed
"Further Letters of
Benjamin Rush," PMHB 78, no. 1 (January 1954): 17.
.
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extraordinary power, and generally
was quite eager to return
the powers granted him, believing
the civilian bodies more
capable of mandating the desired means
and ends.
Even some

non-extraordinary powers Washington believed
should be more
properly exercised by civilian bodies
rather than himself.

Thus, we find early in the war, Washington
hounding both
the Massachusetts Provincial Congress
and the Continental

.

Congress to assume the responsibility for the
prizes taken
by his "navy." The Continental Congress did
so in August
1776, assuming at that time control of all naval affairs.

Washington not only assured Congress and the state
governments of his willingness to subordinate himself to
them, but he was also quite adamant about insuring that
his

army clearly understood the principles and practices of
civil supremacy, and acted upon them.

Early in the war,

when precendents were being established regarding the military's relationship to the civilian governments, Washington

was very diligent in assuring that his subordinates understood the military was subject to the will of the civilian
119

.

William Bell Clark, George Washington's Navy:
Being an Account of His Excellency's Fleet in New England
Waters (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1961),
15-16, 17, 19-20, 135, 174, 185-186; Donald W. Beattie
and J. Richard Collins, Washington's Nev7 England Fleet:
Beverly's Role in its Origins, 1775-1777 (Salem, Massachusetts: Newcomb and Gauss Company, 1969), pp. 34-41; George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
November 8, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 4:73;
Same to same, April 25, 1776, ibid., 517-518.
pp.

,

governn^ents, particularly the
Continental Congress. During
the sunder of 1776, Washington told
a congressional board
of war that he would "obey to the
utn^ost of r.y power and
to the best of my Abilities, all
orders of

Congress with

a

scrupulous exactness

.
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from his subordinates. ^21

Washington expected no less
He also expected them to keep

the best relations possible with the
civilians,

for he

considered harmony between the army and the
civilians essential to winning the war.^22
^^^^ ^^^.^^ ^^^^^
^^There
is nothing

I

wish for more than harmony and

a

good under-

standing to prevail between the Country and the
Army."

Two

years earlier, when Washington had received complaints

against Lee's corps for illegal foraging, he told him
"This

complaint

I

nothing

wish so much as

I

confess gives me extreme pain, as there is
a

perfect good understanding and

Harmony between the Inhabitants and every part of the
Army."

123

When Washington learned that Colonel Moylan had

120

George Washington to the Board of War and
Ordnance, July 29, 1776, ibid., 5:347-348.
121

George Washington to Philip Schuyler, June 25,
1775, ibid., 3:302-304; George Washington to Artemas Ward,
April 4, 1776, ibid., 4:467.
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George Washington to George Clinton, October 19,
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George Washington to Henry Lee, September 3, 1780,
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had a misunderstanding with
Governor Trumbull, he wrote
Moylan that "You will upon the whole,
find that many advantages by cultivating a good understanding
with Civil
Authority "^^^
.

VThen

Elias Boudinot went to Washington with
an

informant's information about

a

traitor, Washington told

Boudinot not to take up the citizen and
confine him without
letting him know his crime or his accuser.
Boudinot, some-

what taken back by Washington's attention to
civilian rights,
wrote, "My mortification was very great, to
think, that

who had entered the Army to v/atch the Military

&

I

preserve

the civil rights of my fellow citizens should be
so reproved

by

Military man, who was so interested in having acted

a

otherwise

[.]

imprudence

.

I

reed [Sic] it as

a

severe lecture on my own

12 5

Washington's officers shared his beliefs about civil
supremacy.

They acknowledged that the state governments

and Congress were superior to themselves

"'"^^
.

Like
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George Washington to Stephen Moylan, February 3,
1780, "Selections from the Correspondence of Col. Stephen
Moylan, of the Continental Cavalry," PMHB 38, no. 3 (1913):
353.
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Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections,

6-67.
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John Haslet to ?, December 24, 1775, Delaware
Archives 3:1384; Statement signed by Georgia Continental
officers, February 10, 1776, White, His to rical Collec tio ns
of Ge orgia, p. 94; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr.,
December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL.
,

Washington, they realized the
importance to the war effort
of their relationship to the
civilian authorities, and
the
necessity for harmony between the
civilian governments and
the military.!"
They also realized the
civilians were
quite jealous of their power.
As General Putnam told
another officer, "The civil power
is exceeding jealous
lest the Military should make
encroachments on
its

Jurisdiction."

1

T p

Therefore
inererore, fho
the rr^^iA^
military were generally

careful not to offend the civilian
authorities.
The military leaders throughout the
war, continually
demonstrated to the civilian leaders their
subordinate position.
This involved giving basic courtesies,
following
orders, asking and receiving advice, avoiding
political

involvements, and generally abiding by the
basic tenets of
civil supremacy.
It was in their dealings with the British
on

questions of

a

basic political nature where the American

127
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officers clearly dennons trated

,

as Washington did,

that

congress and the state governments
set public policy, not
themselves. Even Charles Lee, who
violated the spirit, if
not the letter, of almost every
aspect of civil supremacy,
was quite proper in his relations
with the British, at least
at the beginning of the war.

When Burgoyne contacted him

during July 1775 about an interview,
Lee asked the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress whether
it was proper for
him to meet with the British general,
and if they did, would
they appoint one of their members to
accompany him. They
informed Lee that was a bad idea, but if he
decided to meet
with Burgoyne to have Elbridge Gerry represent
the govern-,

ment.

Lee,

deciding

a

meeting would cause jealousies and

suspicions, opted not to meet Burgoyne.

Other generals were

even more adamant in their refusal to deal with
the British.
Sullivan, for instance, during the spring of 1778,
refused
one British general's attempt to have him circulate Lord

North's conciliatory bills to the people of Rhode Island.
In doing so, he informed General Pigot the people of
Rhode

Island recognized no authority but the civil magistrates,
and therefore he would turn over all the copies to the Rhode

Island Assembly.

Similarly, another British general

contacted Greene during 1782 in hopes of having him stop
South Carolina abuses of Tory property.

Greene refused,

informing him that questions of Tory property were in the

204

purview Of the civilian authorities
and therefore he should
deal with them.
He later gave the same
advice to hi. when
the latter desired a temporary
cessation of hostilities so
that he might purchase supplies """^^
.

The military also demonstrated
their subordinate
position by obeying instructions, even
when the instructions
were militarily unsound.
The classic example is Lincoln
defending Charleston when it was really
not defensible.
He probably should have evacuated his
troops from the city

early in its seige.

Instead, at the instructions of Congress,

he defended it and was forced to surrender
the largest

American force captured until that at Corregidor
in 1942.
Other military decisions were also based upon
political
considerations, such as Washington's decision in 1776
to

protect New York City and his 1777 decision to winter
at
129
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Congress, July 10, 1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC
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1778, TBid., 114n.; John Sullivan to George Washington,
May 1, 1778, ibid., 114; Alexander Leslie to Nathanael
Greene, April 4, 1782, Edward McCrady, The History of S outh
Carolina in the Revolution 178 0-1783, pp. 632-633; Nathanael
Greene to Alexander Leslie, April
], 1782, ibid., p. 633;
Alexander Leslie to John Mathews, April
], 1782, ibid.,
p. 633; John Mathews to Alexander Leslie, April 12, 1782,
ibid., pp. 633-635; Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion,
April 8, 1782, Gibbes, Documentary History of the Ame rican
Revolution, 2:155.
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valley Forge.

And when given power by
the state governments
or Congress to aot in a forceful
manner, the military,
realizing the necessity of not
offending the civilian
leaders often did not exercise their
power to its fullest,
we have already discussed how
Washington frequently did not
use powers given him.
similarly, Israel Putnam made
every
effort to avoid a display of power or
to appear placing the
military above the law, when he became
military commander
of the city of Philadelphia on December
12, 1776, and placed
it under martial law."^"^^

Additionally, the military demonstrated their

subordinate status by turning over to civilian
authorities
those soldiers and civilians they believed should

be tried

by civilian law rather than military law.^^^

When four

130„
,,^^"^^"^1^ Lincoln's Report to George Washington,
, ,
July
17, 1780 [Copy], Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); James Thomas Flexner, Georqe Washington
in
the American Revolution (1775-1783) (Bo¥t^: Little,
and Company, 1967), p. 90; A. E. Zucker, General De Kalb,
Lafayette's Mentor University of North Carolina Studies
the Germanic Languages and Literature, no. 53 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 162;
Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed.. Defences of Phi ladelphia
in_lZZ2' PP- 220 221 250-251, 255 Scharf, Histor"7W~
Philadelphia 1:334; William Cutter, The Life~of Israel
Putnam, Ma jor-General in the Army of the Am erican
Revolution 4th ed'. (New York: Cooledge, 1850), p. 273.
131^
^.
George „
Washington
to George Clinton, October 8,
1778, Fitzpatrick, Writin gs of Wash ington, 13:50; Alexander
McDougall to Aaron Burr, January 15, 1779, Matthew L. Davis,
Memoirs of Aaron Burr 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1836-1837), 1:145; Asa Bird Gardner, "Martial Law During the
T^erican Revolution," MAH 1, no. 12 (December 1877): 714.
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;

officers coi^plained to General
Wayne they were going to be
turned over to civilian authorities
to stand trial for an

offense conrn^itted against civilians,
he reminded them they
"Certainly can't be Ignorant of the
superior power of the
•Civil Law over the Mil i tary " ^ ^2
^^^^ instances military officers even threatened their
soldiers with civilian
justice believing it would be more severe. "^^^
.

The military realized they needed
the advice and
support of the civilian leaders to be successful.
Therefore,
they frequently called upon state leaders for
advice and to

issue instructions that could just as well be
issued by

themselves, but would be more acceptable coming
from civilian

authorities rather than from the military

"^^'^
.

Because of

vagueness in instructions and because of political ramifications, military leaders often consulted with civilian

leaders before taking action.

This was especially true

early in the war when precedents were being established and
132

Anthony Wayne to Jno Henderson and John Marshall
and VJm. Bell and Peter Smith, October 10, 1778, Stille,
Anthony Wa yne p. 172.
.

,
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Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, November
1778, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons p. 200.
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,
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Philemon Dickinson to William Livingston, June 26,
1777, Selection s fr om th e Correspondence of the Executive of
New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786, p.' 74.
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divisions of authority were blurred.

a major problem

throughout the war for the military
leaders was what to do
with civilians and British subjects
either caught in illegal
acts or suspected of some nefarious
plans.
The military
did not desire to inflict punishments
unilaterally,
thus

throughout the war we find them consulting with
civilian
leaders as to what course of action they should
take.^^^
Besides asking advice, the military leaders
also

demonstrated their subordinate position by keeping the
civilian leaders informed of their activities and intentions,
often when it was requested but just as often when it was
not.

They did so, believing the civilian leaders would be

better able to assist in the strategic decision-making
process.

In New York during 1776 and 1777,

George Clinton

was very diligent in keeping the New York Committee of

Safety and Convention informed of his activities.

Also

135

David Wooster to Peter V. B. Livingston, July 7,
177 5, Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 2:1604; Stewart,
Will iam Woodf ord ' 1: 4"'2'4 Jo[seph] Seawell Jones, A Defence
2£_L^?_?.?Y^lH.ti9i}.^£y_. Hif tory_of_t?^ _State of NorthrCaF6lIn"a
from the Aspersions of Mr. Jefferson (Boston: Charle"'s"~Bowen
1834), pp. 242-243; George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln,
August 18, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:36.
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;
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Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, July 11,
1780, MHSC 7th ser., 2:64-65; Same to same, March 4, 1781,
Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 343; Benjamin Lincoln to
William Moultrie, May 17, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the
American Revolution, 1:452; William Irvine to President
William Moore, March 17, 1782, Butterfield, Washi ng tonIrviiie Correspondence, 1:235-236
,
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keeping the New York authorities informed
were Tench
Tilghman and Alexander Hamilton. Between
March and

September 1777, Hamilton wrote the Convention's
Committee
of Correspondence over twenty letters.
Earlier, during the
fall of 1776, Tilghman sent almost daily
military situation

reports to a committee of the convention.

New Hampshire's

John Stark, after the death of General Enoch Poor,
assumed
the responsibility for keeping the government of
his state

cognizant of the movement of their state's troops.

Similarly,

Generals Putnam, Parsons and Huntington kept Governor
Trumbull apprised of how Connecticut's troops were perform-

mg. 137

In the middle states, early in the war, Lord

Stirling kept the New Jersey Assembly and Council of Safety
informed, as did Joseph Reed, President Wharton of Pennsylvania.

13 8

Further south, early in the war, Robert Howe

regularly reported his activities to the Virginia Convention.
Later in the war, George Rogers Clark kept the chief executive and the Board of War of Virginia apprised of the
137

Hastings, Public Pap ers of George Clinton,
l:passim; Syrett, Pap ers of Al exander Hamilton", 1:216-321
passim; Emily Stone Whiteley, Washing ton a nd His Aides-D eCamp (New York: Macmillan Company, 19 36) pp^ 30-31^ John"
Stark to Meshech Weare, December 14, 1779, Stark, John
Stark, p. 197; see Connecticut correspondence in MHSC, 7th
ser
2 passim
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Lord Stirling to [Samuel Tucker], October 2, 1775,
Kirkland, Letter s on the TVme ric an Revolution, 2:20-21; Reed,
Joseph Reed, l:passim.
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~ents

Of his conunand in the west.

Often both Lee and

Lafayette, despite their constant
difficulties with state
executives, kept then, acquainted
with their plans and
actions. Assisting Lafayette keep
in touch with Maryland's
governor during the 1781 campaign
was James McHenry, who
as a volunteer aide-de-camp,
wrote Governor Lee nearly
fifty
letters, generally about the state
of the army.^^^

Probably the most important way the
military
evidenced their subordinate position
to the civilian
authorities was by their constant support
of the civilian
governments. The military saw the necessity
of stable

governments, for they would help in preventing
anarchy and
military tyranny. Additionally they provided
the best means
of supplying the army and harnessing the
resources
of the

state,

i.e., monies and recruits.

139^^
Stewart,
lamJWood f ord 1:523-560, passimJames, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781,"
passimJames, "George Rogers Clark's Papers 1781-1784,"
passim;
Charles Lee to Nicholas Cooke, November 14, 1776, Bartlett
Records of Rh ode Island, 8:55; Charles Lee to Edmund
Pendleton, May 25, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 5
(1873)
37; Marquis De Lafayette to Thomas JeffersorT;^
February 21, 1781, Chinard, Laf ayette^n_Vi^ginj^,
p. 3;
For numerous letters from Lafayette to Governor Thomas Sim
Lee of Maryland, see J. Alexis Shriver, Lafayette in Harford
County 1781: An Ac c ount of the Events Attending the Passage
of the Marqui s_de^a^ayette_aj}d_Hi_s^_Troo
Harfor d
County in 1781 an d of Subsequent Events, to the Surrender
of Co rnwalli s at Yorktown (Bel Air, M a" r yTa nd~rT r i v a t e
Ty
Printed, 1931), pp. 24-112, passim; Helen Lee Peabody, ed
"Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 3 (September 1954): 227.
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Where the governments were
weak or virtually nonexistent, the military played an
important
role in

supporting and re-establishing the
governments.
especially true in the South during

This was

the latter part of the

war.

Both Greene and Lincoln when they
commanded the southern
army stressed the necessity of the
state governments existing
and being free of military interference.
In May 1781, Greene
told the chief executive of South
Carolina that the state
government should be re-established immediately,
"as it is

of importance to have the minds of the
people formed to the
habits of civil rather than military authority "^^ °
That
.

summer he advised the Georgia state leaders
to elect

a

legislature, called on Colonel Clarke to have the
people

elect

a

council, and directed Nathan Brownson, who he

recognized as governor, to repair to Augusta to organize
the government.

During the summer and fall of 1779, Lincoln

encouraged both Mcintosh and Colonel Walton to assist the
Georgia civilian leaders with the re-establishment of the
state government and to encourage them to send delegates
to Congress.

141

140

Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, May 14, 1781,
Greene, Nathanael Greene 3:281.
,

141

Thayer, Nathanael Greene p. 367; Johnson,
Nathanael Greene 2:14 5-14 6; Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan
Mcintosh, December 18, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook,
1:122-123, BPL; Same to same, July 15, 1779, Benjamin
Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to
,
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The military also protected
the state governments
in the South.
During the summer of 1780 the
South Carolina
legislature shared the courthouse at
Hillsboro, North
Carolina, with Gates, relying on him
to have the southern
army protect their existence.
Throughout the spring and
summer of 1781 Sumter, Marion, and
Pickens helped keep the
civilian authority in existence in South
Carolina.
During
the fall of 1781, at the request of
South Carolina's chief
executive, the brigadier generals of the
South Carolina

troops conducted the assembly elections in their
respective
militia districts. Once the legislature assembled
at

Jacksonborough during January 1782,

a

Pennsylvania Regiment

was assigned to camp near the legislature in order
to afford
It protection. 142
In addition to upholding the governments,

the mili-

tary also assisted them in preventing anarchical conditions
and fighting the domestic enemies.

During 1779, 1780, and

1781, VJashington, at the request of Governors Trumbull and

Clinton, used the military to stop people from carrying on

George Walton, October 17,
book,

1:71,
142

[17] 79,

Benjamin Lincoln Letter-

BPL.

Johnson, Nathanael Greene 2:145; [Feltman]
Journal o f William Feltman ," p. 37; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock
Life and Campaigns of General T h omas Sumter (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 213; Charles Gregg Singer,
South Carolin a in the C onfed eration (Philadelphia: University
of PennsylvanTa, 1941), p. 31.
,

,

.
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trade with or n,aking war on those
living on Long Island,
as it was feared that such activity
would cause retaliation.
3
Washington and other Continental
officers used
the army to assist the states in
quelling the internal
enemies

Early in the war several states, to
varying degrees,
authorized the Continental officers to
use their soldiers
as well as the militia,

to quell the disaf f ected

For

example, New York had the Continental
soldiers assist their
state forces in putting down the disaffected
in Dutchess

County during 1777.

Also that year General Smallwood and

Colonel Mordecai Gist, accompanied by Maryland
political

commissioners, lead

a

small force of Continental troops and

militia against the disaffected in Maryland.

The following

year, Rhode Island authorized General Sullivan to call
out

and control their militia against the disaf f ected
14

"^^^
.
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George Washington to Benjamin Tallmadge,
November 2 1779, Fitzpatrick, Wrj^imgs_of J-Jashd^
17 62-63; George Washington to Stephen Moy la~n7"jan"uary 14,
1780, ibid., 392-393; Instructions to William Heath,
August 19, 1781, ibid., 23:23; George Clinton to Jonathan
Trumbull, August 20, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George
Clinton 7:234-236; Thaddeus Burr to Jonathan Trumbull," ~"
November 5, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser
2:453-454.
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1789 (New York": 'Macmillan Company, 1971)7 PP 268-270;
Mcllwaine, Journa ls of the Council of V irginia 1:468-469.
145
Bliven, Under the Guns p. 326; Ford, JCC, 7:82-83;
8:667-668; William Smallv70od to
Jenifer, March 3, 1777,
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The main force used against
the disaffected were
the militia who were often
authorized by the state governments to be led by Continental
officers.
The militia, for
the most part, were commanded by
their own officers, often
under the immediate direction and
control of the civil

authorities.

This was especially true in New
York, where
the militia and special ranger companies
assisted state and
local committees in keeping the Tory
element under control.
During 1777 in Dutchess County, where a
large Tory element
expected the British to come to their aid,
both the militia
and the Continental Army were used by New
York's Commissioners
for Detecting Conspiracies to quell them
into submission
.

Safety to Henry Hooper, February 13, 1777, ibid.,
134; ^oweii,
Cowell
Spir it of '76 in Rhode_I sland p. 176.
.

Hanson, The M inute Book_o£ the_ Committee of
Safety_of_Tryon_County, passim; Willis T. Hai^H7^~ A
History of Schenectadv_Durinq_the_ Revr^^^
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Appended^_Contribution_to_th
Ii2l}^_i:L?Pll_£f_SEh£ILec tadi^Di^£ict_pi^

~tha t~PefTod~

~

(privately printed, 1916), pp. 61-627~Ne^'Y^F~P?^n^ial
Committee Report, 1776, Calendar of H istorical Manuscripts
1 :488-4 89; Victor Hugo Paltsits, Mimutes _of_ the_C^^
for Detecting and Def eat ii2q_Conspiracies" in the State ofl^ew"
~
_Albany_Count^ Sess ions 1778 -1781 3 vols. (Albany"
State of New York, 1909-1910), 1:10, 11, 47-50; Journals of
^^l£_?£2YAi}2i:5l^2I12£^^ Plgyil'gi^l Convent ion, Committ ee
of Safe ty, and Co uncil of Safety of th e State of New York,
1775-1776-1777 1:149, 184, 633-6 3 97~6487~693 676, 774,
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Harold M. Hyman, 5^_JI^y J^^enJ s_Sou_l
sj_ Lo^ya
'
Tests in Am erican History (Berkeley and 'Los AngeTe"sT
University 'of California Press, 1960), p. 89; General Orders
Issued by the Committee of Safety, January 6, 1777, Hastings,
Public Pa pers o f George Clinton, 1:533-535; Staughton Lynd,
"The Tenant Rising at Livingston Manor, May 1777," NYH SQ 48,
no.
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The militia were also active
in New England.
For
example, during the summer of
1779, the Governor and
Council
of safety of Connecticut
authorized Brigadier General
John
Tyler to use the militia to jail
anybody in the New LondonGreat Neck area who he suspected
of being unfriendly
14

state.

to the

8

The middle states also relied
upon the militia to
assist their cominittees in keeping
control of the disaffected.
New Jersey even used special units
for that
purpose, in addition to regular militia
units.
During
the suimner of 1780 the Delaware militia
was used to quell
Tories in the lower county who failed to
pay taxes and bid

defiance by arms.

James Allen, on January 25, 1777, wrote

in his diary that thus far during the
winter Pennsylvania

had been governed by a council of safety who
had "put the

execution of their decrees

&

the whole dispensation of

Justice into the hands of the field-officers of the
several

battalions." Pennsylvania indeed relied heavily on their
148

cut
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Hoadly, Publ ic Records of the State of Connecti"
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Agnes Hunt, The Provi ncial Committees of Safety
of the Americ an Revolution, p. 79; Gerlach, P ro^l ogTieTo
Independence, p. 275; William Livingston to wTTlilrm'wrnds
July 3, 1777, Select ions from t he Corr espondence of the
Min utes o f
p.

109.

1780,
p. 308

t he "Council

'

of Safety of the^S^ate of New Jersey,
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""^^Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, August 22,
Staples, Rho de Island in_ the^Con t inen tal Conaress,
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mlitia

«

for maintaining order.l^l

various times both

Virginia and Maryland gave their
militia officers great
latitude in using the militia
against the disaffected

in

their respective states. "2

^^^^^ Carolina and South

Carolina were also active in using
their militia, as well
as ranger and light horse units,
to assist their committees
in controlling the disaf f ected
The militia, as well as the
Continentals, with a
few exceptions, used the authority
given them without
abusing it.
They did so in part because of
their faith in
the civilian authorities and in civil
supremacy, and because
the civilian and military leaders, as
will be shown in the
next three chapters, kept a tight rein on
them.
151

°f James Allen, of Philadelphia,
Counsellor
1770-1778
PMHB 9, no. 2 (1885): 189 Edward Jord
David Rittenh^use^_Astroi^^
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University o f-^^il^H¥7IViKiTTlF¥iFrT9
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at-Law,
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University of WisconsiFT7^^^7~19 71
pp7~3e^ryfr ^Irold J.
Eckenrode, Th e Revolution in Virgini a, p. 147;
Bradley
Chapm, Th e Americ an Law of Treason: Revolutionary and
Earlv
^
National Origins pp. 60-61^
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Guilford County Committee of Safety to the North
Carolina Council of Safety, August 23, 1776, Saunders, NCCR,
10:761; Provincial Congress Meeting, November 26, 1776,
ibid., 940, 941; A. S. Salley, Jr., The History of Orangeburg County South Carol ina fro m its First Settlement to T h
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CHAPTER

IV

CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL AND
DIRECTION
OF THE MILITARY
^Vhen

Congress met in Philadelphia
on May 10, I775,
the war with Great Britain
was a month old, the
colonies
were calling upon Congress not
only to give a unity to
addressing their common grievances,
but also to take direction and control of the military.
Both before and during
the war the Whigs expressed great
concern about keeping
^

the

n^ilitary under tight restraint,

for to do otherwise would

be to allow the possibility of
military tyranny and anarchy.

Peace was the first preference,

a

successful military war

the second, but more important was
controlling and directing
the military.

The delegates to the second Continental
Congress,

realizing the importance of their tasks,
immediately set
about putting not only their political house
in

order, but

also their military establishment.

Besides providing for

an army and selecting its military commanders,
Congress

suggested military policies and began the process of

establishing the machinery for controlling and directing

216

the military.

The question that was
frequently raised during
the
early summer of 1775, with
respect to controlling
and

directing the military, was where
Congress should physically
locate themselves.
Some members preferred removing
to
Cambridge or Hartford, so as to be
near the scene of battle.
Debate continued about a location
into the fall, but by the

following spring when the war had
spread to other parts of
the continent, it was decided to
stay in the centrally
located Philadelphia.

Debate regarding being nearer the

army was renewed during the summer of
1779, when several
delegates unsuccessfully attempted to have
Congress join
the army and act "en Militaire."^ Although
Congress as a

whole never sat near the army, they did actively
involve
themselves in the control and direction of the
army.

Until 1781, when executive departments were
created.

Congress attempted to keep the direction and control
of the
army in their own hands, though sharing some authority
and

Adams to Abigail Adams, July
field, AFC, 1:255-256; Ford, JCC, 2:passim.
""John

24

,

1775

,

Butter-

Titus Hosmer to Silas Deane, May 28, 1775, Burnett,
LMCC, l:94n.2; Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston, June 5, 1775,
ibid., 113; Eliphalet Dyer to Jonathan Trumbull, June 20,
1775, ibid., 138; Toger Sherman to Hoseph Trumbull, July 6,
1775, ibid., 154; Silas Deane to Mrs. Deane, September 22,
1775, ibid., 204
Henry Laurens to John Laurens, July 17,
1779, ibid., 4:328; Ford, JCC, 14:835-836.
;
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responsibility with the states
and for lifted periods,
with
the military themselves.
During the first
two years of the

war congress frequently
involved itself in even the
minutest
details of army policy and
procedures.
Relying on standing
committees, special committees,
and grand committees.
Congress attempted to keep tight
rein over all aspects of
the military.
Special committees generally were
appointed
to answer specific queries made
by the military.
Standing
committees were established to handle
such matters as
procuring cannon, fire arms, saltpetre,
clothing, beef and
salt.
Standing committees were also established
to provide
for prisoners of war, spies, cavalry,
recruiting, improving
the militia, and the health and discipline
of the army.

Hospital and medical standing committees were
also established
the first year of the war.^ Generally the
committees numbered
between three and five delegates, but often numbered
thirteen
members, one from each colony.

The latter were called grand

committees
Spending so much time on the minute military matters.
Congress frequently accomplished little else, even when
3

Ibid., 2:86, 106, 191, 203, 250; 3:419, 436, 459;
4:40, 45-46, 49, 55, 58, 63-64, 108, 154, 162, 164, 169,
184; 5:350, 442, 616, 810; 6:992; 7:193, 280-281; 8:413.

{

219

relying on the con^ittees
for guidance and
recommendations
Part of the problem was
absenteeism/ Also, the members
When present, were forced
to spend a large amount
of their
time among many con^ittees.
Thomas McKean was chairman
of
five corr^ittees and a member
of thirty-three others
at one
time during the first year
of the war and Richard
Henry Lee,
during his first five years
in Congress, served on
fortyfive military and naval
committees.
John Witherspoon served
on 120 committees during his
six years in Congress; Roger
Sherman on 110 during his six
years; and William Ellery on
seventy during his five years.
John Adams, during his short
stay in Congress, chaired twenty-five
committees and served
on sixty-five others.^
The committee system was as tedious,
cumbersome,
and complex as it was slow and
ineffective, as committees
often worked at cross-purposes.^ Responding
to Washington

James Lovell to Banjamin Franklin, October
28, 1780,
Re volutionary Diplomatic Corresponde nce.
4:107.

^
Wharton,
TTV.

5

G.
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Rowe,

"Thomas McKean and the Coming of the
Revolution," PMHB 96, no. 1 (January 1972):
33; Lee, Memoir
^f,^hej.ife of Richard Henry Lee 1:215; Varnum
LansiH^^
Collins, President Witherspoon: A Biography
2:4; William M
Fowler, Jr., William Ellery: A Rhode Island Poli
tico and
Lord of Admiralty (Metuchen. New Jersey 9,n^^^c^^r...
Pr^s^
1973), p. 187; Butterfield, AFC, 2:332n.l.
_
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Samuel Ward to Henry Ward, November 2, 1775,
Knollenberg, Correspondence of Governor Samuel Ward
pp. 115-116; William Fleming to Thomas Jefferson, July 13
1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:315.
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regarding

letter he had written
Congress, President
Laurens reminded him that
it was the rule of
Congress to
commit letters to the consideration
of co„™ittees and
boards that were dispersed in
different parts of Philadelphia
and governed by rules of their
own making for meeting
and
responding to Congress, and therefore,
"it is not always
or I should say, 'tis seldom
in the power of the President
to answer with that dispatch
which may seem necessary."'
Even when the committees met, they
were not, for the most
part, given any more authority
than to inquire and make
suggestions
a

Even as early as January 1776 it
was obvious to most
members of Congress they could not continue
regulating
all

military matters by temporary committees and
by the
committee of the whole, for although these
seemed

the safest

way,

it also appeared that some form of a
permanent military

oversight should be established.

Therefore, on January 24,

1776, a committee was appointed to consider the propriety

of establishing a congressional war office.

calling for

a

Their report,

Board of War and Ordnance, was made in April

and adopted on the twelfth of June.

Its first members, John

Adams, Roger Sherman, Benjamin Harrison, James Wilson and

Edward Rutledge, with Richard Peters as secretary, were
7

Henry Laurens to George Washington, November 13,
1777, ibid., 2:549.

^
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elected the next day.

Charles Carroll of Carrollton,

because of the experience he had
gained by visiting the ar.y
in Canada and his knowledge
of French, was added a
month
later
.

Initially, the Board of War and
Ordnance was
authorized to keep military records
and accounts of arms
and supplies; forward congressional
dispatches and money
to the army; provide for the
prisoners of war; and superintend the raising, fitting out and
dispatching
the army.

The Board met most mornings and every
evening, at least

when its members were not sitting on other
committees or
attending sessions of Congress.
In Congress, much of their
time was spent explaining and justifying their
proposals
and actions,

for Congress remained a council of war, still

passing final judgment on any matter of the least
substance.^
The demanding schedule of the members of the Board,

coupled with personnel changes in congressional membership,

resulted in frequent changes in membership on the Board.
During the first five months of its existence the Board had
nine different members."*"^
^Ford, JCC, 4:85, 215, 293, 293n.l; 5:434-435, 438,
575

.

9

Ibid., 434-435; John Adams to Abigail Adams,
June 26, 1776, Butterfield, AFC, 2:24; John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield, DAJA, 3:342.
""^Ibid.,

342

;

Ford, JCC,

5:732

,

751

;

6:923

.

President Hancock, elated
when the Board was
established, wrote Washington
that it was a great event
in
the history of America and
would be attended with
essential
advantages when properly conducted
and inspected. ^1 This
did not happen for obvious
reasons.
instead of being given
broad powers, the Board of War
and Ordnance was initially

granted only authority to consider
and deliberate military
policies and procedures, and had no
real decision-making
powers.
occasionally, Congress would delegate
just enough
authority to the Board to care for
specific problems when
they arose, but in almost all instances
the Board had
to

report to Congress as

a

whole for

a

decision to be made.

Additionally, Congress continued to rely on
the various
special, standing, and grand committees
for military
recominendations.

Despite the handicaps under which the

Board operated, they were able nonetheless to
make several
useful recommendations.^^ If this method of
conducting

military policy conformed to Whig beliefs regarding
the
placement of authority in numerous hands, it certainly
was
a dilatory and ineffective system.
This was not very
"^'''John

Burnett, LMCC

,

Hancock to George Washington, June 14, 1776
1:488.

Ford, JCC, 5:632, 729, 751, 753, 754, 757, 762,
768, 780, 781, 835, 838; 6:1041, 1043, 1047, 1053; 7:13,
108-109, 115-118, 154-155, 188-189, 340; 7:422, 491-492
494-495.

ii^portant the first year of the
war, as .ost Whigs
expected,
or at least hoped, for a

peaceful accommodation with
Great

Britain.
By the end of 1776, it appeared
to most Whigs that
the Board of War and Ordnance was
not significantly assisting congress in handling military
affairs, and in fact, due
to personnel changes and absenteeism,
as well as lack of
military experience, might even be
detracting from their
efforts.
"If we expect to succeed in the
present war,"
Samuel Chase wrote one general, "we must
change our mode
of conduct.
Distinct and precise departments ought to
be

established.

Board of War

A gentleman of the military must be of
the
"-^^
.

Other members, agreeing with Chase, persuaded

Congress on December 26, 1776, to appoint
formulate

a

8,

committee to

plan for better regulating the executive

business by non-members."^"^
April

a

The committee's report of

1777, was tabled until mid July, at which time

Congress resolved to appoint

a

new Board of War.

This new

body was to consist of three members not of Congress who
13

Samuel Chase to John Sullivan, December 24, 1776,
Burnett, LMCC 2:186.
,

14^

Benjamin Harrison to Robert Morris, December 29,
1776, ibid., 196; William Hooper to Robert Morris,
December 28, 1776, ibid., 196; Richard Smith Diary, March 19,
1776, ibid., 1:398-399; Ford, JCC, 6:1041-1042.
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would, on

full time basis, conduct
the business of the
Older board, under the direction
and supervision of the
existing Board of War and Ordnance.
However, on July 22,
1777, the date set for the election
of the three non-.e.bers,
congress, having second thoughts,
postponed making a selection and allowed the plan to
lapse.
a

While Congress spent the first
half of I777 in
deliberating the possibility of
creating a new board, the
old one continued to function, with
its members coming and
going with alacrity."^

Washington's defeats at Brandywine and
Germantown,
coupled with his expressed desire for a
knowledgeable board
of war to superintend all the war business,
thereby relieving both him and Congress from the
details of administration
that weighed them down, Congress during the
fall
of 1777,

began once again seriously to consider appointing

a

board with membership consisting of non-members.

Most

new

members, by late fall, with the army in retreat,
and finding
directing military affairs too complex for the limited
amount
of time they had to devote to them, and believing
that
some

executive authority could safely be entrusted to non-members,

decided the time had come to appoint an effective board of
^^Ibid., 7:241-242, 259;
-""^Ibid.,

9

:1080

.

8:424

,

563

war.

so,

on October 17, 1777,
Congress provided for a
new
Board Of war, to consist
of three .e.bers not
of Congress.
Its duties were to keep
a register of officers
^s.L±cors
and accounts
Of ordnance and supplies;
superintend the building
of
arsenals and foundries; forward
dispatches of Congress to
the States and ar.ies;
superintend the raising,
recruiting,
and dispatching of the land
forces of the Continent;
lay
,

before Congress estimates of the
military stores needed;
and make entries of all business
transacted.
All of their
proceedings were to be inspected by
Congress once a month,
or oftener, as Congress thought
proper and convenient.
The
board was required to sit where
Congress did and no member
of it could absent himself without
permission of Congress.
"Nothing is more essential than the
proper
Establishment of this Board" James Duane
informed General
Schuyler, referring to the new Board of
War.^^ Most Whigs
completely agreed. Despite fears of giving
military men
too much authority in either a civilian
or military capacity,
it was generally believed that experienced
military men should
17„.

^
^^^"""^

^° George Washington, October 20,
1///, Ballagh, Lette£S_o^Rlcha^rd Jlen^
George
Washington to the President of the Conti^tal1:338;
Congress,
October 13, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
~
9 :366-367; Ford, JCC, 9:818, 818-82'o:
"^"""^

James Duane to Philip Schuyler, November 19, 1777,

Burnett, LMCC,

2:559.
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be the non-congressional
.embers of the new board.
Under
the watchful oversight by
Congress, it was believed
that
the military .en could be
trusted, for they had, to
that
point in the war, demonstrated
obedience to Congress and
the concept of civil supremacy.
But which military men?
certainly those with demonstrated
administrative abilities,
and most members did not want
men who were sycophants
to
Washington who, by late 17 77, was
coming into greater
disfavor with a certain segment of
Congress and the country.
Thomas Mifflin, Timothy Pickering,
and Robert H.
Harrison were the military men selected
to the board on

November

1777
///.

Mifflin nr>+--;i
uirriin,
until that morning had been the
Quartermaster General, was allowed to retain
his major
generalship although resigning his position.
Pickering,
the Adjutant General of the Army, remained
in that position
until mid January 1778, before assuming his
place on the
board.

7

,

.

Harrison, Washington's military secretary,
refused

the position, primarily because he believed
that Mifflin

and Pickering were not loyal to Washington, and
were going
to use their position to undermine him."""^

With Pickering at camp, and Harrison refusing to
serve. Congress decided that the old Board of War and
u
Richard
Henry Lee to Thomas Mifflin, November
1777, Ballagh, Lett ers
char d_ Henry _ Lee 1:347;
Pickering, Timothy Prckering,' 1 183-184 7^203 Ford, JCC,
19r.-

.

,

:

9

:

874.

,
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Ordnance would continue to
function until the new one
began
its operations.
And to breathe so.e new
life into the old
board, seven members of
Congress were appointed board
..embers during the fall and
winter. ^0 Also in an attempt
to give more direction and
control to the board, particularly
with respect to better organizing
and disciplining
the army,

in December it was authorized
to appoint an Inspector
General
in every department, who, in

Eliphalet Dyer's words, would

be the executors and assistant
agents of the board.

By the end of November, when it
appeared that only
Mifflin was readily available and willing
to serve on the
board. Congress decided that additional
members be selected.
Schuyler and Gates were favored by many
members, in part
because both were qualified, and because by
selecting them
various factions in Congress would be satisfied.
Despite
the support for Schuyler, he was not selected.
Gates was,
on November 27,

1777.

He was to serve as President of the

Board, retaining his military rank and leave to
take the

field whenever he desired.

Richard Peters and Joseph

Trumbull were also selected, the former as secretary.

Peters assumed the new job, and retained his position as

secretary to the Board of War and Ordnance.
20
21

Because of ill

Ibid., 871-872, 874, 953, 1080; 12:1277.

Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, December 15,
1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:589.

.

health, Trumbull never took his
place on the new board,
resigning formally in April.

Two reasons have been preferred
as to why the Board
of War was established, both in
the context of the Conway
cabal, of which more will be said
in

a

later chapter.

The

first is that Washington, unable to
discipline his army and
unable to win major battles, needed
guidance from those who
understood the military realities of the
war, supposedly
Gates, Pickering, Mifflin, and Conway.
Thus, their appointments. Another reason is that Congress,
needing the time
for other duties, had the board established
as

a

helpmate

to both itself and Washington, and was not
established to

undermine or thwart Washington
During 1778 the new board suffered

a

succession of

failures, beginning with their first project, an
invasion
of Canada.

In its wake came the resignations of Conway as

Inspector General and James Wilkinson, who had served as

secretary of the board for less than two months.

Trumbull

22^
Same to same, November 28,

1777, ibid., 575; James
Duane to Philip Schuyler, November 19, 1777, ibid., 559Ford, JCC, 9:960, 971, 971-972.
23

Marquis de Lafayette to Henry Laurens [ca.
January 5 1778], Idzerda, L^layette^_in_tlTe_^ge_o^_tl^
America n Revolution 1:216; Richard Henry Lee "to~George
Washington, November 20, 1777, Ballagh, Letters of Richard
Henry Lee, 1:349; Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbu'riV
November 27, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:571; William Williams
to Joseph Trumbull, November 28, 1777, ibid., 573; Eliphalet
Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, November 28, 17 77, ibid., 575.
,
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had resigned in April,
never having taken his seat;
and that
™onth Gates left to take
of the Northern Department.
Thus, by the summer of 1778
the board was criticized
for
being just as ineffective as
the old board and even
more
caught up in small details. ^'^

™nd

TO improve the board's efficiency.
Congress, on

October 29, 1778, changed its
membership so that it would
consist of three non-congressional
members and two members
of congress, with any three
constituting a quorum.

Colonel

Harrison, Pickering, and Richard
Peters were the three noncongressional members chosen; Francis
Lightfoot Lee and
Jesse Root, the members of Congress
appointed.
Harrison
again declined and was replaced by Colonel
William Grayson,
who had served during 1776 on Washington's
staff.
Major
Peter Scull was elected secretary. The
congressional

membership frequently changed during 1779 and
1780, with
nine different members serving.
For long periods during 1779 and 1780 it appears
that Peters and Pickering managed the Board of War
by themselves, and when Pickering left in the summer of 1780
to
24

Henry Laurens to Robert Morris, April 6, 1778,
ibid., 3:156; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, May 16, 1778,
ibid., 245; Henry M. Ward, The Dep artment of War, 1781-1795
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 7~I'9 62y7~p"7~5r;
25

Ford, JCC, 11:546, 641; 12, 1076, 1077, 1086, 1101,
1134, 1241, 1277; 15:1447; 18:1230.
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become Quartermaster General, Peters
managed affairs until
that fall by himself. After November,
he was ably assisted
by Ezekiel Cornell, who was appointed
a congressional
member
TO make the Board of War more
than just

a

super

adjutant general's office. Congress on
November 25, 1119,
placed the board in charge of the
Departments of Quarter-

master General and Commissary General of
Purchases and
Issues, hoping it could untangle the
difficulties in which
those departments found themselves ^'^ This
responsibility
only bogged the board down in more detail,
thereby preventing them from concentrating on often more
pressing
.

needs

of military administration.

It should be noted,

it was not

the Board of War alone which suffered from
inefficiency,

overwork, and lack of real authority.

Most of the other

major committees of Congress lacked any force or strength,
and as 1780 ended, with the army suffering and threatening
to either disband or turn on their civilian leaders.

Congress decided to create separate executive departments
26

Jennings B. Sanders, Evoluti on of Executive Department of the Continental Congress, J/7 74-1 789 " Chape JThTIII
University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 15; Harry M.
Ward, The Departme nt of War _17_81-179 5 p. 5; Louis Clinton
Hatch, The Administration of" the Amer ican Revolutionary Army,
vol. 10 of the Harvard Historical Studies New" York! Long^
man's Green, and Company, 1904), pp. 19-20.
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Jesse Root to Jeremiah Wadsworth, November 26,
1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:527; Ford, JCC
17:511-512.
,

to handle their executive
business.

By doing this, it was

hoped that the army would
understand that Congress had
not
forgotten their responsibilities
and obligations to thorn.
On January 10,

1781, the first executive
department

was created, the Department of
Foreign Affairs.

A month

later, the Departments of Finance,
Marine, and War were also
created.
It was decided to appoint a
Secretary at War who,

besides being

a

super Adjutant General, would
provide

a

more

efficient liaison between the civil and
military leaders.
Until one was selected, however. Congress
decided the Board
of War would remain in operation.
Washington, pleased with Congress's decision
to

create a Department of War, desired
Hamilton, be appointed secretary.

a

member of his staff,

He also believed

Hamilton's father-in-law, Philip Schuyler, would make
good choice.

a

Schuyler, however, would not accept the post

without prior guarantees that he be reinstated as

a

Major

General, something that many in the army and Congress

objected to.

John Sullivan, who like Schuyler had had

experience both in army and Congress, was also put forth
by some as a likely candidate, despite his lack of interest
in the post.
28

Pickering believed the delegates might pick

Ibid.,

19:19,

126-127, 133, 206; 21:1030.

him, all the other candidates
being undesirable for one

reason or another.
Indeed, there were reasons that
some of the candidates were undesirable, and as
there was no clear choice,
congress, late in February 1781,
postponed the selection
until the following October.
The New England delegates
favored this because they feared Sullivan
would be chosen,
something they did not desire for, as a
member of Congress,
Sullivan frequently voted with the southern
delegates, and
as a person with close ties to the army,
it was feared he

might side too often with Washington against
Congress.
Another group of delegates desiring the selection
of Gates,
supported the postponement, hoping that by October
Gates
would be cleared by a court of inquiry for the
defeat
at

Camden, and therefore be eligible if selected.

The official

reason given for the delay was that it was imprudent to
hazard a change in congressional military administration

when the campaign was just beginning.
29

George Washington to John Sullivan, February 4,
1781, Fitzpatrick, Writi^£S_of^ Washi^
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Schuyler to George Washington "April""3 1781 Jared Sparks,
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During the first week of
October 1781 Greene, Knox,
and Lincoln were nominated
for the post of Secretary
at War.
Debate respecting the three
generals 's .erit lasted several
weeks.
It was generally believed
that Greene should remain
with the southern army and Knox
with the artillery at the
seige at Yorktown, and then most
probably at New York at a
later date.
This left Lincoln, who had once
obeyed

Congress's orders, even when it neant
losing Charlestown
and the tarnishing of his own
reputation.
Thus he was

elected and, by the end of November
1781, he had accepted
and been confirmed by Congress. ^"^
The army was pleased with Lincoln's
selection, as
he was well liked by them and Washington.
This was

evidenced in part by Washington having allowed
him to
receive the British surrender at Yorktown. Most

civilians

were pleased as well.

The Rhode Island delegates informed

their governor that "when we add his knowledge
and experience
as an officer, his integrity and attention to
business, we

cannot but flatter ourselves that the public will receive

George Washington, August 20, 1781, ibid., 191; Ford, JCC
19:205

•'

.
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essential benefits from his
appointment

.

The benefits

were not that essential, but certainly
Lincoln was the best
choice at the time and did able and
steady service as the
Secretary at War. Washington worked
well with Lincoln,
sending his communications to Congress
through him and
respecting him as a symbol of civil and
congressional
authority.
Similarly, Lincoln respected Washington
and,
though his civilian superior, treated him
with deference.
Thus, they worked well together, with Lincoln
constantly

demonstrating great wisdom, tact, thrift, all with
an amiable
manner 33
Observing Lincoln at work,

a

young French nobleman

wrote that the "work is not immense and all important
points
are decided by Congress. "^^

accurate observation.

For the most part, this is an

Lincoln's responsibilities were

mainly those held heretofore by the Board of War and by an
additional grant in April 1782 he was given many of the time
consuming administrative duties hitherto the responsibility
of Washington.

Lincoln, although given some decision-making

authority, rarely exercised it, believing that Washington
32

.
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33
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and Congress should be consulted on
all matters of substance,
and to a degree Congress expected
Lincoln to rely upon them
for guidance. 35 Lincoln, assisted by
a secretary and two
clerks, was content simply to do what was
expected of him,
no more, no less.
During 1782 he found time to write

geographical descriptions in letters to family
and friends
and to make philosophical notes for his own
amusement.
However, during 1783, as the war came to

a

increased with the disbanding of the army,

close, his duties

with most of

the army disbanded, Lincoln retired during the late
fall
of 1783.

37

By giving some military control and direction to the

Board of War and Ordnance, the Board of War, and the office
of the Secretary at War, Congress and the military commanders

were relieved of many administrative details, but neither
were truly relieved of the policy-making aspects of military
control.

Congress, because of their republican fears of

consolidation of authority and responsibility in
35
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individuals, and fear of giving
the mlitary too .uch
authority, kept most military
policy-making in their own
hands.
Despite the limitations on the
three above-mentioned
offices, they did serve as a useful
link between Congress
and the military, and were just
another reminder
to the

military of their subordinate position
to the civilian
authorities, even when the membership on
them became

progressively more militarily oriented.
Another form of controlling and directing
the
military came in the form of the personal
contact between
members of Congress and the military, as
members of
committees and individually.

As has been stressed in the

previous chapter, personal connections were very
important
to understanding the mechanics of how civil
control operated

and was maintained throughout the war.
The first members of Congress to visit the army were

Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, and Thomas Lynch, Sr.,
who, at Washington's request, came as

a

committee to confer

with the commander-in-chief at Cambridge on the organization
and operation of the army.
in October 1775

,

Arriving in Massachusetts late

they met not only with Washington and his

officers, but also with the New England civilian leaders
then in camp.

Their meetings, which lasted

a

week, resulted

in the conimittee successfully recon-imend ing to Congress that

they adopt Washington's
suggestions for improving
the
operation of the army.^^

Another congressional comn^ittee,
consisting of
Robert R. Livingston, Robert
Treat Paine, and John

Langdon,

also took to the field that fall.

m

November they went

to Canada with instructions
to visit Schuyler and
the
northern army, which by the time
they

had arrived in New

York, had retreated out of Canada.

The result of their

visit was an accurate report of
the reasons for the failure
of the Canadian expedition.
Rather than being resentful
of the committee overseeing his
activities and reporting
on past failures, Schuyler welcomed
congressional oversight
In fact, early in 1776 he requested
Congress send another
committee, hoping it would help him supervise
his unruly
army, composed to a large degree of New
Englanders with

whom Schuyler did not work well.

Before the arrival of

spring 1776, Congress selected Franklin, Charles
Carroll
of Carrollton,

and Samuel Chase as a committee to the

northern army, empowering them to sit and vote on military
38
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councils, with any two having
complete control over the
military; suspend officers and
fill up vacancies; and to
authorize the raising of up to six
independent companies.
Also early in 1776 Congress sent
a committee,
consisting of Benjamin Harrison, Thomas
Lynch, Sr., and

Andrew Allen, to New York City to
calm the impetuous Charles
Lee, who had managed to embroil
himself in a debate with
the New York authorities regarding
their respective

responsibilities and authority
Sending committees to camp. Congress very
quickly
learned, was

a

useful means of informing themselves of the

situation of the army, coordinating activities
with military
and civilian leaders on a direct basis, and exerting

congressional supremacy on

despite the introduction of

personal basis.

a
a

Therefore,

Board of War and Ordnance in

1776, Congress continued to send committees to camp frequently

during the next two years.
39„
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Late in the

sunur,er

of 1776

,

they sent Elbridge Gerry,

^

Rober Sherman, and Francis Lewis
to New York to inspect
the
state of the army, and George
Clymer and Richard Stockton

to

the northern army for the same
purpose.

That fall they sent

William Paca, John Witherspoon, and
George Ross to Washington's camp to discuss promotions
and the appointments of
officers.
The next summer they sent Elbridge
Gerry, Philip
Livingston, and George Clymer to the main
army to ascertain
its condition.
To determine the condition
of the army at

Fort Pitt, Congress appointed Joseph Reed,
Gabriel Jones,
and Samuel Washington late in November
1777 as a committee
to travel to that western post, authorizing
them to suspend

and appoint officers and to draw up offensive
operational

plans in concert with General Hand.

Because of other duties,

this committee was replaced by George Clymer, Sampson

Mathews, and Samuel McDowell, who did not reach Fort
Pitt
until March 1778

.^"'"

Undoubtedly the most important committee appointed
the first half of the war was the one sent to Washington's

camp during the winter of 1777-1778.

This was

41

a

time when

Ibid., 5:808; 6:973, 973n.l, 975; 7:546, 577;
9:942-945, 1018; 10:9, 38, 314; William Williams to Joseph
Trumbull, September 26, 1776, Burnett, LMCC 2:104; Elbridge
Gerry to Horatio Gates, September 27, 1776, ibid., 105;
Samuel Chase to the Maryland Council of Safety, November 26,
1776, ibid., 166; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, July 15,
1777, ibid., 414; Henry Laurens to George Clymer, March 27,
1778, ibid., 3:144, 144n.2.
,

240

Washington's popularity in
Congress was at its lowest,
and
the war effort desperate.
Hoping to help Washington,
and
at the sa.e ti.e to assert
closer control over the
military,
congress during the fall of
1777 established the Board
of
war and the Inspector General's
departxnent, and began sending committees to VJashing ton
s camp.
'

On November 28,

17 77,

Congress appointed Elbridge

Gerry, Robert Morris, and Joseph
Jones to repair to the main
army to discuss with Washington the
possibility of a winter

campaign.

They reached camp on the third of
December and,
after several days of meetings with
Washington and his
generals, realized the army was in no
condition to mount a

winter offensive.

Therefore, upon returning to Congress,

they had that body resolve that the army not
take to the
offense until spring. They also suggested to
Congress, as

did Washington, that since the army was in such
bad shape,
the quartermaster general's department in shambles,
they

send another committee to camp to help assist Washington
in

correcting abuses and to make new arrangements for the

preservation of the officer corps and the army itself.
Congress responded on January 10, 1778, by appointing three members of Congress and a like number from the
42

Ford, JCC, 10:972
1029-1031; George Washington
to the President of the Continental Congress, December 13,
Fitzpatrick, Wrj^tin gs o f W ash in gton 10:194.
17 77
,

,

,
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Board of War as a committee to meet
with Washington at camp,
where they would reduce the regiments;
make recommendation,
removals, appointments; and adopt such
other measures "as
they shall judge necessary for introducing
economy and
promoting discipline and good morals in the
army."^^

Elected on the tenth were Joseph Reed, Francis
Dana, and

Nathaniel Folsom, and Board of War members Gates,
Mifflin,
and Pickering.

John Harvie was added as

a

congressional

member on the twelfth.

Because of the embarrassing situation created for
Washington's critics in and out of Congress when the "Conway
Cabal" fell apart,

it was decided in Congress that it would

be impolitic to have Washington directly controlled at camp

by Gates and the other Board of War members.

Thus Gates,

Mifflin, and Pickering were excused from going to camp,
being replaced by Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Gouverneur Morris.

Most of the members of the committee to camp

eventually made it to Valley Forge, and they, in conjunction
with Washington, were able to impress upon Congress the

necessity for the proper providing of the officers and
soldiers.

During the first week of May 1778, several members

of Congress came to camp to help celebrate the French

'^^Ford,
44

Ibid.,

JCC, 10:40.
40,

41.
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alliance and, while there, discussed military policy.

Another committee was sent to camp that summer to
help
arrange the organization of the army."^^

Although Washington was allowed more control over
the affairs of the army after the summer of 1778, Congress

nevertheless continued to send committees to camp to discuss

military policy.

In December 1779,

for example, Philip

Schuyler and Henry Marchant were selected to see Washington
about the arrangement of the Southern Department.

On

January 10, 1780, when it appeared to many members that the

military needed help, Elbridge Gerry moved that Congress
send a committee to camp who would, with the commander-inchief,

"be authorized to take such measures as they may

judge necessary, for obtaining immediate supplies for the

army."

Robert

Although this motion
R.

v;as

soundly defeated, Gerry,

Livingston, and John Mathews were selected as

a

committee to investigate the possibility of reducing the
size of the army and increasing its efficiency.
45

4 6

11:676, 769; Gouverneur Morris to John
3:66; The Committee
Jay, February 1, 1778, Burnett, LMCC
of Conference to Thomas Johnson, Jr., February 16, 1778,
ibid., 86-87; The Committee of Conference to George Clinton,
March 16, 1778, ibid., 131; Francis Lewis to Pierre Van
Cortlandt, March [April], 10, 1778, ibid., 163-164; Joseph
Reed to Esther Reed, August 16, 1778, ibid., 375; The
Committee of Arrangement to Theodorick Bland, September 11,
1778, ibid., 407; The Committee of Arrangement to George
Washington, September 30, 1778, ibid., 431-432; Horatio
Gates to Thomas Conway, May 17 1778, Stark, John Stark p. 143
Ibid.,

67;

,

,

,

"^^Ford,

JCC,

15:1331, 1332

;

16:37-38
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About

a

week and

a

half later, to supplement
the

activities of the above-mentioned
committee, Congress
decided to send two men, one of whom
was to be a member of
Congress, as a committee to camp. Philip
Schuyler and Board
of War member Pickering were selected,
and later Thomas
Mifflin was added/'^ Schuyler, however,
feeling Pickering
and Mifflin were enemies of Washington and
that Mifflin had
failed as Quartermaster General and, therefore,
was not
capable of making a contribution to the better
provisioning
of the army, refused to serve.

Thus,

the committee collapsed

and never went to camp.

Washington, although appreciating Schuyler's loyalty,

nevertheless wanted

a

committee to be sent to camp to assist

him in provisioning his army and keeping them under control,
as well as helping him to get the states to supply his army.

Congress responded to Washington's April appeal by appointing a three-man committee which would go to camp to confer

with Washington about the reduction of the army and the
arrangement of the staff departments.
a smaller army,

This was in hopes that

efficiently supplied, would not only remain

in the field, but would not turn on their masters.

Schuyler,

John Mathews, and Nathaniel Peabody were elected as the
^^Ibid., 75-77, 79.

.
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committee on AprilX 13
-LJ, 1780,
7Rn and
=,r.^
y
proceeded to camp shortly
thereafter .'^^
1

This committee, which was
given additional
responsibilities and authority in
May, was not that successful, even when Congress in
June called on the states
to
cooperate with it. The military
leaders, who had hoped the
committee would be able to assist them
in better supplying
and controlling the military, became
disillusioned.
So did
Congress, which finally recalled them
by an overwhelming
vote on the eleventh of August, believing
the committee
wanted too much authority for themselves
and the military
commanders 4 9
So,

upset and disappointed with this committee.

Congress did not send any members to camp the
remainder of
the war.
Individuals from, and representing Congress

did,

however, go to camp.

Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris

and Board of War member Richard Peters visited
Washington's

camp at Dobb

'

s

Ferry during August 1780 to ascertain the

arrangement of the army for the ensuing campaign and to
48^

George Washington to the President of the Conti
nental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 18:207-211; Philip Schuyler to Alexander
Hamilton, April 8, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:110; Ford, JCC,
16:332-333, 354-356, 362.
49

Ibid., 17:438-439, 720; 18:538, James Duane to
Philip Schuyler, May 26, 1780, Burnett, LMCC 5:170-171;
Nathanael Greene to Samuel B. VJebb, July 4 1780, Ford,
Samuel Blachley V^ebb, 2:269
,

,

.

245

determine their financial needs.

The Secretary at War,

Benjamin Lincoln, visited the camp also,
during 1782 and
1783 for the same reasons.

Individual members of Congress also visited
camp
throughout the war, for various reasons, but always
with
the affect of reminding the military their
actions were not
only being directed by Congress, but also monitored.
Most
often, congressional visits came about as members
traveled
to and from the meetings of Congress.

Such congressional

visits began with John Adams visiting camp at Cambridge in

January 1776, where he consulted with the commander-in-chief
about sending General Lee to New York, and ended with James
Duane

•

s

visit to Washington's headquarters at Newburgh during

February 1783 52
.

Some members of Congress went to camp to

50

Ford, JCC, 21:791, 817; George Washington to Israel
Putnam, June 2, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington,
Harry M. Ward, The De pa rtment of War ,~I7"81-T7 957~
26 462
p. 24; Robert Morris Diary, Ferguson, '"Paperi^£'~Robert
Morris, 1:418, 418n.l; 2:74-80; Joseph Reed~€o~George~
Washington, August 3, 1781, Burnett, LMCC, 6:164-165; James
Mitchell Varnum to George Washington, August 20, 1781, ibid.,
:

;

191.
51

James Duane to Alexander Hamilton, February 17,
1783, ibid., 7:45; Minutes of Councils of War, January 16,
4th ser., 4:774, 774-775;
17, 1776, Force, American Archives
John Adams to George Washington, January 6, 1776, Adams,
Work s of John Ad ams 9:370-3 71.
,

,

52

James Duane to George Clinton, March 13, 1778,
"Original Documents," MAH 13, no. 2 (February 1885): 177;
Horatio Gates to John Stark, January 24, 1778, Stark, John
Stark, p. 142; Lossing, Pliilip S£huyle£, 2:404; Reed, Joseph
Reed, 1:365; Conway, Omitted Chapters of History, p. 39;
Edmund C. Burnett, The ConH nental Congress (New York:
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serve as military volunteers, such
as Benjamin Rush during
the winter of 1776-1777, Thomas
Burke during the Brandywine
campaign, and Elbridge Gerry and three
others during the
1780 New Jersey campaign.

Another means by which members of
Congress maintained
their personal contact with, and indirect
control of
the

military officers was by having their sons
and other relatives serve as aides-de-camp to the major
military

leaders.

For example, Silas Deane

'

s

stepsons, Samuel B. Webb and John

Webb, served as aides-de-camp to Generals Washington,
Putnam,
Howe, and Greene.

Lewis Morris's sons, Lewis, Jr., and

Jacob, served as aides-de-camp to Generals Greene,
Lee, and

Sullivan.

Francis Lewis's son, Morgan, served as an aide-

de-camp to Gates.

John Witherspoon

an aide-de-camp to General Nash.

'

s

son,

James,

James Duane

'

s

served as

son-in-law,

Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 449; Burnett, LMCC, 5:134n.2,
206-207n.3; James Mitchell Varnum to William Greene,
April 21, 1781, ibid., 6:65; James Duane to Horatio Gates,
December 16, 1777, ibid., 2:590; James Duane to Philip
Schuyler, December 16, 1777, ibid., 590.
53

Corner, AAitoba^graphy_of _Ben2a
pp. 124127; Griffith J. McRee, Lj^fe_ and Correspondince of James
Irdell, One o f th e Asso c iate Justices of the""Supreme 'Court
of the Un ited States
1:547; John Steele to WilTTiam]
Steele, June 14, 1780, "Original Revolutionary Letter," HM
4, no. 5 (May 1860): 138; L. Carroll Judson, The Sages and
Hero es of th e American R evo lution.
I n Two Parts Including
the Sign e rs of the Decla rat ion "~of "independence. ~IV o~Hundre
and Forty Three of the Sages and Heroes7~are~preserrtedr"l[n
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William North

served as an
-^r,
^
aide-de-camp
to General Steuben.
Philip Livingston's son, Henry P.,
was captain of
,
,

Washington's guards.

Henry Laurens's son, John,
served as
an aide to Washington; and John
Hanson's son, Alexander

Contee, served as private secretary
to Washington.
John
Armstrong, Sr.'s son, John, Jr., served
as an aide-de-camp
to Generals Mercer and Gates.
William Burnett's
son,

Ichabod, served as an aide-de-camp to
General Greene.
Edward Biddle's son-in-law, Peter Scull,
served

as an aide

to Washington.

And James Mercer's half-brother,
John

Francis Mercer, served as an aide-de-camp to
General Lee.^^
Another indirect way the members of Congress
were

able to strengthen their control over the military
was by

having military leaders communicate with them.

This not

only reminded the military that Congress was the supreme

decision-making body of the continent, but it also allowed
Congress to know better what was happening in the army.
Additionally, it strengthened the ties between the civilian
and military leaders.
54

Julia Delafield, Biograph ies of _Francis_ Lewis and
Morgan Lewi s, 2 vols. (New York: Anson^D. F. Rando'lph"and
Company, 1877), 1:46; Varnum Lansing Collins, Presi dent
With er spoon: A Biography, 2:31, 31n.23; James HaltiganT The
Irish i n tHe American Revolution and their Early Influence""
in t he Colonies, pp. 2 36-2 37; Morton L. Montgomery 7^^rstory
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Throughout the war, members of
Congress asked
military leaders to write them on a
personal basis about
conditions at camp and about the
qualifications
and

abilities of their fellow officers.

Most officers welcomed the opportunity
to express
themselves to members of Congress, and
56
frequently
did so.

Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, September
24
177fi
Butterfield, Lett_ers_o_f_ Benla_min Rush! 1
115
Lewis Morris, Sr., December 207-17757 "Letters jShn Jay to
to Genera?
Lewis Morris " NYHSC 8 (1876): 434; Thomas
Nelson to Horatio
Force, American Archives, 5th seJ
T^tnk
3:1506;
Robert Morris to NathanaiT^^iiHiT-Siptii^ber
lo!
1781, Ferguson, Papers_of _Rober^Morris 2 229;
Gouverneur
Morris to Robert Morris, [SeptembeFToT 1781]
ibid
229Roger Sherman to Joseph Trumbull, July
6, 1775
Joseph
Trumbull Collection, vol. 3, CSL; John Adams to
Abigail
Adams December 3, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:331;
John Adams
to John Thomas, November 13, 1775, JohP^homas
Papers, MHS
(Microfilm); Same to same, March 7, 1776, ibid.; John
Adams
to William Heath, February 18, 1776, William Heath
Papers
MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Same to same, October 5, 1775
ibid
Same to same, April 15, 1776, MHSC, 7th ser
4:9; Same to
same, August 3, 1776, ibid., 14; John Adams to Horatio Gates,
March 23, 1776, Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Correspondence
of John Adams and Horatio Gates," PMHS 17 (October 1941-May
1944): 138-139; Same to same, April 27, 1776, ibid., 143;
John Adams to John Sullivan, June 23, 1776, Adams, Works'of
John Adams, 9:408; John Adams to William Tudor, July 23,
1775, William Tudor Papers, MHS; Same to same, July 26,'l775,
ibid

'

:

;

'

'
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For Lafayette,

,

see Idzerda, Lafay ette in the A ge
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Syrett, Paper s of Alexand er Hamilton 1, 2, 3:passim;
Generals McDougall and Schuyler frequently wrote Jay, see
Morris, Jo hn Jay passim; Robert Morris frequently written
by Tench Tilghman, Generals Wayne and Gates, see Ferguson,
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Some even initiated the correspondence,
not waiting for
member of Congress to ask them to write. ^"^

a

Military men also visited Congress,
thereby
reinforcing the supremacy of the civilians.
These visits
were often prescribed by Congress, but
just as frequently
military leaders took it upon themselves to
come to Congress
to lay before that body a particular
complaint or
request,

generally relating to their own professional
advancement,
which of course, they equated with the patriotic
cause.

Washington, who preferred to stay at camp and
deal

with Congress by letters and emissaries, as well as
through
visits of committees, nevertheless was occasionally required
to come to Philadelphia to discuss strategy and the arrange-

ment and subsistence of the army.

He,

Gates, and Mifflin

were ordered to Philadelphia during the summer of 1776,
where they met with several committees to discuss plans for
a

Canadian campaign, as well as plans for Washington's next

campaign.

This two week stay was almost more than

Washington could bear, for he believed his time could be
57

"Journal of Samuel Holten, M.D. While in the
Continental Congress, May, 1778, to August, 1780," HCEI
55, no. 3 (July 1919): 162.
58

John Hancock to George Washington, May 16, 1776,
Burnett, LMCC, 1:449; George Washington to the President
of the Continental Congress, May 19, 1776, Fitzpatrick,
Writi n gs of Washington 5:58; Same to same. May 20, 1776,
ibid
62; George Washington to Israel Putnam, May 26, 1776,
ibid., 67; Ford, JCC 4 383-384
391
399-400, 410-412
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better spent in the field than in
the cabinet.

He avoided

conning to Congress for over a
year, but return he did during

August 1777, when he spent several days
with a comniittee
discussing the Northern Department
Another whole year
would elapse before Washington again
would be suirmoned to
.

Congress.

This was late in December 1778.

wined and dined for a month and

a half,

Despite being

and meeting with

various committees and members, Washington
continually

expressed his desire to return to his army, and
was allowed
to do so in February.

Appreciating Washington's objections

to being called away from his army during a
winter encampment

or a summer campaign. Congress refrained from calling
him to

confer with them for over two years.

Washington's next

visit occurred during Spetember 1781, as his army was marching towards Virginia through Philadelphia.

Washington used

the opportunity to meet with Morris and members of Congress,

primarily to discuss finances.^"''

After his successful

59

Douglas Southall Freeman, Geo rge Washington: A
Biog raphy, 7 vols. (New York: Charles Scr ibner i^Sons";
1948-1957)
4:447-449.
'

,
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Ford, JCC, 12:1250; 13:7; Henry Knox to Benjamin
Lincoln, January 29, 1779, Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #4); Eliphalet Dyer, Jesse Root, and Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, January 4, 1779, Burnett, LMCC,
4:7-8; John Jay to George Washington, January 31, 1779^ Ibid.,
49; John Fell Diary, January 1, 5, 1779, ibid., 1, 10; James
Duane to Philip Schuyler, January 3, 1779, ibid., 4.
,

Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Adverti ser
September 2, 1 7 8T7^ Robert Morris Diary, Ferg^usorT^ Papers
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Yorktown campaign, Washington returned
to Philadelphia late
in November 1781 and remained there
until March 1782,
meet-

ing with committees of Congress, as
well as with individual

members, to discuss the arrangement and
future of the
62
army.
The only other visit Washington made
to Congress

before the peace treaty arrived the following
spring, was
in July 1782, when he and Rochambeau met
with several

members of Congress to discuss possible operations
against
New York City.^"^
Although Washington did not enjoy visiting Congress-not because he held any disrespect for that body, but
because
he hated to be away from his army, particularly as they
were

constantly on the verge of mutinying and/or disbanding--he
did not mind sending or having sent his representatives.

Congress, therefore, did not hesitate calling upon

Washington's subordinates to come to confer with them.
Because of the importance of logistics, members of
the army subsistence staffs were frequently called to

Congress.

This was particularly true of Quartermaster

Generals Greene and Pickering, who spent much time discussing
62

,

.

.

Robert Morris Diary, ibid., 3:316, 356, 399, 435;
Daniel Carroll to George Washington, November 28, 1781,
Burnett, LMCC, 6:270; Same to same, December 5, 1781, ibid.,
273-274; Ezekiel Cornell to George Washington, [February 12,
ibid
302
1782]
,
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Ezekiel Cornell and David Howell to William Greene,

July 19, 1782, ibid., 387.
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the support of the army with
con^ittees of Congress and
the
Board Of War.^^ other officers
also visited Congress to
discuss the supply of army, including
Thomas Mifflin in 1776;

colonel Daniel Brodhead in 1781; and
General Greene's aides,
Lewis Morris, Jr., and Robert Burnet,
during the latter
65
years

Strategy and related activities also
prompted
Congress to call upon military commanders
to personally
discuss policy with them, particularly with
newly appointed
theater commanders before taking command.
Thus, most
all

of the Southern Department commanders,
beginning with Lee
in 1776 and ending with Greene in 1780, came
to Philadelphia

before assuming command.

Similarly, Northern Department

commander Gates and Schuyler also held discussions with
64
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Congress before taking command of their
department.
Commanding officers often came to Congress

on their own to

discuss strategy, particularly relating to
plans that would
enhance their reputation or gain territory
^"^
for their state.

Other officers also visited Congress uninvited
to
plead their special interest, normally involving
promotions
and command assignemnts.

Although at times this was

a

nuisance, it did serve to reinforce the belief that if
the

military wanted something they had to obtain it through
legitimate means, by appealing to the civilian authorities.^^
67
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Despite the nuisance of some of the
uninvited visits.
Congress, as has been stated earlier,
appreciated the
fact

that the military looked to them for
guidance and direction.

Congress, we must remember, was the supreme
civilian authority,

and therefore responsible for keeping the
continent's

military forces from becoming tyrannous.

Fear of

a

military

tyranny, a Cromwell, and the desire to uphold civilian

direction of the war effort and the military was ever present
in the thinking and actions of the members of Congress.

Although this authority would be shared with the state

governments and with the military itself, Congress from the
first days of their meeting in May 1775 attempted to get
and retain a firm grip on the control and direction of the

military forces of the continent.
As discussed earlier, the primary control exercised

by Congress was its authority to commission and promote
officers, especially the general officers.

But there were

many other ways that Congress controlled and directed their

military forces; all of which tended to reinforce the concept
of civil supremacy.

Congress spent

a

considerable amount of time,

particularly early in the war, making personnel assignments
for even the lowest ranking officers, especially for the

foreign officers which they commissioned with abandon.
69

Ford, JCC, 4:223; 5:565.
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These personnel assignments were not just
limited to the
lower ranking officers, for Congress even made
personnel

assignments for general officers, such as sending De
Woedtke
to Canada in 1776, keeping Mifflin in the Philadelphia
area

late in 1776, and sending Steuben to Rhode Island in 1778.^°

These personnel assignments did not generally upset the

military as

a

whole or Washington, but congressional
*

involvement in troop movements, command decisions, investigations, and strategy did, especially if they were made

without consultation with the military.

Nevertheless, most

of the military accepted the authority of Congress to make

those decisions, and grudgingly accepted them, even when

they believed Congress did not have the expertise or the

best interest of the army in mind

v/hen

making ipilitary

decisions
Early in the war especially, but throughout it.

Congress made troop assignments, even at the company level. 71

Often these assignments came to Washington in the form of
request, generally asking him to spare

a

a

regiment or two

^°Ibid., 4:209-210; 6:979, 995; 11:849.
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Besides making individual
personnel and unit
assignments. Congress also mandated
which units constituted
a particular command.
Often this meant nothing more
than

providing for

merging of units, such as the
joining
together of Pulaski's Legion and
Armand s
a

'

Corps in 1780.

Congress frequently declared which
units constituted a
particular field army, such as with
the southern army.
They
also mandated during 1775 that five
thousand troops be kept
in the New York theater of operations,,
and
in 1777 they

informed Washington that he could not
detail more than
twenty-five hundred men from the northern
army without first
consulting with General Gates and Governor
Clinton. When
making these organizational decisions,
Washington was
generally consulted, particularly after Trenton
and Princeton, but there were exceptions, as the president
of Congress

explained to him after ordering the Pennsylvania Line
south
in 1781 without prior consultation,

stating quick action

necessitated their decision.
Probably no other subject caused more debate within
the army and Congress than the appointment of commanding

generals of the various armies and expeditions.
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Washington was frequently asked
his opinion or given
authority to :.ake such appointments,
more often than not
Congress reserved to itself the
right to make these
decisions, particularly with respect
to the northern and
southern armies. At the beginning
of the war, Washington
believed he commanded the main army
subject

to the will of

Congress, but the northern army was
subject directly to
Congress.
The result of Washington's
acquiescence with
respect to the northern army resulted in
many complications,
as evidenced by the Schuyler-Gates
feud for command in the
Northern Department, and by the debate over
the choice to
lead the expedition against Canada in 1778.^^
Congress also
kept a firm grip on control of the southern
army, beginning
with the appointment of Charles Lee during
the spring of
1776 until the appointment of Gates during the early
summer
of 1780.

Congress appointed successively Lee, Howe, Lincoln,

and Gates without consulting Washington; with
Washington's
one appointment, DeKalb, being only temporary in nature.

'^^

It was not until Gates faltered at Camden did Congress
ask

Washington to name the southern commander.
77
78
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Washington responded by reco™,ending
Greene, who Congress
readily accepted.
Congress made other cominand
appointments as well.
They included the creation of a
position titled Commandant
of the Forts in the New York
Highlands and filled

it in the

spring of 1777 with George Clinton;
the appointment of Gates
to command the army in the area
around Fishkill, New York,
during the spring of 1778; and several
of the commanders
at Fort Pitt and the Western Department,
including Edward
Hand and William Irvine.

Just as Congress appointed commanding officers,
they
also removed them, as well as investigated their
actions,

beginning with the removal of General Wooster in
June 1776,
and Washington being directed the following month to
make
an inquiry into the conduct of the officers who had
directed

the unsuccessful Canadian expedition.

Washington was able to ward off

a

The following year,

congressional called-for

investigation of Sullivan's conduct at Staten Island and
Brandywine.

Not so lucky v;ere St. Clark and Schuyler, who

were recalled after the loss of Forts Ticonderoga and
Independence, and required to repair to Washington's
^^Ford, JCC, 18:906, 994-995.
80
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9:944; 10:275, 354; 21:996-997;
Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, April 15, 1777, Burnett,
LMCC, 2:325.

11

.

headquarters to face an investigation.

Also called to

account for their actions were
the comn^anders of Forts
Clinton, Montgomery, and Mifflin,
which also fell in I777.
Mcintosh and Howe were removed
from their respective
commands in the south for their
inability to get along with
the local civilian authorities.
As Washington became more
trusted by Congress, he was allowed
greater latitude in
calling for investigations and removing
officers.
Congress
even ignored the fact that Washington
avoided having an

investigation of Gates's conduct at Camden,
despite having
previously requested it; and eventually
repealed their
request

8

By making personnel and troop assignments,
investi-

gations, and command appointments. Congress kept

relatively tight rein on the military.

a

True, Washington,

as he demonstrated his ability and willingness
to subordinate

himself to the will of Congress, was given more decision-

making responsibility.

Nevertheless, when major strategical

decisions were to be made Congress, believing they were in
8

John Hancock to George Washington, June 7, 1776,
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Abigail Adams, August 20, 1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:321;
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better position than the military
leaders, including
Washington, to see the needs of the
continent as a whole,
throughout the war mandated and
recommended major campaigns,
expeditions, and other strategical
movements.
a

Much of American strategy during
the war was simply
a response to British movements.
Nevertheless, Congress
was quite active giving military
directions to their military
commanders, beginning soon after their meeting
in May 1775.
At that time. Congress specifically advised
New York not to
oppose British troop landings and to leave
them in peace
unless they committed hostile acts or erected
fortifications.
They also ordered the New York forces to abandon
Forts

Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and withdraw all the
troops,
cannon, and stores to the southern end of Lake George.

Later that month, and during June, Congress ordered that

New York and the Hudson River be protected; prohibited, and
then reversed themselves, regarding

a

Canadian expedition.

In September 1776, when it appeared that New York City would

be captured, many of Washington's generals suggested burning
the tovm to the ground before evacuating.

Initially,

Congress ordered Washington to hold the town and do no
damage to it; but after Washington's queries to them.
Congress informed him he was under no obligation to hold
the tovm, but under no circumstances was he to burn it.

Earlier that year and again in 1778, before later suspending

their orders. Congress
directed expeditions be
taken against
^
Detroit.

Early in the war, particularly.
Congress took an
interest in the Northern
Department.
During the winter of
1777-1778, for example, they twice
ordered the securing of
the Hudson River, and authorized,
then cancelled, a Canadian
expedition.
During 1777 and 1778 they also
took an active
interest in the western theater of
operations, ordering
Gates in the latter year to mount
an offensive in the Seneca
Country and during 1779 they ordered
an expedition against
the western Indians.
Additionally, during the
fall of 1777,

they commissioned James Willing, a
brother of member of
Congress, Thomas Willing, to lead an
expedition down the
Mississippi, attacking the enemy wherever
he found them.
With respect to the Southern Department,
they ordered an

expedition against West Florida in 1777, and
against East
Florida in 1778 .^'^
After 1779, Congress relied more on Washington to
make strategical decisions, in part because he had
become

more trusted, and because he would have to coordinate
his
82
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activities with the French.

Nevertheless, Congress did not

relinquish their right to mandate strategy,
for in August
1780 they ordered Washington to make
plans with the French
to rid the south of the British
forces.

They also

continued, as they had throughout the
war, making recommendations.
Often Congress believed they knew what
the best
strategy or military policy was, but realizing
that military
in the field might have better judgment
with respect
to

practicability of carrying out their plans, they
formed
their strategical requests as recommendations.
Late
in

November 1777, for example. Congress reconmended
that

Washington undertake a winter campaign.

Although they were

unsuccessful in this instance, as the army went into
winter

encampment at Valley Forge, they were successful

in their

recommendation during the late summer of 17 82 to have the

military undertake

a

western campaign against the Indians.

Congress, although possessing the authority over
the continent's military establishment, frequently shared

this authority with military leaders, particularly Washington.

This sharing of authority was progressive in nature, in that
it was increasingly shared as military commanders became

more trusted and as the war situation worsened.
84
85
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Actually, the sharing of
authority began with
Washington's appointment as
co„er-in-chief

on June 25,

Realizing they could not foresee
all eventualities!
congress told Washington they were
leaving .any things to
his prudent judgment, which they
hoped would reflect the
opinion of councils of war. These
councils,
1775.

they desired,

would suggest the most advantageous
means for the ends to
which the army had been raised.
Gates had hoped Congress
had been more explicit in granting
Washington
specific

powers, but Washington was satisfied
that Congress had been
proper in their instructions to him.^^
For the next year
and a half, Washington generally
followed what he believed
to be Congress's desire; that is,
calling councils of war
before making any important decisions.
Additionally,

Washington, in his desire to remain completely
under the
will of Congress, frequently did not take
action until he

received the express authority from Congress.
By consulting Congress so frequently, Washington
had, by the summer of 1776, become a nuisance.

Bluntly,

Congress told Washington they "have such an entire confidence
86
87
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m

his

3Ud„.

that they will ,ive no
particular direction,
about the dispositions of the
troops, but desire that
he
will dispose those at New
York, the Flying Ca^p
and

Ticonderoga, as to hi™ shall
see. the .ost conducive
to the
public good...«S With respect
to hi„ calling councils
of
war, congress that winter and
again the following year
indicated that he did not have to
rely completely upon
councils of war, preferring he acted
as circumstances
RQ

dictated.

Despite the discretionary authority
granted
Washington early in the war, he was,
for the most part,
still subject to the will of Congress,
which constantly
involved themselves in overseeing and
directing the military.
For example, early in the war they
ordered Washington to
offer a pardon to all deserters; strongly
recommended he

give Lafayette command of

division; and directed him in

a

the spring of 1778 to call

a

council of war to formulate

plans for the next campaign. ^°

Such orders and recommenda-

tions continued throughout the war, as Congress acted
on
the belief they must keep a firm grip on the military,
88
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otherwise the military might
pot a fir™ grip on the.
and
the country.
Vet, as the military
became more trusted, they
were given greater latitude
in decision making,
especially
Washington
Early in the war, during the
height of the SchuylerGates conflict, when Gates was
reappointed by Congress to
coin^and the Northern Departraent,

Congress informed Washington

that they "never intended by any
commission hitherto granted
by them, or by the establishment
of any department whatever,
to supersede or circumscribe the
power of General Washington
as the commander in chief of all
the Continental land forces
within the United States. "^1 Yet, as
we have
seen,

the

powers granted the commander in chief
were indeed circumscribed by Congress.
It was a fine line that Washington
walked, as many decisions he faced often
required asking
whether or not he was even entitled to make
such decisions.
That, to a large degree,

is why Washington frequently con-

sulted Congress and its members, as definition of
his powers

changed with events.

Hoping to clarify matters for

Washington and itself. Congress, early in 1779, directed

Washington to "superintend and direct the military operations
in all the departments in these States," subject to the
^"""Ibid.,

8:668.

—

general orders of Congress.

This .eant the Northern,

western, and Middle Departments,
for Congress at that
ti.e
reserved to themselves control
over the Southern Department
Thus, Washington never had
control, or at least complete
control, of all the forces of
the continent, nor the
grand
Strategy.

Washington was allowed after 1778
greater say in
what constituted that strategy.
To a large

degree this was

because of the arrival of the French
forces.
Thus, despite
ordering many of the forces under
Washington's direct
control to the southern theater of
operations during 1779
and 1780, Congress in the summer of
1779 authorized

Washing-

ton to act with the French without
applying to Congress for
directions. 9 3 Besides giving Washington
more say-so over
strategy. Congress gave him more control
over command and

personnel assignments.

Washington was frequently authorized to make major
appointments, beginning with commanding general and
other

generals of the "Flying Camp" during the summer of 1776.
During 1778 and 1779, he was authorized to appoint the
92
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commanding officers of the
Canadian expedition,
to replace Spencer in Rhode
Island, the

a

general

conu^anders at Fort

Pitt, and the commander-in-chief
of the cavalry.

After

congress's appointments of
commanders of the Southern
Department faltered one after
another, Washington was
directed in October 1780 to appoint
a successor to Gates.
Not desiring to force his choice
upon Congress, Washington
simply nominated Greene.
Congress then appointed him
officially with instructions that he
would be responsible
to Washington and not to themselves
After the reorganization of the army
late in 1776,
and finding that the states were dilatory
in appointing new
officers, and thus the inability to
recruit the new army.
Congress directed Washington, in consultation
with his
officers, to appoint the new officers.

As discussed

earlier, this was an especially important
grant of authority,
for appointment of officers was something
Congress and the

states generally kept in their own hands.

This statement

does not apply to staff officers for Congress frequently

authorized Washington to make such appointments.
Ford, JCC, 5:418; 10:84, 87, 188; 11:417; 12:1158;
18:906, 995; George Washington to Daniel Brodhead, March
5,
1779, Fitzpatrick, Wri^tij2£S_o_f_Wa_sJ^
14:194; George
Washington to Nathanael Greene, October 14, 1780, ibid.,
20:182; George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, October 15, 1780, ibid., 189.
95

Ford, JCC, 6:920-921; John Hancock to George
Washington, November 5, 1776, Burnett, LMCC 2:139-140.
,

269

Beginning during the summer
of 1775, Congress
authorized Washington to
.ake staff appointments.
;.t that
time they authorized hi.
to appoint the Co™.issary
of Muster
the Quartermaster General,
and the Wagon Master.
The following year he was authorized
to appoint
a

Co^issary of

Clothing for the army under
his i^ediate co™„and
and a
Clothier-General of Supply for the
army.
At Valley Forge
early in 1778, Washington was
authorized, in conjunction
with a congressional co™.ittee
at camp, to appoint minor
positions in both the Quartermaster
and Co,™issary departments, and the following year
he was authorized to arrange
the western Commissary and
Quartermaster departments, "any
resolutions of Congress notwithstanding."'^

Washington was also given discretionary
authority
with respect to other military
personnel matters. Realizing
he was in a better position than
themselves to
judge his

recruiting needs. Congress often allowed
Washington, if he
judged necessary, authority to give bounties
to augment
Continental bounties.
Similarly, he was authorized to
offer rewards to British deserters, if he thought
proper,
and in 1778, he and the commanders of the various
departments

186

,

;

13:130-131.

2:190-191, 211-212;

6

:

881

,

1043;

10:185,

270

were authorized to determine
the hasic ration
accor.in, to
circumstances.
Additionally, Washington was
given authority to call
on certain states, for
a fixed period
of ti.e and for

a

fi.ed

number of .ilitia, to serve
generally for a set a.ount
of
time in a specific area for
a specific purpose. ^8
In granting this authority Congress
reminded Washington that
he,
like themselves, could only
make such requests of
the states,
not compel.
Probably the most surprising
grants of authority
to Washington and the other
generals during the war were
those of a dictatorial nature.

Disappointed with the state the
American forces
found themselves during the fall
of 1776, Charles Lee wrote
his friend, Benjamin Rush, that if
Congress would give him
sufficient power for just a week, he
could improve the
condition of the army and thus their
ability to defeat the

British the next time the forces met.

But he doubted

Congress would ever give any military man
the necessary
power.
"Did none of Congress," he queried
Rush,

the Roman History?"

298-299;\'4 758
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"ever read

Most had, and knew that the military
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:

Ibid.,

3:324;

10:309-310; 11:684; 15:1108, 1331.

Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 20, 1776
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 289

271

in Rome had frequently been
safely entrusted with
dictatorial

grants of power.

They knew also, however,
that it was the
military that had undone the
civilian leadership
of the

Roman Empire.

They also knew of the military
tyranny and
despotism of the preceding century,
and their own with the
British forces in America the decade
before the war actually
began.

Nevertheless, by mid December 1776,
there was talk
of giving the military dictatorial
power, for it appeared
the war would be lost unless something
drastic
was done.

The army had been reduced to less than
five thousand men,
and the British army was sweeping through
New Jersey on its
way to Philadelphia. Drastic action was
indeed needed, and
it was called for by many both in and
out of the army.^°°

Washington's neighbor, George Mason, successfully
had the
Virginia legislature on the twenty-sixth of December

adopt

resolution calling for Congress to "invest the Commander

a

m

Chief

.

.

.

with more and ample extensive Powers for

conducting the Operation of the War."^°^

Even Benjamin Rush,

certainly not someone to trust the military with extensive
Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, December 21, 1776, Nathanael Greene Paoers,
vol. 1 (photostat), WLCL.
"'"'^^Nathanael

''"^"'"Resolution
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powers,

eanea

for Washington to
.e invested

power for several months.

„Uh

dictatorial

"^^^

"Safety from external danger,"
Hamilton wrote in
the Exghth Federalist,
"is the most powerful
director of
national conduct. Even the
ardent lover of liberty
will,
after a time, give way to its
dxctates " ^ ^3
.

This was true

during December 1776.

Threatened with extinction
if they
remained in Philadelphia, Congress,
on the twelfth of
December, departed for the safety
of Baltimore.
Before
leaving, however, they conferred
complete control of the
army in Washington's hands and
placed Philadelphia under
the military command of General
Putnam.

Washington was pleased to have
complete responsibility and control of the Continental
military

forces, but he

needed the appropriate power to make
his control meaningful
and effective.
He therefore wrote Congress
asking for the
power to procure men and supplies, explaining
that he was

not lusting for power, but that desperate
diseases required
desperate remedies.
Congress, not wanting
to set a

11-70.
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precedent for military dictatorship,
but realizing that
extraordinary measures were
required, decided that
Washington
would have to be trusted with
some for. of dictatorial
power.

Thus, on the twenty-sixth of
December they appointed
a
comraittee, headed by Richard
Henry Lee, to consider
entrusting Washington with extraordinary
powers.
Their report, the
next day, called for giving
Washington the authority to
raise sixteen regiments, three
thousand light cavalryn^en,
three regiznents of artillery and a
corps of engineers; to
appoint, promote and discharge their
officers; to call on
the states for militia; to impress
supplies; to arrest and
confine persons who refused to accept
Continental currency,
or were disaffected to the American
cause; and to give
bounties, or otherwise prevail on the
troops, whose terms
of enlistment were to expire on January
1, 1777, to stay

for a longer period.

Their report was accepted and Washing-

ton was given these powers for

sooner revoked by Congress

a

period of six months unless

^"^^
.

Explaining this decision to Robert Morris, William

Hooper stated Congress had given Washington "large and ample
powers, fully equal to the object if America means to

contend and support him."

"Thus the Business of War will
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for six .onths to co^e,"
he added,

"^ove in the proper

channels and the Congress
be no longer exercised
about
matters of which it is
supremely ignorant."
Benjamin

Harrison told Morris that if
these powers granted
Washington
did not save Philadelphia,
nothing else would,
particularly
anything Congress could do.-^°^
Despite the belief they were
doing the right thing
in granting Washington
dictatorial
power, n.any n.en.bers of

congress, realizing that many
An^ericans would not understand
the dictatorial grant, called
for an official explanation.
Therefore, on the twenty-eighth of
December, a committee
was appointed to prepare a circular
letter to the states

explaining the reasons which induced
Congress to enlarge
Washington's powers and asking them to
cooperate with him.
This circular was sent to the states
two
days later.

Additionally, several members of Congress
wrote letters to
the leaders of their respective states
explaining,
as did

William Whipple, that "This measure was thought
absolutely
necessary for the Salvation of America ""^^^
.
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Notwithstanding these assurances
.any people believed
that Washington had been
appointed -Dictator;" at
least .any
people used^that term to describe
Washington's status
as

m

1777 began.

explaining Washington's grant
of dictatorial power, John Adams was
very careful to tell his
wife
that "Congress never thought
of making him Dictator,
or

giving him

Sovereignty "Ill

a

.

congress was also careful to

make this clear to Washington.

The resolve giving him

absolute powers was sent to him with
an accompanying letter
from the committee of Congress
then in Philadelphia,
expressing their trust in him.
"Happy it is for this Country," they wrote, "that the General
of their Forces can
safely be entrusted with the most
unlimited Power and
neither personal security, liberty or
property be in the
least degree endangered thereby.

"H^

^t least that was

their hope and desire; and they would not
be disappointed.

Washington showed great restraint in exercising
the
powers granted him, particularly as they did not
have to
be

fully used because of the victories at Princeton
and Trenton
ll^Dr. William Shippen, Sr.,
to
Shipoen,
January 4, 1777, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 21, no. 4 (1897)4 98; Duane, Extracts f rom the Diary of Chfistopher
Marshall,"
[

p.

]
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which eased the military crisis that
had prompted the grant
of powers to meet the crisis.
John Glover wrote: "I have
always been a Lover of Civil Law, &
ever wish'd to see

America govern

'd

by it.

But

I

am fully of the Opinion that

it would be the Salvation of this
Country was Martial Law
to take place, at least for 12 Months-^

that Genl

.

Washington

was invested with power to call forth (any
or) all the Male
inhabitants (if wanted) at 24 hours Notice. "^^^
To a degree
Congress agreed, but it was not until mid
September, with
the British army approximately twenty miles
from Philadelphia,
that they acted.
On September 17,

1777,

two days before vacating

Philadelphia, Congress provided that for

a

period of sixty

days, anywhere within a seventy mile radius of Washington's
camp,

the commander-in-chief be authorized to suspend

officers for misbehavior; fill up company grade and field
grade vacancies; seize provisions and other articles; and

remove goods from owners in areas subject to control by the

British army.

These powers were augmented and extended by

Congress in October and November.

Washington, however, ever

respecting the sanctity of private property, was somewhat

hesitant to seize property.

This forbearance on Washington's

part caused Congress on December 10, 1777, to pass a
113

John Glover to Jonathan Glover or Azor Orne,
June 17, 1777, "General John Glover's Letter Book." HCEI
112, no. 1 (January 1976): 14.

resolution stating that they
understood his delicacy in
exerting military authority on
the citizens of the states,
but reminding him that though
it was highly laudable
in
general, it may, "on critical
exigencies, prove destructive
to the army and prejudicial to
the general liberties of
America." They told him they
expected him to draw his
supplies from exposed areas, and
explicitly ordered him to
seize and pay for supplies anywhere
within seventy miles
of his camp and, in general, to
carry off or destroy everything that might be useful to the
British army, and not
absolutely necessary to the owners. Washington's
powers
were extended to April 10, 1778, on December
30,

to August 10

,

1778

,

on April 23, 1778

.

1777; and

""--^^

In April 1780, with his army in a terrible
condition,

Washington asked Congress to help him provide for
his army.
Congress responded by sending a committee, consisting
of

Schuyler, Mathews, and Peabody, which was dicussed earlier
in this chapter.

Schuyler hoped this committee would be

invested with the power necessary to adequately help
Washington.

In fact,

he hoped they and Washington v;ould be

invested co-jointly with

a

dictatorial power

"'""'"^
.

At first

Congress, though trusting Washington, restricted the powers
114

10:384
17 80

,

Ford, JCC,

8:752;

9:784,

905,

1013-1014, 1068;

.

'^''"^Philip Schuyler
Burnett, LiMCC, 5:110.

to Alexander Hamilton, April

8,

.
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granted the committee.
private letter to

Learning this, Washington
wrote

a

member of Congress, that it
was necessary for the committee to be
vested with a power sufficient
for cooperation with the French
army, to draw out men and
supplies, and able to "give their
sanction to any operation
which the Commander in chief may not
think himself at
liberty to undertake without it as well
beyond, as within
the limit of these States, "ll^ Mathews
returned to Philadelphia almost immediately after arriving
at camp,
a

to lobby

Congress for increased authority for the
committee
Somewhat responding to Mathews, as well as
the news that
Lincoln and the southern army had been captured

at Charleston,

and that there had been a mutiny by the Connecticut
Line,

Congress twice, during May and June, called on the
states
to cooperate with the committee at camp and Washington
in

drawing out supplies and men.^^^

Washington and the committee

had hoped for more than this recommendation to the states.

They wanted the necessary authority to draw out the supplies
116

George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 14, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Wr itin gs of Washington, 18:356-357; see also
George Washington to James'Duane, May 14, 1780, ibid., 358.
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Robert R. Livingston to Philip Schuyler, May 21,
1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:158-159; James Duane to Philip
Schuyler, May 26, 1780, ibid., 170-171; Ford, JCC, 17:438-439.
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President Samuel Huntington to the Several States,
May 19, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:155-156; Same to same,
June 21, 1780, ibid., 232.

and men on their own.

But,

as Duane told Schuyler,

"it is

the fate of deliberate bodies to
move with caution. "^^^

Many found the actions and
explanations of Congress
unsatisfactory. Ezekiel Cornell, after
visiting the army at
Morristown in May, wrote the governor of
Rhode Island that

he despaired of "any vigorous exertions
until there is a

power vested in some man or number of men,
obligatory and
binding on all the states in the Union, as
it will
be

impossible to convince the several legislatures
of the
necessity, until the happy mom.ent is past."^^^
Returning
to Philadelphia later that summer, Cornell
reported others

shared his desire for more authority to be lodged
in fewer
hands.

In fact,

some even spoke of making Washington a

dictator, under the belief that

x^as

"the only means, under

God, by which we can be saved from destruction

Talk of

a

""'"^'
.

dictatorship frightened many members of

Congress, particularly as the committee at camp, Schuyler,

Mathews, and Peabody, appeared to fully support Washington
at the expense of civilian supremacy.

Thus,

was recalled by an overwhelming majority.
119
ibid.,

the committee

Upon returning

James Duane to Philip Schuyler, May 26, 1780,

170.
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to congress, Mathews wrote
Washington that "l suppose
any
future propositions of .ine will
be i^ediately exploded,
as too strongly tinctured with
those 'Army principles,'
which I had imbibed, whilst with
them."^^^

The recalling of the coi^ittee
was a signal to those
concerned about Washington not having
ample powers to save
the states that Congress was
unwilling to give any dictatorial powers to Washington, Washington
and the committee
jointly, or even to themselves. The
reason Congress was
unwilling to do so had to do, to a large
degree, with their
growing uncertainty of their own authority
and their greater
reliance on the states to provide for the
army.
Thus, the

states would have to act to ward off the
impending crisis
of the war effort completely collapsing.
A convention of New England civilian leaders
meeting
at Boston early in August,

1780, after a lengthy debate on

the state of the army, recommended the New England
states

and New York send comm.issioners to Hartford that November
to discuss how the army could be better provided for,

expecially with winter coming.

The New York legislature

responded to the call by unanimously agreeing in October
to send delegates, with instructions to have the meeting

urge Congress be given the power to march the army into
122

Ford, JCC, 17:720; John Mathews to George
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delinquent states to force
compliance with resolutions
for
men and supplies. This the
Hartford meeting
did, as well

as urging Congress be given
power of taxation in order
to
pay the interest on the national

debt.^^^

Several civilian leaders believed
if the Hartford
Resolutions were adopted and implemented
by Congress, and
the French gave their full cooperation,
that a renewed army
could possibly win the war in 1781.124
everybody shared
their enthusiasm.
There was great opposition to the
resolu125
tions.
James Warren, for one, believed they
had
.

.

been

adopted "without recollecting political
Maxims, without
attending to Historical Admonitions and warning
or the

Principles on which our Opposition to Britain
Rests."

He

123

John Witherspoon to William Livingston, December 16, 1780, ibid., 487-488; Franklin B. Hough,
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November 14, 1780, ibid., 445; Josiah Quincy to George
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William Livingston to John VJither spoon
December 28, 1780, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); Abigail Adams to John Adams, November 13,
1780, Butterfield, The Book of Abigail and John, p. 279.

believed

Washington to be

a

-Good- and a Great Man"
but

"only a Man and therefore
should not be vested with
such
powers and besides," he added,
"we do not know that
his
successor will be either Great
or Good." Additionally,
he
worried about "what Influence
this precedent," if
adopted,
"may have half a Century Hence. "^26
He need not have
worried, for Congress was not
about to give Washington or
anybody else dictatorial powers
of the nature that was
suggested in the Hartford Resolutions
with the French
army present in large numbers, it
was believed it would be
dangerous to experiment with any form
of unlimited power
placed in the hands of the military.
Besides, French help
might end the war, thus making grants
of power to make the
states comply with requisitions
unnecessary. Nevertheless
Congress did make a concession to those
that wanted a
.

stabler and stronger central government,
by reducing the
value of the currency, establishing executive
departments,
and adopting resolutions for an impost to
pay the interest
on the national debt.

With the French assistance in defeating the British
at Yorktown and satisfied v^ith the actions taken by
Congres
126
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mentioned above, Washington
no longer felt the
need to asK
for any special powers
the remainder
of the war; nor was

he granted any.

Although Washington was no
longer given
extraordinary powers, he was,
as he was frequently
throughout the war, given information
formally by Congress
that

would not normally be given
by

a

civilian body to

a

military

commander.

He was also frequently
given such information
informally by congressional members,
including the

president.
Before discussing, in the next
chapter, how the
states controlled and directed the
military, and what powers
they Shared with them, it should
be noted that Congress also
gave General Gates "dictatorial"
powers.
In fact,
he

received his first grant before Washington.

On June 16,

1776, Congress ordered Washington to send
Gates to command
the Northern Department with authority
to appoint officers,

fill vacancies, and suspend officers,
as well as to settle

financial accounts, until October

1,

1776.

John Adams

12 8

Elias Boudinot to George Washington, March 17,
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Washington, November 26, 1780, ibid., 460; John Laurens to
Henry Laurens, May 7, 1778, Simms, The Army Corresponde nce
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told Gates that Congress
was sending
north as ..nictator
.n Canada for Six Months,
or at least untiU
the first of
October...
By later grants of
power to Washington the
grant to Gates during the
sunder of 1776 can hardly
be
considered extensive, or
dictatorial. But in .id
1776, this
grant was considered as such.
Gates, who became the darling
of many members of
Congress during 1777 and 1778,
was given great latitude
by
congress with respect to calling
on the states to supply
him
with militia. He was also given
authority, at times, to

personnel decisions generally made
by Congress.
During
the summer of 1777 he was empowered
for a four month period
to suspend any officer and appoint
replacements in the
Northern Department. During the summer
of 1780, he was
authorized to appoint all staff officers
for the southern
army.
This latter grant of authority was
also given to
Greene when he replaced Gates as commander
of the southern
army.
Greene, and Lincoln before him, were also
authorized,
as commanders of the southern army, to
call on the
n^ake

states

for militia assistance.

These grants of authority were

limited in nature for, as John Adams told Gates,

Burnett,

"We don't

John Adams to Horatio Gates, June 18, 1776

L.MCC,

1

:

497

.

choose to trust you Generals,
with too much Power,
for too
long [a] Time "
.

Although Congress did not grant
the military
commanders too much power, for

too long a time, as
with

Washington, they did provide them
with information that
normally a civilian body would not
provide the

military.

This was usually done in an informal
manner, usually in the
form of correspondence between
friends. "^^^

Congress, in summation, was generally
able to
control and direct the military,
primarily because the
military were willing to be controlled
and directed by the
civilians.
There were problems and difficulties,
but for
the most part the military believed
the best chance for

their revolution and war to succeed was to
subordiante themselves to the civilian government, for to
do otherwise was
to increase the opportunity for and the
possibility of

military tyranny, something both the civilian
and military
leaders feared and wanted to avoid.
131^ ^
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CHAPTER

V

STATE CONTROL AND DIRECTION
OF THE MILITARY

Although Congress provided
central control of
America's military efforts,
the state governments
also
played an important role in
controlling and directing
the
military forces, particularly
their militia.
The
means

by which the states controlled
and directed the military
varied from state to state, and
from time to time.
what
did not vary, was their desire
to keep the American military forces from becoming the
enemy.
The states,

fearing too strong an executive
power,
placed most of the control and
direction of the military
in their legislative bodies.

Initially, however, quasi

legislative-executive bodies controlled and
directed the
military forces in every colony. These
bodies were committees and councils of safeties, which
were first established
during the fall of 1774 and the subsequent
winter, as has
been discussed earlier.
The early realization of the importance
of control-

ling and directing the military in every
colony prompted

Congress during July 1775 to recommend to those
colonies

286
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without committees
tees of safety
q^-f^4-,, to
appoint them, suggesting
they be empowered to direct
all military matters in
the
recess of the respective
colonial assemblies or
provincial
congresses. At that time five
colonies did not have
committees of safety, but by
year's
-i-

end they did.^

Generally, the early coromittees
of safety functioned
only when the provincial congresses
were in recess and were
often restricted to specified
duties.
But more often than
not, their authority, as well
as tenure, was just as vague
and ill-defined as the authority
upon which the provincial
congresses acted. Few of the committees
existed after 1777,
with those of Vermont, New York, and
New Jersey lasting until
1778; Rhode Island until 1781; and New
Hampshire and

Connecticut to the end of the war.

Nevertheless, they

served a useful and important function in
the civilian control of the American military forces,
particularly in those
colonies, later states, where the executive
was weakened
by constitutional or self-imposed restrictions, and
where
the provincial congress and later, state legislature,

infrequently assembled or did not adequately exercise their
constitutional responsibilities.
Early in the war the

Nev;

England committees and

councils of safety were frequently given extensive authority
"'"Ford,

Committees o f

JCC, 2:189; Agnes Hunt, The^rovincia 1
Sa fety of the_7lmer ican Revolution7~^Tnr71
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with respect to appointing and
comi^issioning officers,
raising and discharging troops, and
directing

their i.ove-

ments.

Later, when their states were
threatened with or
actually invaded, such authority was
again given.
The
reason they were given such authority,
and were successful

exercising it, was the fact that they were
composed, for
the most part, of prominent leaders,
including chief
executives and members of Congress.^
Ibid., pp. 34
35
43, 52
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««airs. particxarly anrin,
ti.es of threatenea
or actual

invasions

The conunittees of safety,
though for the „ost
part
Short lived, generally served
as useful forces in
giving

aireotion to their respective
colony. s military policy
and
providing for the control of
the military itself.
.it.ough
their authority was often
questioned and occasionally
Challenged, they nevertheless
provided the legitimacy
and
stability necessary until the
governments under
the state

governments were established.

To a large degree their

success was due to thp
fp>r--f^u^-^
tne tact
that 4-u
their membership consisted
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of prominent leaders who,
realizing the necessity of

preventing anything that would
lead to anarchy or .ilxtary
tyranny, generally exercised
their powers so that the .ob
and the military would not
undermine the political and
social fabric.
Once the constitutions were
written and the
governments under them were formed,
the responsibility for
the direction and control of
the military within the states
passed to the state legislatures,
who also realized the
importance of keeping tight control
of the military.
By 1777, when the legislatures
began fully exercising their powers, most legislators,
because of their lack
of military experience and because
the military situation

often necessitated broad-based policies,
often deferred, in
military matters, to the Continental Congress
and the

Continental generals.

Yet this was only to the degree that

their own state's interests and safety were
provided for.
The state legislatures nevertheless rarely
relinquished
their responsibility for appointing and commissioning
officers, supplying the military, and giving some direction
to the military activities in their respective states.

Despite most of the responsibility for overseeing
the activities of the military rested with the committees
of safety early in the war, the provincial congresses and

conventions also directed and controlled military affairs.
The state legislatures did as well; particularly in

.

Massachusetts, wh.ch. untU
IVSO. had no chief
executive
Although occasionally
delegating .iiitary authority

to thei.

council, their Board of
War. and even to military
officers
the Massachusetts
legislature was active in
giving military
directions and setting military
policy.
During the early
years of the war the New York
Provincial Congress also gave
great attention to military
affairs, especially with
respect
to preparing the colony's
defenses.^

Most legislatures, however,
did not have the time
and experience, nor were they
suited for giving their
undivided attention to military
affairs.
That is why, early
in the war, military
responsibilities were frequently delegated to the committees of safety.
Because of
the fear of

placing too much power in the executive
and because they
were not always in session, some of
the state legislatures
provided for other bodies to oversee
various military
activities.

These bodies included boards of war,
extra-

ordinary councils, war offices, and county
lieutenant
systems
Realizing it was too large to control efficiently
the military affairs of the state, the
Massachusetts

legislature on October 26, 1776, created

a

board of war,

endowing it with authority to direct the operations of the
^Albert Bushnell Hart, ed.. Commonwealth His tory
of Massachusetts
3:121; Saunders, NCCR, 10 .-passim.
,
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land and sea forces of the
state.
The following spring
the supreme Executive
Council of Pennsylvania
created a
board of war and navy board
to assist the. in
military
matters.
The Board of War, composed
of such prominent .en
as Owen Biddle, Oavid
Rittenhouse, Hichard Bache,
and .ohn
Bayard, was initially responsible
for supplies and

finance.

Later they were given responsibility
for military appointments and given more authority
over military policy.

Their

tenure was rather short, as their
existence ended on
August 7, 1777. Vermont established
a board of war on
February 25, 1779, primarily to
oversee the defenses of the
New Hampshire Grants.
it remained in existence until
1783.^
The states that experimented most
with boards of
war, extraordinary boards, and war
offices were North

Carolina and Virginia, particularly when
they became the
subject of British offensives during the
middle years

of

the war.

Governor Jefferson, at times indecisive about

exercising executive leadership, took an active
stance in
May 1779, by calling upon the Virginia legislature

to create

a

board of war, which was done later that month.

It served

as an advisory body to the governor on military matters
6

Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 1:5, 12-74^^Iton, Records oF Vermont 1 2 9 4 ~Samuel Adams to James
Warren, November 6, 1776, "Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC, 72
(1917): 275; Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors o f the
~~
Revolutionary War 1 xxiii
,

,

:

.

:

;

294

until its abolishment a
year later. The Boara
of War was
replaced during the su™,er
of 1780 by a war
office, headed
by a cor^issioner,
appointed by the Governor
with advice
Of the council. The
con^issioner served as a
military clerk
to the Governor and Council,
thereby relieving the.
of the

secretarial chores.^

Because North Carolina',
L-droima s r„
Governor Nash
had trouble maintaining
sufficient attendance of
his

councillors to assist hi. and
because he lacked sufficient
authority to control and direct
his state's military forces,
the Assembly in September
1780 unconstitutionally
put the

state's war power rn the Governor
and

a

five man board of

war.

The board of war, actually
composed of three men, had
two major stumbling blocks to
exercising their power. They
were considered too inexperienced by
the military, and
Governor Nash, being upset that he had
to share the authority
over the military with them, treated
them as an advisory
body.
In his message of January
28, 1781, to the state
legislature, Nash threatened to resign unless
the Board of
7

Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, June
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1:291- Journal'
of_the House _of__Delegates_ of the 'Con^^wi^Tth of
ViraTFii--^
,

^^SHL4Ild_JeW at th^
on^londai^the__thi^
^^^^ousandSe^^n^

White, 1827), pp. 6, 8, 17; Hening, Th^ Statutes
at Large:
a_Co 11 ect ion_of _ al l_the_L^ws_o f jy i£^^ra7~ToTi 7^^
291-292; Boyd, Papersjof Thomas Jef f erson7~3T3 99n
Thomas
Jefferson to William DavTes, March 22 ;""l 781 ibid., 5:204.
.
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war was abolished.

It was, bot „pon
the suggestion of

ex-Governor Hichara CasweU,
then a .e^er of the
Senate,
a "council extraordinary"
was est^hi.-.i.
establisheda on February 15
y
This council, consisting
of Caswell, Alexander
Martin, aid
Allen Jones, was responsible
for advising the
governor on
all matters, and any two
u or
of them
tnem, wii-K
y
with the governor, were
invested with full power
oower .o -t-^v^
take measures for the
defense
Of the state.
Nash, not liking this
arrangement, refused
to seek re-election.
Because his successor,
Thomas Burke,

also refused to work with the
council, it was abolished.^
The extraordinary councils,
boards of war, and war
offices were generally adopted when
matters were desperate,
and therefore they were usually
not very effective. Often
of extra-constitutional origin,
they were disliked by the
executive, whose authority they
generally shared. They were
also unpopular with the military,
who saw them, for the most
part, as just another layer of civilian
control.
Rather
Clark, NCSR 18:707; 24:355-357, 378-38025-vii225-229; William D. Cooke, compiler.
Revolutionary
^
gistory of North Carolina, in Thr^^^j^^^^^TT^^^r^
Francis L. Hawks, Hon. David L^_j^^TVr:;^g-TJ^^^
^^^^^"^ (Raleigh: William D. Cooke; New York:
Georqe P
Putnam and Company, 1853), p. 172; Hugh F.
Rankin, The
North Carolina Continentals, pp. 246 254
Blackwell^.
Robinson, William R. Davie (Chapel Hill: University
of North
Carolina Press, 1957), pp. 82-83; Davidson, William
Lee
Davidson, p. 69; George Doherty to [Jethro] sT^SH^i^
September 16, 1780, Jethro Sumner Papers, vol. 1, WLCLAbner Nash to Thomas Burke, July 5, 1781, John Wattersin
III,
The Orders of Governor Burke," NCHR 43, no. 2 (April
1971):
,

,

9

6.

;
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than Sharing the power
of the state with the
.iutary a.ring
emergencies these bodies were
created often to control
the
military, as well as be a
liaison between the civilian
and
military leaders.

Another important layer of
civilian control were the
county lieutenants. Virginia ^^n^q
and Pennsylvania
appointed
civilian military commanders.
Colonels
^

.

of the militia,

in

each county, and gave them
command of the militia in
their
county and some control of the
military policy in the county.
This was particularly effective
in the western counties
which were frequently the scene
of military
action.

Although most of the military
control and direction
on the state level was exercised
by multi-person
bodies,

the executive branch of the
revolutionary governments also,
to various degrees, exercised
authority over the military
throughout the war. The prevalent
distrust of executive
power, as well as that of concentrated
power, and the haste
with which the new governments were
instituted in each state,
affected almost every constitutional aspect
of the executive

branch of the new state governments.
9

Fear of concentrated

Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania,
p. 81; Edgar W. Hassler, 01dJVestiTOrelaiYdT~A~Hr^6?7~^f
Western Penn sylvan ia_p
"Re vol u tT^n7"p7' 4 On~T^"""
Lewis S. Shimmell, Bor_de^ Warfare_in PenFivlvania During
Hl?__^Y£lytPThomas"Jeffer"son~t"6^LTi'ut'i'hiFti~of
Fayette, Lincoln, and Jefferson Counties, December 24, 1780
Boyd Papers of Thomas Jefferson ,4:237.

—

,
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power caused power to be divided
everywhere, particularly
with respect to that to be exercised by
the new chief
executives. An accompanying diffusion
of power
did not

alv.ays apply to the legislative branch,

as they retained

most of the real authority over the military.

Thus, the

revolutionary governments were not truly balanced.

Where

th,

legislatures, like the English parliament,
exercised their
authority with few restraints, the chief executives
were
restricted by the state constitutions, statutes,
councils,
and the legislatures, as well as restraints they
placed upon

themselves.

For the most part, the chief executives, with

their councils, did not initiate legislation or make policy,

but simply carried out the desires of the legislatures, who
in most states, were the ones who elected the chief execu-

tives.

Under peacetime conditions the weakened chief

executives would have not been so noticeable because of theii
lack of authority; however, as one governor told General

Greene,

"I

am left to the Constitution which may do in Peace

but is by no means adopted to

war."''""'"

Margaret Burnham Macmillan, The VJa r Governor in
the TVmerican R evolution (New York: Columbia University PTess,
1943), pp. 57-73; James DeWitt Andrews, ed., The Works of
James Wilson Being His Publi c Disc ourses upon Jurisprudence
~~
and th e Political Science Including Le ctures as Professor
of La w, 179 0-2, 2 vols. (Chicago: Callaahan and Company,
TS^'ey~ 1 357T~
:

:

Harrison to Nathanael Greene, March
Offic i al Letters of the Go verno r s of

'""'"Benjamin

178 2,

Mcllv.-aine

,

Virginia, 3:170.
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Most of the states severely
lifted the authority
and power of their chief executives.
They also limited their
tenure.
in all but three states the
chief executive
was

limited to a one year term of office.

Most of the states

imposed restrictions on successive
terms of service, with
only Connecticut and New York allowing
unlimited tenure.
None of the chief executives were given
unlimited veto power,
and the few that did allow the veto,
provided
for it to be

overridden by the legislature.

In addition,

as a further

limitation on the chief executive, most states
appended a
council to their executive branch, providing
the council's
concurrence in many instances.
In Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Delaware the Council
was
the

executive body, its president generally just
,

equals

a

first among

12

The chief executives v;ere restrained in their

ability to make military policy or give direction to the

military forces of their states. "^"^

In most states the chief

executive could not call out the militia on his own authority.
12

Albert Berry Saye, A Const itutionaJ_Historv_of
Georgia 1732- 1 968 rev. ed
(Athens: University of "Georgia
Press, 1970), p. 115; Meshech Weare to Josiah Bartlett,
August 8, 1778, "Stray Leaves from an Autograph Collection,"
HM 4, no. 11 (November 1860): 332.
,

13

.

John Jay to William Livingston, March 22, 1777,
Johnston, Corresponde nce a nd Publ ic Papers of John Jay,
1:123; Roche, Joseph Reed, pp. 150-151^!
,

,
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although some states did allow

then,

this authority in

special circumstances, such as
during invasions.
It was not just constitutional,

statutory, and

legislative restraints which hampered
the chief executives
from giving direction to their
state's military forces.
Often they limited themselves.
Some chief executives were
simply indecisive leaders, such as
Lowndes of South Carolina
and Jefferson of Virginia.
The latter, because of
his

strict constitutionalism, refrained from
taking actions,
frequently believing major decisions needed
the imprint and
sanction of the legislature.^^ Many chief
executives,

rather than taking active roles in military
affairs, expended
their energies in political matters. This was
particularly
true in Georgia, Maryland, South Carolina,
Pennsylvania,

and to

a

degree. New York, where the states were often

embroiled in debates between radical and moderate Whig
factions

Other problems confronted the chief executives.
Thomas Burke of North Carolina spent considerable time, after
14^

^
Robert
Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and T imes of
Edmund Pendleton pp. 210-211; David A Bernstein, '^VJilliam
Livingston The Role of the Executive in New Jersey's
Revolutionary War," William C. Wright, ed
New Jersey in
the Am erican Re vol ution
2:21-2 2.
,

:

.

,

,

^Edward McCrady, The History of Sq^uth^_ Carol ina__in_
the Revolutio n 177 5-1780, pp.' 24 3-24 4
Hamilton ^ J "Eckenfode
The Re volution in Virginia, pp. 210, 220.
.

;

'

.

escaping from the British, trying
to re-establish his
legitimacy as many argued that he had
broken his parole by
escaping.
Burke was not the only chief
executive captured
or forced to flee before the
ciiti isririsn
British ^r-^^r
n
army.
Governor McKinly
of Delaware was captured, and
Livingston, Rutledge,
Reed

and Jefferson all spent considerable
time avoiding capture.
The chief executives were also exhausted
by time-consuming

duties of their office, as few had
administrative staffs
to handle the day-to-day business.
Despite these handicapping factors and influences, many chief
executives took,
were given, and/or properly exercised their
responsibility
over military affairs. Usually, however, this

did not take

place until the state faced invasion or actually
had been

invaded
Several chief executives, either by acquiescence
by the legislature or by the vigor of their personalities,

did become true heads of state during the war.

These

included Jonathan Trumbull, Caesar Rodney, Thomas Johnson,
Thomas Sim Lee, Meshech VJeare, VJilliam Livingston, George
Clinton, Richard Caswell, Joseph Reed, William Greene, John

Rutledge, and for a few months, Thomas Nelson.
16„

For the most

Benjamin Harrison to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates, December 20 1782 Mcllwaine, Of fici a 1_ Letters
o^ the Governors of Virginia, 3:409 Meshech Weaire to'
Josiah Bartlett, August^B^ 1778, "Stray Leaves from an
Autograph Collection," HM 4, no. 11 (November 1860): 332.
,

,
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part, the chief executives possessed varying
degrees of
personal prestige and some were able to use
their political
and personal standing to exercise an influence
on their

respective councils and legislatures.

This was particularly

true with respect to Trumbull, Livingston, Reed
and Clinton.
The chief executives were by no means novices
to the political structure of their states.

All the first state chief

executives had been prominent local leaders before the
revolution and eleven had been members of the provincial
assemblies.

Weare

,

Trumbull, Caswell and Bulloch had served

as speakers; Wharton and McKinly had been presidents of

their councils of safety; and Caswell and Bulloch had presided over their respective provincial assemblies.

Clinton,

Livingston, Johnson, Henry, Caswell, Rutledge and Bulloch,

were or would be members of the Second Continental Congress.
These were not radical men.

They were among legal, social,

and political leaders of their respective states.
the later governors.
(ten from Georgia)

,

Nor were

Of the fifty-five wartime governors

nearly half were very prominent and

would have been, were they not already, leaders even v/ithout
the revolution."'"'^
17

Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 17751783 pp. 19 0-191; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War
Governors in the American Revolution, pp. 51-53.
,

8
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Given or taken power over military
affairs, several
chief executives demonstrated they
could use the limited
resources to best advantage. We must
remember that besides
not being political novices, many of
the wartime governors
were not military novices either. of
the first thirteen
chief executives, four had served as militia
generals:
Clinton, Livingston, McKinly, and Johnson;
and three as

militia colonels:

Weare, Henry, and Caswell.

Clinton,

Reed, Trumbull, Nash, Nelson, Burke and
Jefferson all

demonstrated at times an interest in and exercised
vigorously their authority over military affairs. Clinton
was

active throughout his tenure in office suggesting
military
policy.

So was Jefferson.

Both were quite interested in

western expeditions, especially since such expeditions would

undoubtedly result in the addition of territory for their
respective states. 19

Other chief executives, such as Reed,

Rutledge, and Gwinnett, also involved themselves in military
1

Ibid

.

,

p

.

53

19

George Clinton to George Washington, October 15,
1778, Hastings, Pub]^c_Paper s__of _George_Cl^in^
4:163-164
Same to same, October" 17 1778, ibid. I 167-169; George
Clinton to the New York Delegates to the Continental Congress,
November 18, 1778, ibid., 294-295; Thomas Jefferson to George
Rogers Clark, January 29, 1780, James, "George Rogers Clark
Papers 1771-1781," pp. 144-149; Anthony Marc Lewis,
"Jefferson and Virginia's Pioneers, 1774-1781," MVHR 34,
no. 4 (March 1948): 551-588.
;

,
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planning. 20

Most chief executives, to varying
degrees,
involved themselves in directing and
controlling the military by their participation in providing
supplies,

countering Tory activities, and assisting
in the selection
and promotion of officers.
The most direct control of the military
by the chief

executive resulted when he was in the field
with the military, or meeting with military leaders who
came on their
own or by direction to visit him.

Normally the chief

executives became quite active in giving direction
to

military affairs and exercising control over the
military
when the British had entered their state.

Clinton and

Rutledge are perhaps the best examples of chief executives
as commanders-in-chief.

Clinton, even after being elected

Governor of New York, early in 1777, remained in the field
as a Continental Brigadier General, and even once inaugu-

rated, he returned to the field, rather than assuming his

civilian duties.

During his first six months in office he

spent much time in the field, giving orders for the state's
20

Joseph Reed to Archibald Lochry, March 27, 1779,
"Original Documents," MH 5, no. 3 (March' 1907)
175; Joseph
Reed to Robert Morris et al. [September 21, 1781], Ferguson,
Pape rs of Robert Morris, 2:328-329; Robert Morris Diary,
September 21," 1781," ibid., 316; Moultrie, Memoirs of the
American Re v olution 1:479 Charles C. Jones Jr ., The
History of Geo rgia 1:51, 53-58; Burton Barrs, East Florida
in the American Revolution (Jacksonville, Flor idaT^Gund""
Press, 19 32)",~^p~2j-2 5 :
:

,

,

;

,
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defense.

since the Hudson Highlands were
of such strategic
importance during i.ost of the war,
Clinton found himself
frequently in the field in that area,
giving directions,
offering suggestions, and receiving
information
as to the

needs and concerns of the military
stationed in that area.
During 1779 he was persuaded by Washington
from going on
an expedition against the western Indians,
as his presence
was needed in the Highlands area in event
of a British
offensive.
The next year, however, Clinton often
led the

militia into the western portions of his state
against the
Indians ^'^
.

Rutledge, the President of South Carolina, similarly
took to the field, but unlike Clinton, he did so as

civilian rather than as

a

military commander.

a

He usually

took to the field to assist the military to procure supplies
and to inspire them, as v;ell as the citizens of his strife-

torn state, particularly after the fall of Charleston early
21

George Clinton to George Washington, July 31, 1777,
Calendar of Hi storical Manuscripts, 2:262; George Clinton
to the New York Delegates to "the'^Continental Congress,
June 14
Hastings, Pub]J^_Paper^s_of _George_C]^
1780
George Washington to Goose Van Schaick7~July~ 31,
5 821-822
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Was h ing ton, 19:287; George
VJashington to James Clinton, June 25, 1781, ibid., 22:262;
George Washington to Moses Hazen, November 18, 1782, ibid.,
25:349; John Palsgrave VJyllys to George Wyllys, October 11,
1777, "Wyllys Papers 1590-1796," CHSC 21 (1924): 458;
Proceedings of a Council of War, October 31, 1777, MHSC,
7th ser., 2:180-181; Spaulding, George Clinton, pp."T2¥-129,
133; Champagne, Alexander McDou gall pp
141.
,

:

,

;
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in the sunnier of 1780.

Rutledge's ventures to the
field

actually began the year before as
he joined with Lincoln
to help direct the movements of
the South Carolina militia.
During 1780 he left besieged Charleston
to attach himself
to Sumter's command, later joining
Gates in North Carolina.
The next year he ventured north to visit
Congress and
Washington to discuss policy before
returning to South
Carolina to re-establish civil government
in his state.
Upon returning, he joined Greene's camp at

the High Hills

of the Santee on August 1, 1781, re-established
the civil

government, before continuing on to Camden to
re-organize
the state's militia.

Clinton and Rutledge were somewhat unique in the

amount of time spent in the field, but they were not the

only chief executives who ventured into the field, either
to command the militia or to assist military commanders.

Governors Houston and Gwinnett of Georgia took part in
22

George Washington Diary, June 5, 1781, John C.
Fitzpatrick, ed
The Diaries of G eorge Washi ngto n 1748-1799,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company "f of ~tFe Mount
4 vols.
Vernon Ladies Association of the Union, 1925), 2:224; Edward
McCrady, The History o f South Caro lina in the Revolution
1775 - 1780 pp. 351, 764-765; Edward McCrady, The Histor y
of South Ca rolina 1780-1783, pp. 510, 511; Anne King
Gregorie, Thomas S umter (Columbia, South Carolina: R. L.
Bryan Company "1931
p. 182; Rev. Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin and Company, 1895), p. 76; Boweii, Benjamin_Lincoln
pp. 281, 283; Journals of Benjamin Lincoln, September~3-T7
1779, Benjamin Kennedy, ed and trans.. Muskets, Cannon
Balls & Bombs: N ine Narrativ es of the Si ege o f Savannah in
17 79 (Savannah :~Beehive 'Press"7 19lT)'~~p~.~121
.
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expeditions against Florida.

North Carolina's chief

executives, Caswell, Burke and Nash,
also ventured into the
field.
so popular was Caswell as a
mlitary commander
that while governor, the South Carolina
delegates to Congress
early in 1779 invited him to accept a major
generalship over
the North Carolina militia in their state,
and to rank only
second to Lincoln.
He declined, sending General Ashe
to
command the militia.
Alexander Martin, Speaker
of the

North Carolina Senate and Acting Governor during
Burke's
captivity, during the fall of 1781 joined General
Rutherford's

camp to assist him in controlling the state's militia.

Chief executives of the upper south also took to the field
23

Charles C. Jones, Jr., T he History of Georgia
1:59-61, 113-114; Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American
Revolution pp. 23-25, 31-34; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett,
pp. 144-145.
,

"

,

24

Abner Nash to George Washington, March 19, 1781,
Elizabeth G. McPherson, ed,
"Unpublished Letters from North
Carolinians to Washington," NCHR 12, no. 2 (April 1935): 157;
Same to same, April 4, 1781, ibid., 157; Hugh F. Rankin, The'
North Carolina Continentals pp. 200, 2 60; Ashe, Biographical
History of North Carolina 2:29-30.
,

,

,

25

William D. Cooke, compiler. Revolutionary History
of North Carolina, in Three Lectures, by Rev. Francis L.
Hawks, Hon. David L. Swain, and Hon. Wm. A. Graham p. 201
R. D. W. Connor, Revolutionary Leaders of North Carolina
North Carolina State Normal and Industrial College Historical Publications, no. 2 (n.p.: State of North Carolina,
.

,

,

1916)

,

p.

95

26

William A. Graham, General Joseph Graham and his
Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History with Appendix:
An Epitome of North Carolina's Milit ary Servi c es in the
Revolutionary War and of the Laws Enacted for Raising Troops
(Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton, 1904)
pp. 363-364.
,
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to control military activities.

Maryland's Governor Johnson,

military veteran, commanded the militia
in 1777, as did
Virginia Governor Nelson at the siege of
a

York tovvn

Few

.

northern

chief executives took to the field, when
compared
to their southern counterparts.
Nevertheless, besides
Clinton, other chief executives in the northern
states did
play active roles in the field with the military,
as evi-

denced by the activities of Pennsylvania's Joseph
Reed and
Massachusetts 's John Hancock. The former, during
1779 and

1780,

frequently took to the field to give assistance and

encouragement wherever he could, and during the latter year
he commanded the militia in person.

Hancock, who frequently

took to the field, primarily in Rhode Island, before becoming

governor in 1780, continued to do so once assuming his state's
top position, even leading the Massachusetts militia to Rhode

Island during 1781.^^
27

Delaplaine, Thom as John son pp. 250, 256; Acomb,
Jour nal of Baron Ludw i g von Closen, p. 180; Marquis de
Lafayette to George Washington, August 21, 17 81, Sparks,
Correspo nd ence of the Amer ican Re volution, 3:389-392 Thoma
Nelson to David Jameson^ September 21, 1781, Mcllwaine,
Offi cial Letters of the Governors^o^ Virginia 3:65; Same
to same, September '27
1781 PalmefT CaTind ar of Virginia
State Papers 2:501; Evans, Thomas Nelson pp^ i067~112~
,

;

,

,

28

,

Joseph Reed to Baron Von Steuben et al., February 29, 1779, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 7:199;
Joseph Reed to Archibald Lochry, March"T77~17 79, "Original
Documents," MH 5, no. 3 (March 1907): 175; Joseph Reed to
George Washington, August 17, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:238;
Roche, Joseph Reed, p. 102; Robert D. ArbuckTeT" Pennsylvania
Speculator and Patriot: The Entrepreneurial John Nichol on
1751-18 00 TUnivers'ity Park: PennsylvahTa State University

Although some chief executives took
an active
interest in directing military activities
and

controlling

the military, most were not granted
sufficient authority
and power to do either adequately.
From the beginning of
the war, many Whigs believed a strong executive
was needed
to prevent anarchy and military tyranny, as
well as to

direct the energies of the state.

This became m.ore

apparent as the war progressed and state after
state was
invaded and occupied.
Some chief executives were actually
urged to seize authority, especially during

a

crisis period.

Governor Lee of Maryland, for example, was told by James

McHenry during the summer crisis of 1781 to "Let the people
clamour, but save the State.

Lee and most chief execu-

tives refused to act in an extra-legal or unconstitutional

manner, preferring to work within the established political

framework.

Exceptions

v/ere few,

but they did occur.

Gover-

nor Nelson of Virginia, although being granted extraordinary

authority during the summer of 1781, exceeded it by providing
for military impressment without the consent of his council.

Press, 1975), pp. 6-7; John Hancock to ?, March 6, 1781,
Collec tions of the Main e Historical Society 2d ser., 19:
177-178.
,

29

Edward Rutledge to John Jay, November 24, 1776,
Johnston, Correspondence and Publi c Pap ers of John Jay, 1:94.
30

James McHenry to Thomas Sim Lee, July 10,
Kite, A Side Light on History, pp. 23-24.
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For this action he was later
greatly condemned. ^1 And
Governor Burke, when asked by a
.ilitia colonel for approval
of acting without for.al
confirmation by the Assembly,
told
him, "GO on and prosper in God's
name
do all the good
you can under any form or title
you please. "^^
[

,

]

,

Most Whig leaders were realistic
and practical men
who understood the mechanisms for
directing and controlling
the military during periods of crisis
were inadequate.
Therefore, the state legislatures often
gave their chief
executives extensive powers while the
legislature was in
recess and/or the state under invasion.
For the most part,
granting of extensive powers to the chief
executive to

harness the energies of the state took place
in the southern
states, which were occupied by large British
forces beginning in 1778.
South Carolina, which perhaps suffered more than
any other state, placed great trust in their chief
executive,

Rutledge, giving him

leader during the war.

more pov^er than any other civilian

Early in 1779, the Assembly, fore-

seeing a rather long legislative recess, voted him and his

council authority during the interim "to do everything that
31

Evans, Thomas Nel son, pp. 104, 114-115.

32

Thomas Burke to Robert Lutrell, September 4, 1781,
Watterson, III, "The Ordeal of Governor Burke,"

John S.
NCHR 43, no.

2

(April 1971):

103.
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appeared to him and to them necessary
for the public good."
on February 3, 1780, the South
Carolina legislature again
conferred additional powers on Rutledge
and the council,

stating that since it had always been
the policy of republics
to concentrate powers of government in
the hands of the
supreme magistracy during time of danger
and invasion, they
were to do so, for a limited period. Until
ten days after
their next session meeting the legislature
authorized

Rutledge with such of council he could conveniently
consult,
"to do all

.

.

.

things which may be judged expedient and

necessary to secure the liberty, safety and happiness
of
this State except taking away the life of a citizen without

legal trial," and prohibited the subjecting the militia to

Continental articles of

war."^"^

From this point early in

1780 until the Assembly met at Jacksonborough in January
1782,

"it is not an exaggeration," according to one historian,

"to say that the government of South Carolina centered in the

person of John Rutledge, rather than in any group of persons
as the Privy Council, or in any place. "^^

These powers

33

Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in
the Revolution 1775-1780 pp. 319, 432; David Ramsay, The
History of the Revolution in South Carolina 2 vols.
(Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1785), 2:47048; David Duncan
Wallace, The History of South Carolina 2:197-198; Robert W
Barnwell, Jr., "Rutledge, 'The Dictator,'" JSH 7, no. 2
,

,

,

(May 1941)

:

216.

34

Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the
Confederation p. 10; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War
Governor in the American Revolution, p. 84.
,
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granted Rutledge, for a short period
in 1782, wore extended
to his successor, John Mathews.
Other southern state legislatures
authorized
extensive executive powers, for limited
periods to their
chief executives, although not for the
length of time nor
to the extent of that given Rutledge.

With the Constitu-

tional Convention adjourned, most of the
members of the
Council of Safety departed from the capitol,
and
facing

threat of

a

a

British-launched invasion from Florida, six

members of the Council of Georgia signed

a

statement on

February 22, 1777, giving President Archibald Bulloch
extraordinary executive powers for

a

month's time, with the only

restriction that he be required to call on the assistance
of at least five persons of his own choosing to consult and

advise him on every occasion when

a

councillors could not be convened.

sufficient number of
Within

a

few days of

adopting this measure, Bulloch died and, apparently, this

power was not extended or assumed by his successor, Button
Gwinnett.

3G

A year later, however, the Executive Council

of Georgia authorized the chief executive, John Houston, to

take full military control of the state without consulting
35

George Smith McCov;en, Jr., The British O ccupation
of C harleston, 17 8 0-8 2 Tricentennial Studies, no. '5 (Colum
bia: University of South Carolina Press for the South
Carolina Tricentennial Commission 1972), p. 140.
,

,
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Jenkins

,

Button Gv;innett

,

dp.
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them, stating circumstances made it
necessary and as well
as the fact the constitution was not
clear on the matter.

Houston was hesitant at first to assume the power
granted
him.
But realizing that the Assembly would meet
in the

near future and thus relieve him of his responsibility,
and
that the full force of government was needed to
supoort the

planned invasion of St. Augustine, he began to exercise
the

authority given him.

Another reason for taking

a

stronger

stance as chief executive was because the military leaders
were, for the most part, members of the opposition political

faction who would have had an excuse for assuming greater
control of the state's affairs had he not acted.

^"^

Extra-

ordinary powers were given to North Carolina's governor
during 1780 and 1781 and to Maryland's governor during
1778.

38

Virginia was more hesitant than its neighbors in

granting extensive powers to its chief executives, even when
invaded
The question of giving the executive extensive

powers in Virginia first rose during the beginning of the
second winter of the war.

At that time, several members

37

Chandler, Revo lu tionary Records of G eor gia
2:304-305.
35, 75-76; Stevens, A History of Ge orgia

,

2:34-

,

38

Abner Nash to Thomas Jefferson, February 2, 1781,
Boyd, The Papers of Thoma£_ Jef f er son 4:504 James Monroe
,

to ThomFs'yefre'rso'n7

JiTne^Je, '17 80

,

;

ibid., 3:466

;

2:344.
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Of the House of Delegates
proposed that

a

dictatorship be

created, invested with every
civil and i^ilitary power.
Great opposition, especially by
Archibald Gary, Speaker of
the Senate, greeted this
proposal.
So opposed to giving
dictatorial powers to Governor Patrick
Henry, Gary supposedly
told colonel Si^ne Henry's step-brother,
that he would
personally kill Henry should be become
dictator. Nevertheless, Gary and other opponents of
any form of dictatorship,
did agree to giving Henry and the
executive council additional powers for a limited period.
Even in 1781, when
Virginia was invaded and the regular
government disrupted,
necessary extraordinary power was not given
the chief
executive until June when Thomas Nelson became
governor.
,

Tarleton's raid on Charlottesville precluded the
scheduled June 4, 1781, election for governor and
forced
the Virginia Assembly to move to Staunton, where,
on the

seventh of June, a debate began on whether or not to

establish some form of dictatorship as
ling the state's resources.

Virginia appoint
for that post.

a

a

means of marshal-

George Nicholas moved that

dictator and that Washington be chosen

When Nicholas' motion was defeated, Richard

39

Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the St ate of Virginia
Amer. ed
(Boston: David^CarTIsTeT
!^-^_?-D_^PP^B^i^'
1801), p. 185; Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:505-509, 522-523;
Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund
Pendleton, p. 211; Brock, Ar chrbard^ CaTfy^PP 101-104.
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Henry Lee called on James Lovell to have Congress
assume
control of the state's affairs until a stable
government
could be re-established or, at least, urge Washington
into

accepting some form of dictatorial power to be used in
their
state.

Lee made

a

similar proposal to Virginia's

Congressional delegates, stating "Both ancient and modern
times furnish precedents to justify this procedure, but if
they did not, the present necessity not only justifies but

absolutely demands the measure."

Lee also wrote Washington

of his desire that he come to his native state's defense,
as a dictator.

Washington, already planning to come south

as the commander-in-chief of the combined armies, declined

Lee's offer without explaining his plans, which were still

secret
But Virginia did need

a

strong executive to guide

the state through its period of crisis.

On June 12,

1781,

Thomas Nelson was elected governor and during the following
three months was given enough power to make

unnecessary.

a

dictatorship

When he was elected governor. Nelson was

authorized by the Assembly, among other things, to call out
the state's military forces,

impress for military purposes,

seize and confine loyalists, place the state q\iartormaster

department in the hands of Continental officers, and to
declare martial law in

American camps.

a

LwcnLy-mile radius of British and

Nelson also extended

tlie

power granted him

.

.
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beyond the breaking point.

He was not, however,

severely

chastised as it appeared the end
justified the i.eans, a
view that the practical ^Vhigs were
willing to accept at
40
times

Granting of executive authority to
chief executives
was more limited in the northern states.
Nevertheless, when
circumstances warranted it, extraordinary
powers, for
limited periods, were authorized.

In Pennsylvania during

the summer of 1780, the Assembly authorized
the President
or Vice President in Council during the recess
of the legis-

lature to declare martial law.

President Reed, at

Washington's insistence, used this power to impress
needed
,

41

•

supplies

Richard Henry Lee to the Virginia Delegates in
the Continental Congress, June 12, 1781, Hutchinson, Papers
of James Madison, 3:158; Richard Henry Lee to James LoveTIT
June 12, 1781, Ballagh, Lett_ers^ of__Richard_Henry Lee, 2 :237;
Richard Henry Lee to George Washington," June~r2 ;~~iy81 ibid'.,
234-235; George Washington to Joseph Jones, June 7, 1781,
Fitzpatrick, Wri tings o f Washing ton 22:179; George Washington to Richard Henry Lee,' July 15, 1781, ibid., 382-384
Henry Young to William Davies, June 9, 1781, Boyd, Papers of
Tho m as Je fferson, 6:84-85; Archibald Stuart to Thomas
Jefferson, September 8, 1818, ibid., 85n.; Henning, The
,

,

;

'

Statutes_a±_L^argej^JBeijig_a_Col]^
the LawF^f
Virginia 10:411, 413-416 419-421 "423 4T77~ThOTias'
Jefferson, No tes on the S tate of Virginia: VJi th an Appendix
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pp. 102, 181n.2.
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The legislatures also granted military
leaders, both

Continental and militia, extraordinary and almost
dictatorial
authority, particularly with respect to using
their descretion in distant theaters of operations, waging war
against
internal enemies, and calling forth the militia and
other

resources of the state

In several instances,

the states

also authorized Continental officers to command or direct
u
their
militia.

4 3

The chief executives also delegated

authority to the military in their state

Although most

42

Asa Bird Gardner, "Martial Law During the Revolution," MAH 1, no. 12 (December 1877): 711-713; Bradley Chapin,
The American Law of Treason: Revolutionary and Early National
Origins p. 65; Ashe, B iographical History of North Carolina
3:76; George Washington to the Pennsylvania Council of
Safety, December 19, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
6:399; Same to same, December 22, 1776, ibid., 423-424.
,

,

,

43

James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, July 7, 1776,
Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence p. 42; Saffell,
Records of the Revolutionary War p. 385; Patrick Henry to
John Todd, December 12, 1778, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia
State Papers 1:312-313; Thomas Jefferson to Baron von
Steuben, April 21, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson
5:525; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island p. 179; John
Morris Scott, John Hobart, and William Duer to William Heath,
January [3?], 1776, William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1)
John Penn to Officers Commanding North Carolina
Militia, General Butler or General Sumner, October 2, 1780,
Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland
Line During the Revolution (Philadelphia Printed for the
Seventy-Six Society, 1857)
p. 58; Drayton, Memoirs of the
American Revolution 2:280; [Rufus VJ. Griswold] Washington
and the Generals oT the American Revolution 1:312; Nicholas
Cooke to George Washington, December 19, 1775, Sparks,
Correspondence of the American Revolution 1:98.
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Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governor in the
American Revolution p. 181; John Rutledge to Thomas Sumter,
March 8, 1781, Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina
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of these grants of authority to
the i.ilitary took place in
the south beginning in 1779, such
grants were r.ade in both
the north and south before that time.
Generally, grants
to Continental officers frequently
involved a legislature's
trust, or a governor's trust, in a
person who, more often

than not, was a native of the state
involved.

believed that

a

it was

military man who had previously demonstrated

loyalty to the civilian government could be
trusted, and
thus, could safely be given extraordinary
authority.

Late in 1778, George Rogers Clark was given discretionary authority by Governor Henry.

During 1780 and 1781,

Jefferson also gave Clark great discretion in the western
theater of operations, generally as long as he furthered

Virginia's interests in that area and communicated to the
chief executive his plans and actions.

Clinton of New

York frequently authorized military commanders discretionary

Revolution 1780-1783 pp. 139-14 0; Hamilton J.
Eckenrode, The Revolution in Vir ginia, p. 256; Bartlett,
Records of Rhode Island, 8:238.
in_t]Te

,

45

Patrick Henry to George Rogers Clark, December 15,
1778, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 62; Thomas Jefferson
to George Rogers Clark, April 19, 1780, Boyd, Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 3 354-355; Same to same, [April (19)
1780, ibid., 356-357; Same to same, December 25, 1780, ibid.,
4:237; Thomas Jefferson to James Innes, December 28, 1780,
,
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247.
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powers, including the allowing
of Generals McDougall
and
Parsons to obtain supplies/^

Probably the most often granted
authority given the
Continental officers by the states
was the permission to
call out the militia, as well as
to command
them.

Early

in the war,

the New York legislature, acutely
aware of the
seriousness of the threat upon the
existence of the revolu-

tionary government in their state,
requested Washington
appoint a Continental general to command
the militia along
the Hudson.
Washington appointed George
Clinton, but

suggested that the New York legislature give
him commands
since the troops were not Continental.
During December 1776,
the New York Provincial Convention authorized
Clinton, as

well as Scott, Duer, Morris, and

a Mr.

Landon to direct all

military affairs, including calling out the militia
of
Dutchess and West Chester counties. Two months later,

in

February 1777, the convention gave Schuyler special authority
to call out the militia whenever he wished and early that

April, before he became governor, Clinton was given permission to call out the militia of four counties until the

first of August.

As governor, Clinton turned over some

responsibility to controlling the militia to Continental
46

George Clinton to Alexander McDougall, April 5,
1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:130-131;
Same to same, March 18, 1779, ibid., 4:646; George Clinton
to Samuel H. Parsons, March 17, 1778, ibid., 50-51.
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Generals Parsons and McDougall.
and even offered to
place
himself onder McDougall as
a Continental
brigadier general.
Another northern state which
frequently
faced

invasion and occupation was
Rhode Island.
They too
authorized Continental and
.ilitia officers authority
to
call out the militia; generally,
however, with the advice
and consent of the governor.

Early in the war. New Hampshire's
legislature
authorized, in the absence of the

council and Assembly, or

if the Committee of Safety
was not sitting,

the general

officer of the colony to call out
the militia.
Later in
the war. New Jersey militia Major
General Philemon Dickinson
was given authority to call out
his state's militia while
the Assembly was in recess
Such granting of authority to
Legislature,
August 8^^W?^^V-?^^^^^^°v
AuQust
8, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 5-399.
Resolve of the New York ConveHtI5^^Dec^Ff'X9
r77 6
P^^i£-?^?£f...2f_George_Clinton, 1:486; ibid.,
fiRffiSr'
^l^^ton to Sanuel H7"pZrsons, February 27,
177Q
Clinton to Alexander McDougall,
^'
Jull'l
liio
K
June 1, 1779,
ibid., 5:6; Bush, Philip Schuyler,
79'
- p.
Ford, JCC, 10:180.
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,

'

.

'

32 0

call out the militia was primarily

a

southern phenomenon,

especially during the latter half of
the war.
Throughout the war, Virginia,
realizing that the
military officers frequently, in emergency

situations, needed

this authority, first granted the right
to assemble the
militia to Colonel William Woodford during

the fall of 1775.

In 1777 and 1778, Continental Generals
Hand and Mcintosh,

both operating in the western theater, were
given power to
call out the militia. When Steuben assumed
command

of the

army in Virginia early in 1781, he received
the authority
to command the Virginia militia once they
were

called out.

Other southern states also granted the military
various

degrees of control over their militia.

Maryland, during

the spring of 1776, authorized the military, because of
an

impending invasion, to call out the militia and during
1779,
South Carolina's chief executive transferred responsibility
for controlling the militia from his hands to those of

General Moultrie.

So concerned was the North Carolina

legislature about its inability to protect the state after
the defeat at Camden, that it gave Gates's second-in-command.

General William Smallwood of Maryland, authority over the

North Carolina militia. 50
Virginia Committee of Safety to William Woodford,
[October 24?, 1775], Mays, Letter s and Pap e rs of Edmund
Pendleton, 1:122; Patrick Henry to Edward Hand, July 3, 17 77,
Thwa 1 1 c s Frontier Def ense o n the Upp er Chi o, 1777-1778
pp. 16-17; Same to same, July 27, 1777, ibid., p. 31;
Mcllvra ine
Journals of the Council of Virginia, 2:174; Thomas
,

,

,
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On the frontier, the need
for quick response to an

enemy attack was quickly realized
and therefore the military
leaders in the west were often
authorized to call out the

militia upon any alarm.

Such authorizations were granted

the military leaders in the Articles
and Agreements or

Compact of Government of the Settlers of
Cumberland River
on May 13, 1780 at Nashborough ^"^
.

,

The military, although given extensive
authority

and power during periods of crisis, were
generally under
the firm control and direction of the civilian
authorities,
both at the Continental and state levels. Control
and

direction at the state level was exercised by several
methods,
including the control over the selection and promotion
of

officers; directly overseeing military affairs, by visits
to and from the military; and by making military policy.
In most states,

the legislature, at various times,

selected and promoted the Continental and militia officers.

Although the company grade officers were usually selected
by the soldiers themselves, the field grade officers and

Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, January 4, 1781, Boyd, Papers
of Thomas Jefferson 4:308; Browne, Maryland Archives
11:262-263; Charles Cotesv;orth Pinckney, Life of General
Thomas Pi nckne y, pp. 54-55; William D. Cooke, compiler.
Revolutionary History of North Carolina in Three Lectures
by R ev Franci s L. Hav/ks,"^ Ho n. David "L. Swa in "and^Hoinr
~
Wm A Graham, p. 171.
,

.

,

,

'

.

.

^''Thomas Edwin Mathews, General James Robertson:
Father of Tennessee (Nashville: Parthenon Press, 1934) p.

188

~

some general officers
were selected by the
legislatures
thereby placing a dependence
upon the., and thus a
for. of
control. ^2
so dependent were the
officers in one colony,

according to one observer,
that they were "the
creatures
and absolute dependents of
the governing party.""
One method by which the
state civilian leadership
maintained control of the military
and assisted in the
direction of the military effort
was by sending individuals,
such as the chief executives,
previously discussed in this
chapter, and committees to the
military camps. Such civilian
visits to Washington's camp began
very early in the war,
beginning with the visit by Elbridge
Gerry and two others
representing the Massachusetts Provincial
Congress upon his
arrival at Cambridge.
During the siege of Boston, many

R22ts_ofJ^yland Democracy
77^°^^?^?''''^^^
1753-1
1753 177^, p. 161; Kenneth Coleman,
ThFAi^^FT^TiV^irnin
ir^Georgia_r7_63-1789, p. 82; Charles~RK^^^^6^lA^^^^^
^:£5Il^t^P__H^_Virgini^^
to Commonwealth,
^2145; George Mason to Martin CockHirHT^TiTT^TrTTTS pp
Rutland
Papers^o^^eorgejlason 1:241; Isaac S. Mulfo^d, History

—
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New_ Jers ey. Civil and Political (Camden: P.
Keen i^^dfE
Chandler, 1848), p. 422; Chfistopher Ward, The
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gontinen tals 1776-1783 p. 6; William Gus ta^^IIi-lvhTtil^,
The
gevolutionary_Soldi ers of Del aware, p. 10; Hemphill, ExtriBts
fr om the Journa ls _o£_jyie_Provinci a 1 Congresses
of South
Carolina 1775-1776 p. 263; Albert BuihHilTllirt ed^T"
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35
p
,

,

,

,

'

.

53

m

.

Cited
Revoluti ona ry War
54

,

.

Phillips Russell, North Carolina in the
31.

p.

.

'

Lincoln, Journals o f Each Prov incial Congress of
Massachusetts p. 4 86
,

.

.

.

323

civilian leaders visited Washington
to discuss policy and
to oversee the activities of the
soldiers and officers from
their colony, including the
arrangement of the officer
corps. 55 During the winter of
1775-1776, Washington was
visited by Governor Cooke of Rhode
Island; Connecticut

Lieutenant Governor Griswold; Oliver
Ellsworth of the
Connecticut Council of Safety; Matthew
Thornton, President
of the New Hampshire Provincial Congress
and Chairman of its
Committee of Safety; and numerous members
of the revolutionary government of Massachusetts
While in
New York

.

during 1776, Washington was visited by various
state leaders,
including Connecticut's Eliphalet Dyer and William
Williams,
New York's John Jay, Robert R. Livingston, and
Robert
Yates,

and three members of the Rhode Island Assembly.

Visits to

55

Hoadly, Public Records of the State of Conne cticut,
1:26; Bouton
Documents and Records Relating to New Ha mp^hlFe
8 :50
386-387; J. Thomas Scharf, History of Dela^^i?i
354
1609-1888 1:24; Nicholas Cooke to George Washington,
September 6, 1776, Sparks, Correspond ence of the American
"
Revolution 1:283-284.
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Samuel Cooper Diary, October 19, 1775, Frederick
Tuckerman, ed., "Diary of Samuel Cooper, 1776-1776," AHR 6,
no. 2 (January 1901): 322; Jeremy Belknap, "Journal of~My
Tour to the Camp, and the Observations I'made There," PMHS 4
(1858-1860): 82; William Garrott Brown, The Life o f Oliver
Ellsworth (New York: Macmillan Company, 19 05)
p. 49;
Charles Thornton Adams, Matthew Thornton of New Hampshire:
A Patriot of the American Revolution Philadelphia Dando
Printing and Publishing Company, 1903)
pp. 30, 34-34.
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'

,

324

Washington's ca.p continued
throughout the war. For example.
New York sent John Jay and
Gouverneur .orris to see Washing-'
ton during the summer of 1777
to discuss the
state of the

northern army and, early in 1781,
Virginia sent Benjamin
Harrison to Philadelphia to make
application to Congress
and Washington for assistance.
Although Harrison met with
members of Congress, he was unable to
meet Washington, since
the latter had returned to camp.^^
Generally, Washington's
dealings with state authorities were
with the chief executives, either in person or in writing, as
he
did not have

the time, nor did he desire to visit or
correspond with

individuals and committees representing the
various governments. Early in 1777, Washington learned that
Virginia
had

sent John Walker to his camp to be the state's
official
liaison.

He then notified Governor Henry that this
was

unacceptable, as it would set

a

precedent for the other

states, and besides, he argued, some things needed to
be

Cooke to George Washington, September 6, 1776, Bartlett,
Reco rds of Rhode Is land, 7:619; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas
Cooke, September 17, 1776, Showman, Papers of Nathanael
"
Greene 1:301.
,

58

John McKesson to George Clinton, July 29, [1777],
Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton 2:145; Benjamin
Harrison to George Washington, February 16, 1781, "Benjamin
Harrison's Mission to Philadelphia," ~"
TQHGM 3, no. 1 (July
24-26
1921)
,

:
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kept secret. 59
1

Walker remained in camp; Washington
making
him an extra aide-de-camp.

Although the states did limit the
sending of
committees and individuals to Washington's
camp,

they

continued sending them to other major
encampments and
fortifications to investigate the needs and
activities of
the military, as well as to discuss
strategy and political
matters.
These visits to military encampments
began almost
as soon as the encampments were constructed,
as the civilian

leaders believed their presence was needed to
oversee the
activities of the military. This was particularly

true in

New York, where the Provincial Congress in May 17 75
sent

George Clinton and Christopher Tappen as

a

committee to the

Highlands to inspect the defenses and later that year other
committees were appointed for the same purpose.
summer of 1776, the Provincial Congress sent

During the

committee to

a

Gates's camp to investigate the officer corps and the

discipline of the soldiers.

During the fall of 1776, the

New York Committee of Safety sent Robert

R.

Livingston,

James Duane, Robert Yates, and nine others as

a

committee

to cooperate with Schuyler at Albany in planning the

defenses of the state, and that December, Livingston,
James M. Scott, and William Duer were appointed as
59

a

George VJashmgton to Patrick Henry, February 24,
1777, Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:484.
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™ttee

to cooperate with George
Clinton.

a .onth later,

the New York Con^ittee of Safety
sent a co^ittee to Dutchlss
county to supervise the Mlitia
and late in April, the New
York Convention sent a comniittee
to investigate the difficulties of mustering and controlling
the militia.
The New
York Committee of Safety sent a committee
in February 1777
to cooperate with Wooster and Heath
and, at Schuyler's

insistence during the early summer of
1777, the Council sent
Gouverneur Morris and Abraham Yates to
inspect the
state's

northern defenses.
requested

Late in December 1777, Putnam also

committee be sent to cooperate and coordinate

a

the state's defenses with him.

sending

a

The legislature complied by

committee to confer with him.^°

The other northern states similarly sent
committees
to camp.

Massachusetts in 1775, and Pennsylvania in 1776,

^.
Hastings,
Public Papers of George Clinton 1:129,
130-132, 526-527, 731; Philip Schuyler to Pierre Van Cort-'
landt, June 30, 1777, ibid., 2:63n.; John McKesson to George
Clinton, July 29, [1777], ibid., 145; Calendar of Historical
Manuscripts 1:504-534 548-550 622-628 Alice P. Kenney,
The Gansevoorts of Albany: Dutch Patricians in the Upper
Hudson Valley p. 92; Berthold Fernow, ed.. New York in the
Revolution pp. 135-136; William Duer to George Washington,
January 28, 1777, Sparks, Correspondence of the American
Revolution 1:330; Sparks, Gouverneur Morris 1:130; Israel
Putnam to George Washington, February 13, 1778, Livingston,
Israel Putnam p. 371; Richard Palmer, The River and the
Rock: The History of Fortress West Point, 1775-1783 p. 139;
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sent con^ittees to Fort Ticonderoga
to oversee and inspect
military activities.
the latter year, Pennsylvania
also
appointed a committee to accompany
Thomas Mifflin in his
attempt to influence the Association
members to turn out
and stimulate them to action, and
another co.^ittee to oversee their navy.
During 1777, New Hampshire's
Committee of
Safety sent Josiah Bartlett and Nathaniel
Peabody to

m

Bennington to cooperate with Stark and,
during the same year,
the Pennsylvania State Navy Board was
sent to
the Red Bank

area to personally direct the movements of
the state's military forces.
The following year. New Hampshire
sent a

committee to Sullivan's camp to ascertain the
condition of
the army and, during the summ.er of 1779,
Massachusetts

sent

Samuel Adams to Providence to petition Gates to
spare

Jackson's regiment for the Penobscot expedition and, that
same summer, Connecticut sent a committee to New London and

Groton to inspect the fortifications and confer with the

commanding officers
6

Alden Bradford, Historx^f__Massa_ch
(Boston: Richardson and Lord; VJells and Lilly7~ATd'en
3 vols.
Bradford, 1822-1829), 2:153; James Potter, William Clark,
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"Records of the Committee of Safety,'' CNHHS7~7TirT7~Pennsylvania State Navy Board to President Thomas VJharton,
October 30, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylv ania Archives 1st ser..
:

,

,

:

;

,

The southern states also
utilized comn^ittees to
inspect and oversee military
activities, beginning in
South
Carolina during the sunder of
1775.
At that ti.e the South
Carolina Council of Safety sent
William Henry Drayton and
the Reverend William Tennent
to the back country with
orders
'°
"^^^^i^
protecting those that signed
the
Association. ^2 Because of the distances
involved on the
southern and western frontiers, as
well as the nature of the
war there, military commanders were
often given great latitude.
Nevertheless, civilian leaders were sent
to the

frontier to oversee and cooperate with
them.

Virginia, for

example, sent a committee to Fort Pitt
early in the war and,
during the winter of 1781-1782, sent a
committee to advise
George Rogers Clark, as well as to settle the
accounts of
his soldiers.

Similarly, during 1782, Georgia sent a

committee to the St. Mary's River area to investigate
and
5:723; Matthew Thornton to John Sullivan, September 28,
1778, Hammond, Let ters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1-92-95Samuel Adams to ?, August 14, 1779, Cushing7~W^TtTngs of
Samuel Adams, 4:161-162; James Wentv;orth et ar7rto'"j^¥than
Trumbull and the Council of Safety, August 7, 1779 MHSC
7th ser.
2:420.
'

'

,

Drayton, Mem oirs of the American Rev olution,
1:326-329, 396-398; William M. Dabney and Marion Dargan,
Wil^li am Henry Drayton and the American ^Revolution (Albuquerque University of New 'Mexico Press, 1962), pp7~T01-104;
A. S. Sal ley, Jr., The Histo ry of Oranqebu£q_Countv South
Carolina from its First S ettle men t to th e (Jroii~oT"tT-re
Revoluti o nary War ," pp. 2 82-3 04".'
:

'
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supervise military activities

Because the southern

.

states were frequently involved
in ar.ed conflict throughout .ost of the war, their state
governments made use of
comi^ittees and individuals as
liaisons with the military
with respect to strategy decisions.
June 1776 a member
of the Georgia Council of Safety
went to Charleston to plead
with General Lee for Continental
assistance in defending
Georgia by attacking Florida. Lee
informed him he would
discuss the matter with only an official
delegation from
Georgia.
Such a delegation, consisting of
Jonathan Bryan,
John Houston, and Lachlan Mcintosh, paid
Lee a visit in

m

July.

The result was the sending of a military
force under

Howe and Moultrie to Georgia.
•

Besides the states sending committees to camp
to

oversee military activities, they also sent individuals
to
act as liaisons with the military leaders.

summer of 1776, William Sharpe,

a

During the

member of the North

Carolina Council of Safety, accompanied General Rutherford
on his western expedition, acting as an aide.

Similarly,

the New Hampshire Committee of Safety sent Samuel Folsom to
63

Hening, The Statutes at Lar ge: Being a Collection
of al l t he Laws of Virgin ia, 9:374; George Rogers ClaFk to
the Commissioners of Western Accounts, December 15, 1782,
Palmer, Calen dar_of_Vir^ginia_St£te_Pa^
3:396-397; Stevens,
7'."
A Histo ry of Georgia, 2:' 3 3
,

64

Ibid., 144, 146-148; Isabella Remshart Redding,
Life an d Tim.e s of Jo nathan Bryan, 1708-1788, p. 72,
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join Stark's camp during the
summer of 1777 to act as a
liaison.
During the summer of 1780,
Jefferson of Virginia
sent one of his law students,
the former Continental
captain,
James Monroe, to the southern army
armed with the title of
"Military Commissioner from Virginia
to the Southern Army
He was charged with collecting
and co™icating information
about the state of the southern army
to not only Jefferson,
but also Rutledge of South Carolina and
Nash of North
Carolina. Early in 1781, Jefferson
attempted to send another
individual to the southern army, to be
attached to Greene's
headquarters as a liaison. However, the plan
was dropped
when Greene assured Jefferson that it was
unnecessary to send
.

anybody to camp, for he would make sure Jefferson
was adequately informed of events.
It was not just civilians visiting camp
that provided
a

means for civilian oversight over military affairs.

The

military were often required to visit the civilian leaders.
Often the military simply came on their own.

Just as the

^^Willie Jones to Patrick Henry, October 25, 1776,
Saunders, NCCR 10:860-861; Moore, John St ark, p. 271;
Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, June 10, 1780, Boyd,
Papers of Thomas J efferson, 3:431; Same to same, June 16,
1780, ibid., 451-452; Thomas Jefferson to Abner Nash,
June 16, 1780, ibid., 452; M. F. Treacy, Prelude t o Yorktown:
The Southern Campaign of Nathanae l Gree ne 178 0-1 781 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963) ,"^p. 211,
212n.l7.
,
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Tench Tilghman to William Smallv;ood, September 20,
1776
Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relatin g Chiefly t^o the
Maryland Line During the Revolution, p. 65.
,
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military leaders often paid visits
to Congress to discuss
supplies and strategies, as well as
to ask for preference
of one kind or another,

so did they,

even more frequently,

visit the state governments for the
same things.
This was
especially true after 1779 when the states
became more
responsible for the needs of the Continental
army.^^

Another way the state civilian leaders
kept

a

personal contact, as well as an indirect control
over the
military leaders was by having their sons and
other relatives
serve as military aides to the major military
leaders.
For

example, Governor Trumbull's son, John, served as
an aidede-cam.p to Spencer and Washington,

adjutant to Gates, and

as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Sullivan.

Livingston's sons, William
as aides-de-camp to Greene,

S.

Governor William

and Henry Brockholst, served

Schuyler, Arnold and St. Clair.

His nephew, Matthew Clarkson, served as an aide-de-camp to

Arnold and Lincoln.

6 8

State leaders also were able to watch the

activities of the military by serving with them as
67

Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governor in
the American Revolution p. 134.
,

^^Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull pp. 173-175; Graydon,
Memoirs pp 14 5 14 5n
Flexner The Traitor and the Spy
,

,

pp.

161,

.

463.

,

.

;

,
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,
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volunteers.

69

For exaxnple, John Houston,
after leaving the
governorship of Georgia in 1779, and
before serving in Congress, served as a volunteer aide to
Mcintosh; John Archer,
a inember of the Maryland Assembly,
served as a volunteer
aide to Wayne; and James Sullivan,
judge on the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, served as a volunteer aide
to his brother,
7n
John Sullivan

Another indirect control of the military
was by
state leaders having the military write them.
This not

only allowed the civilians to know what the
military were
doing, but reminded the military that the civilians
were
the supreme power.
It also strengthened the ties between
the civilian and military leaders.

Such requests for

correspondence were often formal, as chief executives and
executive and legislative bodies often asked military
commanders, including Washington, to inform them of their
69

Wallace, William Bra dford pp. 107-108, 121, 128,
135, 157; Hanson, Minute Book "of the Committee of Safety of
Tryon County, p. 109n.8; Samuel Rezneck, UnFecognrzed
Patriots: The Jews in the American Revolution (Westport
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp.~2'3-24; David Ramsay,
Ramsay's H istory of South Car olina fro m i ts First Settlement irrT670 t o the year 1808 2:2 57-258 ;"^Z ui s i'"Fxe d er Tc k
Hays, Hero of H ornet's Nest: A Bi ograph y of Eli ja h Clark
1733 to 1799 (New York: Hobson Book Press, 1946)
p. 148
,

,

,
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Edith Duncan Johnston, The Ro us tons of Georgia,
7~
BDC p. 522; Albert B u s h n eTI"~Ha"r F^ ~ edT "Commo n
pp. 223-224
wealth History of Massachusetts, 3:123.
;
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plans and activities

Most requests for correspondence

.

were informal in nature, as it was
believed it allowed the
military a greater degree of freedom
in their expressions ^2
The military leaders welcomed
the opportunity to
communicate with the civilian leaders,
and frequently did
so, both informally and formally.
often they initiated
the correspondence with the state leaders,
asking them to
.

^^Maryland Council to Marquis De la Favette,
July 3
17 81, Browne, Mar^^^
45 494
Virginia Committee
of Safety to William Woodford, [October 24"^,
I7751
Mav^.
Letters and Pap ers of Edmund Pen dleton. 1:123;
ComAittee'of
the Executive Council of Georgia to Benjamin
Lincoln
MX^ll^tionary_Re^^
9""?^^ Nicholas
2:159; l^'u^V^'r^^^?'''^^^'''
Cooke to George Washington
nber 6
1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:620; George
Clinton to George Washington, March 3, 1779, Sparks
Correspondence of the American Revolution 2:255-256.
:

;

,

^i^

'

,
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John Penn to William Woodford, August 11, 1778
Stewart, William Woodford 2:958; John Dagworthy to Caesar
Rodney, September 15, 1777, Leon de Valinger, Jr., "Rodney
Letters," DH 3, no. 2 (September 1948): 108; Elias Boudinot
to Alexander McDougall, January 20, 1779, "Selections from
Portfolios in Various Libraries," HM, 2d ser. 3, no. 2
(February 1868): 80-81; John McKinly to Caesar Rodney,
April 29, 1777, Delaware Archives, 3:1402; George Clinton
to Alexander Hamilton, March 5, 1778, Hastings, Public
Papers of George Clinton 2:865.
,

,
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Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag:
Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49,
no. 3 (September 1954)
227; William Gustavus v;hi teley7~The
Revolutionary Soldiers of Delaware pp. 13-14; Adolph Ben'son,
Sweden and the American Revolution (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor Company, 1926), pp. 84-85; "Original
Documents," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 531-445; Nathanael
Greene to
Brownson, January 7, 1782, Nathanael Greene
Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1)
Nathanael Greene to Anthony
Wayne, January 9, 1782, ibid.
:
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reciprocate with information that would
be useful to the
military 74
One of the most important contacts
between the

military leaders and the state civilian leaders
came about
in the form of meetings regarding the
safety of a state.

Frequently commanding officers of departments
and other
military commanders visited state leaders to discuss
strategy and other military matters.
true in the southern states.

This was especially

Charles Lee, in 1776, while

commanding the southern army, discussed military policy
with
a wide

variety of southern civilian leaders, primarily those

of Virginia and Georgia.

Howe also consulted southern

civilian leaders, mainly as

a

result of the contemplated

expeditions against Florida in 1777 and 1778.

Lincoln

frequently met with the chief executives of North Carolina
and South Carolina to discuss strategy and policy.

Gates,

after taking command of the southern army, visited Jefferson
in Virginia,

as did Lafayette the following year.

Lafayette

also visited Maryland's Council upon arriving in the Southern
74

William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney,
January 10, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the Amer ican Revolution, 1:258; Philip Schuyler to Jonathan Trumibull, June 5,
1777, MHSC,

7th ser.,

2:54.

75

Rawlins Lowndes to VJilliam Moultrie, November 29,
1778, Moultrie, M emoi rs of the American Revolution 1:246;
William Moultrie to Charles Pinckney, April 16, 1778, ibid.,
3 70-371; Edward McCrady, The His tory of South Carolina in
p." 529
the Revolution 1775-1780
,
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Department.

Similarly, Greene, after being
appointed to
command the southern army, spent
over a week in Philadelphia
discussing strategies with Congress
before proceeding south
on November 2, 1780. Arriving in
Maryland, he discussed
strategy and supplies with state
leaders, leaving behind
General Gist to continue lobbying for
support.
From Annapolis, he proceeded to Richmond to see
Jefferson
and the

legislature of Virginia about his plans.
behind Steuben to act as

a

There, he left

liaison with the state, joining

Gist in forwarding recruits and supplies.

Because of the distances involved in the Southern
Department, the commanding generals, desiring personal

contact with state leaders, often sent emissaries,
military

necessity preventing them from leaving camp.
Moultrie and Colonel Pinckney as
76

a

Lincoln used

link to Rutledge, as did

.

Virginia Committee of Safety to Charles Lee,
April 10 1776 Sparks, Cor£es£onden^e_o_f_ the_^jrier ican Revo~
lution, 2:486-488; Hugh F. Rankin, T he No rth_Caro"l ina
Conti nenta_ls, p. 67; Chandler, Re vo]jj t^i qna r y~Re co r "ds^o f
Georg ia, 1:179, 190-191; Charles Lee to" ArcFibTlT~BulToch
August 23, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872):
238; Same to same, August 24, 1776, ibid,, 240-241; Button
Gwinnett to John Hancock, March 28, 1777, Jenkins, Butto n
Gwinnett pp. 218-221; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History
of Geor g ia
1:113; Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln pp. 270, 'iTl;
Edward McCrady, T he History of South Carol ina in the Revolution 1775-1780 p. 384; Patterson, Horatio Gates pp. 302303; Paul David Nelson, Gener a l Hora t io Gates: A Biography
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Universi ty~l9"7 6y7"p 2 2 0T^
Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American
Revolution p 2 01; Mc 1 1 wain e Journirs o f ~ trhe~C'o"ijn"cri "of
Virginia 2:343; Nathanael Greene to Joseph^ReedT^JarTuary 9,
17 81, Reed, Jose ph Reed
2:344; Thayer, Nat hanael Greene,
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Lafayette use James McHenry as

a

link to the government of

Maryland and George Augustine Washington
to the government
of Virginia. 7 7
Visits of commanding officers and their
emissaries
to state leaders were not limited
to the south.

Schuyler,

for example, visited the New York
Convention in 1777 to

discuss that state's defense and a year earlier
Lord Stirling
visited the New Jersey Committee of Safety to
discuss that
state's defense.

Lafayette, on his way north to command the

Ill-fated Canadian expedition early in 1778, visited
Clinton;
and on his way south late in 1780, he visited Thomas Mifflin
in Philadelphia to discuss Pennsylvania's recruiting poli-

cies.

During 1779, Putnam, who commanded the Continental

troops on the east side of the Hudson, visited the Connecticut General Assembly to discuss policy, particularly as it

related to raising additional troops.
a

Not that successful

field commander, Putnam was adept at dealing with civilian

officials, and was quite successful in coordinating the

defenses of New England and the Hudson Highlands with the

civilian leaders.
77

.

.

During 1778 and 1779, General Maxwell,
.

Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, February 12,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #3)
Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas
Nelson, August 7, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in Virginia
p. 44; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, August 21,
1781, Louis Gottschalk, ed.
The Letters of Lafayette to
Washington 1777-1799 p. 219; Same to same, August 24, 1781,
ibid
221
p
;
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and Officers ho permitted,
frequently visited the New
Jersey

legislature, primarily to draw
attention to the distresses
of the New Jersey Line.^^
It was not just the top field
commanders who visited

the state civilian leaders.

More often than not, it was

a

company or regimental commanding officer
who directly
appealed to his state to provide supplies,

recruits, and

pay.

Connecticut's government was frequently
prevailed upon
by Parsons, Putnam, Tallmadge, and Humphreys;
Vermont by

Stark; and New York by McDougall.^^

Southern field com-

manders were less likely, as the war progressed,
to visit
78

Bush

PhjJJ^_^chu^^

p. 78; Alan Valentine, Lord
Stirl ing, p. 174; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Joins
the
American Army p. 134; Marquis de Lafi^^¥FE¥~tF~Gi^?^^
Washington, December 5, 17 80, Louis Gottschalk, ed
The
Letter s of La fa yette_ to _Waj hing to n 177 7-17 99 p 135Livingston, Israel Putnim,' pp. 1957"39"57~WiTliam Maxwell
to the New Jersey Legislature, April 25, 1779, Selections
from the Correspo ndence of the Executive of New~Ji?^v """Trom
~
1776 to 1786 pp. 146-147:
,

.

,

,
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,
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Livingston, Israel_Put£iam p. 3 77 Jonathan
Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., August 16, 1777,
MHSC, 7th ser., 2:118; Samuel H. Parsons to George VJashington, May 11, 1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 94; George
Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, May 17,' 1777, ibid., p. 96;
Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, June 24, 1780, ibid.,
p. 292; Same to same, July 4, 1780, ibid., p. 294; Samuel H.
Parsons to the Committee of Congress, June 24, 1780, ibid.,
pp. 292-293; Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge p. 41; Humphreys,
Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1:205-207; Pennsylvania
Supreme Executive Council to George Washington, January 22,
1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives
1st ser., 6:200; Arthur
St. Clair to George Washington, April 15, 1781, Smith, The
St. Clair Papers
1:547-548; Same to same, June 16, ll^TT'
ibid
549-550; John Stark to George Washington, April 9,
17 82, Moore, John Sta rk, p. 4 59; Champagne, Alex ander
McDougall, p. 166.
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,

their state

gove™nts

as they were either being
pursued

or were pursuing the British.

Generally, however, n^ost

commanders in the field during the
southern campaigns sent
subordinate officers to visit the state
80
civilian
leaders.

Fortunately for the southern officers,
state executives did
spend a lot of time at camp to coordinate
their state's

defense.

Therefore, it was possible for General
Andrew
Pickens, early in 1781, to pay a special
visit to Rutledge
p
at Greene's camp.
-I

Although Washington rarely visited Congress
to
discuss the concerns of the army, he frequently
paid visits
to the leaders of the state governments,
particularly those

of New York when the army was quartered at New
Windsor and

Newburgh during 1781 and 1782.

Because of the demands on

his time, Washington preferred dealing with state leaders

by mail.

Whenever possible, he often had his letters hand
80

Stewart, William Woodford 2:1153-1154; Hugh P.
Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals pp. 344, 381;
Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sim Lee, November 10 1780
Browne, Maryland Archives 40:177; Baron de Kalb to Thomas
Sim Lee, July 9 1780 Helen Lee Peabody, ed.
"Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence,
1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 1 (March 1954): 16.
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Pickens, Skyagunsta, The Border Wizard Owl:
Ma jor-General Andrew Pickens (1739-1807) (Greenville, South
Carolina: Observer Printing Company, 1934
89.
p
A.

L.

)
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,
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Spaulding, George Clinton p. 136; George
Washington to Horatio Gates, November 14, 1782, Fitzpatrick,
VJritings of Washington, 25:341.
,

carried by members of his staff
or other officers who
could
expound on his written communications.
He also sent aidesde-camp and generals to the state
leaders to discuss
policies, particularly as they related
to supplies and pay.
Washington began sending top assistants
to
the states for

help during the fall of 1776, when he
sent Mifflin to
Pennsylvania, Reed to New Jersey, General
Nixon

to Massachu-

setts, and General Varnum to Rhode
Island.

Until 1782,

Washington frequently dispatched Knox and
Heath to the New
England states to lobby for support.
During
1778,

Washington sent Deputy Quartermaster General
Lutterloh to
see the chief executive of Pennsylvania about
supplies

and

Philip Van Cortlandt to see the chief executive of
New York
about troop dispositions.
During 1781, Washington
told

Stark that as long as he was in New Hampshire he should

impress upon the legislature the needs of the army.

The

following year. Parsons, then in Connecticut, received

a

George Washington to William Livingston,
November 23, 1776, ibid., 6:304-305; Thomas Mifflin to
George Washington, November 26, 1776, Reed, Joseph Reed
1:266; Samuel B. Webb to Jonathan Trumbull, November 24,
1776, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb
1:173; Wilkins Updike,
Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar (Boston: Thomas H. VJebb and
Company, 1842), pp. 149-150.
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George Washington to William Heath, June 2, 1781,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 18:468; Same to same.
May 9, 1781, ibid., 22:63-66; Circular to the New England
States, May 10, 1781, ibid., 68-69; George Washington to
Horatio Gates, November 14, 1782, ibid., 25:341; Abbatt,
Memoirs of Ma jor-General William Heath p. 249; Callaghan,
Henry Knox, pp. 99, 136-137.
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similar letter from Washington

.

Even as the war came to

a close,

Washington was still sending lobbying
parties to
the states.
Early in 1782, he sent numerous
officers to
the New England states to plead with
the legislatures about
filling up their battalions
Besides appointing and selecting the
officers, and

visiting them, and receiving visits from them,
the civilian
leaders asserted themselves by directing,
whenever

possible,

the strategy the military followed.

Often this simply meant

endorsing the plans the military brought to them, such
as
George Rogers Clark's plans for the western frontier
approved
by Virginia and Ethan Allen's plans for invading Canada

approved by the New York Provincial Congress.

^"^

But more

than often it meant adopting a strategy that would benefit
the state the most, often disregarding other states.

Such

was the case with Massachusetts, who, without consulting
Congress, fitted out a military-naval force of nearly four
85

George Washington to Thomas Wharton, March 7, 1778,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 11:45-4 8; Georqe
Washington to John Stark, May "6, 1781, ibid., 22:41; George
Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, January 3, 1782, ibid.,
23:433; George VJashington to Philip Van Cortlandt, October 17,
177 8, Judd, Correspondence of the Van Cortlandt Family p. 269.
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George VJashington to the Superintendent of Finance,
January 25, 17 82, Fitzpatrick, Writin gs of Washington,
23:463-465.
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Edgar VJ. Hassler Old Vfestmoreland A History of
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p. 131; Journal
1:65.
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thousand men during the summer of
1779 for the expedition
against Penobscot. 8 8 Besides directing
the military in
grand strategy, the state governments
also directed the
military in lesser matters, ever reminding
them
of their

subordinate role.

OQ

The state governments, like Congress,
kept a
relatively tight grip on the military.
Nevertheless, when
it appeared consistent with the safety
of the body

politic,

they allowed the military extraordinary power
and authority.
For the most part, the military responded by not
abusing
the trust reposed in them.

Yet there is evidence that the

military often violated the trust placed in them.
be seen,

As will

the state governments, just like Congress, viewed

all such violations of civil supremacy with great concern

and acted accordingly.
8 8

Albert Bushnell Hart, Commonw ealth History of
Mass ach usetts, 3:36-38 Henry I. Shaw," Jr., ^eno"bicot~
Assault-1779 " MA 17, no. 2 (Summer 1953): 83-94
;

,

89

.

Proceedings of th e Convent i on of the Delaware

State, p. 20.

CHAPTER

VI

THE ARflY CONTROLS ITSELF

Nicholas Cresswell, during July 1777,
wrote in his
journal that the American army was composed
of a
"ragged

Banditti of undisciplined people, the scum and
refuse of
all nations on earth."
A Swedish Colonel in French service
described the American army in Savannah during 1779
as being

composed "almost wholly of deserters and vagabonds of
all
nations."-^

These were somewhat exaggerated descriptions,

yet at times they seemed very true and therefore concerned
the revolutionary leaders.

Their ideal was

a

disciplined

army composed of VThigs who had a stake in society.

They

desired an army composed of men who shared the same cultural,
political, and social background and beliefs.

But because

of the difficulty in recruiting such an army, and military

necessity, many who did not share a stake in American

society as they envisioned it, enlisted in the patriot
forces.

These included Blacks, Indians, foreigners, British
"'"[Nicholas Cresswell],

Journal of Nicholas Cresswell,
1774-1777 pp. 251-252 Baron Curt von Stedingk to King
Gustavus III, January 18, 1780, Adolph B. Benson, Sweden and
the American Revolution, p. 165.
,

;
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and German deserters and prisoners
of war, as well as
Tories

The first group that was taken into
the Ai^erican
military forces, against the wishes of
most Americans, were
the Blacks, a people many had always
feared to arm.^

Despite Blacks demonstrating their skill and
courage at
Lexington and Bunker Hill, Washington issued
orders

that

they were not to be recruited, although those
already

enlisted could remain.

Congress in September rejected a

motion to discharge all Blacks, but
at Cambridge on October

discharge all slaves.

8,

a

council of officers

1775, unanimously agreed to

By a large majority, they agreed

that free Blacks in service not be re-enlisted when their

enlistments ended.

Washington concurred."^

Late in 1775, however, because of difficulty in
recruiting, Washington allowed Blacks to re-enlist.
ing this.

Learn-

Congress informed Washington that he could

continue to re-enlist Blacks who had faithfully served at
the siege of Boston, but no others.

This restriction was

lifted during the following years as enlistments slackened.
2

Banjamin Quarles, "The Colonial Militia and Negro
Manpower," MVHR 45, no. 4 (March 1959): 648, 652.
3

General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Wri ting s of Washington,
3:319; 4:57, 86; Details regarding the October 8th meeting
4th ser., 3:1040; Recruiting
in Force, Amer ica n Archives
Instructions Tbid., 3 :1385; Diary of Richard Smith,
Burnett, LMCC 1:207.
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and Blacks were encouraged to
join both the Continental
army and the state military forces.
By the summer of 1778,
there were over 750 Blacks serving
in the Continental army
and by 1780 both Rhode Island and
Connecticut had all Black
companies, except for the officers/
This increasing use of Blacks did not
take place

without protest.

Six members of the Rhode Island
Assembly

opposed the decision of their body to raise
Black companies,
fearing the world would believe that the Americans
were

attempting to win their rights and liberties with
slaves.

a

band of

Heath was asked by Schuyler whether it was "consis-

tent with the Sons of Freedom to trust their all to
be

defended by Slaves?"

Heath agreed it was not.^

Opposition to the use of Blacks, as one would surmise, was greater in the southern states, for as one
4

General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Washington
4:194; George VJashington to the President of the Continental
Congress, December 31, 1775, ibid., 195; Ford, JCC, 4:60;
Benjamin Quarles, The Negro i n the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1961),
pp. viii, 16-18, 52, 55-56, 71-72, 80-82; Jack D. Foner,
Blacks and the Military in American History (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 10-11; David 0. V7hite,
Connecticut's Black Soldiers 1775-1783 Connecticut Bicentennial, ser 4 (Chester: Pequot Press, 1973)
passim;
James M. Varnum to George Washington, January 2, 1778,
"Revolutionary Correspondence," RIHSC 6 (1867): 209-210;
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island 8:358-360, 640-641.
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^Ibid., 361, Philip Schuyler to William Heath,
July 28, 1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 4:135-136; William Heath to
Samuel Adams, August 27, 1777, ibid., 148.
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southerner wrote, arming

then,

was "the child of

a

distempered

imagination."

Nevertheless, from the beginning
of the war,
Virginia allowed Blacks to join the
militia
and South

Carolina allowed them to be used as
laborers.

Additionally,

Maryland allowed (the only southern
state to do
to be enlisted and even resorted to
drafting

so)

Blacks

them in 1781.^

Congress, during the British invasion
of South
Carolina and Georgia in 1779, suggested the
use of Blacks
under white commissioned and non-commissioned
officers,

compensating slave owners for any loss they may
suffer.

Alexander Hamilton, for one, thought the plan

a

good one,

believing the slaves would make good soldiers, having
lived
a life of subordination.

But he doubted the southerners

would readily accept such a plan, believing "Prejudice and
private interest will be antagonists too pov/erful for public
spirit and public good." 7
^E[dward] Giles to Otho H[olland] Williams, June 1,
l^Sl, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers
in the Maryland Historical Society p. 46; Benjamin Ouarles.
The Negro in the /American Revolution pp. 56-58; Hemphill,
Extracts from the Jou rnals of the Provincial C ongresses of
~"
South Carolina 1775-177 6, p. 14T^
,

,

'

7

Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, [September 11,
1779], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton 2:166;
Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, March 14, 1779, ibid., 17-19;
John Laurens to Henry Laurens, February 2, 1778, Simms, The
Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens p. 117; William
Ellery and John Collins to William Greene, April 13, 1779,
Burnett, LMCC, 4:156; John Collins to William Greene,
March 30, 1779, ibid., 124; Ford, JCC, 13:387-388.
,
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Hamilton was correct in
believing the plan would
not be adopted, for as one
southerner wrote after
learning
of it, -we are much disgusted
here at the Congress
recommending us to arm our Slaves,
it was received with
great
resentment, as a very dangerous
and impolitic Step."
Despite the rejection of the plan,
some Continental officers
and civilian leaders continued
to lobby for the use
of

Blacks, believing that the threat
posed by

a

British army

outv>7eighed the danger of using
slaves.^

John Laurens, once elected to the
South Carolina
legislature in 1782, raised the possibility
of the state
enlisting a Black regiment under his
command.
This recommendation was not adopted, as "The prejudices
against the
measure," according to Lewis Morris, Jr.,
"are so prevailing
that no consideration could induce them to
adopt it." The

legislature did, however, agree to the limited
use of Blacks
Q
for fatigue duty.
8

,

.

Christopher Gadsden to Samuel Adams, July 6 1779
Walsh, Chri_sjtopher_Gadsden, p. 166; Benjamin Lincoln'to
John
Rutledge, July 24, 17~79, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Benjamin
Lincoln Letterbook, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Joseph Jones
to James Madison, December 8, 1780, Hutchinson, Papers
of
Jame s Madison 2 :233 James Madison to Joseph JoneF,"
November 28, 1780, ibid., 209.
,
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Lewis Morris, Jr. to Jacob Morris, February 7, 1782,
"Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 499;
Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, January 21, 1782,
Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel tl)
Aedanus Burke to Arthur Middleton, January 25, 1782,
Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon.
Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence,"
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Although the use of Blacks in
combat was sporadic
during the war, it has been
estimated that some five

thousand

did serve in various guises,
primarily as sailors aboard
privateers." Another domestic source
of manpower

that was

avoided as much as possible was
the Indian, who, like the
Black, was considered to possess
the seeds of discord and
anarchy.
The first two years of the war,
Congress and the
colonies, for the most part, attempted
to keep the Indians
neutral, believing the cost of maintaining
them as allies

outweighed any advantages which may be gained
by their use.
Indians did, however, serve in American
arms
in the first

year of the war at the siege of Boston, in
Canada, and on
the South Carolina frontier."'"''"

Arthur Middleton, February 8, 1782, ibid., 27, no
1
(January 1926): 4 A. S. Salley, Jr., ed.
Journals of the
House of Represen tatives_^^oirbh_Carolina TColSbTa"^
Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1916),
56-58;
John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton, [July 1782] pp.
Syrett,
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 3:121.
;

,

'
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,

IOt.

Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolu
tion, pp. ix, 83; Luther Porter Jackson, Virginia Negro
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Quality Press, 1944), p. vi.
•

JCC, 2:123, 4:191; Lossing, P hilip Schuyler
2:106-113; 395-396; Philip Schuyler to George Washington,
August 6, 1776, Walter H. Mohr, Fede ral Indian Relations
1774-17 88 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1933), p. 39; Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the
Eastern Indians, May 14, 1-75, Frederic Kidder, Military
Operations in Ea s tern M ain e and Nova Scot ia During the
Revolution, Chie f ly compiled from the Jou rnals and Lett e r
of C olonel John Allan, v/ith Notes and a Memoir of~Col. John
"^"''Ford,
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Because of manpower shortages, the
urging of Gates,
and after consulting Washington,
Congress in May 1776
authorized Indian use during the northern
campaign, allowing
bounties for Indians who would take
prisoners at
garrisons,

hoping this would prevent massacres.

In June, Washington

was authorized to recruit up to two
thousand Indians, and
later that summer was authorized to recruit
additional

Indians from the St. Johns, Nova Scotia, and
Penobscot

tribes

'^^
.

Despite the seemingly large numbers authorized
during
1776 and 1777,

Indians were rarely used in large bodies,

hardly ever incorporated with Continental units, and
almost
always used on the frontier.

This remained true during 1778

and 1779 as Congress, pressed for military manpower,
author-

ized Indian use, even giving blank commissions to the Northern

Department's Indian Commissioners to pass along to warriors
of the Oneida and Tuscarora tribes, hoping this would bring

Allan (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1867), pp. 51-52; Edward Miles
Riley, ed
The Journal of John Harro we r: An Indentured
Servant in the Col ony of Virgini a, 17^7l£l776 (Williamsburg
Colonial Williamsburg, 1963), pp. 127-128; Hemphill,
Extracts from the Journa l s of t he Pr ovincial Congress of
South Carolina 1 T75 -1776 pp. 56 159^607 Isaac J. Green wood, "The Stockbridge Indians During the American
Revolution," NEHGR 54 (April 1900): 162-164; Ward, The War
of the Revolution
1:14 4.
.
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JCC, 4:394-395; 5:412, 452, 527.
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them into closer cooperation.

During the spring of 1780,

Colonel Brodhead was given six blank commissions
to bestow
upon Delaware Indians, and early in 1781 he
was authorized
to use as many Delawares as volunteers as he
desired.

On

the southern frontier during 1780, Major William
R. Davie

supplemented his command with thirty-five Catawba,
whose
tribe also supplied warriors in

1781."*""^

In all, probably two or three thousand Indians

served in or with the American military forces during the
war.

Rarely were

a

hundred used at the same time and place,

and always their conduct was carefully monitored.

The

states generally restricted their use in populated areas
and frequently prohibited their serving in the militia

""""^

.

^^Ibid., 9:943, 1002
10 :220-221; 12:411; 14:693;
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no. 1 (March 1950): 31; J. E. A. Smith, The History of~
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(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972), pp. 132-133
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ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 19 74)
p. 71;
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Washington was generally against using
them, believing their
services never compensated the expense.
He felt
the same

way about another category of manpower
both Congress and the
states were forced to call upon-British

and German deserters

and prisoners of

v/ar

Initially, orders were issued both
by the Massachusetts Committee of Safety and by the army
forbidding the

enlistment of British deserters.

Throughout the war similar

orders would be issued, as well as prohibitions
against
enlisting British prisoners of war.^^ These
prohibitions
did not, however, preclude Congress from frequently
providing
incentives for British and German soldiers to renounce
their

allegiances, with no obligation to serve in the American

military forces. 17

It is estimated about thirty-thousand

Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, May 3 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 11:343-344; George Washington to William Heath
September 3, 1781, ibid., 23:75.
"""^George

,

,

1

George Washington's Recruiting Instructions, ibid.,
6:198; 7:7; 11:186; George Washington to Thomas Johnson,
April 8, 1779, ibid., 14:349; Lincoln, Journals of Each
Provincial Congress of Massachusetts p. 5 92; Samuel H.
Parsons's Orders, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons pp. 160-161;
Caesar Rodney to ?, February 3, 1780, Delaware Archives
3:1459; William Heath's General Orders, "Orderly Book of
the Regiment of Artillery Raised for the Defence of the Town
of Boston in 1776," HCEI 14, no. 2 (April 1877): 127-128;
Ford, JCC, 4:105.
,
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^^Ibid., 369; 5:640, 653-655, 707-708
7:430
8:417;
10:406-407; Proclamation by Thomas Jefferson, Boyd, Papers
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German mercenaries served in Ainerica
between 1776 and 1783,
about twenty thousand of them Hessians,
who, for the most
part, neither demonstrated great love
for the British
nor

great hatred for the Americans.

it is understandable,

therefore, why nearly half were captured,
and some five
thousand deserted. 1 8

With increasing manpower needs during the
second
and third years of the war, many civil and
military

leaders

believed German mercenaries who had deserted or were
taken
prisoner should be recruited, and some actually were.
Congress and Washington generally opposed their use, despite
the argument that German mercenaries were disciplined, and

therefore posed no threat to persons or property."*"^

Washington believed their limited use by the end of 1777 had

demonstrated that the Germans deserted the American forces
1

Edward J. Lowell, The Hessians and the Other
German Auxiliaries of Great Britain in the Revolutionary War
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1884), pp. 282
300"]
Matthew H. Volm, The Hessian Prisoners in the A merican War
of Independence and their Life in Captivity Virginia
Pamphlets, vol. 13 (n.p., 1937), pp. 4, 7, 10.
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George Washington to the President of the
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1777 Burnett, LMCC
of V7ar to Horatio Gates, November 2
2:539-540; Ford, JCC, 10:203; 11:522-523; for discussion of
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just as easily as they had the British,
taking with them
their bounty as well as their equipment.

Early in 1778, Congress agreed to
the limited use
of Germans, primarily fighting as a
separate corps
on the

frontier, or as part of Pulaski's Partisan
Corps of Armand
Legion.
Later that year, at Washington's
suggestion,

'

Congress gave Pulaski and Armand great latitude
with respect
to the foreign deserters and prisoners of war
they
could

recruit for their respective corps.

But just as quickly

as they and other commanders enlisted German and
British

deserters and prisoners of war, they deserted.

This was

also true of many foreigners who were recruited to serve
in the state forces, often against the wishes of the
20

George Washington to George Baylor, June 19, 1777,
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2:87-8 8; George Washington to the Commi ttee~f rom~Fhe
Continental Congress, April 9, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washing ton, 11:230; George Washington to Casimer~PuTasFi
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Adrian C. Leiby, The Revolutionary War in the
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177 5-1783 (New Brunsv/ick: Rutgers Univer si ty~PresF, I96"2y7~
p. 265; Nathanael Greene to George Washington, February 28,
1781, Sparks, Corres pondence of the American Revolution,
3:247; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, January 1, 1781,
"Notes and Queries," PMHB 28, no. 2 (1904): 241.
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legislatures and military commanders

.

^

By 1780, Washington and other
military comi.anders
were willing to admit the experiment
of using foreigners
was not worth the expense and trouble.
Yet deserters and
prisoners of war were continually recruited
because of
military necessity.

Not much trust and faith was placed in
the Tories
who frequently, when captured, quickly joined
the patriot
forces rather than face summary punishment.
They were never
systematically recruited during the war, as it
became evident
very early in the war that Tories, forced into
American
arms,

deserted at the first opportunity, taking their bounty
with
them.

Yet many served, and proved to be as unruly as their
23

Abraham Ten Broeck to George Clinton, February 26,
1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:13;
George Clinton to Abraham Ten Broeck, March 9, 177 8, ibid.,
14; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 20,"'
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Council to the Recruitings Officers of Anne Arundel County,
January 3, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives, 43:48; Clark,
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Queries," PMHB 28, no. 2 (1904): 241.
25
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de la Luzerne to the President of the Continental Congress,
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Whig brothers. 26

Also not systematically
recruited were
criminals and vagabonds. But they were
used, often given
the choice of serving or being jailed.
Maryland, by mid
war, was giving pardons to criminals
who agreed to
serve

three years in the army, and South Carolina
forced many
convicted of being idle, lewd, or disorderly
persons into
the military.

27

So concerned about recruiting those they
believed

had no real stake in American society, the
revolutionary
leaders, at times, prohibited, or at least limited,
the use
of foreign born residents of America.
Early in
the war,

Massachusetts set the pattern by forbidding the enlistment
26,,
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of foreigners, unless they were
truly a settled resident
with a wife and fainily. Delaware,
New York and Virginia,
in 1776, ordered their recruiting
officers to only take i.en,
who by birth, or family connection,
or property, were tied
to the country. 29 Washington wanted
only natives for his
guard, and only natives, or foreigners
of approved fidelity
for the light dragoons.
Similarly, Greene imposed the
same
standards for his dragoons.
Despite these prohibitions,

many foreign born residents of America served
in the
revolutionary military forces. "^"^
Thus, despite all the attempts at limiting
the

"outside" influence in the army, the American military
forces were indeed a mixture of races and cultures.

What

was desired-mature domestic yeomen--did make up the
bulk of
the army surrounding Boston during the summer of 1775,
but

by the end of the year many of those had left the service

when their enlistments terminated.
29

Even those Americans

.

Lincoln, Journals of E ach Pr ovincial Congr ess of
Massachusetts p. 593; Delaw are Archi ves, 1:3T; CaTendar
of Histori cal Ma nuscripts, p. 11, Campbell, Orderly~Book, p. 33
,

30

George Washington to Alexander Spotswood, April 30,
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that were recruited beginning in 1776
began to include the
young, the old, and the lame.^^ ^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^^

complained to Washington that among the eighty
most recent
recruits arriving in the Highlands from
Massachusetts were

many old men, boys, Negroes, as well as two French
from
French frigate. "^^ Captain Webb's company of the

a

Fourth

Connecticut Regiment, in 1777, listed thirty-six of
its
fifty-seven men, with ages given, as being twenty or
younger.

34

The militia, which was supposed to be the back-

bone of American society, also suffered from

a

lack of

stable, responsible, and respected membership, especially
in the southern states.

General Lee described the militia as being composed
of the most idle, vicious and dissolute members of society.
32

Ibid., p. 499; "Diary of Ezekiel Price, 1775-1776,"
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Another officer called them a
"dangerous part of society.""
Even Stark, who successfully led
the militia,
reported they

were "such a set of poltroons" as
found no place else on
earth. 3 6 The militia indeed suffered
the same recruiting
problems as the army, often filling
out their ranks with

small boys and old men.^"^

Because both the army and the militia
were composed
of so many people who were either
"outsiders" to American
society or were barely a part of it, the Whigs
believed that
the officers would have to keep a close watch
on
the mili-

tary,

to keep them from becoming a threat to
life, liberty

and property.

"Without a good set of officers," Greene

wrote the Governor of Rhode Island, "the troops will
be
little better than a lawless Bandittie or an ungovernable
Mob."

The success of their cause, Governor Cooke was
told

by Greene,

"depends upon establishing

of Officers,"

38

a

good Core or Corps

Cooke and the other civilian leaders

Charles Lee to James Bowdoin, November 30, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 323-324; Samuel
Shaw to [John] Eliot, November 18, 1776, Quincy, Samuel
Shaw p. 27.
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36

John Stark to the President of the New Hampshire
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John Cray ford, The Penobscot Expedition: being an
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Revolutionary War (Orrington, Maine: C. and H. Publishing
Company, 1976), p. 11.
38

Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, October 11,
1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:313.

.

,

realized this, but the officer corps,
like the
commanded, left much to be desired, especially

inen

they

at the

company grade level.
The company grade officers were, for
the most part,
little different from the men they led. After
all, in most
instances, these officers had been elected by
the men
they

commanded.

From the first day Washington arrived at

Cambridge, he realized that most officers were not
born
leaders.

speaking
saw." 39

In fact, he reported, they were
.

.

.

"generally

the most indifferent kind of People

I

ever

It was not only of the New England officers he

complained, believing all the states were appointing officers "not fit to be Shoe Blacks," even his own Virginia/^

Knox agreed, believing the bulk of the officers
of ignorant,

'^a

parcel

stupid, men, who might make tolerable soldiers,

but bad officers."

41

Similar complaints were voiced both

within and without the army during the first three years
of the war.

42

If the quality and character of the

39
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,

4 0

George Washington to John Augustine Washington,
November 6, 1776, ibid., 6:246; George Washington to Jackie
Gust is January 22, 1777, ibid., 7:52.
,
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Drake
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Hnery Knox to William Knox, September 23, 1776,
Henry Knox pp 31-32
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John Adams to Joseph Hawley August 25 1776
Adams, Works of Joh n Adams 9:434; "Journal of a Campaign
in America by Du Rousseau de Fayolle," in Idzerda, Lafayette
,

,

,

359

Continental officer was complained of,
then that of the
militia officer was condemned. Washington

described the

militia officers, with few exceptions, "not
worth the bread
they eat. "^^
Like their men, the officers frequently
came and
went, as personal needs and desires dictated.

It was the

rare officer who always remained in camp to oversee
the

activities of his men.

Many officers, besides furloughing

themselves or resigning when things got rough, simply
deserted.

In one study of seven New York regiments it was

found that during the war at least 15 percent of the officers deserted.

44

Officers were also constantly in trouble,

just like their men.

A study of some fifteen hundred

offenses committed which were penalized by court martials
reveals that 30 percent were committed by officers and

non-commissioned officers. 4 5

They frequently demonstrated

in the Age of th e America n Revolution,

1:71, 72; Samuel

Patterson to George Read, September 19, 1776, William
Gustavus Whiteley, The Revolutiona ry Soldiers of Delaware,
p.

18.
43

George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30,
1776, Fitzpatrick, VJriting s o f Washing ton, 6:138-139; see
also Alexander McDougall to John Jay, October 20, 1775,
Morris, John Jay p. 174; David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of
Maryland De mocracy 1753-1776 pp. 162-165.
,

,

44

Allen BovOTian, The M orale of the American
Revolutionary Army, p. 72.
Ibid.,

116n.21.

.

,

3G0

insubordination, and were often unruly/^
Often such conduct was the result of
drink, which
was not limited to just the company
grade officers/^

Lord

Stirling, William Maxv/ell, Henry Babcock
and Adam Stephen
had drinking problems, the latter being
dismissed from

service as a result.

4 R

Officers were also frequently

involved, because of drink, or greed, or low pay, in
plundering, taking financial advantage of their men,
or

involving themselves in questionable and fraudulent
schemes

49

46

Edward D. Seeber, trans.. On t h e Threshold of
Liberty: Journal of a Frenchman's Tour of the Ame rica"n~"
Colonies in 1777 p. 97; Philip Schuyler to John Hanco'ck
July 11, 1775, Force, American A rchives 4th ser., 2:1646;
Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 13, [1775], "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872): 216; "Journal Kept
During an Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer Elmer,
Lieutenant in the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in
the Continental Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias Dayton.
Printed from the Original Manuscript," PNJHS 2, no. 4
,
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,

(1847)

:

176

.

47

Ibid., 3, no. 2 (1848): 92; Charles Carroll of
Carrollton to George Washington, September 27, 1777,
Rowland, Charles Carroll of Carrollton Papers 1:218;
Scheer, Private Yankee Doodle pp. 146-147.
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,

48

Alan Valentine, Lord Stirling pp. 275-277;
General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Order ly Book
pp. 104-105, 106, 117-118, 135-136; Dexter, L iterary Diary
of Ezra Stile s, 2:9; Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll i n
the American Revolution p. 204.
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John Taylor to Edmund Pendleton, April 13, 1777,
Stewart, William Woodford 2:756; Alexander Hamilton to
George Clinton, December 22, 1777, Syrett, Papers of
Alexander Hamilton 1:368; George Clinton to Alexander
Hamilton, December 28, 1777, ibid., 371; Regimental Orders,
Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 677-678.
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The soldiers they cominanded
certainly were more
unruly and undisciplined, especially
early in the war. A
surgeon aboard a British warship anchored
in Boston harbor
wrote late in May 1775 that the An^erican
army was a "Rabble,

without order, subjection, discipline, or
cleanliness," and
predicted in three months' time they would
dissolve as a
unified fighting force.
Similarly, Benjamin
Thompson

observed in Boston on November

1775, about the lack of

4,

discipline in the American army, observing "the
doctrines
of independence and levellism have been so effectually
sown

throughout the country, and so universally imbibed by all
ranks of men, that

I

apprehend it will be with the greatest

difficulty that the inferior officers and soldiers will be
ever brought to any tolerable degree of subjection to the

commands of their superiors." 51
with these observations.

New-England troops are the
soldiers."
lamented,

American officers agreed

General Montgomery believed "The
v/orst stuff imaginable,

for

"There is such an equality among them," he
"that the officers have no authority ."

Schuyler,

during July 1775, informed VJashington that with respect to
50

Letter dated May 26, 1775, in Farley s Bristol
Journal of July 8, 1775, cited in Margaret Wheeler Willard,
Lett ers on the Americ an Revolution 1774-1776, p. 120.
51
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the New England troops,

"it is extremely difficult to

introduce a proper subordination amongest
so little distinction is kept up."

people where

a

So frustrated did

Schuyler become that by November he wanted to retire from
service, believing he v/ould never be able to discipline
the

soldiers under his command.

53

These problems were not only

encountered by the New York generals already cited.

Many

officers expressed contempt for the New Englanders,

generally believing them too radical and independent in their
thoughts, beliefs, and actions, and certainly too excessive

m

their equality. 54

As Joseph Reed told his wife, it was

impossible to introduce discipline where the principles of

democracy so universal ly prevail

,

"where so great an

53
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equality and so thorough

a levelling

spirit predominates

^5

In many respects the New England
soldiers at the

beginning of the war were indeed an
ungovernable mob, doing
pretty much as they pleased, causing displeasure
to
the

officers that commanded them, particularly those
of the
middle colonies, but also to the soldiers of the
other

colonies that served with them.

At the beginning of the

war Benjamin Thompson predicted the American forces
would

never be united due to the fact that there existed
great

jealousies between the troops of the different colonies and

would only get worse the more they came in contact with one
another.

These sectional differences did exist, and

frequently manifested themselves in fighting between the
troops of the different sections. ^"^

Fights also took place

55
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between Continental soldiers and the militia.
The southern troops were oftentimes as
guilty, if
not more so as the war progressed, of being
unruly and

undisciplined.

One company of Virginia backwoodsmen under

the command of Captain George Gibson were so rowdy
they were

satirically called "Gibson's Lambs. "^^

Several months after

taking command of the southern army, Greene reported that
his army was "so addicted to plundering that they v;ere

terror to the Country. "^^

a

Indeed they were, as will be

discussed later in this chapter.

But if the Continental

soldiers V7ere unruly, undisciplined, and at times

a

terror

to the country, as well as to each other, then the militia

were even more so.

Late in the war,

a

young Pennsylvania officer

serving in North Carolina complained that the militia in

Christopher Marshall, p. 213.
58

May 25,

Ibid., pp. 275-276; William Atlee to Joseph Reed,
1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives 1st ser
9:170.
,

.

,
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Resolutions adopted by Officers at Williamsburg,
Virginia, July 18, 1775, "Papers, Military and Political,
1775-1778, of George Gilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,' Albemarle
"
VHSC, new ser., 6:92; John T. Goolrick, The
County, Va
Lif e of General Hugh Mercer (Nev; York: Neale Publishing
Company, 1906), pp. 44-45.
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2:531.
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that state were under no control.

unique to the south.

This complaint was not

Referring to the militia at White-

marsh late in 1777, one observer noted
"There is no more
regulation among what I have seen of them,
than

Bullocks."

a

flock of

From the falls of the Ohio, another
reported

the militia was under no subordination,
where "every man
61^

Enos Reeves to ?, March 13, 1782, John B.
Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves
Reeves
of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 3 (1897):
386.
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George Washington to Lund Washinqton, September 30, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6:138; George Washington to Robert Morris, March 2, 1777, ibid., 7:222; Samuel H.
Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, February 27, 1779, Kail,
Samue l Holden Parson s, p. 219; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot,
November 18, 1776, Quincy, Samuel Shaw, p. 27; Benjamin
Lincoln to Elbridge Gerry, March 14, 1777, Austin, Elbridge
Gerry 1:260; William R. Davie to Richard Caswell, AugirsF^9
1780, Blackwell P. Robinson, William R. Davie, p. 64; Thomas
Conway to the President of the P'ennsylvania Supreme Executive Council, August 17, 1777, Hazard, Pennsy lvania Archives
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seems to do that which he thinks
best."

The militia indeed

did what they thought best, often
against the desires of
their officers.
"with the militia," Greene wrote,
"everybody is a general." when called on to
explain his accounts,

Richard Peters who commanded

a

company of Philadelphia

Associators, was asked how many men he commanded,
stated
"Not one."
The paymaster immediately queried

him as to his

large expense account if he commanded no

m,en

.

Peters

explained that he indeed commanded not one, "but

I

am com-

manded by ninety."
The militia constantly demonstrated that they
would

only be commanded by those that they selected, and would
only obey such orders as they thought proper to their best
interests.

64

Both the Pennsylvania and Maryland militia

made it perfectly clear they did not desire to be commanded
by anybody they had not chosen and would not follow any that
63

Samuel Hay to William Irvine, November 14, 1777,
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their legislative bodies selected
for them.^^

So frustrating

was it for one Maryland militia
officer to command a company,
that he resigned, preferring to stand
in the ranks as a
common soldier.
The thing about the militia that
most
upset military commanders v;as that they
came and went as
they pleased, including the officers.
Washington complained,
"they come, you scarce tell how, they go,
you hardly know
67
when."
In all, not counting drafts who never
joined the
army, one scholar has estimated that at least
half of the

militia enrolled during the war deserted.
With such military forces as these it is easy to
understand why America had few successes the first three
years of the war.

Most of the failures were attributed to

the lack of discipline both in the field and in camp.

This

lack of discipline greatly concerned both the civilian and

military leaders for without it, not only would military
^^Richard Barnes to Thomas Jefferson, December 20,
Ronald Hoffman, A_Spirit_of jDi s_sensj.on _j:con
1777
Poli tics and tlie_^e volution _Tn_ Maryland (BaltimoreT" Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 205; Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, pp. 8 8-8 9; Charles S. Smith
to [Matthew] Tilghman, September 9, 1776, Browne, Maryland
Archives 12:262-263; Thomas Wright to the Maryland~CouncTl
of Safety, September 20, 1776, ibid., 288-289.
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1776, ibid., 262-263.
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Allen Bo\\Tnan, The M orale o f the Am erican
Revolutionary Army, p. 70.
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success be impossible, but it was necessary
to prevent
domestic anarchy and military tyranny.
This concern about
discipline was a carry-over belief from the
pre-war days,
when the colonists were urged to moderate
their protest by
using legitimate, constitutional, and peaceful
methods.

Thus, during the first months of the war,
discipline was

called for in the army by individuals, colonial
legislative
bodies and Congress. 6 9 So important was discipline

considered by Congress that they informed the army they
would "consider activity and success, in introducing discipline into the army, among the best recommendations for

promotion."

That was an idea that Congress thought might

improve discipline in 1776.

During 1777, Congress continu-

ally attempted to come up with other ideas that would

promote discipline, some of which will be discussed later
in this chapter.

"^^
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Butterfield, AFC 1:218; Address by George Gilmer in Albemarle, Virginia, 1775, "Papers, Military and Political,
1775-1778, of George Gilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,' Albemarle
"
County, Va
VHSC new ser., 6:128; Minut es of the Provincia l Congress and the Council of Saf e ty of Ehi~sFate~oT~New
Jersey p. 353 Berthold Fernow, ed
New '!^r k~in~the'"Revo^
lution p. 11; "Journal of the Council of Safety~for The
Province of South Carolina, 1775," SCHSC, 2 (1858): 38; John
Hancock to Philip Schuyler, October 11, 1775, Burnett, LMCC,
,

,

.

,

,

,

;

.

,

'

,

1:228; Ford, JCC, 2:96.

^^Ibid., 5:784; 794; 7:193, 259, 274; Edward
Rutledge to Robert R. Livingston, August 19, 1776, Burnett,
LMCC, 2:55; John Hancock to Philip Schuyler, September 27,
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Individual members of Congress
constantly urged the
necessity of discipline. We "will stand
or fall," John
Adams told Heath, according to how the
army
"adheres to or

deviates from the same discipline," referring
to that of
the Roman legions and British regulars.
So concerned about
discipline, he wrote the Judge Advocate of the
Army that
"Every officer ought to be hanged, who does not
discipline
his Men every day.""^^
the fall of 1775

,

Thomas Lynch told Washington during

shortly after the articles of war had been

adopted, that he should enforce them with vigor, with the
full support of his friends in Congress.

Washington, from his previous plantation and

military experience, was
of discipline.

a

devout believer in the necessity

During the Seven Years War, he wrote

"Discipline is the soul of an army.

It makes small numbers

formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to
all."

Twenty years later, in approving

a

court martial

sentence at Valley Forge, he stated "exact discipline and
,

71

John Adams to William Heath, August 3, 1776, MHSC,
7th ser
4:14; John Adams to William Tudor, March 11
1777
William Tudor Papers, MHS; see also John Adams to Henry
Knox, August 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:61; John Adams to
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the strictest obedience to orders
is the Soul of an Army."^^
Upon taking comi^and of the army in
July 1775, he emphasized
the need for exact discipline being
adhered to, stating

without discipline the army would become
the scene of disorder and confusion. Again on January
1,

1776,

in the first

general orders of the new Continental Army
he warned "an
Army without Order, Regularity, and Discipline,
is no better
than a Commission'd mob."
"it is Subordination and Discipline (the Life and Soul of an Army) which next
under

providence," he stressed,

"is to make us formidable to our

enemies, honorable in ourselves, and respected in
the

world."

74

These themes he constantly reminded the officers

and soldiers. 7 5

His subordinates reminded their men as well. 76

73

General Instructions to Captains of all Companies,
July 29 1757 Fitzpatrick, Writin gs of VJash ing ton , 2:114;
General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Book, p. 206
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General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
~
Washi ngton, 3:309, 354-355; 4:202, 202-203.
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General Orders, ibid., 355, 525-526; 18:214-215;
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George Washington to John Stark, June 25, 1781, ibid., 22:
264; George Washington to Charles Armand-Tuf f in November 1,
1781, ibid., 23:318; George Washington to Benedict Arnold,
June 19, 1778, ibid., 12:94-95; George Washington to
Coggeshall Olney or Officer Commanding the Rhode Island
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Washington knew that simply
encouraging discipline
would not prevent the army from
becoming a
terror to the

people they were meant to protect.

"A people unused to

restraint must be led," he wrote Lord
Stirling, for "they
will not be drove, even those who
are ingaged

for the War,

must be disciplined by degrees. "^^

Part of the process of

leading them, it was generally agreed,
was improving the
officer corps and extending the terms of
enlistments, which
will be discussed later in this chapter,
but even more
importantly Washington and most other Whig
leaders believed
that religion and discipline went hand in hand,
with
one

contributing to the other.

Although the fervor of the Great Awakening had
played itself out by 1775, still the American Revolution,
the mental process, was partly a movement permeated with
a

Present State of the ARMY: addressed to the military " by
"A LIEUTENANT COLONEL," The New- Jersey Gazette, December
24,
1777; Henry Knox to [Henry] Jackson, April 277 1777, Revolutionary War Letter Collection, no. 9, BPL; George Clinton
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religious conviction that God was
actively involved in the
welfare of America.
As was discussed earlier,
Americans
believed that God would only protect
them so long
as they

were virtuous and .oral.

This was constantly stressed
by

the revolutionary leaders.

morality and

"The importance of religion
and

devout acknowledgement of the
government of
the heaven, to the support of order
and government
a

among

men, and the liberty,

safety and happiness of society,"

was, according to Jonas Clark in

a

1781 election sermon,

"what reason teaches, and what common
sense, as well as
universal practice of mankind, in all ages and
nations,

concurs to confirm."

"m

a

word," according to Clark,

"religion among a people, in its power, purity
and governing
influence, is the guardian of liberty, the strength
of

government, the energy of laws, the band of society,
and

both glory and defence of the state,"
wrote that "Statesmen

.

.

.

Similarly, John Adams

may plan and speculate for

liberty, but it is Religion and Morality alone, which can

establish the Principles upon which Freedom can securly
stand.

79
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General Washington certainly shared these beliefs.
Throughout his public career he regarded organized
religion
as an important stabilizing force and saw the
church as the

bulwark of American social and political order.

These

beliefs, acquired early in his life, were greatly reinforced
as he grew older,

church woman

.

Thus,

^

particularly after his marriage to

devout

a

^

from the beginning of the war, Washington

stressed the need for religion in the army, and the necessity
that his army be virtuous and moral.

performing the duties of good Citizens
the army at Valley Forge,

"tVhile we are
&

zealously

Soldiers," he told

"we certainly ought not to be

inattentive to the higher duties of Religion.

To the

distinguish d Character of Patriot, it Should be our highest
'

Glory, to add the more distinguish d Character of Christians."
'

Earlier he had told the army of his hopes "that every officer
and man, will endeavour so to live, and act, as becomes a

Zabdiel Adams, June 21, 1776, Butterfield, AFC

,

2:21.

80

Paul F. Boiler, Jr., Geor g e VJas hington & Religion
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 19631, pp. vii,
3-2 3, 29, 44-46; W. E. Woodward, George Washingt on: The
Image and th e Man (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926)
p. 14 2; VJilliam J. Johnson, George Wa s hington the Christian
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1919), passim; John C. Fitzpatrick,
"Washington as a Religious Man," Pamphlet no. 5 in Albert
Honor t o George Washington and Reading
Bushneli Hart, ed
About George Washing toil (Washington, D.C.: United States
George^W ashing ton Bicentennial Commission, 1932), p. 46.
,
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Christian Soldier defending the
dearest Rights and Liberties
of his country.
It is not surprising then to
find Washington order-

ing that Congressional days of fasting,
prayer, and

humiliation be strictly observed by the
army.

Nor is it

surprising to find him constantly ordering
soldiers to attend
divine services. 8 2 He also was concerned
about the role of
the chaplains of his army, hoping by their
conduct and their

exhaltations they would guide the soldiers in
morality and
lead them to discipline.
Chaplains, however, were never plentiful.

It has

been estimated that less than half the regiments had

chaplains during 1775, and by January 1776, there were only
nine in Continental service.

During 1778, the army employed

twenty-tv;o chaplains, and probably that same number were

with the army during the latter stages of the war.^^

Despite

8

General Orders, Pennypacker, Valle y Forge Orderly
Book, p. 303 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 5:245.
",

;
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General Orders, ibid., 3:403; 4:369; 9:275; 11:252;
Circular to the Brigadier Generals, May 26, 1777, ibid.,
8:127; Journal of Ammi R. Robbins, Theron Wilmot Crissey,
History of Norfolk Litchfield County, Connect icut 1744-1900
(Everett, Massachusetts Massachusetts Publishing Company,
1900), pp. 98, 100, 112; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of
Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army.
With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser
7
(1899, 1900): 182, 192,
207-208, 210, 212.
:

.

83

Revolution
2:319.

J.
,

,

Headley, The Chaplains and Clergy of the
pp. 62-63; Dexter, Literar y Diary o f Ezra Stil es,
T.

'

~
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their small number, these ministers
who served as chaplains,
as well as officers of the Line,
did have some success in
encouraging discipline and moral conduct.
iMany

ministers, such as Enoch Poor, James
Hall, John
Peter Muhlenberg, and David Avery, served
in the army in a
military capacity. Others, such as James
Caldwell, shouldered weapons as common soldiers, or like
Thomas Allen and
Caldwell, exhorted men on, or on to, the
battlefield.^^
It was not, however,

in their military capacity

that Washington and the other Whig leaders hoped
the clergy

would have great influence.

It was in their ability to

exert a moral influence over the army that was greatly

desired and considered essential, for as Philips Payson
of
Chelsea, Massachusetts, stated in a May 1778 election sermon,
"The fear and reverence of God, and the terrors of eternity,

are the most powerful restraints upon the minds of men."^^
84

Ellis Ames, "Death of General Poor in the American
Revolution," PMHS 18 (1880-1881): 435-436; J. T. Headley,
The Chaplains and Clergy of the Revolution, pp. 68-69, 72-73,
149-150, 212, 222, 227, 234-236, 246-248, 298-299; Nicholas
Murray, "A Memoir of the Rev. James Caldwell, of Elizabethtown," PNJHS 3, no. 2 (1848): 82; Johnston, Yale and Her
Honor-Roll in the TVmerican Revolution pp. 222-22 3, 241;
Foote, Sketches of North Carolina pp. 322-325, 326-327;
Edward E. Hocker, The Fighting Parson of the American
Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg
Lutheran Clergyman, Military Chieftain and Political Leader,
,

,

pp.

52,

59-62.
85

Cited in John Wingate The Pulpit of the Aineric an
Revolution or, The Political Sermons of the Period of 1776~
with a Historical Introdu^t ion Notes and Illustrations
(Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1860), p. 339.
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Congress, Washington, and others
hoped the ministers
would help remind the soldiers of
the goodness of the
revolutionary cause, the necessity for
discipline despite
hardships, and the desirability for
morality at all times.

Many ministers complied with these
desires, frequently
preaching sermons reminding the men of their
patriotic and
moral duties and obligations. As John Hart
told the Virginia
soldiers in 1777, that in order to "enjoy
our property
in

security, we must stand firm to the cause of
liberty and
public virtue 8 7
.
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Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 2, 1777
Bernhard Knollenberg, "The Revolutionary Correspondence
of
Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942)50; John Adams to Nathanael Greene, May 9, 1777, ibid
54-'
Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler, August 27, 1779, MHSc'
7th
ser., 2 428-429 Ford, JCC, 4:61; 5 522; General OFd^s
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 3:355; 5:211.
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cited in Frank Moore, ed.. The Patriot Preachers
of the American Revolution with Biographical Sketches (New
York: Charles T. Evans, 1862), p. 148; see also Journal of
Josiah Atkins in Joseph Anderson, ed.. The Town and City of
Waterbury, Connecticut, From the Aboriginal Period to the
Year Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-Five 3 voli^ (New Haven:
Price and Lee Company, 1896), 1:472; Henry Woodman, The
History of Valley Forge: With a Biography of the Author and
the Author's Father who was a Soldier with Washington at
Valley Forge During the Winters of 1777 and 1778 (Oaks,
Pennsylvania: John U. Francis, Sr., 1920), pp. 64-65;
Journals of Simeon Lyman and Benjamin Trumbull, "Orderly
Books and Journals Kept by Connecticut Men While Taking
Part in the American Revolution 1775-1778," CHSC, 7 (1899):
121, 124, 207; Appleton Morgan, [ed.], "The Diary of Colonel
Elisha Porter of Hadley, Massachusetts Touching His March to
the Relief of the Continental Forces Before Quebec," MAH 30,
no. 3 (September 1893): 201; William B. Weeden, ed.
"^^ary
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Washington also involved himself and the other
officers in encouraging the soldiers to discourage vice in
every shape.

"Purity of Morals," Washington told the army

in his general orders, was "the only sure foundation of

publick happiness in any Country and highly conducive to
order, subordination and success in an Army."

Orders of a

similar nature were constantly issued by Washington and

other officers.

88

Despite these encouragements to maintain

a

high

moral character, the conduct of the army was generally less
than desired during the first several years of the war.

The soldiers frequently spent their days, including Sundays,
gaining,

drinking, cursing, and generally being unruly and

rowdy.

James Warren described the American army occupying

Boston during April 1776 as "the most undisciplined, profligate Crew that ever were Collected."
of the army in Canada,

Similar descriptions

in the Southern Department, on the

frontier and in New York City and State were made.
^^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, \^tings_o_f WasM^
Generals, May 26,
ton 13-118-119; Circular to the Brigadier
Woodford,
ibid., 8:127; George Washington to William
1777
of
November 10, 1775, ibid., 4:80; Regimental Orders
Colonel
Nathaniel Wade, "Orderly Book of Capt. Simeon Brown
HCEI bb, no.
Wade's Regiment, Rliode Island Campaign, 1778
,

3

(July 1922)

:

252

1776,
^^James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, April 15,
Henry Knox to
Gardiner, Warren-Gerr y Corresp ondence, p. 17;
42;
Tucv Knox, "May 20, 17"7 7, Drake, Henry_Knox, p.
a Physician on the
Frederick R. Kirkiand, [ed.], "Jo-^fnal of no.
(October
Expedition Against Canada, 177 6,- PMHB 59, Adams,4 May 28,
John
1935)- 347, 352; Nathanael Greene to
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of having an undisciplined army
was numerous military
defeats, and very few victories. ^1
An additional and
unwelcomed result was the destruction
of property and the
specter of domestic anarchy.
Edmund Burke told Parliament
in a speech during 1790 that
"An armed, disciplined body
is,
in its essence, dangerous to liberty;
undisciplined, it is

ruinous to society." 9 ?
shared this opinion.

American Whigs during the mid
1770s
They did not want their revolutionary

war to be lost on the battlefield, nor did
they want it to
become the source for domestic turmoil and
tyranny.
By the end of 1777, many Whigs were
therefore

expressing their concern about the direction the war
was
taking.

The Philadelphia campaign had resulted in
the loss

of that city; the army was foraging for itself, seemingly

under no control; and though victories had been achieved
in
the north, still no word had come from Europe regarding
a

Paul David Nelson, General Koratio Gates: A Biography
p. 179; John Hancock to Horatio Gates, February 23, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC 2:273; "Journal of a Campaign in America by
Du Rousseau de Fayolle," in Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of
the American Revolution
1:72; General Orders, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 5:32; George Washington to Charles
Armand-Tuf fin, September 2, 1777, ibid., 9:167; George
Washington to Robert Morris, March 2, 1777, ibid., 7:222.
,

,

,

,
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George Washington to John Sullivan, June 16, 1777,
ibid., 6:148-149; Cotton Tufts to John Adams, September 18,
1777, Butterfield, AFC, 2:346.
92

Cited in Michael Howard, ed., Soldiers and
Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations
(London: Eyre and Spottisv/oode
1957)
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French alliance.

Many Whigs, including members of the

military establishment and Congress, placed

a

large share

of the blame for the sad state of the army on Washington,

believing his Fabian strategy was not working nor that he

sufficiently disciplined his army.^"^

Many Whigs, however,

believed the lack of discipline in the army and the numerous

military setbacks

were not completely Washington's fault;

the blame should rather be placed on the whole officer

corps

94

The officer corps, for the most part, possessed
little real military experience nor the professional back-

ground to make them good military disciplinarians.

During

the summer of 1775, one Connecticut officer complained that

many officers, who passed for agreeable, clever men in
civilian life, made indifferent figures in the military,
having "no Idea of the Discipline and Government which are

absolutely necessary among military Men."

Another officer

Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 21,
Butterfield, Lett e rs o f Benjamin Rush 1:159-160.

17 77,

,

94

Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, June 28, 1775,
Showman, Papers of General Natha nael Greene 1:92-93; Same
to [same?], September 28, 1776, ibid., 304; John Trumbull to
Jonathan Trumbull, July 12, 1776, John Trumbull, Aut obiography. Reminisce nces and Letters of John Trumbull, from 1756
to 1841, p^ 304; John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 3, 1776,
Butterfield AFC, 2:6; John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons,
August 19, 17 767 Adams, VJork s of John Adams 9:431; Charles
"The Charles Lee
Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 137 [1775]
Paoers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 216; William Smallwood to the
], 1776, Browne, Maryla nd
Maryland Council October
Archives, 12:363.
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complained to Washington that year the
officers, for the
most part, "totally ignorant in military
"^^
affairs.

Washington found this to be true during
the siege of Boston,
learning that his New England officers
were not used to
handling large bodies of men, being primarily
farmers with
little or no leadership experience. He learned
very quickly
that besides being unable to give orders, few
of his
offi-

cers were willing to obey them.

A month after arriving at

Cambridge, he wrote Lund Washington that the "Men
would
fight very

v^ell

(if

properly Officered) although they are

an exceeding dirty and nasty people. "^^

But the army was,

as we have seen, not properly officered.

During the fall

of 1776, William Ellery told the Governor of Rhode Island

that "the officers of the army in general are not equal to

their appointments, and from hence it is that our soldiery
is disorderly and undisciplined."^"^

under such criticism.

98

The generals also came

So did the militia officers, who

95

Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington,
September 8, 1775, "Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 236;
Jacob Morris to George Washington, n.d., cited in North
Callahan Daniel Mor g an: Ranger of t he Revolution p 121
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George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3 :433
.
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William Ellery to Nicholas Cooke, October 5, 1776,
Rho de I sland in the Continental Congress p 89
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Gouverneur Morris to the President of the New York
Council, July 16, 1777, Hastings, Public P apers of George
Clinton, 2:115-117; Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 1,
Butter field Letters of Ben j ami n Rush 1 157 Same to
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Washington stated, with few exceptions,
were not "worth the
bread they eat.""
^^^^^ ^^^^^^
time disciplining their men, and
were, as discussed earlier,
under little discipline themselves,
coming and ooing as they
pleased
Washington and other commanding
officers, realizing
that much depended upon the officers
disciplining themselves
and their men, began very early in the
war to suggest and
implement methods by which the officers would
become more
disciplined, and therefore better leaders. From
the beginning of the war it was obvious to Washington
and others that
many company grade officers, in part because they
had been
selected by the men they commanded, were not strict
disciplinarians, often showing great familiarity with their
men,
as well as giving in to their every indulgence
99

George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30,
1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings_of Washington ,' 6 138-139
:
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William
Duer to George Clinton, January 29, 1777,
Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:565; George
Slaughter to Thomas Jefferson, January 19, 1781, Boyd,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 4:410; Samuel Hay to William
Irvine, November 14, 1777, "Replies," HM 3 no. 9 (September
1859): 284; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, February 27, 1779, Hall, Samue l H olden Parsons p. 219; Robert
Levers to Joseph Reed, August 23, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania
Archives 2d ser
3:523.
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Glover to the President of the South
Carolina Council of Safety, Henry Laurens, September 22,
1775, A. S. Salley, Jr., ed
"Papers of the First Council
of Safety of the Revolutionary Party in South Carolina,
June-November, 1775," SCHGM 2, no. 1 (January 1901): 4;
Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, June 18, 1777, Butterfield,
Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:150; Elbridge Gerry to James
'"^'"Joseph

.
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Washington, most southern officers, and many
New York
officers, early in the war expressed their
disapproval of
the levelling influences existing in the
army, believing

they greatly accounted for the lack of discipline
in the
army.

102

Although attempts were made to change the officer

selection process, they met with little success.

Thus,

it

was realized that if qualified officers could not be imme-

diately had, at least the unqualified ones could be gotten
rid of as quickly as their actions warranted.

Within two weeks of his arrival at Cambridge,
Washington began arresting and discharging officers for
improper conduct.

During the next several years numerous

officers were cashiered for many offenses, primarily for

conduct unbecoming a gentleman and for being absent without
leave

"'"'^"^
.

While the army was encamped at Valley Forge,

VJarren, October 6, 177 7, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 8 6; John Adams to Joseph Hawley, August 25, 1776

Adams, Works of John Adams 9:434-435; Nathanael Greene to
Jacob Greene, June 28, 1775, Showman, Papers of General
Nathana el Greene 1:92-93; Thacher, Milit ary Journ al of the
Ame ric an Revolution pp. 68-69; Edward Hand to George
Washington, August
], 1776, Linn, Pennsylvania in the
War of the Revolution, 1:305; George Washington to Richard
Henry Lee, August 2 97 1775, Fitzpatrick, VJritings of Washing
ton, 3:450-451; George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 21, 1775, ibid., 508.
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John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, June 18, 1775,
Adams, Works of John Adams 9:358; Graydon, Memoirs p. 149.
,

10 3

,

George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20,
1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washi ngton, 3:433, General
Orders, ibid., 5:343-344, 141; "Orderly Book of Gen. John
Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB
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Washington used the lull to cashier many
officers, being
told by Hamilton that without putting a
stop to

the numerous

abuses by the officers to the military
constitution, it
would "be impossible to establish any order
or discipline
among the troops. "^^^ Cashiering of officers
did not cease

after the Valley Forge campaign, as many officers
were dis-

charged throughout the remainder of the

war."^*^^

Washington and the other commanding officers
realized that discipline in the officer corps v;ould only
be achieved with time; time for the officers to learn their
trade.

To ensure this happened, Washington and his generals

set about to stop officers from being constantly furloughed
or from furloughing themselves.

Early in the war, many good

officers spent as much time at home as they did in the field.
To put a stop to this, Washington, by mid war, was requiring
34,

no.

Putnam

,

(1910): 347; Ford, General Orders Issued by Isr ael
pp. 49-50, 66-67.
3
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Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [prior
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Book pp. 22 3-224 235 Whiting, Revolutio na r-y Orders of
Gen e ral W a shing ton, pp. 30, 84, 86; "Revolutionary ~ Army
Orders for the Main Army Under Washinqton [1778-1779]," VMHB
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Journal of Willi a m Feltman
pp. 2 69, 301, 630-631; [Feltman]
p. 19; Bray, Diary of a Commton Soldier, p. 169.
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each regiment to have a certain number of officers
present
at all times, particularly during each winter encampment

Just keeping the good officers in the army
enough.

v;as

.

"^^^

not

Training and attention to personal character were

considered necessary for the American officer corps to be
truly effective.

With respect to personal character,

Washington attempted to instill in the officer corps the
necessity of appearing and acting as officers and gentlemen,

appreciating their commissions, and realizing their leadership responsibility.

From the beginning of the war, Washington attempted
to make the officers more conscious of their character and

appearance.

With respect to the former, besides encouraging

observance of religious duties and discouraging vices,

Washington encouraged the creation of and participation in,
Masonic lodges, believing they were character building institutions, as well as being stabilizing and socializing forces.

General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writi ngs of
Washington 13:196-197; George Washington to Israel Putnam,
November 27 1778, ibid., 342 George VJashington to VJilliam
Heath, November 16, 1779, ibid., 17:113; George Washington
to the Major Generals and Officers Commanding Brigades,
January 22, 1780, ibid., 426; Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of
Aaron Burr_^ Wi th Miscellaneous Selections from Hi s
Correspondence, 1:112; "Memoir by the Chevalier Dubuysson,"
crted~TrrTdzerda La^aygtte _in_ the Age of the Amer ican
Revolution, 1:81; Baron von Steuben to Nathanael Greene,
May~r57TT81, Kapp, Steuben, p. 4 29; Anthony Wayne to [James]
Bowdoin and Council of Massachusetts, March 25, 1777, Smith,
The St. Clair Papers, 1:388-389.
,

;

,

,
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The first military lodge, St. John's
Regimental Lodge, was
established during July 1775 by the New York
officers.
By
war's end, ten traveling lodges were
established.
Washington, who had joined the Masons in 1752,
actively participated
in their meetings, setting an example many
officers
followed.

As for personal appearance, Washington attempted

to make the officers' appearance distinct from their
soldiers,

first by having them wear different colored ribbons and
cockades, and later by distinctive uniforms.

And to ensure they

had the necessary funds for their personal upkeep, as well as
to make their commissions more desirable, Washington got

Congress early in the war to raise their wages significantly

higher than had originally been authorized

"""^^
.

Training was seen as an absolute necessity to bring
about discipline in the officer corps.
107

Many military and
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Colonies (New York: Macoy Publishing and Masonic Supply
Company, 1929), pp. 202-222; Sidney Hayden, Washington and
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Publishers," 1866), pp. 21
42-45
73-74 Bernard Fay,
52
Revol ut ion a nd Fre emason r y 1680-1800 (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1935), pp. 245-250; William B. Weeden, ed.,
"Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary
Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser
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Graydon, Memoirs p. 147; General Orders, Orderly
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in the War of the Revolution, 2:379; Louis Clinton Match,
The Administration of the Amer ican R evolu tionar y Army, p. 14;
Fitzpatrick, Spirit of the'~Revolut ion pp 117-138 George
Washington to^he"President of the Continental Congress,
September 21 1775 Fitzpatrick Writings of Washington,
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civilian leaders during the sumi^er of
1776 began lobbying
for a formal military academy, believing
it would give the
necessary training needed if the war was
long lasting.
That
fall. Congress debated the possibility
of establishing
an

academy, but no formal plans were made,
most likely because
Washington's victories at Princeton and Trenton
convinced

many that Great Britain would peacefully end
the war, and
probably because of the fear of establishing a
professional
military class. "'"'^^
Although an academy was not established,

training

a

regiment was, which Congress authorized during 1777.

This

regiment, the Invalid Regiment, was primarily assigned

garrison duties.

But until it was disbanded during the

spring of 1783, it also served as an officer training
school

^

Two other units, though not formally established

for that purpose, also provided effective training and

produced many disciplined officers.

The first was the

Delaware Regiment, which was well-trained by Thomas Holland,
a former British army captain, who served as its adjutant.

The second

v\'as

the Kentish Guards,

formed during the winter
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Nicola to Anthony Wayne, March 19 1779
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of 1774-1775 in East Greenwich, Rhode
Island, and comi.anded
by James Mitchell Varnum.
it was well-schooled
in the

military arts by William Johnson,

a

British deserter.

This

unit provided over thirty Continental officers,
including

Nathanael

Greene."'""'""^

Although the American forces did not have

a v/ealth

of military talent to call upon when the war began,
and

although many qualified officers, such as Montgomery,
Thomas,
Mercer, Hitchcock, and Haslet,

were killed or died the first

years of the war, America did have a sufficient number to

provide adequate leadership and discipline.

Eleven of the

first thirteen Continental generals appointed had prior

military experience, and of seventy-three brigadier generals
commissioned during the war, sixteen had held European commissions, and all but twenty-one had prior military

experience
It was not just the generals who were experienced

in the field of Mars.

All but

tv/o

of the first Virginia

regimental commanders had prior military experience, mainly

gained during the Seven Years War.

Many field grade offi-

cers had served in European armies, including Colonels
Ward, The Delaware Continentals
1776-1783, pp. 7, 240; Fletcher PratF7'~FrGvern3enefars
Studies in American Command_ (New York: William Sloane
Associ at e s","r9 4 9')"7"p ~4 7 ^Thay e r Nat hanael Greene, pp 4 4,
"'""'""'"Christopher

•

49.

L.

,

.
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Lutterloh, Febiger, and Beauman.l^^
also joined the

^^^^^

^^^^.^^ officers

arr.y,

including Lafayette, DeKalb,
DuCoudray,
Conway, Steuben, Duportail, DeBorre,
DeFermoy, Pulaski,
Armand, Fleury, L'Enfant, and Kosciuszko.
It was hoped early in the war that,
with time,

America's citizen soldiers would become
adequate military
commanders, able to give the military the
discipline
necessary to keep it under control.
Washington

and the

other generals constantly urged attention be
given to discipline, encouraging officers to spare the time necessary
to

make themselves better disciplinarians

"^^^
.

And many
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Mary C. Doll Fairchild, [ed.]. Memoirs of Colonel Sebastian
Descen dants; Wit h Selections from His
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John Adams to Josiah Quincy, July 29, 1775, Adams,
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An^ericans did in fact become exacting
discipl inarians

.

Besides attempting to improve
discipline in the
army by improving the the quality and
adequacy of the
officers, Washington and Congress also
adopted other
measures, including the introduction of
inspector-

generalships and provost units, and the
infliction of
punishments
During the summer of 1777, to placate the
aspirations of two French officers. Congress made
Colonel Mottin
de la Balme Inspector General of Cavalry and
Major General
du Coudray Inspector General of Ordnance and Military
Stores.

-^-"-^

By doing this. Congress found a method of not

only fulfilling commissioning obligations, but set the

precedent for establishing an army-wide Inspector General
system
Thomas Conway, who came to America during the winter
of 1776-1777 from France with almost thirty years military

experience to his credit, gained many admirers, not only for
the skill he demonstrated during the Brandywine-Germantown
115

Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Mar ion; T he Swamp Fox
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pp. 25-26;
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Mariner s pp. 17 5-17 6; Stewart, Wil liam Woodford 2:963;
Stille Anthony Wayne, pp. 22-2 3, 171; Samuel Youngs to
R. V. Morris, January 25, 1814, "Aaron Burr, as a Soldier,"
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operations, but also for the discipline his troops exhibited.
Thus, when by late 1777, it appeared that Washington was

having problems disciplining the army, Conway was promoted
to Major General and made Inspector General of the

Army."'""'"^

Before he could actually begin functioning in that capacity,
he became involved in what has been called "The Conway

Cabal," and lost whatever influence he might have had in
the army.

Realizing he would be ineffective as Inspector

General, Conway did not attempt to exercise his authority
and resigned during 1778.

His replacement, Steuben, was

well-received in camp and by the time Conway resigned, had
instilled much discipline in the army at Valley Forge.
Steuben must have made an early impression at Valley

Forge when he first appeared early in 1778, wearing foreign

decorations and accompanied by an Italian greyhound which
he had brought with him from Europe.

Washington, learning

of his ability as a drill instructor, immediately put him
to work as an Inspector General, and Congress accepted his

services as a paid volunteer.

Steuben would have preferred

a line command, but realizing the increasing prejudice

against foreign officers assuming leadership positions,

decided to prove his worth by becoming
-^^^Ibid.,

a

good drill master.

9:1023-1026

"The Autobiography of
^^^James L. VJhitehead, ed
(April 1939):
Peter Stephen DuPonceau," PMHB, 63, no. 2
Laurens,
201-202; Ford, JCC 10:50; John Laurens to Henry
February 28, 17787 Simms, TnT^rmy_Corresponden^^^
.

,

,

118

He bagan his task by drafting one
hundred twenty

men from the various lines, forming them
into the guard
for the commander-in-chief.

"i

wrote,

"my military school.

i

a day;

and to remove that English prejudice which
some

made this guard," Steuben
drilled them myself twice

officers entertained, that to drill

a

recruit was

a

geant's duty and beneath the station of an officer,

serI

often

took the musket myself to show the men the manual of which
I

wished to .introduce

""^-'-^
.

Assisted primarily by French

volunteers, DuPonceau and Ternaut, and by Captain Benjamin
Walker, and to

a

lesser degree by Colonels Francis Barber,

John Brooks, William Davies and

field officer from each

a

brigade, Steuben diligently worked at drilling squads of
two to twelve men.

For emphasis he frequently swore at the

men in German and French, and

v/hen

exhausted of his foreign

expletives, he would call to his aides, "'My dear Walker
and my dear Duponceau, come and swear for me in English,

these fellows won't do what

I

bid them.'"

"A good natured

smile then went through the ranks," reported DuPonceau,
"and at least the manoeuvre of the movement was properly

John Lau rens pp. 131-132; Same to same, March
ibid., pp. 137-138.
,
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9,

1778,

Cited in Kapp, Steu ben p. 126; General Orders,
Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General VJashington, p. 35
,

"
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performed." 12 0

March

24

,

1778

His program of drill instruction began on
,

and by June there were reports of a notice-

able difference in the drill and discipline of the v/hole
army, particularly as after one small group of men learned

their lessons they were returned to their respective units
to set an example.

Part of the reason he was so successful

was, according to one witness, because he was "much Respected
and Esteem "d" and "beloved by the soldiers who themselves

seem to be convinced of the Propriety

Regulations

.

&

Necessity of his

121

Washington, quick to recognize Steuben's value, on
March 28, 1778, appointed him Inspector General and
120
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Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #17); Alexander
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Batchelder, May 15, 1778,
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and Company, 184 3)
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Huntington, June 10, 1778, "Huntington Papers," CHS^, 20
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Lieutenant Colonels Davies, Brooks,
Barber, and John Ternant
as sub-inspectors, until the
pleasure of Congress was known.
Additionally, he appointed brigade
inspectors and Steuben's
sub-inspectors, in April, were made
division inspectors,
along with Lieutenant Floury.

Congress, learning of the

improvements in the army and attributing
them to Steuben,
on the fifth of May commissioned him a
Major General and
formally made him the Inspector General.
In

September, they

commissioned John Ternant

a

Lieutenant Colonel and appointed

him Inspector General of the southern army.

Congress

continued throughout the war to make changes in the
Inspector
General's department, hoping that it would give greater

uniformity and discipline to the army.

Once commissioned,

Steuben hoped to be given a field command.

He did not,

however, forsake his interest in drill and discipline for,

with the help of Walker, Fleury, DuPonceau, L'Enfant, John
Laurens, Hamilton, and Greene, during the winter of 17781779 he wrote a manual of discipline for the army, which was

adopted by Congress during March 1779 and used until the War
122

of 1812.
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It is difficult to weigh the
ii^portance of Steuben
to the army.
Certainly his contemporaries
believed he

deserved great credit for the army's
successes at Monmouth
and Yorktown, but probably more
importantly he was most
praised for the contribution he made in
attempting to give
order and regularity to the army, which
it lacked before
his arrival. 12 3 But it was not Steuben
alone

that gave the

army the discipline it acquired after the
winter encampment
at Valley Forge.
Other methods and means were employed,
such as the creation of a provost corps and
the increased

severity of punishments inflicted upon the soldiery.

Although men had been assigned to provost duties
as
early as 1775, it was not until May 1778 that
Congress

authorized a Provost Corps, consisting of five officers
and

fifty-eight soldiers, including four executioners.

Its

primary functions included apprehending deserters, marauders,
rioters, stragglers; inspecting departed camps; and during

battle, to keep troops from fleeing the scene of action.

"""^^
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Strict punishments wore also utilized
as
by which the army was kept under control.

a

means

Rules of

soldierly conduct and punishment were
originally adopted
by Congress on June 30, 1775, and issued
as sixty-nine
articles of war. They were modeled on those
adopted in
April by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,

These rules,

which Washington believed not comprehensive or
severe enough,
were amended by Congress in November 1775, during the
summer

of 1776

,

and again during April 1777

."'"^^

Congress ordered the Articles of War be read and
published once every two months at the head of every regiment.

Washington, by early 1776, was requiring their reading

to every company at least once a week.

Other commanding

officers also had the Articles of War read more often than
was required by Congress.
125
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pp. 66, 91-106; Hazard, Pennsy lvania Arch ive 7~4th ser.,
3:549-555, 584-589; Minutes of the ProvincTaI~Congress and
the Council of Safety of t he "State of I^w~ Jer se"y7 'p^r~'2"6 1~2 6 2
Bouton, Documents a nd Re c ords Rel ating to New Hampshire
7:537-543.
,

,

,

;

,

12 6

Ford JCC 5:806; General Orders Fitzpa trick
Writings of Washington 4:206, 527; 8:152; General Greene
Orders Henry P. Johnston, Cam paign of 1776 Around New York
and Bro oklyn part 2, p. 14 2; Edward"Cra^f t s General Orders,
"Orderly Book of the Regiment of Artil lery Rai sed for the
Defence of the Town of Boston in 1776," HCEl 13, no. 4
(October 1876): 240; 16, no. 1 (January 1877): 62; Regimental
,

,

,

'

,

,

,

,

'

Despite all the administrative, personal,
ideological and moral efforts to keep the military
disciplined and

under control, soldiers continually demonstrated
insubordi-

nation to both civilian and military authority.
corporal and capital punishments were used as

a

Therefore,
last resort

to correct and punish such behavior.

Early in the war, for disobedience to orders,

absences without leave, disrespect to officers, theft, and

other minor offenses, punishment generally consisted of
riding the wooden horse, being reprimanded, drummed out of
the service, paying a minimal fine and/or receiving from ten
to thirty-nine lashes.

12 7

The latter figure, which had been

the most common punishment during the English Civil War and
the maximum figure allowed by Mosaica

Lav;,

was the maximum

Orders, Lauber, Order ly Bo oks p. 445; Orders of Daniel
Brodhead, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio
1778-1779," p. 459.
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Isaac W. Hammond, ed.. Diary a nd Orderly Boo k of
82
p^^
the
Se rvice
Jonathan Burto n o f W ilton, N. H., W hi le
Army on~Winter~Hiir:"~Dece mber 10, 1775 -January 26, 1776 and
oT~the same Soldier as' Lieu te nan t Jonathan Burton, whTle
the Canada Exped it ion ^at^Mou nt Ind epend e nee: August 1 17 76November~^ 9 177"^ " (Concord "New Hampshire: Republican Press
Association, 1885)
pp. 6, 21; Dawson, Diary o f David How,
p. 12, Diary of David Farnum, pp. 2, 3, MHS.
:

,

,

,

,

,

.

,

;

m

,

m

m

,

,

,

,

,

number authorized by Congress, and
was perhaps the nost
common punishment administered during
the

first year of the

12 8

Most soldiers considering thirty-nine
lashes more
sport than punishment, Washington and
the Judge Advocate
suggested the number be increased to one
hundred.

This was

done in September 1776 when Congress
amended the Articles
129^
of War.

Despite getting approval for administering
one

hundred lashes, Washington desired some form
of punishment
between one hundred lashes and the death penalty.
Early
in 1781, after the January mutinies, he
recommended to

Congress that he be authorized to administer such
punishments
as labor at public works, assignment to sea duty, and
five

hundred lashes.

A cominittee of Congress recommended five

hundred lashes be authorized, but Congress rejected it as
too harsh a corporal punishment
128
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officers did indeed adi^inister

inore

than one hundred-lash

punishments, usually administering
that number to an individual daily for several days.^^l
g^^^ officers did not
attempt to disguise their exceeding
the maximum, number of
lashes.
Other forms of harsh corporal
punishment

were used,

such as being lashed on the "bare buttocks"
and running or
walking through a gauntlet where hundreds
of soldiers would
use switches to inflict punishment
^
Although harsh
corporal punishments were inflicted throughout
the war, mild
punisliinents such as thirty-nine lashes,
reduction in
.

ranks,

and reprimands, continued to be the rule, rather
than the

exception throughout the

war."*"-^^
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,

.
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The offenses Congress and
the ari.y were most con-

cerned with were desertion and
plundering.

The former

because of the harmful effect it had
on the ability of the
army to field sufficient nmnbers to
defeat the British and
the latter because of the harmful
effect it had with respect
to the sanctity of private property.
To stop desertion, besides utilizing
pickets around
the perimeter of the camp and the
Provost Corps in the camp,
Washington and the other comnianding officers
had roll calls
taken three or four times a day, and
infrequently at night.

Threats of punishment were also made.^^^

Congress also

involved themselves in the desertion problem, making
provisions for rewards for those that apprehended
deserters
115-135, 237-252, passim; ibid., 14, nos. 1-3 (January,
April, July 1877): 60-76, 110-128, 188-211, passim; General
Mcintosh's Orders, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper
Ohio 1778-1779," p. 441.
134

Daniel Brodhead s Orders, ibid., pp. 430, 434Greene's Orders, Greene, Nathanae l Greene 3:337; Charles C.
Pinckney's Regimental Orders, A. S. Salley, Jr., ed
"An
Order Book of the 1st Regt., S. C. Line, Continental Establishment," SCHGM 7, no. 3 (July 1906): 135; Division Orders,
"Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington
[1778-1779]," VMHB 20, no. 3 (July 1912): 254; 21, no. 1
(January 1913): 30, 21, no. 4 (October 1913): 379; General
Orders, "Elisha Williams' Diary of 1776," PMH3 48, no. 4
(1924): 338, 341; 49, no. 1 (1925): 55, 607~General Orders,
Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington 9:243; 12:221, 22:270;
25:343, 354.
'

,

.

,

,

135

Alexander Scammell's Regimental Orders, "Orderly
Book of Captain Daniel Livermore s Company, Continental
Army, 17 8 0," CNHHS
9:236.
'

,

''"^^Ford,

JCC,

3:325;

7:154-155;

8:594;

9:813-814.
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Nevertheless, it has been estimated that
nearly 20 percent
of the army deserted during the war."^-^"^

Because of the large number of desertions.
Congress
instructed Washington, as early as the latter
half of 1776,
to punish desertion.

"lop

Washington and his subordinates,

wishing to set an example, began early in 1777,
increasing
the severity of punishment for desertion, raising
the

punishment to one hundred lashes, occasionally administering
as many as five hundred to an individual

"^-^^
.

Death penalties

137

Thad W. Tate, Jr., "Desertions From the American
Revolutionary Army," (M.A. Thesis, University of North
Carolina, 1948), pp. 9-11, cited in Hugh F. Rankin, The
North Carolina Continentals p. 393; see also Arthur~j7
Alexander, "A Footnote on Deserters from the Virginia Forces
During the American Revolution," VMHB 55, no. 2 (April 1947):
137, 138; John H. Stutesman, Jr., "Colonel Armand and
Washington's Cavalry," NYHSQ 45, no. 1 (January 1961): 24;
Allen Bowman, The Morale of The American Revolutionary Army,
,

p.

~

71.
"""^^Ford,

JCC, 6:933.
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George Washington to Joseph Spencer, April 3,
1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
7:353; General
Orders, ibid., 17:344-347; 22:442-443; 23:320-322; 25:118212-213 252-253 424
119
"Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter
Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB 33,
,

,

,

,

;

no. 3 (1909): 267, 274; 33, no. 4 (1909): 459; 3471To. 1
(1910): 24; 34, no. 2 (1910): 183; General Mcintosh's Orders,
Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779,"
Court
p. 441; Court Martial at Fort Mcintosh, ibid., p. 462
Martial at Fort Pitt, ibid., p. 415; General Orders of the
;

Southern Army, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August
1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 14, no. 3 (July 1913): 168, 169; 14,
no. 4 (October 1913): 220; 15, no. 2 (April 1914): 86; 15,
no. 3 (July 1914): 124-125; 16, no. 1 (January 1915); 47-48;
17, no. 1 (January 1916): 29; [John Faucherand Grimke],
"Journal of the Campaign to the Southward. May 9th to
July 14th, 1778," ibid., 12, no. 4 (October 1911): 206, Bray,
Diary of a Common Soldier p. 181; Thomas Proctor to the
Pennsylvania Council of Safety, January 31, 1777, Hazard,
,

,

.
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were also increasingly administered,
particularly during
1779 and 1780 .^''° There were at Ipast
least 225 soldiers sentenced
to death for desertion during
the war, but approximately
only forty were actually executed,
for it often took a man
several times to desert before his
sentence was actually
carried out.
One soldier even deserted seven
times before

Pennsylvania Archives

1st ser,, 5:207.

,

General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings
,
of
„
Washington, 17 343-347 20:442 2 3
320-322r-^^R^lirtionarv
for the Main Army under Washington
[1778-1779^ "
VMHB 13, no. 4 April 1906): 340-341; General
Southern Army, "Order Book of John Faucherand Orders of ti;
Grimke (August
1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 14, no. 2 (April 1913):
107; 17
no 1
(January 1916): 29; 17, no. 3 (July 1916):
118;
Martial at Fort Pitt, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance Co^rt
on the
Upper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 417; Brown, Revolutionary
War
Journals of Henry Dearborn, pp. 162, 19¥7-lmrriir^T-W^eden
ed.,
Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the
Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser
7
(1899
1900): 111, 211, 212; Alexandir~Ti"wrence
"Journal
of Major Raymond Demere," GHQ 52, no. 3 (September
1968)344; "Journal of Capt. William Beatty. 1776-1781," MHM 3
no. 2 (June 1908): 108, 112, 115, 119; R. W. G.
Vail7-ed;,
"The Western Campaign of 1779.
The Diary of Quartermaster
Sergeant Moses Sproule of the Third New Jersey Regiment in
the Sullivan Expedition of the Revolutionary War, May 17October 17, 1779," NYHSQ 41, no. 1 (January 1957): 48, 49;
[Feltman]
Journal of William Feltman, pp. 5, 40; John Bell
Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the Journal of Lieutenant
John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782,"
PMHB 19, no. 2 (1895): 222; Thomas R. Bard, "Journal of
Lieutenant Robert Parker, of the Second Continental
Artillery, 1779," ibid., 27, no. 4 (1903): 406; "The
Journal of Ebenezer Wild (177601781) Who Served as Corporal,
Sergeant, Ensign, and Lieutenant in the T^erican Army of
the Revolution," PMHS 26 (1890-1891): 119; Diary of David
Farnum, p. 22, MHS
.

,

:

;

;

:

,

,

,
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he was executed. 141
,

Plunderers and marauders were also

harshly punished, as destruction of private
property was
considered a very serious offense.^^^ General
Orders were
frequently issued by Washington and his subordinates
threatening instant punishment for plundering,
marauding,
or leaving ranks during a march with the intention
of doing

either.

14 3

At least one hundred soldiers were sentenced

to death for plundering and marauding during the war,
of

whom as many as thirty v/ere executed
141

.

'''^'^

Marvin Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History

2lJlilAtary_r^b^izati^n_i

Arnnr~1775-1945

,

Department of the Army Pamphlet No .""'20-2 12 ~( Wa"s h i ng ton', D C.
Department of the Army, 1955), p. 15n.45; William B. Lapham,"
ed., Elija h Fi sher's Journ al VThile in the_War for Independence, and Cont inued 'Two Years after He""Carne~to~Maine 1775^
1784 (August, Maine: Badger and Manley, 1 880T"r~PP^"9^T5~
.

:
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Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson, January 12,
1781, Boyd, Papers of Th oma s Jeff erson, 4:344.
14 3

Robert Howe's Orders, Otto Huf eland, Westches ter
County During the American Revolution
1775-1783 p .'^ST]
'
Israel" Putnam s Orders "Ford 'Sa"muiT""" Bi ac"h'l e"y"~Webb
1:271;
General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley F o rge 6 Fderly~Book, p.72;
George Washington to the President of the ContInental~~
Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 6:114.
,

'

,

,

,

,

144

General Orders, Orderly Books in Linn, Pennsylvania in the VJar of the Revolutio n 1:632; 2:375; [Feltman]
Journal of Willia m~F eltman T7 8r-T7 82 p. 41; John Bell
Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the Journal of Lieutenant John
Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782," PMHB 19,
no. 2 (1895): 222; "The Journal of Captain VJilliam Beatty,
of the Maryland Line, 1776-1780," HM 2d ser., 1, no. 2
"Diary of Enos
(February 1867): 84 William B. VJeeden, ed
Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With
a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 221.
,

,

;

,

,

.

,

Early in the war, capital punishment was
not
generally inflicted upon soldiers as a punishment,

in part

because of questions of the legality of doing
so and because
many believed that the soldiers, until properly
disciplined,
were not responsible for the misbehavior.

So,

despite many

soldiers being sentenced to death during the first
three
years of the war, only three or four were actually
executed.
As Washington told Clinton early in 1777,

"By making

Executions too common, they lose their intended force and
rather bear the Appearance of cruelty than Justice

""''^^
.

But with the increase of plundering and desertion during
1779 and 1780, when the army was suffering for lack of

supplies, approximately fifty soldiers were executed.

During the next two years, about
executed.
all,

tv^7enty-f ive

men were

None were during the last year of the war.

In

approximately seventy-five soldiers were executed.

Soldiers were frequently forced to watch the executions,
in hopes it would be a good object lesson for them.
V7ere

They

often required to march around the dangling body, and

in one instance,

a deserter of the

Maryland Line, after

having been executed, had his head brought to the camp of
14 5

George Washington to George Clinton, May 5,
8:18-19; see
1777, Fitzpatrick, Wri tings of Wa shington
also George Clinton to the President of the New York
Convention, February 25, 1777, Hastings. Public Pap e rs of
George Clinton, 1:632.
,

Fitzpatrick, Spirit of the Revoluti on, pp. 186187.

G
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the Virginia Line and placed atop of
a gallows as a
warning. 147 Also used as a warning were
planned executions
which were commuted, generally to corporal
punishment, at
the last possible moment.

The tempering of capital

punishment was also implemented in the form of
proclamations

G^^eral Wayne's Light Infantry Orders,
"Revolu^^i^ A^^y ^"der Washington
^tS^p'^T.^o^^n^^^^^^
[1778-1779]," VMHB 18, no. 4 (October 1910):
428; Whitinq
Revolutionary Or der s_of_ eneral Wa shington,
pp. 102-103
198-199; Nathanael Greene to George w¥ihTHgton,
August 26
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Washington 19:446n 5Washington to Nathanael Greene, August^, 1780, ibid Georqe
19:446; Alexander Lawrence, "Journal of Major Raymond
Demere
GHQ 52, no. 3 (September 1968): 344; John Smith Hana, A
Captain Samuel Dewes, A
^—
—
Native of Pennsylvani a. ^_and_Soldier_ of the Revo IIIti^arv'^d
La_s^tJVars^_A]^o^_Ren^^
pp. 201, 22 8-2 31; wTTTTanr^
Weeden, ed
"Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in
the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser
7
(1899, 1900): 221, 223; Peter Ten Broeck to Mr. & Mrs!'
Cornelius Ten Broeck, July 9, 1779, "News from Camp: Letters
Received by Cornelius Ten Broeck of Rocky Hill, New Jersey,
from his Sons Cornelius and Peter Serving in the Continental
Army 1779-1780," MAH 2, no. 3 (March 1878): 169; R. W. G.
Vail, ed., "The Western Campaign of 1779: The Diary of
Quartermaster Sergeant Moses Sproule of the Third New Jersey
Regiment in the Sullivan Expedition of the Revolutionary War,
May 17-October 17, 1779," NYHSQ 41, no. 1 (January 1957): 48.
,

'

z~z

I

;

.

,
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Ibid., 48, 49; John Smith Hanna A History of the
Life and Services of Captain Samuel Dewes, A Native of
Pennsylvania, and Soldier of the Revolutionary and Last Wars.
Also, Reminiscences pp. 228-231
261-263; Bray, Di ary of "a
Common Soldier p. 172; Journal of Ammi R. Robbins", Theron
Wilmer Crissey, compiler. History of Norfolk, Litchfield
County Connecticut 1744-1900 p. 97; Brown, Revolutionary
War Journals of Henry Dearborn pp. 162, 163; William B.
Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in
the Revolutionary Army. VJith a Memoir," RIHSP new ser,, 7
(1899, 1900): 111, 211, 212, 221; "Journal of Capt. William
Beatty, 1776-1781," MHM 3, no. 2 (June 1908): 107; "The
Journal of Ebenezer Wild (1776-1781), Who Served as Corporal,
Sergeant, Ensign, and Lieutenant in the American Army of the
Revolution," PMKS, 26 (1890-1891): 119, 120-121; General
Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of V7ashington 11:356.
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issued by Congress and Washington pardoning
all soldiers
awaiting punishment, and by proclamations
giving deserters
a set amount of time for returning to
camp without having
to face punishment.

"^'^^

Despite the punishments and pardons; the improve-

ments in discipline made through the efforts of
Steuben and
the inspectors;

the increasing the effectiveness of the

officer corps; and obtaining longer enlistments, the army
remained barely controllable during 1779 and 1780, attested
by numerous mutinies, destruction of property, and violation
of personal rights. "''^^

This was especially true in the

south, where Greene reported his army was "so addicted to

plundering that they were

a

terror to the Coun try

.

" "'"^'^

situation little changed during the remainder of the

This

war."*"^^

During the summer of 1782, the Governor of South Carolina

reported the army was so licentious that they were "extremely
14 9

General Orders and Proclamations, ibid., 4:204;
7:364; 9:426, 496; 11:362; 14:222-223, 429-430; 18:451;
19:471-472; 23:469.
'"^^George Washington to Lord Stirling, March 5,
ibid., 18:73; George Washington to James Bov^doin,
1780
September 12, 1780, ibid., 20:36.
,

January

"'"^''Nathanael Greene to Alexander Hamilton,
10, 17 81, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Ham ilton

15 2

,

2:531

Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, December
17 80, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:183; Nathanael
Greene to BarorT^von Steuben, December 7, 1780, Greene,
Henderson to John
Nathanael Greene, 3:541; Colonel
Rutledge, August 14, 1781, ibid., 377.
[

]

6,

,

detrimental to the inhabitants who are
unfortunate enough
to be within their vortex. "^^3
Nevertheless, Greene was
able to maintain a semblance of discipline
by being

severe

in administering punishment, particularly
during 1782 and

1783

.-^^^

Discipline, which had been lax on the frontier

in the Fort Pitt area, was improved
beginning in the spring

of 1782 when General Irvine quelled mutinous
troops by

numerous court martials.

So effective was Irvine that by

•

the next summer the inhabitants of Pittsburgh thanked
him
for maintaining his troops in such good conduct.

Disci-

pline came sooner to the main army under Washington.

Although the main army occasionally mutinied and
were unruly during 1779 and 1780, for the most part

Washington kept them under tight rein, by increasing the
severity of punishments; by keeping the army busy (such as
having unnecessary earthworks constructed)

;

and by keeping

153

John Mathews to Arthur Middleton, August 25, 1782,
Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur
Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM
27, no. 2 (April 1926): 70.
154

Nathanael Greene to [Otho Holland Williams]
June 6, 1782, Calendar of the Gen era l O tho Holland VJi lli ams
Papers in th e M aryl and His torical Society p. 66.
,

155

W. Butterfield, An A ccount of the Expe ditio n
Against S andusk y u nder Col V7i lliam Cra wford in 178 2
C.

.

42-43; Address of the Inhabitants of Pittsburg
William Irvine, September 13, 1783, ibid., p. 303.
pp.

,

to

,
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his army away from populated areas.

By the summer of

1781, after the mutinies of that January
had been severely

quelled, discipline was rigorously
enforced, as evidenced
by the success by which Washington was
able to march his

army to and establish the siege at
Yorktown

^^^^
.

Despite

some lapses, discipline continued in a
high state throughout
1782 ."^^^

Discipline in the militia increased during
the
latter stages of the war, due in large part to
the

influx

156„
Benjamin Rush to John Adams, April 28, 1780

Wharton, Revo]AJti^nari^ip]x^^
3:639
Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, 'Decembef~T27~r7 79
Morris
John Jay, p. 670; General Greene's Orders, September
26
1780
Lauber, Orderly Books p. 142; Earl Schenck Miers,
Crossroads'
of Freedom: The Amer ican_Revolution^nd_t^hP_pi
of^New
Nation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press7~r9Try7~p 2 06
;

,

,

.
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Robert Morris to John Jay, July 5, 1781, Johnston,
Correspondence and Public Papers^_of^ohn__Jay 2:45; Marquis
de Lafayette to Comte de Vergennes, January 30, 1781,
Charles H. Sherrill, French__Memorie£_o^Ej^
America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1 ^TsTr^PpT" 32T322; Journal of Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de Verger, Rice, The
American Camp aigns of RochambeauV_s_^rmv 1:152; Robin, New
"
Travels T hrough North -America, p. 36.
,

.

,

15 8

George VJashington to Benjamin Harrison, November 13, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:336;
George Washington to Elias Dayton, May 7, r7827~rbid.,
24:230; Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, April 28, 1782,
Wharton, Revolu t io nar y D ipl omatic Cor respondence, 5:377;
Journal of Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de VergerT Rice, The American Ca mp aigns of Roc hambea u s Army 1:16 6; Acomb, The
Rev olu tio nary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p~. 242;
Balch, Journa l of Claude Blanchard, p. 17 5 Baron von Steuben
to George Clinton, April 10, 17 82, Spaulding, George Cli nto n
p. 137; General Orders at West Point and Nev/burgh, Whiting,
Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 215, 216.
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,
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of supernumerary Continental
officers talcing

„nd

militia units.

Additionally, Continental officers
the militia, often at the insistence
of the

of

co^ed

state govern-

ments

159

Although the military commanders
attempted to and
were relatively successful in maintaining
discipline within
their forces, believing to do otherwise
would create opportunities for and the possibilities of attacks
on the lives,

liberties, and properties of their fellow
Americans, the
military, nonetheless, as will be seen in later
chapters,

often were threats to the very things they were
charged with
protecting. And as will be seen, the civilian leaders

rarely tolerated such threats.
159

^
Robert
Morris to John Jay, July 4, 1781, Johnston,
Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 2:45;
Robert R. Livingston to" John Jay, April 28, 1782, ibid.,
2:210; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Contin entals,''
pp. 188, 247; George Plater, William Carmichael, John Henry
and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Thomas Johnson, Jr.,
June 1, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:244; The Maryland Council to
the Maryland Delegates in the Continental Congress, May 20,
1779, Browne, Maryland Archives
21:405; George Washington
to the Maryland Council, May 25, 1779, ibid., 419-420.
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CHAPTER

VII

AN ARMY CRITICAL OF CONGRESS, THE STATE

GOVERNMENTS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

With the existence of ideological controls and the

extablishment of organizational controls as discussed in
the first six chapters, one would assume the American

military forces would remain subordinate to the civilian
governments during the

vjar.

For the most part, they did,

complying with the desires of the civilian governments and
posing little threat to them.

Nevertheless, the military

were frequently critical of the civilian governments and
the civilian control.

This critical attitude, as will be shown, resulted

politically
in the military interjecting themselves, both
and militarily, in civilian affairs.

creating

a

It also resulted in

mutinous and rebellious spirit in the military.

particularly during
As a result, conditions were present,
feared most
1780 and 1783, for the two things the Americans

anarchy and military tyranny.
Throughout the war the military, for

a

variety of

its policies,
reasons, were quite critical of Congress,
of Congress by
procedures, and personnel. Most criticisms

410

the military related to congressional decisions involving

military appointments, promotions, rewards, and punishments.
Because Congress seemed inconsistent and indecisive
in its command and staff appointments the first five years

of the war, the military were often quite vocal in their

criticism of Congress.

The most notable example of Congress

antagonizing the military early in the war with respect to
appointments came about as

a

result of Congress not clearly

establishing the authority of General Gates when he was

appointed to command the American forces in Canada.

By the

time Gates arrived in the northern theater of operations,
the army he was to command had retreated out of Canada and

was generally considered under the jurisdiction of the

Northern Department's commanding general, Philip Schuyler.
Gates and his supporters assumed he was the commanding

general of the Canadian-bound army, wherever it was located,
and therefore, acted as such.

The result was a year-long

generals.
debate as to the command authority of the two
reappointed both men,
During that time. Congress removed and
Compounding the
trying to please the supporters of both.
who also served
problem was the fact that John Sullivan,
slighted
Northern Department, believed he had been
in the

in command of the Canadian
placed
was
Gates
when
congress
by
Congress attempted to
bound army instead of himself. When
supreme commander in the Northhave Washington appoint the

problem back to them.
ern Department he referred the

He

=
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First, he believed it was their

did this for two reasons.

responsibility.

And second, he did not want the unselected

general to be critical of him.

Thus, during 1776 and 1777,

the Northern Department was in turmoil, and Congress was

held responsible."^

Congress was also criticized by the military for
being inconsistent and somewhat capricious in appointing

commanding officers of the staff departments.

This was

particularly true with respect to the medical department,
where professional and personal jealousies among the surgeons
caused the offended party to become quite critical of
Congress. Whenever Congress made a command appointment,
structure of
upheld one, or tampered with the organizational

was inevitable that
the hospital and medical departments, it
some surgeon would be offended.

This was especially true

medical officers
early in the war, since such strong-willed
Jr., John Morgan, and
as Benjamin Rush, William Shippen,
odds with the decisions
Samuel Stringer, were constantly at
5-488-451; 6:526; 7:180-181, 202, 216,
600-601
540, 596
179-280 336!'3^' 8 364 375-376 391
President of the Contrnental
604- Geirge Washington to the
Writir^_s_of Wa|hing^
congress August 3, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Washington, July 1,
to George
ton! 9:8-9; Philip Schuyler

^FnrH

JCC

,

,

,

,

mi^^^s ^-^^^^^

•

is!

^^

The Politics
280-281; Jonathan GreglJfy-Rossie,
ion (Syracuse: Syracuse
;™eri«n_Revolut
in
the
i^i^Hnd
107-173
jn ivers ityTr'ess'; 1975), pp.
l^^^^^lan'

1

.

i
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of Congress, as well as with one another.

2

The Commissary Department also had its critics of

congressional decisions respecting their command appoint-

ments and organizational changes.

The first Commissary

General, Joseph Trumbull, had numerous difficulties with

Congress regarding his authority, as did VJalter Livingston,

Deputy Commissary General of Stores and Provisions for the

Northern Department.

As a result, both left the military

very early in the war.

3

Jeremiah Wadsv;orth, who became the

Commissary General in April 1778, was ready to resign by
that summer as he had become dissatisfied with congressional
The following summer

policies respecting his department.
he wrote Congress,

"I

must part with my peace of mind and

good Name, or my Office!"

Therefore, he requested to resign

^Louis C. Duncan, I^dical_Men__in_ the American
Revolution 1775-1782/ PP 84 "103-I04n 2 ,'"117-129 140
276-30r; J. M. Toner, The Medical Men of t he R evolution,
32; Harvey E. Brown, The_Me23^ca_l Depar^
p
States Army from 1775-1_783_ (Washington, D.C.: Surgeon
GiHi?iI"^OffT^e7"l873) ; pp. 16-19 21-23 29-31 34-38
James E. Gibson, Dr^_Bo do_Ot t^a nd __th e _M e d i cal Back46-47
ground of the ^mer ican_Revolution (Springfield, Illinois;
104-114,
BaTtTm ore", "Mary land: Charles C. Thomas, 1937), pp.
203-302 Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., John J^organj_
185-194
Continental D octor, pp. 178-239.
.

.

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

;

,

;

^Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The_Poli^ics_of_Com^^
118-134; Don R. Gerlach,
in the American Revolution, pp.
of
-^^PhiTTFsHhuPiF"iHd -The Road to Glory,' A Question
(October 1965):
Loyalty and Competence," NYHSQ 49, no. 4
p.

361.
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Congress granted this request, allowing him to resign the
first day of 1780.^

Nathanael Greene, who became the Quartermaster
General during the Valley Forge winter, became completely

disillusioned with Congress's handling of his department
and, by 1779, was ready to resign.^

When Congress attempted,

early in 1780, to change the Quartermaster system, based on
the suggestions of Thomas Mifflin and Timothy Pickering,

two men Greene cared nothing for, and realizing this change

would make his job more difficult, Greene became very ada-

mant in expressing his disapproval, even taking his views
Getting no satisfaction from

personally to Congress.^

a
Congress, he wrote Wadsworth that Congress "are as great

^Jeremiah Wadsworth to the President of the ContiPapers,
nental Congress, June 5, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth
Box 128, CHS; Ford, JCC, 15:1326.
^Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 6,
John Fell Diary,
1779, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS;
Jonathan Trumbull
Burnkt, LMCC, 4 292-293 Roger Sherman toLivingston to Philip
ibid., 542; Robert R.
^ y'
2^1779
December
uecemoer zu,
Greene to
^.^^ Nathanael
ucn-iiai
1779, iDia., d^^,
Schuyler, December 20
Congress, December 17, 1779,
Continental
the
of
President
the
Same to same,
Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:259-263;
January 13, 1780, ibid., 263-264.
Sathanael Greene to President Joseph ^^f
Same to
February 9, 1780, ibid., 264-265
April 25, ^^SO, ibid
same,
to
Same
271-273;
ibid
1780
George ^^-^^^^3^°-,^-^% 1^
1 'Natha;;el Green; to
:

'

;

,
'

'

,

'

'

;

,

ibid., 275; same to --^g^^^^^^.^^i.^^Sccf 5:io8n'li^urnuLu,
Same to same, April 8, 1/bU,
Trumbull, May 7 1780 MHSC,
Jonathan
to
Greene
N^hanael
3 36-37
7th ser

—
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,

.

,

:

.

,

,

415

[rascals]

set of

as ever got together." 7 When he received

the newly adopted plan on July 26
it provided too small a staff,

,

1780, and seeing that

lower pay, no provision for

his two deputies, and obligated him for the acts of his

subordinates, Greene immediately wrote Congress, asking to
resign and questioning their competency.
was not well received.

g

Greene's letter

Congress, in fact, was so upset with

it that not only did they accept his resignation as Quarter-

master General, but even considered removing him from the
army altogether.

These actions regarding the Quartermaster

system and Greene were very upsetting to Washington and
others, who were already critical of the congressional

system of specific supplies.

9

Greene's and VJadsworth's

successors, Timothy Pickering and Ephraim Blaine, also had

difficulty with the congressional decisions, and lack of
decisions, respecting their departments.

Blaine complained

"^Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11,
CHS.
1780, Nathanael Greene Papers [code book provided],

^Nathanael Greene to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 19, 1780, Greene, Nathanael
ibid.,
Greene, 2:288-292; Same to same, July 26, 1780,
at
314-316 Nathanael Greene to the Committee of Congress
Cornell to
camp, jily 14, 1780, ibid., 304-308; Ezekiel
Ford, JCC,
Nathanael Greene, July 29, 1780, ibid., 322;
17:615-635, 690-691.
•

Conti^George Washington to the President of the
^itzpatrick, Writin^s_of^^
nental congress, March 26, 1780,
ibid
1? 8 0
^0
Washington, 18:152-155; Same to same, August
August 13,
19^03^404 George Washington to Joseph Jones,
to Nathanael
ibid., 366-369 Jeremiah Wadsv^'orth Papers, CSL.
1780
Wadsworth
Greene, July 15, 1780, Jeremiah
,

;

;

,

,
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to Congress late in 1780 that he was at a loss as how to

run his department, as Congress had set down no government
The following spring, Pickering wrote Congress

for it."^^

that he did not "mean to be continually hounding the ears
of Congress with tales of public poverty and distress," but

he needed Congress to act,

"If any other man can, v/ithout

money, carry on the extensive business of this department,
I

wish most sincerely he would take my place.

myself incapable of doing

I

confess

it.""^"^

If the command appointments and departmental control

caused the military to be critical of Congress, then

congressional promotions caused many of them to almost hate
Congress, as they believed their honor was involved.

One

historian of the Revolution wrote in 1822 that "Military
reputation is even a more delicate commodity than female
chastity.

It is often acquired without merit, and as often

lost without justice.

"-^^

With respect to the promotion

Continental
-•-^Ephraim Blaine to the President of the
PuMic_Papers
Congress, October 17 1780 [copy], Hastings,
,

ofGeorge__Cld£rton, 6:301.

Pickering to the President of the
continental Congress, April 21, 1781, Pickering,
Pickering, 1:289.

Tim^

-^-'"Timothy

Re^^^
^^Paul Allen, A Hijtoory jDf_the Amer d^an_
ts_^oth^in_ the FieM
romorehending all the P7incipal Even

li^olTs- of -Thi-^nU^ta^Conar^^
_Gener a 1 Washington
M5^-lH^?taRtlL^te^

of
TBiTtTSBr'^: Franklin Betts,

1822),
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,

2

vols.

417

problem during the American Revolution, he was accurate
in his observation.

Although most officers were not mili-

tary professionals, the act of putting on uniforms had the

effect of making them highly conscious of their honor and
reputation, as well as grieved when someone was promoted
ahead or over them.

Because of the sensitivities involved

in promotions, Washington was eager that Congress be regular
in their promotions.

Congress was not, however, consistent

in their promotion policies,

frequently complain to them.

thereby causing Washington to
13

Officers frequently resigned during the war because

Congress had not promoted them.

William Woodford left the

military service in the summer of 1776 when Adam Stephen
was made a general before him.

The following year, John

Stark resigned when Enoch Poor was made
of himself.

a

general instead

During 1779, Colonel Thomas Price resigned when

Colonel Harry
Mordecai Gist was promoted before him, and
During 1777,

Livingston resigned when he was not promoted.

Andrew Lewis left the army
Generals John Armstrong, Jr., and
Arnold went home
Benedict
and
promoted,
not
were
when they
13ceorge Washington to the Commr^
with the Army January 2 9 177 8],^^

'

,H^-p?^diHt

^^-^^]^^

1778
July 7
Duane, December 26, 1780, ibid..
James
to
Washington
George
21:15.

l^^^iine^tl^Con^

,

,
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to sulk when he was not made a major general.

Not only

were those that resigned unhappy with the promotions made
by Congress, but so were many of their peers who believed

Congress had not made the proper selection.

Often this

involved wide-spread criticism of Congress.

Probably the

most criticism was generated as

a

result of Congress

promoting James Wilkinson and Thomas Conway late in 1777.
Conway, who had been commissioned

a

general in May

1777, was promoted to major general and Inspector General

of the Army on December 13, 1777.

Despite Washington's

warning to Congress that the promotion of Conway v/ould be
highly disagreeable to the twenty-three men who were his
senior. Congress went ahead when Conway threatened to resign

This news

if they did not promote him.

army encampment with great disgust.

met at the main

v/as

General Huntington

reported the promotion was "an Insult to the Understanding
and Sensibility of the general Officers of the Army."

Early

Hocker, The_ Fj^gh±ing_^r son
Revolution: A Biograp hy "of General Peter Muhl enberg p. 96:
Stewar t7" Wi Hi am^'ood fo rd 1:721; David R. B. Nevin,
p. 147;
Continental Sketches_of _^i£t2Jigui^shed
Washin gton
Stark, John~Stark, pp. 42-43; [Rufus W. Griswold]
and the~Gen erals of t he Americ a n Revolution 2:334; Wallace,
Nancy
TraTEorous HeFo pp. TT?-1 35 'Ethel Armes, ed
Shippen: Her Journal Boo k^^Zjlg-^^^g^"^^^""-^- J^o"^ance_of_a
Young Lady oFTash Ton of Co lonTaT Philadelphia with^etters
t^TT^^and about Her (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company,
p
7Tr~0thon^Holland Williams] to Elie Williams,
19 35)
February 24, 1779, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. H.
E.

,

,

,
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;
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in January 1778, Generals Knox, Huntington, Mcintosh,

Paterson, Poor, Maxwell, Varnum, Scott, Weedon, and Sullivan
sent a memorial to Congress criticizing them for promoting

Conway.

"^^

About the same time as the generals learned of

Conway's promotion, and began expressing their ire, the
colonels of the army learned that Congress had promoted

Wilkinson because he had brought them news of the victory
at Saratoga.

John Laurens wrote his father that Wilkinson's

promotion had given "universal disgust" to the officer corps,
and suggested that instead of having promoted him, Congress

should have rev;arded him with

a

good horse

had dallied on his way to Philadelphia)

.

(as

Wilkinson

Hoping Congress

would rescind the promotion, at least thirty colonels were
threatening resignation by year's

end."*"^

Congress was not

Nathanael Greene to President of the Continental
Congress, January 12, 1778, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 2,
V7LCL; Jedediah Huntington to Joseph Trumbull, January 21,
1778, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 2, CSL; Nathanael
Greene to Jacob Greene, Greene, Nath anael Gre ene 1:543-544;
Thomas Conway to Charles Carroll of Carrollton, November 14,
Rowland, Charles Carrol l_of_C_arrol_l ton 1:225-230
177 7
Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 29, 1777,
"Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 390; George Washington
Writing^
to Richard Henry Lee, October 17, 1777, Fit zpatrick
9:1023-1026;
of Washington, 9:387-389; Ford, JCC, 8:349;
Callahan, ^^enry K nox, p. 133; John Laurens to Henry Laurens,
_o£_Colone^
January 1, 1778, Simms, The Army C orrespondence
John Lauren s, p. 100.
,

;

,

,

,

1777
-^^John Laurens to Henry Laurens, November 26
January 3,
83; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene,
P
,

,

ibid
Greene
1778*'Greene, Nathanael Greene, 1:543-544; Nathanael
Congress, January 12,
to the President of the Continental
WLCL; John Sullivan
1778, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 2,
Hammond, Letters_and
to Henry Laurens, January 20, 1778,
Papers of J ohn Sullivan, 2:14, 14-15.
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pleased with the officers questioning their promotions of

Wilkinson and Conway.

Nevertheless, Congress, realizing

how adamant the officer corps was in opposition to the two
off icers and their promotions

,

reassigned Conway to the

Northern Department and made Wilkinson Secretary to the
Board of

VJar

17

The military were also very upset with Congress for

commissioning and promoting so many foreign officers.
"Congress in the beginning
a

,

"

Hamilton observed

,

"v:ent

very injudicious plan with respect to Frenchmen.

upon

To every

adventurer that came, without even the shadow of credentials,
they gave the rank of field officers."

Hamilton believed

that it would be wise to acquire the services of several

qualified foreigners, even gratifying them "beyond what they
can reasonably pretend to."
late spring of 1777.

These comments

A little less than

a

v;ere

made in the

year later, after

Congress had continued to commission foreigners in large
numbers, as well as to promote them ahead of deserving

Americans, Hamilton complained that Congress had not been
able to "summon resolution enough to withstand the impudent

importunity and vain boasting of foreign pretenders," and
armed
were thus bullied "by every petty rascal, who comes

Clark to Lord Stirling, January 15, 1778
3:40; Henry Laurens to John Rutledge,

-^''Abraham

Burnett, LMCC
January 30, 1778, ibid., 63-64.
,

,

8
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with ostentatious pretensions of military merit and
"These things," he informed Clinton,

experience."

my feelings as

a

republican more than

I

"v;ound

can express."

1

During the summer of 1778, Washington wrote one member of

Congress that he wished Congress had employed no foreigners
other than Lafayette, as he considered them little more than
adventurers.

19

Most American officers shared these opinions

of Hamilton and Washington.

20

Most irritating to the

American officers was the commissioning of Philip de Coudray
by Congress during the spring of 1777.

Du Coudray arrived

in America from France with an agreement signed with Silas

Deane promising him

a

Major-Generalship of the artillery

Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, May 6, 1777,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamil ton 1:246, 247; Alexander
Hamilton to^George Clinton, February 13, 1778, ibid., 426.
,

"^George VJashington to Gouverneur Morris, July 24,
1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of ^'Jashj-ng_ton 12:226-228
George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, May 17, 1777, ibid.,
7:75; George Washington to Silas Deane, August 13, 1777,
Franklin,
ibid'., 9:61, 63: George V/ashington to Benjamin
August 17, 1777, ibid., 85-87.
;

,

1778
^"^George Washington to Henry Laurens, July 24
12:224; William Smallwood to George Washington,
,

ibid.,

2,
December 30, 1778, "Some Revolutionary Letters," MHM
Henry Laurens,
no 2 (December 1907): 340; John Laurens to
o f Colonel^
Julv 16, 177 8, Simms, The Army Correspondence Officers of
John Laurens, p. 203; PT^t^it"^ the General
31, 177/,
thFArmy to'the Continental Congress, December 1:^
Hammond, Letter^and Papers_^f^oJm_Sullivan
i^id
1779
John SulliVi^rto Henry "Laurens, January 25February 10, 1777,
2:501; Arthur St. Clair to James Wilson,
Smith', lli^_Sjt^_Clair_ Papers, 1:382
,
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and a half -pay pension for life.

VThen

news of this reached

camp, many officers formally and forcefully voiced their

objection to Congress complying with Deane

'

s

As we will see in the next chapter, Congress

agreement.
v/as

displeased

with the protest, believing the military should not interject themselves into the civil sphere of commissioning and

promoting.

Nevertheless, Congress was wise enough to work

out a compromise whereby du Coudray was made an inspector

general with command of no troops.

21

Not only did the American officers have problems

with Congress commissioning and promoting foreigners, but
They often quibbled

so did the foreign officers themselves.

about the propriety of being subordinate to an officer to

whom they would normally be the superior were they in
Europe

22

2

Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, May 6, 1777,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:246-247; Nathanael
Greene to John~Adams May 7 17 77 /"Bernhard Knollenberg, "The
Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John
Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 52; Same to same. May 28,
,

,

1777, ibid., no. 3 (July 1942): 74; Nathanael Greene to ?,
June 4, 1777, Johnson, Nathanael Gr eene 1:97; James Lovell
to Joseph Trumbull, [June], 6, [1777], Burnett, LMCC, 2:379;
Henry Knox to George VJashington, June 5 1777 Sparks,
Correspondence o f the American Revolution 1 378-380
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^^Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, June 26, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC, 2:389; James Lovell to William Whipple,
Same to same, July 7, 1777, ij^i^-'
ibid., 394
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403; James Lovell to George Washington, July 24,
417-419
_

,

.

,

;

,

.

423

Seniority problems also plagued Congress from the
beginning of the war almost till the end, as many officers

believed Congress often acted improperly in assigning
seniority.

Seeing the list of the first nine brigadier

generals selected, Artemas Ward wrote John Hancock he hoped
they would "not have a tendency to create uneasiness among
us."

They did, however, as four of the selected, Seth

Pomeroy, David Wooster, Joseph Spencer, and John Thomas,

believed they had been slighted with respect to their
seniority.

All four threatened to resign unless their

seniority was adjusted upward.

Eventually Wooster and

Pomeroy resigned when Congress did not act.

Thomas was

placated when he was made the senior brigadier general and
Spencer, who went home temporarily, was coaxed back and
later promoted.

23

Numerous other generals, including Arnold,

^"^Artemas Ward to the President of the Continental
Congress, June 30, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser
2:1140; Cotton Tufts to John Adams, July 3-4, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC 1 237; Charles Lee to John Thomas, July 23,
1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 197-198;
George Washington to the President of the Continental Con1775 Fitpzatrick, \^it2£igs_o£J2a_shdj}
gress, July 10
3:325-326; George Washington to John Thomas, July 23, 1775,
ibid., 358-361; Samuel B. Webb to Silas Deane, [July], 11,
2:103,
1775, Ford, SajTmel_^la^]^yJ^eb^ 1:79-81; Ford, JCC,
.

,

,

:

,

_l£ad^
191; North Callahan, Connecticut s Revo_lutj^onaj^^_War
A Publication of the TVmerican Revolutionary Bicentennial
Series 3
Commission of Connecticut, Connecticut Bicentennial
25-26;
(Chester, Connecticut: Pequot Press, 1973), pp.
Christopher Collier, Connecticut_in the^ontinental_^Con^^^
Pequot Press,
Series 2 of the above (Chester, Connecticut:
'

1973)

,

pp.

26-28
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Weedon, and Muhlenberg, as well as many company and
field
grade officers, resigned or threatened to resign as

a

result

of Congress not giving them the seniority they expected.

Needless to say, such seniority disputes did not endear
Congress to the offended officer.

Also not endearing Congress to offended officers
involved those instances where officers believed that

Congress had not properly rewarded or punished them.

Wash-

ington, for example, was disturbed with Congress for not

giving credit to the role played by Major Lee's partisan
unit at Stony Point.

Samuel Smith was similarly upset with

Congress for giving Pennsylvania's Commodore Hazlewood

a

sword for his role in the defense of the Delaware River when

Smith believed he did not deserve it, and Simeon Thayer

v;as

upset he was not given one at all, since he believed his

efforts v;arranted one.

25

More officers were upset by the

24

Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, January 17,
1782 Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1)
Philip Van Cortlandt and Peter Gansevoort to the President
of the Continental Congress, April 9, 1779, Judd, C orrespond
ence of the Van Cortlandt Family, pp. 295-298; Philip Van
Cortlandt to John Jay, April 14, 1779, Judd, "Memoir" and
Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt p. 12 8;
Wallace, Traitorous Hero pp. 134-135; Paul A. W. Wallace,
The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1950), pp. 170-171; Stewart, William
Woodford 1:72, 722; 2:878-879, 898-916.
;
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^^Noel B. Gerson, Light-Horse Harr y: A B iography of
Washington's Great Cavalrym"an, General Ilenry Lee (Garden
pp. 68-69;
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966)
John Armstrong, Sr., to Thomas uniarton, November 23, 1777,
Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives 1st ser., 6:32; Ford, JCC,
The
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way in which Congress punished or censured them.

During

the summer of 1777, Sullivan and several other officers v;ere

upset with Congress for having condemned Sullivan's action
at Staten Island without giving him
self.

St.

a

chance to explain him-

Clair and Schuyler were reprimanded by Congress

for their role in surrendering Fort Ticonderoga and Putnam,

similarly, for abandoning Forts Montgomery and Clinton.
All three generals complained so much about not getting a

public hearing to explain their actions, that Congress

eventually cleared them of responsibility for the military
setbacks.

Schuyler was also upset with Congress for being

so dilatory in investigating and clearing him of charges

of misusing public funds.

Gates, who was removed from

command of the southern army after his defeat at Camden,
was upset with Congress for not urging Washington to hold
a

court of inquiry into his conduct and then for repealing

their original resolution calling for such an inquiry,

thereby not allowing him to formally clear himself.

26

Defenses of the Delaware (Mew Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1974), p. 218.
^^Adam Stephen to John Sullivan, September 20, 1777,
Hammond, Letters and Pap er s_of_jJohn_SijaijA^ 1 :455 John
Sullivan to John Hancock, September 27, 1777, ibid., 460-470;
Arthur St. Clair to Horatio Gates, November 21, 1777, Smith,
The St. Clair Papers, 1:446; Gouverneur Morris to Philip
1:141Schuyler ,~Awr^'^ 77 17 77, Sparks, Go^uverneur Morris
1777,
142- Philip Schuyler to Gouverneur Morris, September 7,
the Continen143; Philip Schuyler to the President of
ibid
^rchiA/_e^
tal Congress, September 8, 1776 Force, Ameri^can
ibid.,
5th ser., 2:245-247; Same to same, September 14, 1776,
September 11,
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The military were also critical of Congress for the

way they believed it often mistreated Washington.

During

the spring of 178 3, Washington wrote Alexander Hamilton that

he "often thought

.

.

.

that the public interest might be

benefitted, if the Commander in Chief of the Army was more
into the political and Pecuniary state of affairs than he
is."

This was an observation Washington made frequently

throughout the war.

27

Not only did Congress not keep

Washington adequately informed, often intentionally, but
they often sent information to his subordinates without

informing him.

Learning of an instance of this, John Laurens

wrote his father that "The conduct of Congress in giving
orders to officers on detached commands, without communicating them to the General, is not only

a

politeness, considered as an omission of
is due to him,

deficiency of
compliment which

a

but likewise a breach of military propriety."

28

ibid., 293-294; Ford, JCC, 5:841; 7:326-327, 349-350;
10:601-602; 11:803-804; 12:1186; 23:465-466; Bush, Phili p
Schuyler, pp. 134-138; Patterson, Horati o Gates pp. 319,
324-3257 332.
1776,

,

^"^George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 4,
George
1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton 3:277;
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
22:404July 21, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
August 1, 1779,
405; George Washington to Edmund Randolph,
1778,
ibid., 16:28; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, May 11,
Burnett, LMCC, 3:228.
,
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^^John Laurens to Henry Laurens, April
The Army Correspondence_o£_Colone Wohn^^
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1778, Simms,
p. 154.
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These transgressions were considered relatively slight when

compared to the treatment Washington received during the

winter of 1777-1778, the period of the Conway Cabal.

It

was during this time that many in the military believed
Congress was not adequately supporting Washington, and were
adopting policies which undermined his authority.

in fact,

The military were often critical of Congress for
its handling of military policy.

Throughout the war,

Congress involved themselves in strategical, tactical, and
other matters that the military believed came under their
purview.

30

"'Inter nos,'" General Lee wrote Benjamin Rush

during the fall of 1776

,

'"all

the resolves of Congress

relating to Military affairs are absurd, ridiculous, and
ruinous."

Two weeks earlier, he had written Gates that

Washington should threaten to resign unless Congress stopped
interfering with military policies.

About the same time, in

Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington,
December 29, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923):
390-391; Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, December 14, 1777, Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 215; Elbridge
Gerry to Henry Knox, February 7, 1778, Austin, Elbridge
Gerry, 1:242; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington,
Idzerda, La^ay e t te_j-£_ the _Age_of_^
December 30, 17 77
American Revolu tion, 1:204; Same to same, February 23, 1778,
The Let ters of La faye tte to Wash ingLouis Gootschalk, ed
ton 1777-1799, p. 30, Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene,
March 17, 1778, Greene, Nath anael Gre ene 2:35; Rossman,
Thomas Mifflin p. 132; Champagne, Ale^cander _McDougal^,
,

,

.

,

,

,

pp.

135-136.

^"^Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, March 12,
1778, Syrett, Pape rs of Alexander Hami lton, 1:439.
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a more charitable mood, Greene wrote "The Congress
in the

infancy of Politicks could not be brought to believe many
serious truths; by attempting speculative principles rather
than real life their maxims in War have been founded in
folly.

However, experience ripens Judgment and

...

I

dont

doubt the Congress in time will be as able Politicians in

military matters as they are in civ[i]l Governm [e] nt

.

"

With the creation of the Board of War late in

17 77,

many in the military hoped that Congress would become less
of a nuisance in military affairs.

These hopes were quickly

dashed, as it appeared that the Board of War was just as
inept as Congress.

Their first project, an invasion of

Canada early in 1778, was described by Washington as "the
child of folly."

32

Not only did the planned Canadian

expedition upset Washington and most military leaders, but
it caused
a

much bickering among the generals who were to have

prominent part in its implementation.

Wisely, Congress

cancelled it in March, leaving several generals feeling they
had been mistreated by both the Board of War and Congress.
3

Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 2, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 263; Charles Lee
ibid., 261-262;
to Horatio Gates, October TT, ri776]
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, December 21, 1776,
Showman, Papers of Nathanael Greene 1:375.
,

,

"^^George Washington to Thomas Nelson, Jr.,
February 8, 177 8, Fitzpatrick, Writings of W ashington,

10:432-433
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Lafayette was so upset that he wrote Washington that he had
been "shamefully deceived by the board of

war.""^"^

There were other military related activities that

Congress made policy and decisions about that upset the
military.

34

They were generally minor in substance, but

compounded, they had the result of malcing Congress appear

insensitive to the pride and dignity of the officer corps.
One such example related to the status of the staff depart-

ment officers.

Most line officers

v;ere

upset

v;ith

Congress

for giving the staff department officers, including those
in the wagon masters'

department, regular commissions.

They believed this lowered the value of their own commissions.

35

Another example related to congressional decisions
Sullivan wrote Washington early

regarding prisoners of war.

in 1778 that the conduct of Congress with respect to those

prisoners captured earlier in the war would disgrace

a

3 3

Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington,
March 11, 1778, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 27; Marquis de Lafayette to
Henry Laurens, January [26J, 1778, Idzerda, Lafayette in the
Age of the American Revolution, 1:253-6; Same to same,
January 27, 1778, ibid., 258-61; Same to same, January 31,
1778, ibid., 271-272; Henry Laurens to John Rutledge,
January 30, 1778, Burnett, LMCC 3:64.
,

^^Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March,
Smith, The St. Clair Papers p. 462.

5,

1779

,

,

^^George Washington to the Committee of Congress at
WashingCamp, [January 29, 1778], Fitzpatrick, Writings of
10-377; A LIEUTENANT COLONEL writing "THOUGHTS on the
ton
Addressed to the Military," The
fTi'sent State of the ARiMY
New-Jersey Gazette, December 24, 1777.
:
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"Senate of Barbarians."

Many officers shared this belief,

believing Congress was very inconsistent in whom they

desired to be exchanged.

Congress frequently gave orders

as to who would be exchanged and when, often not
consulting

Washington in the process.

This was most upsetting to

VJashington when Congress involved itself in attempts to
get

General Lee exchanged.

Lee himself, and others, were upset

with Congress for attempting to include civilians in their
prisoner of war exchange formula, and attempting to have

Washington give preference to officers taken at Long Island
and New York, rather than to those taken earlier in Canada. "^^

Especially upsetting to the military was what they
considered Congress's lack of ability and will to direct
successful war effort.

a

Many officers, particularly early

in the war, believed Congress v;as not energetic in pursuing

policies that would allow for a military victory.

37

"Are we

36

John Sullivan to George Washington, March 2, 1778,
Hammond, Letters and Pa pers of John Sullivan 2:28; Ford,
"Report on Exchange of
JCC, 6 862'^ Jared Sparks et al
Prisoners during the American Revolution," PMHS 5 (1860-1862)
325-347; John Richard Alden, General Charle s Lee: Trait or or
Patri ot? pp. 171-173, 191-192 Max Mrntz," Gouv erne'ur Morris
and the American Revolut ion (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Prei¥^^ r97 0) ~~pp7~ 9 7^9 9";" William Irvine to the Pennsylvania
Council, January 7, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvani a Archives
5:172.
1st ser
,

:

.

,

;

,

,

,

.

,

^"^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 18, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, 1, WLCL; Same to same, January 4,
1:178; Charles
Sho\sTnan, Papers_of J^athajT_ae]^ G^e^ne
177 6
Lee to George WashFngton, July 1, 17 76, "The Charles Lee
Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 103.
,

,

.

.
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at war or are we not?" General Lee rhetorically asked early
in 1776.

38

During the last week of June 1776, the Quarter-

master General pleaded with one member of Congress, "For
Gods Sake Mr

[

. ]

Gerry, give a little more velocity to

Congress-you do not know the situation of your Country, or
your conduct would be more Decisive."

A week later,

Congress did give a little more velocity by declaring
independence, and in September by providing for what they

believed was sufficient force and means to achieve

a

mili-

Nevertheless, many in the military believed

tary victory.

Congress was too timid in asserting their powers to assure
adequate support of the military.
true of General Lee

was not just

a

,

who

,

This was particularly

early in the war

,

wrote that it

...

few members of Congress who were timid, but

"the whole Stable."

40

Complaints of congressional inertia

increased as the war progressed, so that by the summer of
1780 most military leaders agreed with Joseph Reed that
oo

ibid

.

,

Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 23, 1776,

255

^^Thomas Mifflin to Elbridge Gerry, June 29, 1776,
Elbridge Gerry Papers, Russell W. Knight Collection, MHS

^^Charles Lee to Horatio Gates, October 14, [1776],
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 261; see Charles
Lee to Benjamin Franklin, November 6, 1776, ibid., 266-267;
Charles Lee to the President of the Massachusetts Council,
November 22, 1776, ibid., 303; Charles Lee to George
Washington, February 26, 1777, ibid., 4 (1872): 335; see
also Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, September 5, 1776, Drake,
Henry Knox, p. 30.

,

432

every measure by Congress for the general good "has been
timid, feeble, and languid.

"^"^

This complaint continued

the next year, but became less frequently voiced after it

appeared that Congress was making itself more efficient in

directing the war effort and more effective in supporting
the army.

Besides the inertia, also upsetting to the military
was the fact that Congress relied on expedients

.

^

"V7e

have

lived upon expedients,'" VJashington complained during the
"till we can no longer, and it may truly be

fall of 1780,
41

Joseph Reed to George Washington, June 5, 1780,
Reed, Joseph Reed
2:211; see also Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, February 29, 1780, Greene, Nathan ael Greene,
2:273; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, February 13,
1778, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton 1:425; Arthur
St. Clair to Horatio Gates, November 21, 1777, Smith, The
John Laurens to Henry Laurens,
St. Clair Papers^, 1:446
March 9 1778 Simms Army Correspondence of Colonel John
Laurens, p. 137; Alexander Scammell to John Sullivan
April 8, 1778, "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters,
from 1768 to 1781, Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss
8, no. 3 (September 1870): 143;
Nabby Bishop," HM 2d ser
Anthony Wayne to VJilliam Irvine, March 10, 1780, "Letters
of General Wayne to General Irvine, 1778-1784," ibid.,
,

,

;

,

,

,

.

6,

no.

10

,

(October 1862): 323.

1781, ibid., no. 11
"^^Same to same, March 25
(November 1862): 339; Horatio Gates to Thomas Johnson,
February 26, 1781, Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates:
A Biography, p. 254; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering,
,

March 9, 1781, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1)
.

^^Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, March 11, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC
(Microfilm Reel #1); George Washington to William Greene,
October 18 17 80 Bartlett, Records of Rhod_e_Island^, 9:250;
George VJashington to the President of the Continental
1780 Fitzpatrick, V7ritin g s of
Congress, August 20
V^ashington, 19:407
,

,

,

.

,

.

said that,

the history of this

is a history of false

VJar'

hopes, and temporary devices." 4 4

Si^nilarly, St. Clair

complained that Congress was continually "patching rather
than adopting some uniform system in regards to the nili-

tary."

45

Relying on short enlistrxents and atte^nptinc to

meet the material needs of the

6r:iy

through

a

sjstem of

specific supplies were just two e>:pedients that upset the
mil itary

The military viewed the problems of congressicnal

inertia and reliance on expedients as a result of the

Congress was organized and functi€»ned.

/;ay

To a large extent

the military believed Congress was not capable of

befjag

effective because it had almost no executive control of
affairs, and what little executive control existed,

v:3S

in

committees and boards, whose membership were constantly
fluctuating as was that of Congress itself.
suppose, that Boards composed of their

ov;ri

"If Congress

body, and always

fluctuating, are competent to the great business of ¥ar
(which requires not only close application, but

a cor.stant

and uniform train of thinking and actinglr'^^^ashingtori

^^George Vlashington to Gearge Maso-n, October 22,
ibid., 20:242; see also George Washingtor. to Jchn
1780
Cadwalader! October 5 1780, ibid., 122; Gecrce Wash i^ng ton
to James Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 218.
,

,

^Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reco, April
Hazard, Pennsy lva nia_A£chiA^, 1st ser., 8:168.

8,
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informed James Duane late in 1780, "they will most assuredly

deceive themselves "^^
.

Congress also upset the military by

attempting to handle too many matters, including minor
decisions, as a committee of the whole, thereby rendering
It a less efficient body.

47

"By their grasping to do every

thing themselves," complained one general,

done."

48

"very little is

Adding to the opinion of the military that Congress

operated inefficiently and was not competent to the
exigencies of the war was the belief that the members of
Congress spent too much time in idle debate or were too
involved in personal and political disputes.

49

But it was

46

George Washington to James Duane, December 26,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wa s hingto n, 21:14.
47

Benjamin Tallmadge to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 20,
1779, Jeremiah VJadsworth Papers, Box 127, CHS.
4 8

Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25,
Washing ton and the Genera ls of
1779, [Rufus W. Griswold]
1:298.
the American Revolution
,

,

49

Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, February 5,
1779, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5);
Benjamin Tallmadge to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 20, 1779,
Jeremiah VJadsworth Papers, Box 127, CHS; Alexander McDougall
to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washin g1:298;
ton and t he General s of the American Re volution
George Washington to Joseph Reed, November 27, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of V Jashington, 13:348; George Washington
to George Mason, March 27, 1779, ibid., 14:301; George
Washington to John Armstrong, May 18, 1779, ibid., 15:99;
George Weedon to Nathanael Greene, September 29, 1779,
Stewart, Wi 1 1 iam Wood f or d 2 1087 Marquis de Lafayette to
George Washington, December 30, 1777, Idzerda, Lafayett^
in the Age of the Am eri can Revolution, 1:204; Marquis de
Laf aye tte"to" Henry Laurens, [ca." January 5, 1778], ibid.,
213-215; Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, June 1, 1778,
Sparks, 'Gouverneur Morris^, 1:182; Nathanael Greene to
AlexandeFTTcDougall, r-.pril 1 5, 1780, Douglas Southall
,

,

:

;

e

1
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v;ith

respect to their political foundation that the military

were the most seriously critical of Congress.
"The fundamental defect," of America's war effort,

Hamilton observed during the summer of 1780
power in Congress

"is a want of

,

Probably the greatest complaint about

."

Congress was that it lacked any real power, that it could
really only recommend, and that under the Articles of

Confederation one state could counteract the will of the
rest of the states.

^"^

During the first winter of the war,

Rhode Island's governor expressed a desire for "a supreme,

superintending power, to exert and direct the force of the
whole, for the safety and defence of all."

52

Washington

certainly shared this opinion, as he believed there should
Freeman, George Washington: A Biography 5:150; Nathanael
Greene to John Sullivan, December 3, 1779 Hammond, Li f
3:171; Nathanael Greene to
and Papers of John Sullivan
Nicholas Cooke, January 23, 1777, Bartlett, Records of
8:116.
Rhode Island
,

,

,

,

50

Alexander Hamilton to James Duane
1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton

,
,

[September
2:402.

3,

5

Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782,
Quincy, Samuel Shaw p. 100; Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris,
February 21, 1783, Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society
of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 161; Lewis Morris, Jr.,
to Lewis Morris, Sr., June 7, 1781, "Letters to General Lewis
Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 495; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael
Greene, December 12, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL.
,

^^Nicholas Cooke to Charles Lee, January 21, 1776,
Bartlett, R ecords of Rhod e Isla nd, 7:448-449; see also
Nicholas Cooke to George Washington, January 21, 1776,
ibid.,

450.
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be one supreme director of the country's wartime
affairs.
He did not want to become that supreme director,
but wished

that it would be Congress.

He informed Congress during the

spring of 1780 that he hoped "a plan could be adopted by

which every thing relating to the Army could be conducted
on a general principle under the direction of Congress."
"This alone," he maintained,

"can give harmony and consist-

ency to our military establishment, and

I

am persuaded will

be infinitely conducive to Public economy. "^^
a fev7

The fact that

members of Congress, or one state, could take

from the pov;er of Congress to direct the war effort

upsetting to the military.

av/ay
v;as

most

"The confederation gives the

states individually too much influence in the affairs of
the army," Hamilton complained during the summer of 1780.
He wished the states had no voice in Continental military
"The entire formation and disposal of our military

matters.

forces," he told James Duane,
"I

"ought to belong to Congress."

cannot well form an Idea of national polity," Greene

complained the following year,

"where the Constituent parts

53

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writ ings
of Washington 18:210; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, August~8, 1781, ibid., 22:481.
,

^^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September
1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexan der Hamilton, 2:402.

3,
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.
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claim absolute and independent sovereignty."^^

VJashington

told James Duane late in 1780 that it would be madness to

continue the war if "individual states conceive themselves
at liberty to reject, or alter any act of Congress" and

early the next year he told William Fitzhugh that "unless
the powers of Congress are made competent to all the pur-

poses of War we are doing no more than wasting our time,
and spending our treasury to very little purpose."

Washington, like his fellow officers, could not believe

Congress operated under

a

system that allowed the states

to comply or not comply with requisitions made by Congress

upon them
Just as maddening to Washington and the military
was the fact that Congress frequently relinquished to the
states what little pov/er they had, especially with respect
55

Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris November 21
1781 Ferguson, Pape rs of Robert Morris, 3:229; see also
see also Charles Lee to George Washington,
ibid., 228
January 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872):
,

,

;

259

.

George Washington to James Duane, December 26,
17 80, Fitzpatrick, VJritings of VJashington, 21:14; George
Washington to William Fitzhugh, March 25, 1781, ibid.,
20:375; see also George Washington to John Armstrong,
March 26, 1781, ibid., 379; George Washington to Joseph
Jones, May 31, 1780, ibid., 18:453.
May 31 1780 ibid., 18:453 George
Washington to Fielding Lewis, May 5 [-July 6], 1780, ibid.,
19:131-132; George Washington to John Parke Custis,
February 28, 1781, ibid., 21:320; George Washington to
John Armstrong, March 26, 1781, ibid., 379.
^"^Same to same.

,

,

;

;
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to military affairs.

58

By doing so, Washington and others

frequently complained they were forced to look to thirteen
states for support, instead of to just one body--Congress
and,

instead of having one unified Continental Army, they

had thirteen separate armies.

59

And by doing so, one

consequence Hamilton observed, was that "some of the lines
•of

the army would obey their states in opposition to Congress

notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity
of the army[.]"^^

There were other consequences because of

Congress giving up their powers, but there were even more
problems as a result of the not always clear line of

authority between Congress and the respective states.

Although most Continental officers came to view
Congress as the supreme civilian authority, this view was
not shared by the majority of their countrymen.

In fact,

most Americans believed their state governments were the
supreme civilian authority; after all, they were fighting a
58

Ferguson

,

Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, August 18, 1781,
Paper s o f Robert Morris, 2:70.

59

^

George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Writin g s of Washington 18:453; George
VJashington to Fielding Lewis, May [-July 6], 1780, ibid.,
19:131; George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, ibid., 413; Nathanael Greene
to Robert Morris, August 18, 17 81, Greene, Nathanael Greene
,

3:372.

^^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September
1780], Syrett, Papers_of Alexander Hamilton, 2:402.

3,
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war to defend the life, liberty, and property of their
fellow citizens, their neighbors, not to establish and/or
support a national government, of

a

unified country.

Thus,

throughout the war. Continental officers often found
theraselves caught between the authority of Congress and the

state governments.

The resulting friction caused the mili-

tary to become more critical of the ability of Conqress to

control and direct the war effort, and more upset with the
narrow, and often selfish, interests and attitudes of the
state governments.^"'"

Two problems that arose out of the Continental-state

relationship that were particularly upsetting to the military
involved their relations with state officials with respect
to military policy and command, and to a lesser degree,

their vulnerability to state authorities with respect to
civil matters.

With respect to the latter. Continental

officers often found themselves confronting state authorities over judicial matters, generally as

suits brought against them.

a

result of civil

These civil suits were generally

the result of legal impressing done by the military or

attempts to hold the military responsible for the Continental public debt.

Quartermaster and commissary officials,

such as Greene, Blaine, and Pickering complained constantly

Lincoln to Lachlan Mcintosh, August 14,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 1:13, 14-15, BPL.
^"""Benjamin
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that they and their subordinates were being sued for public
debts, being taxed, and in Pickering's instance being

arrested.

62

Pickering also

v;as

harrassed by state authori-

ties at Yorktown when they would not allow him to receive

official mail at their post office unless he paid the
postage.

The military and state officials also disputed

and then debated their respective authority in other matters,

such as to when Continental enlistments were completed, who

was responsible for transacting prisoner exchanges, letting

people travel to New York City, authorizing private warfare.

^^Ephraim Blaine to the President of the Continental
Congress, July 20, 1782, Ephraim Blaine Papers, Letterbook,
Timothy Pickering to Rebecca
LC (Microfilm Reel #2)
Pickering, January 12 [-19], Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #1); Donald Whisenhunt, [ed.]. Delegate
pp. 107-108
from New jerseyj_'nie_Jo^u£n^l_of_^
Timothy Pickering to George Washington, January 18, 1783,
3 544
Saprks, Correspondence_of_the_Amer2^an^
Timothy PickeriH^to Udny Hay, July 26 1781 Pickering,
the
Timothy Pickering, 1:317-319; Timothy Pickering to
President ot the Continental Congress, August 12, 1781,
Clinton, August 26,
332; Timothy Pickering to George
ibid
335-339; Nathanael Greene to the President of
178l', ibid.
Charles
the Continental Congress, December 12, 1779,
Caldwell, Memoirs of the J^e_and_Cam_pajLgns _o^^
Nathanael gF^ n ^7^135 r_General_An_th^_A^
;

;

;

:

,

,

'

,

Strt^7^n"d~c5iS^^er of the Southern_Department^i^
Desilyer and

Robert
John
p. 4 30; Nathanael Greene to
Th5HiF-Diiil^7T:8l9
Jay pp. 607-608.
Jay, June 24, 1779, Morris, John

W^S^f^n^i^i^l^W'lPhTridilphia:
)

,

,

the
^^Timothy Pickering to the President of
Pickering, T^thy
continental Congress, October 11, 1781,
Pickering, 1:306-307.
_
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and who should pay troops raised by special levies.
The most serious conflict between the Continental

officers and the state govornnionts took place when they
disagreed about their respective areas of authority.

Such

disagreements were frequent, especially in the south, where
some civilian leaders maintained that once Continental troops

entered their state they should be totally subordinate to the
control and direction of the state government.

The first

major disagreement took place in South Carolina during the
suimner of 1776 as General Lee and the state government

issued conflicting orders and disagreed about who was respon-

sible for directing the state's defensive efforts.

South

Carolina experienced similar problems throughout the war,

particularly during the 1779 and 1780 sieges of Charleston,
Douglas Southall Freeman, George VJashinq ton j A
Biography, 5:243-244; George Washington to Comte do
Rochambeau January 20, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 21:120; George Washington to V>/illTam Livingston,
February'T9 1780 ibid., 18:28-31; George Washington to
John Cleves Symmes, February 22, 1780, ibid., 43-44; George
Washington to the New York Legislature, August 11, 1776,
"Minutes of the
ibid., 5:413-414; Allen D. Chandler, ed
Executive Council, May 7 through October 14, 1777," GHQ 34,
no. 1 (March 1950): 35; George Clinton to the New York
Convention, March 23, 1777, Hastings, Pu blic Pape rs of
George Clinto n, 1:676, 677; Samuel H. Parsons to George
Washington, May 15, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons
pp. 242-243.
,

,

,

.

,

,

^

^Thomas Burke io the North Carolina General
], 1777, Clark, NCSR, 11:701-703;
Assembly, December
William Henry Drayton's speech before the South Carolina
General Assembly, January 20, 1778 Niles, Prj^ncieles__and
Acts of the Revolution in /unerica, p. 112.
[

,
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as Lincoln and Moultrie frequently quarreled with the state

leaders as how best to defend the city, and whether or not
to surrender.

Continental officers also experienced similar
difficulties with Georgia's civilian leaders, particularly
Governors Gwinnett and Houston.

During the spring of 1777,

Gwinnett organized an expedition to Florida consisting of
two regiments of Continentals under Lachlan Mcintosh and

large body of Georgia militia.

a

Once underway, Mcintosh

refused to subordinate himself to the governor, who had
taken to the field to lead the expedition.
this difficulty,

Learning of

the Council of Safety requested Gv/innett

and Mcintosh return to Savannah to discuss the command

problem.

Colonel Samuel Elbert, who then assumed command

of the expedition, had problems as well, as he received

orders from both Mcintosh and the civilian authorities.

Charles Lee to John Rutledge, July 5 1776 "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 123; Same to same,
July 22, 1776, ibid., 156; Same to same, July 23, 1776,
ibid., 157-160; Same to same, July 24, 1776, ibid., 163;
Same to same,
ibid., 173-174
1776
Same to same, July 27
August 3, 1776, ibid., 199; Charles Lee to Patrick Henry,
July 29, 1776, ibid., 179; Charles Lee to the Continental
Board of V7ar and Ordnance, August 7, 1776, ibid., 203, 204;
Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution 1:424-426,
428-429, 43T1 2:79-8 0; William Moultrie to John Rutledge,
April 6, 1779, ibid., 1:368-369; William Moultrie to
Charles C. Pinckney, April 16, 1779, ibid., 370-371; Edward
McCrady, The History of South Ca^rolina_ in_ the Revolutioj^
,

,

,

,

;

,

,

4'66;' 472-476
512
485
478
5-17 80^7^^^F0-y61, 37 5
Johnson, Trad itions and Remini scences pp. 219, 260-261;

17

7

,

,

,

Marvin R.~Zahnizer, Cha£les_Cotesv^r tl^Pi^^
Father, p. 63.

,

,
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Because of the confusion of authority, the expedition was
abandoned, and eventually recriminations resulted in

Mcintosh killing Gwinnett in

a duel.

Similar problems arose during the summer of 1778,
as General Howe and Governor Houston debated command

authority while leading an expedition against Florida.
Because of their dispute and subsequent bickering, the

expedition failed.

The command problem between Howe and

Houston continued during the v/inter of 1778-1779 when
68
Savannah and Augusta were surrendered.

During the summer of 1780, Congress attempted to

rectify the problem of state chief executives in the field

demanding control of Continental troops, by adopting

resolution that provided that when

a

a

chief executive acted

in conjunction with Continentals they would be considered

Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 144-145; Lyman Hall
to Roger Sherman, May 16 [-June 1], 1776, ibid., pp. 228-229;
Charles C. Jones, Jr., "The Life and Service of the Honorable
Major Gen. Samuel Elbert of Georgia," MH extra no. 13 (1887):
12; Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American Revolution,
pp. 23-25.
^^Ibid., pp. 31-34; Moultrie, Me^moi£5 Jgf _the American
Revolution, 1:230-231; Minutes of a Council of War, ibid.,
236; William Moultrie to Henry Laurens, July 26, 1778, ibid.,
239; Thomas Pinckney to [Harriott Horry], July 11, 1778,
Jack L. Cross, ed., "Letters of Thomas Pinckney, 1775-1780,"
SCHM 58, no. 3 (July 1957): 159; John Fauchereau Grimke,
"Journal of the Campaign to the Southward. May 9th to
200July 14th, 1778," SCHGM 12, no. 4 (October 1911): 196,
Hugh F. Rankin, 'Hie J^r th_Caro]j£ia_Con^^
206
pp. 190-191; Ford, JCC, 11:55.
;
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Continental major generals. 6 9

What Congress was not able

to resolve clearly was the problem of state chief executives

and state legislatures not allowing their state troops and

militia to be subject to the control and direction of the
Continental officers

v/hen the need arose.

Samuel Adams, at the beginning of the war, was very

adamant about not wanting the militia placed under the

direction of Continental generals, at least not until such
time as a truly Continental government was established.

He

wrote Elbridge Gerry that "it is always dangerous to the
liberties of the people to have an army stationed among them,
over which they have no control."

present

a

"There is," he added,

"at

necessity for it; the continental army is kept up

within our colony, most evidently for our immediate security.
But it should be remembered that history affords abundant

instances of established armies making themselves the

masters of those countries, which they were designed to
protect.

There may be no danger of this at present, but it

strength
should be a caution not to trust the whole military

independent of its
of a colony in the hands of commanders

established legislative."

Gerry agreed in part with his

practical about
mentor, believing, however, they must be
officers. He
letting the militia serve under Continental
if the military
believed this could be safely done only

^^Ibid., 17:777

1

.
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establishment was kept entirely subordinate to the civil
authorities in every part of the continent

"^^
.

Although there were many instances of the militia
and state troops being ordered by the state governments
to

cooperate with and subordinate themselves to Continental
officers, there were just as many examples of

a

lack of

cooperation, and confusion when they served together.

There

were even problems regarding the question whether some troops
were raised as Continental or as state troops, as was the
case in New York,

Rhode Island, and South Carolina.^''"

additional problem was David VJooster

(a

An

Continental briga-

dier general and a Connecticut militia major general), who,

during 1775 and 1776 used the confusion resulting from his
dual commissions to subordinate himself to civilian and

Continental authorities as it suited his own desires. 72
.

.

.

.

The

real problem with respect to Continental control of militia
70

Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775,
Austin, Elbridge G erry 1:120, 119-120; Elbridge Gerry to
Samuel Adams, October 9, 1775, Force, Amer i can Ar chi ves
4th ser., 3:994; Same to same, December 13, 1775, GerryKnight Papers 1713-1825, MHS
,

,

7

Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety
and the American Revolution p. 70; Journals of the
Provinci al Congress Provincial Convention, Committee of
Safety^'and Council of Safety_ of the State of N ew York,
1 422;" Cowe 11,' Spirit of '76"""in Rhode^
r775-177"6 -177 7
130-13 3; Hugh F. Rankin, Francis M ario n:
Island7~ppT~lT6
The Swamp Fox, p. 23.
,

,

:

,

,

Jonathan Gregory Rossie, T he P olitics of Command
Bush, Ph3^1AP„ Schuyler,
in the Tunerican Revolut ion, pp. 4 9-56
;

p.

59.
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and state troops related to large extent to the degree to

which these troops would be subject to the Continental
Articles of War.
During the first two years of the war, Congress

attempted to establish the fact that when the militia served
in conjunction with Continental soldiers they would be
73
subject to the Continental Articles of War
•

readily accepted this policy, but most did not.

southern leader

,

Thomas Burke

,

Some states
74

One

totally opposed allowing any

state or militia troops to be subject to Continental Articles of War

,

believing citizen soldiers should be subject

to civilian authority, not to military court martials.

75

During the summer of 1776, South Carolina's chief executive

would not allow his state's militia serving with General Lee
to be subject to Continental Articles of War.

This so upset

Lee that he wished that Congress would not suffer the

militia to exist, unless they were brought under some uniform system that allowed for Continental control.
-^^Ford,

JCC,

3

:

352;

76

That

5:805

Minute s of^the Provincial Cong r£ss_and___the_ Council
of Safety of th e~State ~of New Je rsey, pp. 2 61-2 62.
"^^Thomas Burke's Abstracts of Debates, Burnett, LMCC,
Confederation
2:277; Thomas Burke's Remarks concerning the
[November 15, 1777], ibid., 557.

^^Charles Lee to John Rutledge, August 6, 1776,
Charles Lee Papers,
(three letters of that same date), "The
to same, July 22,
NYHSC, 5 (1873): 200, 200, 200-202; Same
August 2
ibid., 156; Charles Lee to Richard Peters,
noneraLAs_sem_bly
ibid., 190; Hemphill, Journal s^of the
1776
215.
and House of Representatives, 1776-1780, p.

rmT
;
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summer, Washington complained to Congress about the militia

not following the Articles of War, and expressed his opinion
the militia would be the ruin of their cause. 7 7

The problem

resurfaced in South Carolina again in 1779, as Lincoln

constantly lobbied to have the militia subject to the
Continental Articles of War.

He was unsuccessful in his

attempt, as the legislature ruled that under no circumstances

would they allov; their militia to be subject to Continental
Articles of war.

This policy was even endorsed by numerous

South Carolina Continental officers, including General

Moultrie.

78

Continental officers had difficulty in other

southern states, as well, as it was difficult to convince
the state leaders that the militia would be more useful if
77

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Wa shi ngton 6:111, 112.
,

"^^Benjamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 26,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to Andrew Williamson, August 28,
Benjamin
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook #33, 1:31, BPL:
Lincoln to George Washington, November 7, 1779, Sparks,
2 345; Benjamin
Correspondence_^f_the_AiT^rican_Re\^^
Lincoln to Francis Marion, November"^5, 1779, Gibbes,
:

William
Documentary_lU£tory_of_the_^^
2-3;
Moultrie to Francis Marion, November 13, 1779, ibid.,
William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 26, 1^79,
'

.

!

1:271-274;
Moultrie, Memoirs of the Amer ican_Revo]Aition
Benjamin Lincoln
Same to saff^^7^?nii^297T^7 9 ibid., 286
ibid., 314; Edward
to William Moultrie, February 14, 1779,
McCrady, The History jDf_^outh_Caroljma_in_^
1775-17807"pp7~T42-343 David Duncan Wallace, TheJUstory
of Sou"th~Caro lina 2:186.
,

,

;

,

;

a
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they were more disciplined and subject to Continental court

martials 79
Just as problems resulted from the militia and state

troops not being subject to Continental Articles of War, so
did problems result as

a

lack of clear understanding regard-

ing command authority when Continental and state forces

served together.

During the first year of the war, Congress

established a precedence of rank for Continental, state, and

militia soldiers when they acted in conjunction with each
other.

Although precedence was established for officers of

equal rank. Congress did not clearly establish the prece-

dence among the officers of different grades of the various
Some states did, thereby causing

categories of soldiers.
confusion and disputes.

80

But beyond the question of

precedence of rank, was the more basic question of who would
indeed command when Continental and state forces acted in

conjunction.

This question was raised many times during the

war, and generally not resolved to everyone's satisfaction,

particularly not to that of the Continental officers.
Almost from the first days of the war, there existed
a

problem for the Continental officers with respect to their

authority to command state troops and militia.

During the

^^Georeg Weedon to Baron von Steuben, April
Boyd, Pape rs of Tho mas Jgffg££gll/ 5:276n.l.

1,

^^Ford, JCC, 3:326; Hemphill, Extracts from__the
J o u r n ls of the Provi nc i al _Co n gre ss es of South C arolina
24:2'.
l7767~p. 14 2; Clark, NCSR, 10':199; l6:vi-vii;

1781,

1

77

5

1

.
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summer of 1777, when General Schuyler ordered a Vermont

regiment of rangers to Saratoga, the Vermont Council of
Safety instructed them to remain in Vermont to guard their
own frontier.

Also that summer, the Schoharie and

Schenectady Committees of Safety often countermanded the
orders Continental Colonel Goose Van Schaick gave their

New Hampshire state troops under General Stark

militia.

refused to be subject to the command of Continental generals

during the summer and fall of 1777

and the New Hampshire

,

8

lesgilature would not force them.

About the same time. Commodore Hazelwood of

Pennsylvania's navy, who commanded

small flotilla on the

a

Delaware River, refused to cooperate with or subordinate his
forces to Samuel Smith, who commanded Fort Mifflin, the main
fort the British had to take in order to capture Philadelphia.

Hazelwood ignored pleas from both Greene and

Washington, believing he was

a

better judge of the best

defenses necessary to protect the forts on the Delaware.

of the

Philip
Geo rge
August

82

Agnes Hunt, The Provincia l C o mmittees of Sa fety
American Revol ution, pp. 37-38; Goose Van Schaick to
Schuyler, August 4, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of
Clinton 2:169; Benjamin Lincoln to Philip Schuyler,
1777 Burnett, LMCC 2 456-457n 2
8
,

,

,

,

.

:

^^George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, November 17, 1777, Fitzpatrick,
Writinas of Washington, 10:73-76; George Washington to

John
ibid., 9 427-428
1777
Hazelwood to George Washington, October 26, 1777, Sparks,
Correspondence of the _Amer ican_Re\^ut ion 2:18-21; The
P^sylvania St^'e Navy Board to Thomas Wharton, October 30,

I^ii^rw'^ir^t^HT^October

25

,

:

,

,

;
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During the spring of 17 79, Colonel Brodhead began what was
to be an ongoing debate with the county lieutenant of

VJestmoreland County, Pennsylvania, on the question of how

best to utilize the county's rangers.

83

Most debates

between the Continental officers and the state civil and

militia leaders with respect to command authority took
place in the south, particularly after 1780.

84

Problems in the south began during the summer of
1776 in South Carolina, when that state's chief executive

and General Lee frequently debated whether Lee would be

allowed to command the state's militia which fought with
his Continentals.^^

Lincoln expended much energy arguing

1st ser., 5 :723 James
1777, Hazard, Penn sylva n i_a_A£chlves,
1777,
Mitchell Varnum to George Washington, November 19,
John F. Reed, Campaign to Vallei^Forge_Jul^l^^^77^
of Pennsylvania
December 19, 1777"(PhTladelphia University
pT~32 5; Ebenezer David to Nicholas Brown,
Press 19651
64;
November 11, 1777, Black, AJRhode^Island_Ch^ John p.W.
Same to same, November 23, 1777, ibid., p. 68;
Jackson The Pennsylvar^_I^vylL7
'TT^437'^WiUace, WilT^m_Bradford pp. 428-440
;

:

5^Z^

,

Delaware,

Ha7ard
sh

.

,

1779,
^^Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, June 5,
Lewis
Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:466-467;

S.

i^ e i 1 T^ifioi^i^^

tion, pp. 109-110.

^^Rankin, FrancisJ^arionj^^

PP

•

105-106

1776, "The
^^Charles Lee to John Rutledge, July 5, to same,
123,- ^ame
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873):
17/b,
;
on
I77fi
ibid "TSOT Same to same, July 22,
D;avton"Memolrs of the American Revolution,
''k X
I'si
1

2^280

;

Ed!4rf M^SadyTWlT^^^

Revolution I^TS^ITSO' pp. 140-141.
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with the South Carolina civilian authorities over the same

question during 1779

,

as did General Howe the previous year

with South Carolina's and Georgia's leaders with respect to
86
commanding their militia, who served with his Continentals.

During 1781, Greene constantly had problems in the south

regarding what control he had over the disorganized state
lines

,

state troops

,

militia

,

and partisan units

Greene

.

spent much of 1781 debating with South Carolina's military

leaders the necessity of them cooperating with him, rather
than carrying on a partisan war.

He also spent a consider-

able amount of time attempting to get the southern state

governments to allow him to use their troops as he desired.
In the instance of South Carolina he

v/as

not that successful,

as the government itself was barely functioning.

87

A major reason the Continental officers were unable
because the
to have state forces cooperate with them was

governments of the states frequently put their own safety
as
ahead of that of their neighbors or the country

a

whole.

^^Beniamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 26,
Letterbook, MHS, (Microfilm
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
February 19,
Reel #3), Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge,
CamJohn Fauchereau Grimke, "Journals of the
ibid
1779
14th, 1778 ," SCHGM.
paigA to ti;; southward. May 9th to July
194-195, 202-203.
12, no. 4 (October 1911):
,

^^Robert D. Bass, Gamecock^ Lile_and_CajTipaJ^n^^
Gregorie,
Thomas Sumter, pp. 120-212; Anne King
Greene to William Henderson,
W^I^S^^^^TSS'; S^thanael
M t.
A^^^riTrrySl, Greene, Na thanael _Greene 3:380,
Treacy, Prelude to Yorkto^The_Soutl^^
Nathanae]rG^eene,__ll80;^7^, p. 77.
,

4
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Years after the war, James Robertson was quoted as saying
"Whether we were Virginians or Carolinians we asked and
for we were all for the general Congress and for

cared not;
VJashiny ton

.

"

88

for this was not

Robertson's inomory must have failed him,
tlie

case, cjither at

not at the beginning of the war.

tlie

end, and certainly

Fifteen years before the

war, an English traveller expressed his doubts of the

colonies ever uniting in a common cause, for like "fire and
water are not more heterogeneous than the different colonies
in North T^erica."

1768,

DoKalb, after visiting the colonies in

reported it would be difficult for the colonies to

unite, althoucjli he believed it would happen eventually.

89

The reasons for tliese beliefs was the fact that, despite
some commonly held beliefs, values, forms of government, as

well as language and religion, the colonies envisioned

themselves as separate nations, within the British empire.
If any unification was to take place,

the states generally

looked no further than to their section.

90

Thus, because

The_Rear Guard of
^^James R. Gilmore (Edmund Kirke)
p. 143
the Revolution (New York: D. Appleton Company, 1889)
,

,

^Andrew Burnaby, Travels Through the Middle Settlement in N orth-America in the Years 1759 and 1760. With
(Ithaca:
Observations Upon the Stat e of t he Colonie s, 2d^d
DoKalb to nuc
Cornell Univ ersity Press, T960), p. 113; Jc^hn
63.
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^°John Adams to Joseph Hawley, November 25, 17 75,
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An
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(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p.
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each state considered itself

sovereign body, with its own

a

interests and destiny, it was not surprising then, that
state governments would look to their own safety than that
of the colonies as a whole.

Very early in the

v;ar

the military came to realize

the need for united action by all the colonies, and began

urging the colonial governments to put aside their selfinterest and sectional concerns.

91

Washington certainly

believed that only united action would allow for
victory.

a

military

Responding to Rhode Island establishing its own

military forces for defensive purposes, Washington told
Governor Cooke that "If each state was to prepare for its
own defence, independent of the others, they would all be

conquered in

a

short time, one by one."

92

Greene was

perhaps the most outspoken about the necessity for doing

Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, March 11,
1778 [draft], Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel
February 10 1777 Hall,
#2); Samuel H. Parsons to [?]
Samuel Hol den Par_sons, p. 89; John Sullivan to the New
Hampshire Cominittee of Safety, August 5, 1775, Hammond,
Letters and P aper s__o£_John_^l^ljA7gj]_, 1:73.
,

,

,

^^George Washington to Nicholas Cooke, January 20,
Bartlett, Records_of Rhode_ Inland, 8:114; see also
1777
George Washington to"Joseph Reed, April 15, 1776, FitzPatrick, Writing s of Wash ington, 4:483; George Washington
December 20,
to the President of the Continental Congress,
6:405.
ibid
1776
,

,
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93
away with colonial and sectional distinctions.

"For my

own part," he wrote from the siege of Boston during the fall
of 1775,

"I

feel the cause and not the place.

soon go to Virginia as stay here."

wrote,

I

would as

Two months later, he

"The Interest of one Colony is no way incompattible

with that of another.

VJe

have all one common interest and

one common wish; to be free from parliamentary Jurisdiction

and Taxation

.

94

Late in 1777, Greene expressed the opinion that "it

cannot be expected from the local prejudices of mankind that
the several legislative bodies will be willing to strip

themselves of their inhabitants,

&

lessen their own internal

safety unless they are well persuaded the measure is essential to their own happiness and security."

95

At times the

states were persuaded of the necessity of cooperating with
cooperation
one another, and there were many instances of
requested by the
among and between the states as desired and

^^Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, July 22, 1776,
1:260; Same to
Showman, Papers of General Nathanael_Greene
,

samr s4pt¥fnb^~237T7757~Rirscr627
SeeAe to Thomas j4f f er sonT^^e
Greene

,

(1867): 126; Nathanael
1781, Greene, Nathanael

,

3:556.

1775,
^^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 16,
to same, December 31,
Nathanael Greene Papers, 1, WLCL; Same

1775,

ibid.

1777],
^^Opinion of Nathanael Greene [December 1,
Defences_^,Phila^^
Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed
.

1777, p.

221.

,

.
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military.

But there were just as many instances of

lack

a

of cooperation, and in fact, some states took actions which

harmed their neighbors and the military.

These actions

included prohibitions on recruiting by officers of other
states; establishment of embargoes on food stuffs, and

refusals to supply weapons to soldiers of another state,

except under great pressure, and not at all in one
96

^
instance
•

The states, concerned about self-preservation,

sacrificed the good of the whole by undertaking various

offensive operations; raising their own infantry, horse,
and artillery units for self-defense; and by relying on the

militia, at the expense of endorsing Continental enlistments.

97

These actions were upsetting to the Continental

officers.

With respect to the states relying on their

militia and short Continental enlistments, Washington
^^Henry J. Yeager, "The French Fleet at Nev/port,
RIH
1780-1781," [memoirs of the Chevalier de Lillebresme]
30, no. 3 (August 1971): 90; Mcllwaine, Journals of the
Council of Vi rginia 1:122, 271, 332; Chandler, Revolutionary
Ri^r ds of Georgia 1:223 2:54 Hemphill, Journa l s o f the
GiHef alTAssembly and House of Repre se ntatives 1776-1780
11:357; Philip
pp. 166. 1 68; Clark, NCSR 10T795-796, 880;
Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, January 23, 1777, MHSC, 7th
33-34;
ser., 2:15; Same to same, March 16, 1777, ibid.,
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,

,

,

;

,

,

,

189,

380.
^"^Upton,

80-81;
16-17; Fred Anderson Berg, Ency_2

RevoUat^^nary^^w^H^

Foster, James Jackson, pp.
clopcdj R^^ZIZ^^^j^l^^^l^^L-^^-^j^^^
and Independent Corps", pp. 116-120

pp.

Regiments

.

.

complained during 1780 that this was "a reflection on the
judgment of a nation so enlightened as we are, as well as
a strong proof of the empire of

prejudice over reason.

State self-interest led
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assist

allowinq

I

lieir

anollicvr wIkmi

i

roops \o

t

states to be very chary

lie

1)0

1

akon

frcMii

1

h(M

I

lu

i

n

I

.il

state to

r

their own tiLalo was tlnci (mkhI

instances usually upsi^t the Cont

"'"^^

.

Siieh

officers, as was

the case when Virginia prevented troops from leaviiuj the

state in 1781 to assist Greene and when Soutli Carolina pre-

vented troops in 1776 from going to Georgia to assist that
state
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of any colony other than their own.-^°°

Additionally, many

southerners feared early in the war that once the British
were driven from New England, the army, composed chiefly
of New Englanders, would unleash themselves upon them.

It

took the election of Washington as commander-in-chief and

assurances by the northern civilian and military leaders
to dispel such

f ears

.

Besides state and sectional concerns causing the

military hardships and hard feelings towards the states and
sections, the military also developed a disliking for those

states which engaged in disputes over territory

,

especially

when such disputes had the effect of undermining Continental
Duty in and around Fort Pitt brought much grief

efforts.

Philip Schuyler to Gouverneur Morris September 7
1777, Commager, Spirit of 'Seventy-Six p. 569; Philip
Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, July 27, 1111, MHSC 7th ser.,
1111
2:92; John Jay to Philip Schuyler September 12
Lossing, Phil ip Schuyl er 2:306; George Washington to Joseph
Reed November 8, 1111 Fitz pa trick. Writi ngs of Washin gton,
4:11; John Adams to John Winthrop, October"^, 1775 MHSC
4 :295.
5th ser.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

Adams to Abigail Adams, June 11, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC, 1:216; Butterfield, DAJA, 3:321; John
Adams to James Warren, July 6, 1775, "Warren-Adams Letters,"
MHSC, 72 (1917): 76; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr.,
October 16, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL;
Same to same, December 31, 1775, ibid.; Eliphalet Dyer to
Joseph Trumbull, June 17, 1775, Joseph Trumbull Collection,
1775,
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Knollenberg Corresponden_ce_of_GQver nor Sa mue l V7ard p 116
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to the Continental officers stationed there,

for the area

was contested for by both Pennsylvania and Virginia.

The

military were constantly complaining about the problem of
the Pennsylvania-Virginia dispute, as not only did they have
to expend energies to keep the citizens from both states

from making war upon one another, but found that thoir

ability to mount offensive operations were hampered as
result.

a

General Hand, in 1777, blamed his inability to

mount an attack on the west on the lack of cooperation
between the Pennsylvania and Virginia governments and
settlers.

Hand's successor, Lachlan Mcintosh, also had

difficulty mounting an offensive operation

in

1778, and he

became so discouraged that the following year he asked to
be relieved from command

Mcintosh

.

Brodhead, a Pennsylvanian

,

Vs7as

'

s

successor, Daniel

cautioned by Washington to

avoid becoming embroiled in the dispute between the two
states; nevertheless he found himself constantly at odds

with the governments, settlers, and soldiers of both states.
He especially had trouble with Virginian, George Rogers

Clark, believing his energies were only being expended to

grab more land for Virginia.

Brodhead

'

s

successor, William

Irvine, throughout 1781 and 1782 expressed his displeasure

about being unable to mount an offense in the west because
and
of the difficulties still existing between Pennsylvania

t

,
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Virginia, and because of difficulties surrounding those
that wanted to create a

nev;

state. ''"^^

The military were also upset about having to become

involved in the difficulties between Connecticut and

Pennsylvania relating to control of the VJyoming Valley.
Congress placed Continental soldiers there not only to

protect the settlers from the enemy, but from each other.
Their instructions were not to get involved in the terri-

torial dispute, but they could not help but become
103
involved.
Needless to say, the military did not like
102

.
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Joseph Reed, June 5, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylv ania Archives,
1st ser., 9:193; Same to same, June 27, 1781, ibid., 233-234;
Same to same, August 8, 1781, ibid., 343-345; Thomas Scott
to Joseph Reed, October 19, 1781, ibid., 438; Ephraim
Douglass to [?], August 29, 1781, "Notes and Queries," PMHB
4, no. 2 (1880): 247; Herbert Laub, "The Problem of Armed
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VMHB 42, no. 2 (April 1934): 142.
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Washington to Zobulon Butler, December 29,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 21:32; Samuel H.
Parsons to George Washington, January 10, 1781, Hall, Samuel
Holden Parsons, pp. 326-327.
'''^^George
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having to expend their energies on domestic problems,

relating to the Continental-state and state-state conflicts.

Neither did they like the way the states frequently operated,

particularly when it adversely affected their own operations.
Just as the military were critical of Congress for
the way it functioned, so did they frequently express a

similar displeasure with the state governments.
into the war, John Adams wrote that "every

Two years

government

nev;

is as feeble as water, and as brittle as glass," and a year

later, John Jay observed "The wheels of Gov[ernment]

those of a new Carriage do not yet go easy."

104

like

The mili-

tary certainly believed the state governments were as

brittle as glass and slow as the new wheels of
And they complained about it incessantly

"''^^
.

a

carriage.

"The vile

John Adams to James Warren, February 12, 1777,
Adams, Works of John Adams 9:453; John Jay to Philip
Schuyler, February 6, 1778, Morris, John Jay, p. 465.
,

"""^^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, February 6,
Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm

1782,
Reel #1); Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, April 4,
1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL; Benjamin Lincoln to
George Washington, November 7, 1779, Sparks, Correspond ence
of the American Revolution, 2:346; Henry Lee to George
Washingt6n, February 21, 1778, ibid., 2:77; Marquis de
Lafayette to George Washington, May 24, 1781, ibid., 3:322;
Baron von Steuben to George Washington, February 18, 1781,
Howe to
Boyd, Pap ers of T homas_ Jefferson 4:652n.; Robert
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William Moultrie, December 8 1778 Moultrie, f_lemoir Charles
to
the American Revolution, 1:247; William Moultrie
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Philip Schuyler, March 23 1777 Smith, lli^St
], December 22, i//b,
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3:1364-1365 Timothy_
F^rce', American Archives, 5th ser.,
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water-gruel governments which have taken place in most
of
the States are totally disproportioned to the exigencies
of

the war, and are productive of sentiments unworthy of an
ener-

getic republic," Knox complained during the summer of 1781.

-"-^^

What was really upsetting to the military was the inability
of these weak governments to provide them with pay, supplies,

and recruits.''"^'^

Almost as upsetting was the timidity with

which the state governments waged war against the foreign
Timothy Pickering 1:175; James Craik to William Smallwood,
April 14, 1782, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chie fly
to the Maryland Line During the Revolution p. 17 3;
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 2 3, 1777,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island 8:116; Alexander
Lawrence, [ed.], "Journal of Major Raymond Demere," GHQ 52,
no. 3 (September 1968)
341; Anthony Wayne to V7illiam Irvine,
March 25, 1781, "Letters of General Wayne to General Irvine,
1778-1784," HM 6, no. 11 (November 1862): 339; David Forman
to George Washington, November 7, 1777, Worthington Chauncey
Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 pp. 92-93.
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Henry Knox
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Henry Knox to William Knox, July 20, 1781, Drake,
p.

66.
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Dan[iel] Morgan to Otho [Holland] Williams,
March 10, 1780, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society , p. 19;
William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 10, 1779
[extract], Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution
1:260; Walter Stewart to Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1779,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 6 (1874): 304; Tench
Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22, 1780, ibid., 11
(1878): 455; Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington,
December 19, 1778, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to Richard Caswell,
March 3, 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 2:12-13, BPL.
,

,

462
108
^ domestic
^
a.and
enemy.

Part of the reason the states were not energetic
enough, as far as the military was concerned, was because
of the lack of power vested in the chief executives.

The

military frequently expressed their criticism of this defect

m

the state governments.

109

They also expressed their

dissatisfaction with the chief executives, often because
of political differences, but also for other reasons,

such

as Burke violating his parole and Jefferson insisting he

was not

a

military

Not only were the military upset

man."'"'''^

108

Samuel Patterson to Caesar Rodney, June 22, 1780,
Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney pp. 24 7-24 8;
Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, December 12, 1775, "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872): 226-228; Charles Lee
to Richard Henry Lee, December 12, 1775, ibid., 228; Same
to same, April 5, 1776, ibid., 379; Charles Lee to Edward
Rutledge, April 3, [1776], ibid., 372; Charles Lee to
George Washington, April 5, 1776, ibid., 377; Same to same,
February 29, 1776, ibid., 335; John Stark to the Tryon
County Committee of Safety, June 16, 1778, Stark, John
Stark, p. 163; John Stark to William Heath, September 11,
ibid., pp. 248-249; Nathanael Greene to Samuel
1781
Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers,
vol. 1, WLCL.
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,
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Baron von Steuben to George Washington,
February 18, 17 81, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson 4:652n;
Nathanael Greene to [?], June 4, 1777, Johnson, Nathanael
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December 20, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island 8:163,

,
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The Journal of L ieut. Wil liam
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with the lack of executive power and the executives themselves, but they also criticized many state legislators,

believing many of them to be men of small minds, large
prejudices, and self-seeking

natures."'""'""'"

There were numerous other reasons which caused the

military to become dissatisfied with the state government,
including various personnel matters.

The matter of promo-

tions was a source of constant irritation for the military.

Just as they were frequently upset with Congress for its

appointments and promotions, so too were they upset
112

the state governments for theirs.

V7ith

And just as they were

Henry Knox to Henry Jackson, June 7, 1777, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Nathanael Greene to John
Adams, April 5, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The
Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John
Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 49; [Edward] Giles to
Otho H[olland] Williams, November 15, 1781, Calendar o f the
General Ot ho Holl and Wil li ams Papers in the Mar yland
Historrcal Soc iety p. 56; Daniel Morgan to Otho H[olland]
17 80, ibid., p. 19.
Williams7"~MaFch 10
,
,
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Officers of the Maryland Line to Nathanael Greene,
December 13, 1780, "Grievances of the Maryland Line," MHM 4,
no. 4 (December 1909): 326-363; Henry Knox to George
Washington, March 27, 1781, [draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #5); Journ al of the House of De legates of
the Comm onwealth of Vi rginia'; Begun and Held at the_CaDito]^
in the City of Williamsburg." On M onday, jtlie_fifth_d ay _of_
In the year of our Lord One Thousand Seve^_Hundred
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and S eventy-Eiglvt (Richmond: Thomas W. White, 1827'), p. 25;
Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 3:75; Robert D.
Bass, Gamecockj^TfiTand^
109; William P.
p. 77 ;"Anni"King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter, p.
McMichael, [ed.], "Diary of Lieutenant James McMichael, of
the Pennsylvania Line, 1776-1778," PMHB 16, no._ 2 (1892):
143-144; Josiah Harmer to Anthony Wayne, March 8, 1779,
Wayne
Charles J. Stille, Ajt tho_ny_Wayne pp. 176-177 Anthony Line,
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critical of Congress for how it utilized them, so also
were
they critical of the state governments, believing they
did
not properly utilize their talents.

This was especially

true of the southern officers, who were often quite sensi-

tive in matters where they believed their honor was at

stake

Commanding generals and other officers who state
governments requested not be allowed to serve in their
states or cominand their troops, were, in most instances,

happy to be removed from the personal and political quarrels
in which they found themselves.

Nevertheless, they were

almost always upset with the state governments for making
it known to Congress, Washington,

their commanding general,

and the general public they lacked the necessary character
or ability to get along with the civilian authorities.

Among the generals so upset were Howe, Putnam, Arnold, Gates,

March 14, 1779, ibid., p. 175; James Craik to Jeremiah
Wadsworth, August 17, 1780, Kirkland, Letters o n the
American Revolution 1:67; George Washington to Anthony
Wayne and William Irvine, August 11, 1780, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 19:353-358; Arthur St. Clair to
Joseph Reed, February 21, 1779, Smith, The St Clair Pap ers,
1:460-461; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 23,
1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island 8:116-117.
,
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Hamilton J. Eckenrode", The Revolut"ion~~in Virginia_, pp. 74-76;
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Stewart, William Woodfor d," 1:403; Thomas Perkins Abernethy,
Western Lands and the American Revolution p. 255.
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Sullivan and Mcintosh.
Besides being critical of Congress and the state

governments, the military were critical of the American
people; the people whose lives, liberties, and properties

they were defending.

The military were aware, as v;ere most

civilian leaders, of the necessity of the American people
being virtuous for their cause to be successful.
one officer wrote his wife,

If we fail,

"the Americans can blame only

their own negligence, avarice, and want of almost every
James Lovell to William Whipple, September 17,
1777, Burnett, LMCC 2:496; Hugh F. Rankin, The North C arolina C ontinentals p. 173; Edward McCrady, The H istor y of
South Carolin a in the Revolution 1775 - 1780 p. 330; William S.
Livingston to George Clinton, March 28, 1778, Hastings, Public
Pape rs of George Clint on, 3:90; George Clinton to Alexander
McDougall April 29 1778 ibid., 232-233; George Clinton to
Gouverneur Morris, May 14, 1778, ibid., 310; Robert Howe to
Henry Laurens, October 9, 1778, Clark, NCSR 15:766-767;
William Cutter, The Life o f Israel Putnam, M a jor-Gene ral in
the Ar my of the American Revolution pp. 332-33 3; George
VJashington to Horatio Gates, September 24, 1778, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 12:505; Joseph Reed to George
Washington, April 24, 1779, Sparks, Correspon dence of the
American Revolution 2:275-278; Scharf, Histor y of Maryland
321, 329; Button Gwinnett to John Hancock, March 28,
2 312n
1777, Jenkins, Button Gwinnett pp. 218-220; see also, ibid.,
pp. 138-140; Alexander A. Lawrence, "General Lachlan Mcintosh
and his Suspension from Continental Command During the
Revolution," GHQ 38, no. 2 (June 1954): 101-141; William
Glascock to the President of the Continental Congress,
"The Papers of Lachlan
May 12, 1780, Lilla M. Hawes, ed
Mcintosh, 1774-1779," ibid., 39, no. 3 (September 1955)
263-264; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Geor gia, 2:185585-606,
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public virtue." 115

,

General Greene, early in the war,

desired that America would open her ports to the
world, but
realized, as he warned one member of Congress, "it
will
be

necessary to keep a check upon commerce, lest it take
the
lead of military pursuits."

It was not the time,

tained, to get rich, but to secure v;hat they

he main-

had."'""''^

Yet,

Greene knew, as did most military leaders, most Americans
were exceedingly avaricious, commerce being their

genius."'""'-'^

Greene's fears were realized as, by the second year of the
war, it was apparent to the military that many civilians

had lost whatever virtue they may have had, and were expending their energies in making profits at the expense of the

needs of the war effort, and therefore, the

military."''"'"^
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Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March
1778, Pickering, Timothy Pickering 1:211.
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'"^^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 23,
1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Same to same,
December 31, 1775, ibid.
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Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering,
August 10, 1777, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., August
1777, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876):
449-450; Marinus Willett to John Jay, December 17, 1777,
Morris, John Jay p. 456; John Glover to Jonather Glover
or Azor Orne June 17, 1777, Russell W. Knight, ed
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During 1778 and 1779, the military becaine more disillusioned with the American people.

While the army at

Valley Forge suffered, Greene was convinced that the
American people were only interested in making money,
regardless of what happened to the army and the war itself.
He complained that "Money becomes more and more the

T^ericans' object."

About the same time, John Laurens

observed "it is no less

fact that in every town on the

a

continent, luxury flourishes as it would among a people who
had conquered the world." 12 0

asked the last week of 1778

,

"Where," the Adjutant General
"is that boasted patriotism so

119

Tench Tilghman to James McHenry, January 25, 1779,
Steiner, James McHenry p. 25; Nathanael Greene to Samuel B.
Webb, December 21, 17 79, Webb, Samuel B. Webb p. 193;
Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, March 22, 1779, Quincy, Samuel
Shaw p. 54; Alexander McDougall to Egbert Benson,
February 9, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall p. 146;
Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25^ 1119, [Rufus W.
Griswold]
Washington and the Gen erals of the American
Revolution 1:298-299; Rufus Putnam to Deacon Davis
January
], 1779, Miscellaneous Revolutionary Correspondence 1779-1780, WLCL; Nathanael Greene to George Washington,
September 16, 177 8, Greene, Nath ana el Greene pp. 11, 14 3;
Nathanael Greene to Charles Pettit November 23, 1778, ibid.,
p. 445; Otho [Holland Williams] to [Philip] Thomas,
September 21, 1779, Calendar of t he Gene ral Otho Holland
Williams Pa pers i n the Maryland Hist orical Society, p. 15;
jeremiah~Wadsworth~~to Nathanael Greene, August 7, 1779,
Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL.
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Laurens, April 11, 177 8, Simms, The Army Co rrespond ence of
Colonel John Laurens, p. 157; see also Samuel Smith to James
McHenry, February lO" 17 7 8 The James Mc HeiTry_P ape_rs
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much talked of at the Beginning?

I

absolutely begin to

doubt whether the Americans in general deserve the Blessings
of Freedom,

&

Avarice."

Independence.

They are such Slaves to sordid

"The people of America," one officer wrote his

parents during the summer of 1779, "seem to have lost sight

entirely of the noble principle which animated them at the

commencement of it."

Ke complained the "patriotic ardor"

had given way to "avarice."

Earlier that year, Tench

Tilghman complained that America had advanced as far in
luxury in the third year of their independency as "the old

musty Republics of Greece and Rome did in twice as many
hundred."

121

Washington shared these sentiments.

Throughout 1778 and 1779, Washington expressed his
concern about and displeasure with the American people's
avarice, extravagance, and speculation; their lack of
virtue.

122

"Speculation, peculation, and insatiable thirst

121

Scammell, December 30,
Alexander Scammell to
1778, Miscellaneous Revolutionary Collection, West Point
Library; Samuel Shaw to Mr. and Mrs. Shaw, June 28, 1779,
Quincy, Samu el S haw p. 58; Tench Tilghman to James McHenry,
January 2 5 TT7'9 Steiner, James McHenr y, p. 25.
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,
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,
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George Washington to George Mason, March 27, 1779,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 14:300; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, November 26, 1778, ibid.,
13:335; Same to same. May 12, 1779, ibid., 15:60; George
Washington to Lund Washington, May 29, 1779, ibid., 180;
George V7ashington to Gouverneur Morris, May 8, 1779, ibid.,
25; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, April 10, 1779,
ibid., 14:365; George Washington to Burwell Bassett, April 22,
1779, ibid., 432; George Washington to James Warren, March 31,
1779, ibid., 312; George Washington to Robert Howe, November 29, 1779, ibid., 17:144.
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for riches seems to have got the better of every
other

consideration and almost of every order of Men" he complained
to Benjamin Harrison during December 1778.

A year later, he

told Henry Laurens that virtue and patriotism were almost
gone, as "Stock jobbing, speculating, engrossing,

.

.

.

seems

to be the great business of the day.""'"^^

During the winter of 1779-1780, the military's poor
opinion of the American people increased, as it appeared to

many soldiers that their existence was getting worse while
that of the citizens was getting better, at the expense of
not only the soldier in the field, but also of his family
at home.

This opinion hardened during the spring and summer

of 1780,

and created a situation where the Continentals were

ready to give up the war effort and/or turn against the

civilians.
12

124

One officer, in camp near Morristown early in

3

George Washington to Benjamin Harrison
December 18 [030], 1778, ibid., 13:467; George Washington
to Henry Laurens, November 5, 1779, ibid., 17:73.
124

Philip Van Cortlandt to Pierre Van Cortlandt,
March 23, 17 80, Judd, Memoir and Selec ted Correspo ndence of
Philip Van Cortlandt, p. 152; Baron De Kalb to Baron HoltJeremiah
Kapp, Kalb p
18 4
17 80
zendorff. May 28
1780 Jeremiah
Wadsv;orth to Nathanael Greene, July 15
Wadsworth Papers, CSL; Same to same, August 17, 1780, ibid.,
Udny Hay to George Clinton, Septem.ber 13, 1780 Hastings,
Publi c Papers of George Clinton 6:226; James Duncan to
John Clark, July 28, 1780, "Original Documents," xMH 2
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17 80, wrote that when he entered the army he had
expected

hardships and sufferings, but not because the army
would
be sacrificed "to Aggrandize a few D-d dirty Rascals."

He

believed that "by their Conduct," the American people,
"deserve to be Slaves to British Master s

."

"'•^^

"It really

gives me pain," General Paterson wrote during March 1780,
"to think of our public affairs; where is the public spirit

of the year 1775?

^^There

are those flaming 'patriots' who

were ready to sacrifise their lives, their fortunes, their
all,

for the public?"

"I

once thought America had virtue

to encounter the greatest difficulties firm and unshaken,"

he wrote two months later,

my Supposition was; indeed,

"but her conduct shows how weak
I

am fully persuaded the Doctrine

of total Depravity (which we have so long denied)
and that there is no virtue in man." 12 6

is true,

Later that summer,

Ebenezer Huntington expressed the view held by many officers,
when he wrote
I

despise My Countrymen.

"I

was not born in America.

ashamed of it125

January

8,

]

[

I

I

wish

I

could say

once gloried in it but am now

127

.

Ebenezer Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
1780, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923):

Paterson to William Heath, March 31 1780
MHSC, 7th ser., 5:45; Same to same, May 7, 1780, Egleston,
John Paterson p 115.
"""^^John
,
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,

.

Eb[enezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
July 7, 1780, Blanchfield, Letters Writ ten by Ebeneze r
Huntington, p. 87.
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During 1781, the military continued to express their

dissatisfaction with their countrymen
geographer of the army, in May wrote
College,

America

"Justice

[,]

"'"^^
.

The chief

a

friend at Rutgers

patriotism and charity are fled

sordid Avarice has swallowed us up

[.]

[

.

]

Instead

of gratitude and rewards the Army the benefactors of the
129
[.]
Country Meet with

neglect-

Expressions of dissatisfaction with the Amierican
people subsided somewhat during the last two years of the

Nevertheless, many soldiers believed, as will be

war.

discussed in chapter nine, as did an artillery officer

v;ho

wrote late in 1782 that he had "sacrificed my all in the
service of an inconsiderate

.

.

.

people

"'""^'^
.

Washington

certainly believed the American people were controlled by
12 8

William McCraw to William Davies, August 10, 1781,
Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers 2:311; Jeremiah
Wadsworth to Samuel H. Parsons, February 12, 1781, Hall,
Samuel Holden Parsons p. 322; Arthur St. Clair to George
Washington, April 15, 17 81, Smith, The St. Clair Papers
1:547; Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1781,
"Letters to General Greene and Others," SCHGM 16, no. 3
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tions, 2d ser
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7,
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"every selfish passion" and had replaced public
interest

with private interest, and in the process ignored
the plight
of the army.

One result of the military's constant criticism of

Congress, the state governments, the Continental-state

relationship, and the American people, was the weakening of
the civil-military relationship.

And out of this weakened

relationship grew the conditions by which the military
became

a

lives,

liberties, and properties of the American people.

threat not only to civilian control, but to the

The next chapter will demonstrate the degree to which the

American military violated the principles of civil supremacy,
and in the process made war on the lives, liberties, and

properties of the people they were fighting to defend.
131

George Washington to John Laurens, June 10, 1782,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 24:421; see also George
Washington to James McHenry, October 17, 1782, ibid., 25:269.
,

CHAPTER

VIII

THE MILITARY MAKES WAR ON LIFE

LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
The military, frequently displeased with the

policies and actions of Congress, the state governments,
and the American people, often ignored the desires of the

civilian governments and the will of the people, giving

primacy to their own.

In doing so they took actions, with

respect to life, liberty, and property, which constituted

challenges to the principles of civil supremacy and the
concept of civilian control.

This chapter will discuss

these actions and challenges, as well as the responses of
the civilian and military leaders.

The next chapter will

discuss the serious threats to the established civilian
governments; those instances where the plans and actions

by the military were not only a threat to life, liberty,
and property, but to the revolution itself.

For the most part, the military not only shared with
the civilians the belief in civil supremacy, but generally

acted upon it.

However, lack of confidence in the civilians,

and military necessity, at times prompted the military to
take actions which challenged civil supremacy and civilian
473

474

control.

These actions, which took place throughout
the

war, were often preceded by ultimatums or very
strongly

worded suggestions, generally in the form of letters
to the
civilian leaders, stating that if the civil government
would
not act to satisfy the needs of the military, the latter

would

act."'"

Such ultimatums and suggestions were rare during
the first two years of the war.

But by 1777, when it

appeared to the military that the civilian governments were
not adequately supporting them, the military did not hesitate threatening the civilian authorities.

John Cadwalader

informed the Pennsylvania Council of Safety during January
1777 that "We wish to see the Civil authority regulate and

direct all our public measures, and should greatly lament
the Necessity which may compel the Military power to take
the direction into their hands in order to save this Country

from absolute ruin," however, he continued,

"you may depend

that the Military will exert its authority whenever the

weakness, languor, or timidity of your Councils shall render
it their duty so to do, and all the World will justify them

Philip Schuyler to James Duane, June 5, 1779,
Miscellaneous Manuscripts, 1779-1780, WLCL; Samuel H.
Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, November 2, 1777, MHSC, 7th
ser

.

,

2:183.

.
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in It."

2

More specifically, John White, during the fall

of 1777, while inarching his Georgia regiment through
North

Carolina, informed the chief executive of that state that
if he was not loaned money to feed his troops he would turn

them loose on the land and its inhabitants.

Early in 1779,

John Sullivan twice informed the Rhode Island chief executive that despite being a zealous advocate of civil authority
he would either dismiss his troops or turn them loose on

the state's inhabitants unless the legislature acted to

supply his troops.

The following winter, John Rogers, the

military commander at Kaskaskia in Illinois, constantly
threatened the local and Virginia civilian authorities with
the alternative of either supplying his command or having

them seize what they needed

3

During the last year of the war, upon learning the
South Carolina legislature was unable to supply his army

with forage by means of impressment, Greene wrote Governor
2

Address from John Cadv/alader et al., from Mornstown to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, January 15, 1777,
"Selections from the Military Papers of General John
Cadwalader," PMHB 32, no. 2 (1808): 161.
Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals
p. 131; John Sullivan to William Greene, January 5, 1779,
Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:482-485;
Same to same, January 16, 1779, ibid., 493; John Rogers to
the Magistrates of Kaskaskia, November 10, 1780, Alvord,
"Kaskaskia Records 1778-1790," pp. 206-207; Same to same,
January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 211; Petition of the Inhabitants
of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, ibid.,
,

p.

234.

Guerard

a

threatening letter.

"Due respect shall ever be

paid to the Laws of the State when it is possible," Greene

maintained, but his horses were starving.

"it has always

been my wish, and it shall ever be my study, to act conformable to the Laws of every State where it is possible, but

there are cases where it is not."

This was one of those

instances, Greene stated, threatening to impress on his own

authority unless the state acted. ^

Although most of the

threatening letters related to their physical needs, many
involved state conduct towards the Tories.

During March

1779, McDougall informed Clinton that if the New York

civilian authorities did not assist him in handling the
Tories, he would do so on his own, despite looking like
tyrant.

a

Earlier in the war. General Lee informed the

Virginia comjnittee of Safety that if they did not act to
remove peacefully the Tories from the Norfolk and Princess
Ann areas he would do so at the point of

a

bayonet.

5

Fre-

quently such threats were carried out, both with respect
to the Tories and supplies.

1783
"^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 9
Letters By and To General Nathanael Greene with some to his
Wife (William A. Read Collection), 1 28 WLCL.
,

:

,

^Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, March 14,
Hastings, Public Papers of Georg_e_C]J-ntqn 4:632
1779
Charles Lee to the President of' the Virginia Committee of
Safety, April 8, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4
(1872): 393-394; see also Charles Lee to Edward Rutledge,
372.
ibid.
April 3, [1776]
,

,

,

,

;

,
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For the most part, as will be discussed, civilian

leaders were upset with the military for taking unauthorized

military action against the Tories, but they did not expend

much energy in attempting to stop the military, nor in
punishing them.

As a rule,

the civilian leaders only

responded to unauthorized military action against the Tories

when that action involved oaths, court martials, or in some
way appeared to be

a

threat to civilian control.

With

respect to Tory property, the civilian leaders preferred
the military not seize anybody's property, no matter what

pretext.

Property, after all, was

a

basic right for which

the revolutionaries were fighting to protect.

Most Americans acknowledged the sacredness of private
property, in part because of the wide ownership of land and

property in America and in part because of their English
Whig intellectual heritage.

The economic context of the

American Revolution is evident, as most of the ideological
and political slogans were couched in an economic rhetoric

that all Americans could understand, if not all agree upon.

Property, with life and liberty, was what the American
V7as

fighting to protect.

That was what the Declaration of

Independence declared during July 1776.

northern New York,

a

VJhig

A month later in

flag with "Liberty" written on one side

and "Property" on the other was raised over the newly

,
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constructed Fort Dayton.^
From the beginning of the war, civilian leaders
called for the protection of property, not only from British
arms, but also from American military forces.

Most

American military leaders realized the necessity of protecting property,

for a variety of reasons, including the belief

that they were fighting to protect the sanctity of property
and the belief that unauthorized seizure of property might

force those that had their property violated into the

British camp.
himself

a

"I

Nobody realized this more than VJashington,

large owner of land and property.

never saw any Man so strictly observant of the

preservation of private property," Tench Tilghman wrote of

William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American
Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth
Century (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1977)
pp. 1-52; Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats: The
Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule During
the American Revolution (Chapel Hill University of North
Carolina Press, 1955), p. 146; "Journal Kept During an
Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer Elmer, Lieutenant
in the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in the Continental
Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias Dayton. Printed from the
Original Manuscript," PHNHS 2, no. 4 (1847): 183.
:

:

-7

Hints for the Consideration of Mr. Gerry and Such
others of the Honble Congress as he Shall judge proper to
advise with thereon [January 1776] by Joseph Hawley in Paul
Fullman and George M. Elsey, into., "More Hints from Joseph
Hawley January 1776," Publications of the Colonial Society
402;
Transactions 34 (1937-1942)
of Massachusetts
Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph Reed, February 21, 1778,
3:94.
Burnett, LMCC
,

,

,

:
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Washington early in the war.

An example of Washington's

concern for private property is evidenced by his stay at
the Ford Mansion during 1779 and 1780.

Upon moving in, he

had all the house's articles appropriated for his use inven-

toried.

Upon departing, and learning that one silver

tablespoon was unaccounted for, he had one with his initials
on it sent to Mrs. Ford from Mount Vernon.

He also had the

house replastered and thoroughly cleaned upon leaving.

Q

Not

only did he practice protecting private property, but he

constantly urged others to do so.

In one of his earliest

general orders, he reminded the army they were fighting for
"Rights, Liberty and Property."

"VJhy

did we assemh)le in

arms?" he asked the army in his general orders of September

4,

1777.

"Was it not,

in one capital point,

the property of our country?""'"'^

to protect

He constantly reminded the

army it was not only a disgrace to the name of an American
soldier, but repugnant to the principles of the cause in

which they were engaged, to violate private
^Tench Tilghman to
], September
Tilghman, Tench Tilghman p. 136.
[

property."'"''"

9,

1776,

,

^Mabel Lorenz Ives, Washington's Headquarters (Upper
Montclair, New Jersey: Lucy Fortune, 1932), p. 207.
3:312;

"•^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
ibid., 9:178.
"^"'"General

Books, p. 491.

Orders,

ibid., 19:348

;

Lauber, Orderly

,
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Additionally, he frequently reminded the officers of
their

obligation to impress upon their soldiers the necessity of
protecting private property. 12

Washington's officers complied with his orders with
respect to protecting private property, for the orderly
books are full of reminders to the soldiers to protect their

fellow citizens' property. 13

Charles C. Pinckney told his

soldiers late in 1775 they should look upon themselves as
the "guardians of the property" of the inhabitants of South

Carolina and "deem it an infamous breach of the trust
reposed in them to destroy, or take
to protect."

what they are bound

av;ay

The following year, Greene informed his

soldiers that "we came here to protect the inhabitants

&

12

General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:514; Orderly Book of the Seventh Pennsylvania
Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the VJar of the Revolution
,

2:400.
13

General Greene's Brigade Orders, "The Orderly Book
of Colonel William Henshaw October 1, 1775, through
October 3, 1776," PAAS 57 (April 16, 1947-October 15, 1947):
120; General Orders, "Orderly Book of the Company of Captain
George Stubblef ield Fifth Virginia Regiment, From March 3,
1776, to July 10, 1776, Inclusive," VHSC new ser., 6:146;
"Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26
December 20, 1777," PMHB 34, no. 2 (1910): 186-187; "Orderly
Book of Capt. Simeon Brov/n, Colonel Wade's Regiment, Rhode
Island Campaign, 1778," HCEI 58, no. 3 (July 1922): 249;
Regimental after orders, "Revolutionary Orderly Book of Capt.
Jeremiah Putnam of Danvers, Mass. in the Rhode Island Campaign. July 10, 1779-December 19, 1779," ibid., 46, no. 4
(October 1910): 344; General Parson's Orders, Ford, Samuel
Blachley Webb, 1:309; Light Infantry Orders, "Revolutionary^^
Army orders for the Main Army under VJashington [17 78-1779],"
VMHB 19, no. 1 (January 1911): 43.
,

,

,
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their property from the ravages of the enemy, but if instead
of support
&

&

Protection, they meet with nothing but insult

outrage, we shall be considered as banditti

oppressors

&

enemies."

&

treated as

A wing of the army during the summer

of 1780 was reminded "it is true we are Fighting for Liberty

but it is with

a

View to the free Enjoyment of our Property

and if we dont give Security to the People how can we Expect

they can give Support to the Army, we are called to the

Field not only to Oppose the Enemy but to give protection
to the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants, and if we

fail in the Latter we perform but half our

Duty.""'"'^

During 1775, Heath, upon hearing complaints about
the soldiers destroying private property, told Colonel

Prescott that private property should ever be held most
sacred.

15

It can be safe to assume that Prescott 's soldiers

continued to violate the sacredness of private property
despite what actions Prescott may have taken after receiving
Heath's admonition.

Throughout the war, many soldiers and
Most of

officers plundered their fellow citizens' property.

Extract from the Orderly Book of Charles Lining,
Documentary History of the American Revolution
G ibbe s
1:244-245; General Greene's orders in Colonel Moses Little's
Orderly Book, Henry P. Johnston, The_ Camp aign of 1 776 arounj.
New Y ork and Brooklyn, pt. 2, pp. 6-7; Lauber, OrderlyJBooks
,

,

pTTSO

.

William Prescott, October
William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel U)
"'"^William Heath to

1775

.

,

8,

6

.
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military far from their home area, where
)roperty, particularly if the stranger

BRAD6HER

.dered less wrong in their eyes, as well
HISTORY

This was especially true early in the
PH.D.

antly New England-manned army plundered

New York, and even in the New York City

summer of 1776, Washington wrote Congress

Thesis bind

stop the plundering,
.'lunder,

"but under the

and want of Laws to punish

Imost as well attempt to remove Mount
.|)n

ITHEAST LIBRARY BINDING

EJNDERY COPY 3

had good cause to complain, for even

CO., INC.
D

somebody stealing and damaging his

Other generals suffered as well.

pistols.

Charles Lee had

four of his horses taken by Greene's soldiers; Schuyler had
his property damaged and burned by Major Dearborn's soldiers;
and General Lewis Morris had his Westchester County estate
1

Isaac J. Greenwood, ed.. The Revolutionary Services
of John Greenwood of Boston and New York 1775-1783~idited
from t he Original Manuscript (New York: De Vinne Press for
Joseph R. Greenwood, 1922), p. 35; Th e Autobiograp hy of Levi
Hutchins: With a Preface, Notes, and Addenda, By h is Youngest
Son private ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside Press,
1:69; Edward
1865)
p. 28; Ward, The War of the Revolution
Tilghman to William Heath, September 5, 1776, William Heath
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #2)
,

,

,

1

n

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, 6:114.

8

^
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plundered by soldiers of Hand's regiment
Early in the war the military plundered both Whig
and Tory alike, often simply to obtain booty or because they

were too lazy to cut their own firewood or properly requisition foodstuffs, but just as often because they needed

supplies to survive. 19

This was true during the winters of

1777-1778 and 1779-1780. 20

It was especially true during

the summer of 1780 as the army suffered, starved, and
1

Charles Lee to Nathanael Greene, September 12,
1782, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 7 (1875): 35; Richard
Varick to Horatio Gates, October 28, 1777, Howard Sv;iggett,
War Out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers
Empire State Publication 20 (Port V7ashington, New York:
Ira J. Friedman, 1963), p. 56; Lewis Morris, Sr., to Lewis
Morris, Jr., September 6, 1776, "Letters to General Lewis
Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 442.
.

,

19

.

.

Citizens of Montgomery County to President Thomas
Wharton, August 15, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylv a nia Archives
2d ser., 3:118-119; Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler,
August 27, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:428; St. Mary's [County]
Committee to the Maryland Council, August 7, 1776, Browne,
Maryland Archives 12:184; Division Orders, "Revolutionary
Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779],"
VMHB 21, no. 1 (January 1913): 30; George Washington to
Henry Lee, November 29, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 13:357; George Washington to John Sullivan,
July 25, 1777, ibid., 8:469; Joseph Reed to the Continental
Congress Board of War, March 8, 1779, Martin I. J. Griffin,
(Ridley Park
3 vols.
Cat holics and the American Revolution
and Philadelphia: Martin I. J. Griffin, 1907-1911), 3:90.
,

,

,

,

^"^General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly
Book, pp. 297-298; Lord Stirling to George Washington,
January 16, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American
Revolutio n 2:381; Royal Flint to Jonathan Trumbull,
January 6, 1780, Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the
American Revolution, p. 116.
,

1
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eventually

a

portion mutinied.^-'-

Late in August 1780,

Greene reported the plundering done by the Pennsylvania Line
was "equal to anything corrmiitted by the Hessians."

weeks later,

member of Congress reported that "The army

a

now lives principally by plunder,
keep together

Two

I

fear,

.

soon become

.

.

;

and will, if they

f ree-booter s

And

.

I

think

every man must feel for the inhabitants where the army

marches."

In a circular letter to the chief executives of

the northern states in August, Washington reported the army

had assumed "the odious character of the plunderers instead
of the protectors of the people."

22

Fortunately for the

northern states, the war, and thus the army, moved southward
during 1780 and 1781, and with them, the plundering.
After learning that soldiers had burned some of his

property in Annapolis, Charles Carroll of Carrollton
complained the "soldiers are very troublesome" and

"a

great

2

General Orders, West Point, "Orderly Book of
Captain Daniel Livermore s Company Continental Army, 1780,"
CNHHS 9:215; Ebenezer Huntington to Samuel B. Webb,
August 30, 17 80, Ford, Samuel Blachley We bb, 2:282.
'

,

,

22

Nathanael Greene to George VJashington August 26,
2:207; Ezekiel Cornell to
1780, Greene, Nathanael Gr e ene
William Greene, September 10, 1780, Staples, Rhode Island
p. 312; Circular to the
in the Continental Congress
Governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Maryland, August 27, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 19:450.
,

,

,

,
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nuisance,

heartily wish they were gone."^^

I

&

This was

a

wish shared by many southerners, as the soldiers
and their
officers increased their plundering in the south
after
1779

24^
.

Most of the plundering in the south, and much of it
in the north, was practiced by the irregular state
forces

and militia, who frequently did not discriminate between

friend and foe.

25

One New Jersey resident reported early in

2 3

Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Charles Carroll
of Annapolis, April 5, 1781, Ellen Hart Smith, Charles
Carroll of Carrollton (New York: Russell and Russell, 1942)
p.

208.
24

.

.

Benjamin Lincoln to Charles C. Pinckney, July 24,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #3)
William Henderson to John Rutledge,
August 14, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene 3:377; Nathanael
Greene to Alexander Hamilton, January 10, 1781, Syrett,
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 2:531; Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, January 9, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed 2:344;
Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, July 28, 1781 William
Johnson, Nathanael Greene 2:211; William Smallwood to
Horatio Gates, October 21, 1780, Clark, NCSR 14:720; John
Jameson to George Washington, September 27, 1780, Sparks,
Correspondence of the American Revolution 3:102; John
Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee, September 10, 1780, Helen Lee
Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim
Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 2 (June 1954):
.

;

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

126

.

25

Petition of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the
Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records
1778-1790," 5:234; Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd,
May 21, 1779, ibid., 88-89; Wade Hampton to Nathanael Greene,
July 29, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene 3:342-343; William
Smallwood to Horatio Gates, October 31 1780 Clark, NCSJR,
14:720; William Livingston to the Pennsylvania Council of
Safety, February 22, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives
Aaron Burr to Alexander McDougall,
5 238-239
1st ser.
January 13, 1779, Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr.
With Miscellaneous Selections from his Correspondence
1:142-14 3; Alexander McDougall to Georoe Clinton, Janua r y 20,
,

,

,

,

,

:

;

,
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the war that "We have not had the enemy among
us, but

Staten-Island hath not suffered from the British
troops
scarcely the tenth part of the damage this town hath

from

the militia."

2g

Greene complained that the militia in the

south were "more allured from the hopes of plunder than
from
a

desire to serve the public.

"^'^

Sumter's irregular force

plundered on a regular basis, in part because their booty
was their compensation for military service.

Sumter's

soldiers, as well as other irregular and Continental
soldiers, took much of their plunder from Tories, or those

living in so-called neutral areas, justifying it on the

grounds that if they did not take the property it would be
taken by the British or Tories and used against them.^^
1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clint on, 4:502;
Philip Schuyler to John Jay, February 1, 17[78T, Morris,
John Jay p. 4 64; Lund in. Cockpit of the Revolution
pp. 130-131; "Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Philadelphia,
Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB 9, no. 2 (1885): 196.
,

,

2S

Abraham Clark to
Dayton, October 26, 1776,
American Archives 5 th ser., 2:1249.
[

Force

,

]

,

27

Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 4 17 81
Reed, Joseph Reed 2:352; see also Nathanael Greene to the
President of the Continental Congress, December 7, 1780,
Greene, Nathanael Greene 3:546.
,

,

,

28

Robert D. Bass Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of
General Thomas Sumter pp. 202-204; M. F. Treacy Prelude
to Yorktown The So uthern Campaign of Nathanael Gree ne 1780,

,

,

:

17 81

,

p~4T:
29

John M. Beeckman et al., to George Clinton,
September 10, 1778, Hastings, Public Pa pers of George
Clinton, 4:20; James Millen to Robert Howe, .March 9, 1780,
ibIdT7~552-553; VJilliam Heath to George Clinton, October 19,
1781, ibid., 7:418; Victor Hugo Paltsits, Minutes of th e
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Civilian leaders constantly complained
about
plundering and frequently asked that it be
stopped.

So

concerned about the plundering in their state,
the Maryland
Council declared "every Act of Violence or Invasion
of pri-

vate Property, by the Military, ought to be enquired
into,

redressed and, in future, prevented

The states provided

Commissioners for Detecting and D efeatincr Conspiracies in
the State of New York: Albany County Sess"Tons~i:7 7 8 -17 8r^"~
1:300-301; [Ebenezer Fox]
The~ Revolutionary Adventures of
Ebenezer Fox, of Roxbury, M assachusetts^fBostnn r4nT^;^7^^~7^^
Francis, 1838), pp. 48-49, 51; General Orders, Pennypacker,
Va lley Forge Orderly Book p. 131; Colonel William Campbell's
General Orders, Draper, King's Mountain Appendix, p. 532;
Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sumter, April 15, 1781, Edward'
McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution
1780-1783 7 p. 142.
,

'

r

,

,

'

30

Henry Laurens to William Thomson, July 13, 1775,
A. S. Sal ley, Jr., The History of Orangeburg County, South
Carolina from Its First Settlement to the Close of the
Revolutionary War p. 394; Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson,
Jr., January 12, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson
4:344; Thomas Nelson, Jr., to Marquis de Lafayette,
August 3, 1781, Mcllwaine, Official Letters of the Gover nors
of Virginia
3:20; Proclamation by John Rutledge, August~l,
1781, Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumte r, p. 182; Minutes of
the Executive Council, Chandler, Revolutionary Records of
Georgia, 2:14 8-14 9; Providence Town Council to Horatio Gates,
August 3, 1779, Stone, Our French Allies pp. 140-141;
Joseph Reed to the Continental Board of War, March 8, 1779,
Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives 1st ser., 7:230; Continental
Board of War to Casimer Pulaski, March 9, 1779, ibid., 233,
234; The Maryland Council of Safety to Nathaniel Smith,
January 18, 1777, Browne, Maryland Archives 16:58; The
Maryland Council to William Smallwood, March 29, 1782, ibid.,
48:117; Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler, August 27, 1779,
MHSC 7th ser., 2:428; Ford, JCC, 11:571; Proclamation of
Governor William Livingston, The Pennsylvan i a Packet, or
General Adve rtiser February 11, 1777.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,
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The Maryland Council to David Poe, November 25,
17 81, Browne, Maryland Archives, 48:6.
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in their articles of War and in resolutions
prohibitions

against plundering by the military.

They also adopted

policies they hoped would discourage plundering.
for example,

New Jersey,

in 1777, ordered that no more than six militia

were to go about without an officer.
were expected to enforce this rule.

Colonels of regiments

Officers in Rhode

Island were held responsible for the damage done by their
soldiers.

Connecticut soldiers, who went on expeditions

to Long Island to capture prisoners, were required to give

bonds not to plunder.

To ensure soldiers did not plunder

in a so-called neutral ground in South Carolina,

they were

removed by order of the government from that area. 32

Realizing the importance of private property, and
being chastised by the civilian governments because soldiers
had violated private property, many officers took an active

interest in the plundering problem.

Washington and other

commanding officers constantly reminded their subordinates
of the necessity of keeping a careful v;atch over their

soldiers so as to prevent plundering.

33

Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island 7:344, 495;
Hoadly, Public Records of the Sta te of Connec ti cut 2:34 6347; The Pennsylvania Packe t, o r. General Adve rt iser
February 11, 17 77; William Henry Drayton and William Tennet
to the South Carolina Council of Safety, August 7, 1775,
1:13 2.
Gibbe s Document a^ry_Jii£tory _ of _t^
,

,

,

,

^^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, \^i^i2£S__Oif _Washing ton
4:514; 6:8-9; 9:199, 243; 20:34; 25:309; George Washington
to William Heath, March 19, 1776, ibid., 4:409; George
Washington to Israel Putnam, August 25, 1776, ibid., 5:488;

489

Greene, for example, told one young officer that
"You cannot treat the inhabitants with too much delicacy,"
.

.

.

"nor should the least encouragement be given to the

soldiers, either to invade the property of the people, or

offer them any personal insults -This conduct it is which
.

has made the British so very odious.

"^"^

The officers

constantly issued orders prohibiting plundering, frequently

accompanying such orders with the threat of swift and sure
punishment.

35

The officers also issued orders prohibiting

General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General
Washington pp. 27-28; General Orders, Lauber, Orderly
Books, p. 402; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge
Orderly Book p. 54; Division Orders, Orderly Book of the
First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War
of the Revolution
2:390; Ford, General Orders Issued by
Ma jor-General Israel Putnam p. 37; Samuel H. Parson's
Orders, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons p. 89; Henry Haller's
Orders, Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County
Pennsylvania, in the Revolution, from 1774 to 1783, p. 94;
Lachlan Mcintosh's Orders, Lilla M. Hawes, ed., ^he Papers
of Lachlan Mcintosh, 1774-1799," GHQ 28, no. 3 (September
1954): 260; Nathanael Greene to Anthony Wayne, [December
2:277; Samuel H. Parsons
1781], Johnson, Nathanael Greene
to Samuel B. Webb, August 21, 1777, Webb, Samuel B. Webb
p. 263; William Fleming to William McClenechan, July 16,
1776, Thwaites, The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777
p. 169; Philip Schuyler to David Wooster, July 3, 1775,
Don R. Gerlach, Philip Schuyler and the American Revolution
pp. 284-285.
in New York 1733-1777
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

^^Nathanael Greene to Joseph Egleton, October 21,
1781, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 46, WLCL.
^^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing4:390, 477, 514; 9:178; 3:414; 5:501; 22:269, 443;
Orderly Book of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, Hazard,
Pennsylvania Ar chives 2d ser., 11:299 Pennypacker, VaUey
F^^^Orderly Book, pp. 32 42-43 65 201, 205, 250-251
300-301; General Orders, Campbell, Orderly Book
297-298
ton,

;

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,.

490

The officers also issued orders prohibiting the
taking of

property from Tories or property found in so-called neutral
General, Brigade, Division and Regimental Orders in
Lauber, Orderly Boo ks, pp. 38-39, 94, 369, 440, 480, 534,
607-608, 695; General Greene's Orders, Orderly Book of the
First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Penn sylvan ia in the War
of the R evolution
2:594-595; General Wayne's Orders" for
the First and Second Pennsylvania Brigades, ibid., 2:356;
General Orders of the Right Wing of the Army, ibid., p. 460;
General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General
Washington pp. 72-73, 117; Ford, Samuel Blachl iy~Webb
1:245, 293, 294-295; General Parson's Orders, ibidT7~3'09;
General Parson's Brigade Orders, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons,
p. 216; General Orders, John W. Jordan, [ed.]
"Ord^FliTBook
of the Pennsylvania State Regiment of Foot, May 10 to
August 16, 1777," PMHB 22, no. 2 (1898): 203; ibid., 22,
no. 3 (1898) 306
General Wayne's Orders, "Notes and Queries,"
ibid., 25, no. 3 (1901): 424; General Orders, "Elisha
Williams' Diary of 1776," ibid., 48, no. 4 (1924): 337, 344;
Regimental Orders, "Revolutionary Orderly Book of Capt
Jeremiah Putnam of Danvers, Mass. In the Rhode Island Campaign. July 10, 1779-December 19, 1779," HCEI 46, no. 4
(October 1910): 339; ibid., 42, no. 1 (January 1911): 48;
Brigade Orders, "Orderly Book of Capt. Simeon Brown, Colonel
Wade's Regiment, Rhode Island Campaign, 1778," ibid., 58,
no. 3 (July 1922): 254; Brigade Orders, Joseph Brown Turner,
ed
The Journal and Order Book o f Captain Ro bert Kir kwood
of t he Delaware Re gime nt of the Contin ental Line (Wilmington:
Historical Society of Delaware, 1910), pp. 150-151; General
Orders, ibid., p. 181; General Orders, "Revolutionary Army
Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779]," VMHB
18, no. 2 (April 1910): 171; Regimental Orders, ibid., 20,
no. 1 (January 1912): 49; General Orders, "Orderly Book of
the Company of Captain George Stubblef ield Fifth Virginia
Regiment, from March 3, 1776, to July 10, 1776, Inclusive,"
VHSC, new ser., 6:146; General Orders of the Southern Army,
"Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-May 1780),"
SCHGM 14, no. 2 (April 1913): 101; Regimental Orders, Ford,
General Orders Issued by Ma jor-General Israel Putnam p. 85;
Christian Febiger's Regimental Orders in Captain Robert
Gamble's Order Book, Jos. A. Waddell, Annals of Augusta
2d. ed. "(Staunton,
Co unty, Virgini a, from_ 172j_to_j^821
Virginia: C. Russell Ca'ldv;ell, 1902), p. 271; General Orders,
M. E. Kinnan, Order Bo o k Kept b y Peter Kinnan_J uly 71776 (Princeton: Privately ' printed by Princeton
September 4
University^Press, 1931), p. 96; Colonel Brodhead s Orders,
Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779,"
p.
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areas, suggesting that if such property were
to be seized
it should be done by or with the approval of
the civilian
36
^
governments

The officers also took special precautions and
other

actions to curb plundering.

When Stark took command of the

garrison at Newport, Rhode Island, late in 1779, he had
guards placed in the streets to prevent plundering.

At West

Point, because soldiers picked apples and fruit in nearby

orchards, a guard was placed in the orchards to prevent such

practices

^"^

Besides having soldiers assigned to stop

.

plundering, commanding officers often required junior officers to be quartered with the soldiers, believing their

presence would be

a

deterrent.

38

As was discussed in chapter

General Greene's Orders, Henry P. Johnston, The
Campaig n around New York a nd Brooklyn, pt 2, p. 24; General
Sullivan's Orders, ibid., p. 28'.
p.

425;

.

36

Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan Mcintosh, July 15,
1779, Banjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #3)
General Orders Issued by General
Lincoln, September 2 1777 ibid.
(Microfilm Reel #2)
Tench Tilghman to
?
March 17, 1777, Tilghman, Tench
Tilghman p, 155; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Wri ting s of
Washington 6:8-9, 104-105; 7:109-200; 22:327-328 444"^
General Orders, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke
(August 1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 16, no. 1 (January 1915): 42;
;

,

[

,

]

,

;

,

,

,

,

ibid,, 17, no.

1

(January 1916):

37

Stark, John Stark
Orderly Books p. 4 02

,

p.

30,
81;

General Orders, Lauber,

,

3R

Division Orders, Orderly Book of the First Pennsylvania Regiment Linn Pennsylv ania in the W ar of th e
Revolution, 2:390; Bliven7~Under the Guns, p. 225.
,

,
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six,

frequent roll calls were employed as

a

means of keeping

soldiers near camp where they had less chance to plunder.

Additionally, soldiers were often restricted to the distance
they could be from camp. 39

And besides punishing those

found guilty of plundering, those indirectly involved were

oftentimes punished.

For instance, during the summer of

1780, Washington ordered that anybody found around fires

of burning fences would be considered of plundering, whether
or not they cut them down.

40

McDougall attempted to limit

plundering by threatening those caught in the act with being
turned over to civilian authorities for trial and punishment
"The consequence," he wrote Clinton,

"had been that not a

single panel of fence has been burned" as the soldiers v/ere
more fearful of civil punishment than military punishment

especially as the former would have the tendency to lessen
their reputation at home.

41

Plundering was the taking of an individual's property by force by individual or small groups of soldiers;

impressing was the seizing of one or more person's property,
often systematically, by

Book

,

a

body of soldiers, with or without

^^General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly
p. 98.
pp. 166, 168; Lauber, Orderly Books
,

^^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
V7ashington

,

20 :75

.

^"^Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, November
1778, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p, 200.

5,
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civilian government approval.

Most civilian leaders opposed

impressing, authorized or not, and attempted to have their

governments avoid it whenever possible.

Even the word

"impressing," the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council
told Sullivan, was "repugnant."

Washington and most offi-

cers also preferred not to impress, unless it was absolutely

necessary.

They did not desire to impress as to do so meant

the soldiers were more likely to violate private property in
the process.

And more importantly, because taking property,

even with civilian government approval, alienated from the

revolutionary cause those from whom the property
impressed.

44

v/as

Clair believed that impressing had not

St.

only the disadvantages just mentioned, but as he told Robert
42

William Livingston to George V7ashington, February 16,
1778, Sedgwick, William Livingston p. 261; Corner, Autobiography of Benjamin Rush p. 14 7; Hoadly, Public Rec o rds of
the State of C onnecticut 3:288; Duane Extracts f rom th e
Diary of ChrTstopher Marshall p. 255; A Petition and Remonstrance from the Freeholders of Prince VJilliam County,
December 10, 1781, by George Mason, Rutland, Papers of
George Mason, 2:706-711; Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph
Reed, February 21, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:94.
,

,

,

,

,

^^The Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council to John
Sullivan, May 21, 1779, Hammond, Letters and Paper s of John
Sullivan 3:28-31.
,

Heath to John Sullivan, July 29 1778,
ibid., 2:146; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Sim Lee,
April 17, 1781, Browne, Maryla nd A rchives, 47:197; Robert
Lawson to Thomas Jefferson, January 28, 1781, Boyd, P apers
4:460; Richard McCarty to John Todd,
of Th omas Jefferson
October 14 1780 Palmer, Calend ar of Vi rgini a State P ape_rs,
August 27 1780,
1 380; George VJashington to~Wi"lliam Greene,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:217.
"^"^William

,

,

,

,

,

:
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Morris, after learning the Board of War had authorized
impressing, "The people are already not

a

little jealous

of the army, and such an exertion of what will appear to

them military power, can not but produce mischievous

effects

.

45

The military often went to great lengths to avoid

impressing.

During the summer of 1781, Washington drew

nine thousand dollars of the sum of monies sent by Massachusetts to pay their troops, and placed it in the hands of
the Quartermaster General with orders to pay for the trans-

portation of the army's supplies.
avoid impressing teams.

Washington wanted to

Earlier that year, Lafayette to

lessen the impressing burden, whenever possible, impressed

oxen rather than horses.

And later that year, to avoid

imposing additional burdens on the citizens of Riclimond,
St.

Clair seized some sixty horses being sent from Annapolis

to Greene's army

m

the Carolmas.

46

Despite their dislike of impressing and attempts to

avoid it, the military were frequently forced into situations

1777,

Clair to Robert Morris, November 13,
Clair Papers 1:459; see also 458-459.

"^^Arthur St.
Smith, The St.

,

The Diaries of George
Fitzpatrick, ed
Was hington 1748-1799 2:208; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas
j^ferson, March 17, 1781, Gilbert Chinard, [ed.]. The
Letter s of L afayett e and_ Jef f er so^n The Johns Hopkins
Studies irTTnternatlonal Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), p. 26; Same to same, April 17, 1781, ibid.,
November 14,
p. 37; Arthur St. Clair to George Washington,
1781, Smith, The S t. Clai r Papers^, 1:563-564
"^^John C.

.
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,
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where they requested permission from civilian
authorities
to impress.

Such requests were often accompanied by
a

threat to impress, even if authority was not granted.

Some

officers, however, did not even request permission or
even

threaten before they impressed, as the exigencies of the
war, particularly the lack of supplies,

forced them to

impress on their own authority.
In the south,

especially after 1780, many commanding

officers, including Armand, Gist, and V7ayne, resorted to

unauthorized impressing when the necessity arose.
Lafayette was perhaps the commanding officer in the Southern

Department who impressed the most without authority.

Almost

imniediately after arriving in Virginia, he sent word to

Jefferson that circumstances would oblige him to requisition
goods however unpopular it was.

He made a similar declara-

tion to Jefferson's successor, Thomas Nelson, informing him
47

.

.

Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in
the Continental Congress, January 11, 1782, Hutchinson,
Papers of James Madison 4:25; Benjamin Harrison to Charles
Armand-Tuf f in December 6 17 81 Mcllwaine Official Letters
of the Governors of Virginia 3:107; Same to same,
ibid
120 Same to same January 1 2
January 3, 1782
1782, ibid., 127-128; Same to same, September 2, 1782, ibid.,
17 81
315 Mordecai Gist to Thomas Sim Lee March 3
Alexis Shriver Lafayette in Harford County 1781 An
J
Account of the Eve nts Attending the Passage of the Marquis
de La Fayett^ and his Troops t hrough H arford County in 17 81
and of Subseque nt'^Events to the Surrender of CornwaTlis
TBelair Maryland Privately Printed, 1931), pp. 53 -54;
Evans, Thomas Nelson, p. 108.
,
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that Virginia's governnicnt must understand that often in
sight of the enemy he had been forced to impress without

their approval.

Earlier in the war there was much unauthorized
impressing in the northern theater of operations, particularly in the so-called neutral areas, such as VJestchester
County, New York.

A considerable amount of unauthorized

impressing also took place on the frontier, especially at

Kaskaskia and Fort Pitt. 4 9

Civilian authorities frequently reprimanded or
punished those officers who impressed without their approval,

especially when mechanisms to obtain needed supplies existed.
48

Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 20,
1781, Boyd, Pap ers of Thoma s Jefferson, 5:189; Marquis de
Lafayette to Thomas Nelson, October 31, 1781, Idzerda,
Lafayette in the Age of the Ame r ican Revolution 4:434; see
also MarquTs de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, April 17,
5:477; Same to same,
17 81, Boyd, Papers of Tho m as Jeffe r son
April 21, 17 8T~rbi:d77 523
,

,

.
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Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, January 29,
1779, Hastings, Public Pape rs of George Clin t on 4:504;
Alexander McDougall to wTlliam Hull, March 28, 1779, Campbell, Willi a m Hull pp. 278, 279; Solomon Sherwood to
William Hull, April 28, 1779, ibid., p. 281; Lachlan Mcintosh
to the Magistrates of Westmoreland County, October 21, 1778,
Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779,"
,

,

p.

147.

^^Lincoln, Jojurnals of Each Pr ovincial Congre_ss__of
Massachuse tts pp. 260-261; John Rutledge to Francis Marion,
OcTober 10, 17 81, Gibbes, Documentary ^J:_s tor Y.^9.L.J:h% J^I^^^^j-——
Revolution, 3:1 86, 187; John" Mathews "to Francis Ma'rion,
1782
ibid., 2:157; Same to same, April 1 8
ApriT~rd',~17 82
ibid., 167-168; Bernard C. Steiner, We_sjtern_J^arylan_d^ in
Revolution, John Hopkins University Studies in Historical
and^PoTitTcal Science, vol. 20, no. 1 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1902), p. '.0.
,

,

,

,
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Realizing they would probably be chastised or punished for
impressing without civilian authorization, some officers

attempted to soften the blow by apologizing immediately
before or after they had done

so.^"^

They also gave explana-

tions, or justified their actions on the basis of military

necessity, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Just as protecting property from being ravaged by
the American military forces was of great concern to the
civilians, so too was their concern of keeping their homes

protected from quartering by the military.

Quartering was

an important aspect of the Whig revolutionary rhetoric, so

much so that many Whigs maintained that British quartering
was one of the reasons for the break with the mother
country.

52

So concerned were the Whigs about quartering

that most state constitutions contained prohibitions against

quartering of troops in times of peace in any house without
the consent of the owner, and generally during war only with

the consent of the legislature.

53

Mordecai Gist to Thomas Simm Lee, April 17, 1781,
Browne, Maryland Archives 47:197; Marquis de Lafayette to
Thomas Jefferson, March 17, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in
Virginia p. 7.
,

,

^^William Hooper to Robert Morris, February 1, 1777,
NYHSC, 11 (1878): 418; Patrick Henry's Speech before the
Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 16, 1788, Jonathan
3:411.
Elliot, The Debates in t e_jeveral_State_Con vent ion
,

^^"Hints for the Consideration of Mr. Gerry and Such
others of the Honble Congress as he Shall judge proper to
advise with thereon," by Joseph Hawley, [January 1776], Paul
Fullman and George M. Elsey, [eds.], "More Hints from JoGoph

.
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For the most part, the military shared
the commonly
held aversion to quartering and therefore
went out of their
way to avoid it, by building barracks, using
public buildings, paying rent, and avoiding towns altogether

Despite their efforts to avoid the necessity of
quartering troops among civilians there were instances
illegal quartering.

of

Generally this was early in the war

when the legislatures had not yet made provisions for other
forms of housing arrangements.

Such actions were condemned

by the civilian authorities, as they had little tolerance
for violations against the sanctity of the home.^^

Hawley January 1776," Publications of the Colonial Society
of Massachusetts
Transactions 34 (1937-1942): 402; Joseph
Hawley to Elbridge Gerry, February 18, 1776, Austin, Elbridge
Gerry 1:162-163; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to
New Hampshire 9:857; Proceedings of the Convention of the
Delaware State p. 20; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, feds.],
The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 p. 447; Boyd, Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 1:378 431; William Clarence WebsteF^,^
"Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American
Revolution," AAAPSS 9 (January- June 1897): 387.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,
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Chandler, Revolutionary R ecords of Georgia, 2:86;
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island 7:532; 9:469; Hoadly,
Public Records of the State of Connecticut 1:471-472; Scharf,
History of Maryland^ 2:296; Duane Extracts from the Diary
of Christopher Marshall pp. 115, 116; Balch, Journal of
Claude Blanchard p. 75; George Clinton to John Greaton,
January 24, 1776, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton
1:218; The Pennsylvania Evening Post January 25, 1777.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,
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Nicholas Cooke to William Richmond, March 30, 1776,
Matt. B. Jones, [ed.], "Revolutionary Correspondence of
Governor Nicholas Cooke 1775-1781 ," P_AAS new ser., 36
(April 14-October 20, 1926): 313; Nicholas Cooke to Henry
Babcock, March 30, 1776, ibid., 313; Nicholas Cooke to
George Washington, April 23, 1776, ibid., 320-321; Robert

Just as plundering, impressing, and
quartering were
seen as challenges to civilian authority,
so were
the seiz-

ing of Tories and administering oaths by
the military.

Early in the war, fearing the military might
take the Tory
problem into their own hands, Congress recommended
the

states adopt measures to render the Tories harmless.

Although most states did adopt measures to control the
Tories, the military usually found such measures were
inef-

fective.

Therefore, it is not surprising to find the

military threatening to take matters into their own hands
unless the civilian governments gave more force to their
measures.

General Lee often threatened to act if the

civilian government did not.

When the Virginia government

refused to relocate Tories from an area of military operations, he forced many Tories to leave their homes, and even

burned out one Tory family who refused.

Mostly, the

military did not even threaten before they took Tory matters
into their hands.

They simply acted.

This was certainly

the way Lee operated.

Morris to Horatio Gates, April 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee
4
Papers," NYHSC,
(1872): 388; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The
Revolution in Virginia pp. 90-91.
,

^^Ford, JCC, 3:280;
57

4:18-20,

205.

Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 467-469.

500

At the invitation of Rhode Island's chief executive,

Lee went to that colony late in 1775 to assist them v^ith

their coastal defenses.

Reaching Nev/port on Christmas day,

he was appalled to find the town teeming with an active Tory

element.

Therefore, on his own authority, he arrested eight

of the most prominent Tories and tendered to them "a most

solemn oath of allegiance to the Continental Congress."
three who refused to accept it were jailed.

The

Both Washington

and the Rhode Island legislature congratulated him for his

spirited efforts.

5 8

For Lee, this was license to continue

seizing Tories without consulting civilian authorities.

At

least this is what Lee believed as he headed south to New

York to assist in the fortification of New York City.
Once in New York, and seeing that the provincial

government was taking no action against the Tories, Lee
decided he would act against the Tories when an opportunity

presented itself.

Early in March, receiving news that

he was to be reassinged to the Southern Department,

he implemented his program against the Tories,

Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 3, 1776,
Continental
ibid
233; Charles Lee to the President of the
Congress, January 22, 1776, ibid., 248; Charles Lee to
Nicholas Cooke, January 6, 1776, Matt B. Jones, [ed.],
"Revolutionary Correspondence of Governor Nicholas Cooke
1775-1781," PAAS new ser. 36 (April 14, 1926-October 20,
the
300-301; George Washington to the President of
1926)
Continental Congress, December 31, 1775, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, 4:197.
:

,

.
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leaving the consequences to his successors if
the civilian

authorities objected.

After notifying the Provincial

Congress and Congress of his plan, but not waiting
for their
approval, Lee, on the fifth of March, ordered Isaac
Sears
to offer a test to every suspected Tory in Queens.

Those

that refused to take the oath were to be arrested and
sent
to Connecticut for confinement.

tion to Lee's oath.

59

There was great opposi-

"To impose a Test," John Jay wrote,

"is a sovereign act of Legislation and when the army becomes

our Legislators, the People that Moment become
In Congress,

Slaves. "^°

the New York delegates questioned Lee's actions

As they explained to the New York government:

We took up the Subject on general Principles.
There
can be no Liberty where the military is not subordinate to the civil power, in every thing not immediately
connected with their Operations. Your House, the
natural and proper Tribunal for all civil matters
within the Circle of your Jurisdiction, was assembled,
and Congress itself within the General's reach, ready
to enforce every reasonable Proposition for the
publick safety. To one or other he ought to have
applied
A Similar Effort in Rhode-Island had passed
over unnoticed reiterated Precedents must become
dangerous; we therefore conceive it to be our
unquestionable Duty to assert the Independence and
.

;

59

Charles Lee to Joseph Reed February 28 177 6
4
(1872): 333-334; Charles
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC
Lee to the President of the New York Provincial Congress,
March 4, 1776, ibid., 345; Charles Lee to Isaac Sears,
March 5, 1776, ibid., 346; Charles Lee to the President of
the Continental Congress, March 5, 1776, ibid., 348.
,

,

,

John Jay to Alexander McDougall, March 13, 1776,
Richard B Morris Seven _Wh^ Shape d Our Destiny: The Fou nding
Fathers as Revolutionaries p 18 5
.

,

,
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to this unwarrantable Invasion
of^i^i^^i^j;
ot
Its Rights by one of their Officers. 61

"However salutary such a measure might be,
when governed on
a legal and constitutional basis," they
told Congress, "we

were much alarmed that it should owe its authority
to any
military officer, however distinguished for his
zeal, his

rank, his accomplisliments

,

and services."

"There can be

no liberty where the military is not subordinate to
the

civil power in everything not immediately concerned with
their operations."

Therefore, they requested Congress to

"assert the independence and superiority of the civil power"

with respect to Lee's action.

Although most members of

Congress saw the necessity of the oath in New York, they
were opposed to the military imposing it, and therefore on
the ninth of March they adopted a resolution prohibiting
the military from imposing upon, exacting, or requiring of

any inhabitant of the colonies, any oath.

Three days

earlier, the New York Provincial Congress inforined Lee that
a Long Island

resident had been apprehended in

Nev;

York City

by a military guard and forcibly taken to Connecticut with-

out them being informed of such action.

They wanted Lee to

James Duane, John Jay, Lewis Morris, and John
Alsop to the New York Convention, March 15, 1776 Burnett,
LMCC, 1:389.
,

62

Richard Henry Lee to Charles Lee, March 25, 1776,
ibid., 408; Ford, JCC, 4:203-204, 195.

.
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inform them of the charges so the prisoner
could either be
punished or released, and reminded Lee the
right of apprehending, trying, and punishing citizens belonged
to the

civilian authorities.

"This right we think it our duty to

insist upon, as essential to the security of our
constituents."

They told Lee they hoped to be able to cooperate

with him, but reminded him that "it becomes us, as
faithful

guardians of the people, to protect the liberty and property
of our constituents as much as possible in our present

unhappy situation."

The same day, Lee, in a letter to the

President of the Provincial Congress acknowledged their
authority, explained why he had taken such hasty action,
and expressed regret, but also stated he would continue to

seize professed Tories who constituted

a

threat, as it was

his duty to Congress, New York, and his own conscience

Before the Provincial Congress could respond to Lee's letter,
the general left town on the seventh of March to take command
of the Southern Department.

Shortly after arriving in Virginia, Lee took action
against the Tories in Princess Anne and Norfolk counties.
To Virginia's Committee of Safety he explained his actions

had been predicated upon military necessity and assured them
63

The New York Provincial Congress to Charles Lee,
March 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872):
349-350; Charles Lee to the President of the New York
Provincial Congress, March 6, 1776, ibid., 351-352.
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that if they found him too much in the province
of the civil

power it would be entirely by mistake, not design.

The

Committee of Safety accepted his explanation and assurances,
believing his action was "one of the inevitable consequences
of this kind of war" and agreeing that "what the public

safety seems to require, should be immediately done, even
tho'

some injury may arise to innocent individuals."

They

only asked they be kept informed, as they were the representatives of the people.

Lee complied, even asking twice

that specific actions be taken against the Tories without
first taking the action on his own authority.

His dealings

with Maryland, with respect to actions against the Tories,
was not so amicable.
Early in April 1776, Lee, then at Williamsburg,

Virginia, obtained a packet of letters containing correspondence between Maryland

'

s

royal Governor Eden and British

officials, wherein Eden recommended that

a

British regiment

be sent to Maryland to insure that colony's allegiance to the

crown

•

Instead of sending the letters to Maryland

'

s

Council

of Safety, which was chaired by moderate Daniel St. Thomas

Jenifer, Lee forwarded them to Samuel Purviance

,

the radical

chairman of the Baltimore County Committee of Observation.
Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776, ibid.,
467-469; Same to same, May 11, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 23;
Charles Lee and Robert Hov;e to Edmund Pendleton, May 10 1776
ibid., 21; Edmund Pendleton to Charles Lee, May 5, 1776, ibid.,
,

4

(1872)

:

470,

471.

,
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In doing so, Lee claimed ignorance of who
should properly

receive the letters, and suggested Purviance,
using Lee's
name as his authority, order the arrest of Eden.

teristic style, Lee told Purviance "The sin
head.

I

&

In charac-

blame be on my

will answer for all to ye' Congress. "^^

Receiving

the letters from Lee on the fourteenth of April, Purviance

ordered Samuel Smith to seize the Governor in Annapolis.
Smith, upon arriving in Annapolis and reporting to the

Maryland Council of Safety, was severely reprimanded by the
civilian authorities.

By evening he was sent back to

Baltimore without attempting to arrest the governor.

The

following day, William Paca and several other Maryland

revolutionary leaders called on Eden, confronting him with
the letters.

Eden was able to assure them he did not

intend to inflame the ministry.

To a large extent, they

wanted to be assured, for the Maryland Council of Safety

desired to keep from having to seize the governor and thereby,
they beleived, create a situation that could produce anarchy
6S

Charles Lee to Samuel Purviance, April 6, 1776,
ibid., 381; The Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), April 25, 1776;
Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American Revolution,
p.

98.
66

Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the
Young Republic: Samuel Smi th~Q"f "Tiar y land 1 752-1839 pp 14Sam uel Smith and the Politics of
15; John Silas Pancake
Bu siness 1752-1839 (University, Alabama: University of
Alabama Press, 1972)
p. 7.
,

,

,

,

,
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in the colony. ^7

Learning that the Council of
Safety had
not acted, Purviance sent copies
of the Eden letters

to the

President of Congress, attaching an
unsigned letter of his
own, severely condeinning the Council
of Safety and taking
responsibility for sending Smith to
Annapolis.
President
Hancock read Purviance s letter aloud
to Congress
'

and,

despite attempts by Maryland's delegates
to stop them.
Congress approved Maryland's seizure of
the

royal governor.

The Council of Safety, upset with
both the Baltimore

civilian leaders and the military, ordered
Purviance, Smith,
and several others to appear before them to
defend their

presumptuous action.

After examining them, the Council of

Safety reprimanded Purviance and excused Smith, as
he had

only been following orders.

The real culprit, they declared,

was Lee, because he did not send them the original corres-

pondence and had encouraged Purviance to act.

The Maryland

Convention, which assembled in May, censured Purviance for
67 ^
The

Maryland Council of Safety to John Hancock,
April 18, 1776, Browne, Maryl and Archives 11:349-350;
Governor Eden to Charles Carroll, John Hall, and William
Paca, April 16, 1776, ibid., 337-338; The Maryland Council
of Safety to Governor Eden, April 18, 1776, ibid., 338-339;
The Maryland Council of Safety to the Maryland Delegates in
the Continental Congress, [April 18, 1776], ibid., 339-341;
Same to same, [April 19, 1776], ibid., 354-356.
,

68

Thomas Johnson, Jr., to the Maryland Council of
Safety, April 17, 1776, ibid., 347-348; Thomas Johnson, Jr.,
Thomas Stone, and Robert Alexander to the Maryland Council
of Safety, April 18, 1776, ibid., 351-352; John Hancock to
the Maryland Council of Safety, April 16, 1776, ibid,,
334-335.
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of my present office, and serve as a volunteer."

He also

explained his actions to Congress.
In July,

after the Maryland Convention had asked

Eden to leave the colony the previous month, the chairman
of the Maryland Council of Safety wrote Lee that the Mary-

land government had forgiven him, for Eden's conduct had

justified his sentiment about having him seized.

However,

Lee was additionally informed that the manner in which he

had adopted to have Eden seized was not palatable to them. 71

Although Lee was probably the most active officer
taking the Tories to task on his own authority, many others
did so, including Washington.

with

a

Isaac Sears, in November 1775,

force of seventy-five horsemen, on his own authority

began waging war on New York's Tories.

He seized and con-

fined several leading Tories in Westchester County, and in

New York City he destroyed the printing press of the Tory
printer, Rivington,

Sears believed his actions would moti-

vate New York's Provincial Congress to take actions of their
own against the Tories.

The Provincial Congress did not act,

fearing to do so would result in civil war and social

Charles Lee to Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer,
May 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872):
472-474; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, May 7, 1776, ibid., 477.
of St. Thomas Jenifer to Charles Lee,
ibid., 5 (1873): 141.

'^"'"Daniel

July 17, 1776,
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disorder, and eventually anarchy and military tyranny.

"^^

On their own authority during the first months of
1776, Lord

Stirling had New Jersey's royal governor, Franklin,
placed
under arrest, and New Jersey Colonel Nathaniel Heard seized
four New York Tories and marched them off to confinement in

New Jersey.

The four v;ere later returned to New York for

trial and Governor Franklin was given

a

parole by Stirling

at the insistence of Chief Justice Smythe, but was eventually

arrested by Heard upon the order of the Provincial Congress.
Also early in 1776, the Rhode Island Assembly freed four
suspected Tories General William

VJest

had confined.

In

doing so, they stated they would "ever approve the conduct
of their military commanders, in exerting themselves for the

securing and bringing to trial all persons conducting in

suspicious manner,

...

a

at the same time carefully observing

not to encroach upon, infringe, or supersede the civil
authority, by exertions of the military."

74

Early in the war, Washington also took Tory matters
into his own hands.

On January 25, 1777, he issued a

72

Isaac Sears to Roger Sherman, Eliphalet Dyer, and
Silas Deane, November 28, 1775, Feinstone Collection #1254;
Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, November 26, 1775, Syrett,
Papers of Alexand er Hamilton 1:176-178; Journal of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Conve ntion, C omm itt ee of Safety,
and Councjr~of~Saf ety ~of th e State o f New York 1:333,335,
,

,

3lT;~35"5T

Valentine, Lord Stirling, pp. 160-161; Bliven,
Under t he Guns, pp. 148-149, 299.
'^^Alan

"^^Bartlett,

Records of Rhode Island, 7:467-4 68.

.
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proclamation requiring that anybody who had taken an
oath
of allegiance to the crown must either take an oath
of

allegiance to the United States or be treated as an enemy.
He also required all who had received Lord Howe's protection

passes to deliver them up to the nearest military officer
or withdraw themselves and their families into the British

lines.

Those that failed to comply with the proclamation

within thirty days were to be treated as enemies.

A week

later, when General Parsons asked Washington v;hat actions
he should take against the Connecticut Tories with respect
to an oath, VJashington sent him a copy of his proclamation,

suggesting he modify it for his own use.

Washington

'

7

fi

action raised two important questions

s

One was whether any oath be to the United States or to

a

particular state and the other was whether or not the military should give oaths.

Upset with Washington for making

the oath to Congress rather than to the states

violating the March

9

,

1116

,

,

and for

congressional resolution pro-

hibiting the mil i tar y from imposing or requiring oaths of
citizens, two New Jersey delegates introduced

a

resolution

in Congress on the sixth of February questioning Washing-

ton's actions and authority.
75

F it zpa trick

,

One of them wrote the Speaker

Writings o f

VJa

shington, 7:61-63.

Parsons to George Washington, February 3,
1777 Hall, San}E?l_y2l^??l-?^-?^^' P' '^^l George Washington
to Samuel H. Parsons, February 8, 1777, ibid.
'^^Samuel H.

,
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of New Jersey's Assembly that the state should "not tamely

Submit their Authority to the Controul of
in our Constitution."

a

power unknown

Washington, however, was not chas-

tised by either Congress or New Jersey, in part because of
his recent victories at Trenton and Princeton and in part

because they believed Washington understood he was not to

administer any more oaths.

Not only was he not chastised,

but a congressional committee reported on the twenty-seventh
of February that "considering the situation of the Army,"

his action "was prudent and necessary." 7 7

While Congress was debating what to do about

Washington's proclamation. General Putnam, who disliked
Quakers because of their neutral stand, sent an officer to
Salem County, New Jersey, which was populated by many
Quakers, with instructions to collect fines from persons

refusing to march with New Jersey's militia.

Governor

Livingston, with Washington's backing, persuaded Putnam to
stop this practice.

7 8

During 1777, Washington also persuaded

the Commissary General of Prisoners from seizing a suspected
77

Abraham Clark to John Hart, February 8, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC 2:243; Abraham Clark to Elias Dayton, March 7,
William Livingston to George Washington,
292
1777, ibid
February 15, 17 77, Lundin, Cockpi t of the Revolution, p. 276;
,

.

Ford, JCC,

,

7:95,

;

165-166.

Lund in. Cockpit of the Revolut ion, pp. 240-241;
George Washington to^'William Livingston, February 22, 1777,
Fitzpatrick, W^ i ting s_o^ Washington, 7:186-187; George
Washington to' Israel Putnam, February 22 1777 ibid., 189.
,

,
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Tory and chastised General De Borre for having executed
Tory for an offense not cognizable by martial law.^^

a

It

was also in 1777 that a mob, assisted by soldiers, ran

William Goddard, publisher and editor of the Maryland
Jo urnal and Baltimore Advertiser, out of town for printing

what they considered unpatriotic news.

Although Maryland's

governor issued a proclamation prohibiting the people from
associating for the purpose of taking suspected traitors
to task, a mob came together again during the summer of

1779, with the assistance of Continental officers and

soldiers, to threaten Goddard for publishing

piece,

a

written by Charles Lee, critical of Washington.

Although

Goddard would later retract his apology to VJashington, his
initial apology was enough to satisfy the mob.

80

Frequent unauthorized military actions against the
Tories took place during the winter of 1777-1778, as the

military seized individuals trading
Philadelphia.

v/ith the

British in

Those seized often received corporal

79

Boudinot, Elia s Boud inot 1:51; Louis Clinton
Hatch, The Admi nis tra tion~^ f the American Revolutiona ry Army
VJashing ton and the Ge n erals
pp. 6 3-6Ti [Ruf us W. Grisv;old]
of the /American Revolution 2:230-231.
,

,

,

,

^^William Galbraith to the Council of State, March 26,
1777, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:190; Scharf, History of
Mar yland 2:306-308, 308n.l, 338; Clayton Colman Hall, gen.
(New York:
3 vols.
edT7"~BaTt2J5ore^Its_Kisto^
Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1912), 1:31-32, 34-35,
^V^^
709; Purviance, Baltimo re Town During Jjie Revolutionary
pp. '83-84
John Richard Alden ' Ge^neral_Charles I^^|__Tra^
or Patriot?, pp. 282-283.
,

;

,

"
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punishment and had their supplies confiscated.^"^

Often this

was done without benefit of trial, and when a trial was held,
it was a court martial.

The Pennsylvania government and

Congress were not in a very good position to halt these
actions by the military, nor were they really inclined to
do so.

Many citizens, hov;ever,

v;ere

concerned about the

military trying and punishing suspected traitors and Tories.
Earlier in the war, when Roger Sherman learned that the

military had executed

spy, he complained to Governor

a

Trumbull that the spy should have been tried by the superior
court of the colony, not by court martial.

He reminded the

"We cant be too careful of military incroachments

governor,

.

This view was certainly shared by the Delaware
Council, who, during the spring of 1778, drew up a remon-

strance against Smallwood for seizing Tories and transporting

them out of the state, and confining them, all without due

process of law.

83

When Arnold imposed martial law in

Philadelphia during June 1778, after the British evacuation,
there were few objections, as most citizens realized the

Scharf, History o f P_hij-adelPj}j--j-> 1: 374 Pennypacker, Valley F orge Orderly Book; P- 22 8; George Washington
1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archj.ve_s,
to John Lacey, April 11
6:410.
1st ser
;

,

.

MHSC

,

,

^^Roger Sherman to Jonathan Trumbull, May 26, 1776,
7th ser., 2:52.
^

^Minutes of the_Co^unc_i]^_of_the _D£lav^^^^

1776 to 17 9Trpp".~2lT7~^6-218

82
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necessity of it.

However, several months later, when

court martial sentenced

a

a

citizen to death for treason,

Chief Justice McKean and others strenuously objected, main-

taining a civilian trial should have been held.

The Supreme

Executive Council took the matter to Congress, which ruled
that a civilian trial be held and vacated the sentence of
the court martial.

Attacks against the Tories continued throughout the

remainder of the

v;ar.

They were particularly severe in the

south during 1781 and 1782, and often resulted in Tory

attacks against

^'Thig

citizens.

85

Even once victory was

assured, the Tories continued to have their lives, properties,

and liberties threatened.

The military frequently intimidated

the Tories at elections, trials, and during other civilian

proceedings.

86

In many such instances,

the civilian govern-

ments did not reprimand or punish the military, believing
84

Thomas McKean to the Supreme Executive Council of
Pennsylvania, August 22, 1778, Colonial Records of
Pennsylvania 11:561-562.
,

^^Enos Reeves to
], April 16, 1782, John B.
Reeves, [ed.], "Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant
Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 4
(1897): 474-475; Otho [H. Williams] to [Elie Williams],
June 12, 1781, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams
Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 46; Nathanael
n^^PnP tn Joseph Reed, Mav 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed 2:351.
[

,

^^Phillips Russell, North Carolina in the Revolution
ary War, p. 288; William Thompson Read, Li fe and Correspondence of George Read (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and
"The
p. 325; Harold B. Hancock, ed.,
Company, 1870)
Revolutionary War Diary of William Adair," DH 13, no. 2
(October 1968): 165, 165n.46.
,
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they were justified in their actions.

But in many more

instances the civilian governments reprimanded and punished

military officers for overstepping their authority, despite
justifications.
The military, v;ith a desire not to offend the civi-

lian authorities nor to be punished by them, generally

provided justifications and excuses for their actions which
had violated laws or tenets of civil supremacy.

excuses were simply pleading ignorance;

87

Often these

sometimes military

necessity was held forth; and infrequently the military
reminded the civilians that without an army there could not
be a successful revolutionary war.

Frequently the military complained they could not
be expected to comply with congressional and state policies,

resolutions, and articles of war if they did not have copies
of them.

88

"We are much in the dark with regard to the

resolution of Congress," General Moultrie complained.

"We

on

Alexander Hamilton to William Livingston, April 21,
17 77, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:235-236; John
Sullivan to the New Hampshire General Assembly, January 18,
Documents and Re co rds Relating to New
17 76, Bout on
Hampshire 8:37.
,

,

^^Hugh Mercer to Charles Lee, April 14, 1776, "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYKSC 4 (1872): 419; John Stark to
William Heath, September 20, 1781, Stark, John Stark p. 257;
Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W.
Wash^ington arM5_the_Generals_of_y2^_A^
Griswold]
lution, 1:298"; [Otho Holland^ Williams] to Baron von Steuben,
Holland
October 12 17 80 Cajjgndar j3f_thejGer^
p. 24.
Williams Papers in the Maryland jUstoric^]^^
,
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may be guilty of errors and neglect of duty," he
explained
to Henry Laurens,

"without the least intention of either."

In asking Jefferson for a complete set of Virginia's
laws,

Lafayette explained they were needed so he would not interfere with the authority of "or through ignorance Be deficient
in Respect to the Civil Authority."

oq

To some degree this excuse by the military was

justified.

For most of the war they experienced great

difficulty in obtaining copies of the resolutions of Congress,
as well as the state laws.

This was due to the fact that

both Congress and the states were dilatory in both publishing
and distributing their resolutions and laws.

90

The military also complained that the civilian

leaders did not keep them informed of policies, events, and

other matters which would better enable them to comply with
.

.

the wishes of the civilian authorities.
.

.
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Part of the

89

William Moultrie to Henry Laurens, June 5, 1778,
Moultrie, Memoirs of the Ame rican Revolution 1:217;
Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 17, 1781,
Chinard, Lafayette i n Virgin ia, pp. 7-8.
,

"The Journals and Papers of
The Continental Congress," Annual R eport of the 7\mer ican
Historical A ssociation for t he Year 1896 2 vols. (VJashing ton
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), 1:94-102; Roger
Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, July 12,
3:240; George Clinton to Robert Morris,
1781, MHSC, 7th ser
November 24, 17 81, Hastings, Public P apers of George Clinton
7:523.
^'^Herbert Friedenwald,

,

.

,

,

Mcintosh to George Washington, February 16,
1776, Sparks, Correspondence of the Am erican Revolution
1779
1:150-151; DanT¥l~Brodhea'd to Joseph Reed, November 4
Kellogg, "Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio 1779-1781,"
^"""Lachlan

,

,

,
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reason for the state chief executives and legislators not

adequately keeping the military informed was because they
lacked the necessary staffs to perform correspondence functions; lacked funds to pay express riders; and because their

governments and themselves were often incapacitated, being,
in the latter instances,

the British army.

92

killed, captured, and pursued by

Part of the reason also can be attri-

buted to an ineffective postal system, which subjected the
mail to being lost, stolen, delayed, and captured. 9 3
Most of the excuses the military used for having

violated the various tenets of civil supremacy involved
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, March 6, 1777,
Bartlett, Records of R hode Island, 8:212; Nathanael Greene
to George Washington August 26, 17 81, Greene, Nat hanael
Greene, 3:383; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, February 27,
2:378; Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush,
17 82, Reed, Joseph Reed
October 10, TTTTSlT "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4
(1872): 211-212; George Rogers Clark to Thomas Jefferson,
February 3, 17 79, Palmer, Calenda r o f Virgini a State Pa pers
1:315.

p.

109;

,

,

,

92

Benjamin Harrison to George Rogers Clark, December 20, 1781, Mcllwaine, Official Letters of the Govern ors
3:114; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall,
of Vi rginia
Hastings, Public Pap ers of G eorge Clinton
1778
April" 6
3:139-140; Nicholas Cooke to Nathanael Greene, July 8, 1775,
116.
RIHSC 6 (1897)
,

,

,

,

:

,

^^Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of the Executive
3D epartments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 pp. 15
171; John C. Fitzpatrick, New Light from Some of the Original Sou rces of Amer ican History, pp. 237-265; Wesley Everett,
The~H story of the_Un i t ed_ States Post Off ice to the Year
ISlgT^HarvardnEconomT^' Studies, vol. 27 (Cambridge: Harvard
UnTi^ersity Press, 1924 ), pp. 4 8-67; Francis Johnston to
Nathanael Greene, September 11, 1781, Ryan, A_S alutejto
Courage p. 247.
,

,

"

518

justifications of military necessity.

From the beginning

of the war, both the civilian and military leaders realized
the importance of the military to their revolutionary war.
.

there would be no victory. 94

VJithout the military,
.

reminded Pennsylvania

'

s

chief executive

,

As Greene

"The army is the

great object on which all political institutions must depend

ultimately

.

95

This is not to suggest the military continually

violated the tenets of civil supremacy and then justified
it upon military necessity,

for they supported the concept

of civil supremacy and, as has been discussed, attempted
to comply with the desires of the civilian authorities.

But there were instances when they felt justified in taking

actions they knew the civilian authorities would not approve.

Greene probably offered the excuse of military

necessity more than anybody else.

He began doing so the

first winter of the war, explaining in one instance that
^"^John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974), pp. 7'2-73; Russell F. V7eigley,

Towards an_Amer3^an _Ara
to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962),
Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 18, 1775,
p 4
Rogers
Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Captain
Blachley Webb,
to Samuel B. Webb, May 17, 1782, Ford, Samuel
2:398.
;

[

]

^^Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, June 29, 1780,
FitzReed, Joseph Reed, 2:217; see also General Orders,
patrick, WrjtTn gs of W ashing ton 5:245.
,

.
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.

519

"The Great Laws of Necessity must Justify the Expedient

This was with respect to the army seizing private property
to supply themselves.

As Quartermaster General, he would

be involved in many more seizures of private property.

leaving that position during the summer of

17 80,

Upon

he wrote

his friend, Joseph Reed, that
It is impossible to carry on a war without oppressing the Inhabitants in some degrees and however
disagreeable and inconvenient it may be to the
people, and to those in power, a regard to the
common good and general safety will justify the
measure; and th'o the people may be a little restless & impatient in the present hour, they will
have reason at a future day to bless those who had
resolution enough to consult and persue their true
;

interest
As commander of the Southern Department, he certainly acted

upon this belief

Late in 1780

.

,

he told North Carolina

'

governor that it was his wish "to pay the most sacred regard
to the laws and Constitution of the State, but the emergencies

of war often so pressing that it becomes necessary to invade
the rights of the citizens to prevent public calamities

.

He promised to preserve the property of the people from

unjust invasion, but reminded Governor Nash that the liberties of the people was the great object, the security of

Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 31,
1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; see also Same
1775 [1776], Showman, Papers_of ^neral
to same, January 4
Nathanaej^ Greene 1:17 7.
,

,

Hazard,

^"^Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, August 1, 1780,
8 475-476
Penn5y lvaji3j_Archi^ves 1st ser
,

.

,

:

.

.
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their property a little less so.

Therefore, if property

was seized and the people properly informed why it had
been
done, Greene believed they would not mind the inconvenience.^^

During the middle of February 1781, he wrote Virginia's

governor that

Necessity has and will oblige me to take many
measures to effect the removal of our Stores
contrary to the established laws of the different States; the occasion must justify the
measure, and I trust the Legislature will make
charitable allowances accordingly. The Army is
all that the States have to depend upon for their
political existence.
I trust therefore whatever
is necessary to its support will meet their
approbation
A month later, he wrote Jefferson that "civil polity must

accomodate itself to the emergencys of war
submit to the power of the enemy.

,

or the people

There is no other alterna-

In a more detailed explanation of military necessity,

tive."

late that April

,

he told Jefferson that "The rights of

Individuals are as dear to me as to any Man, but the safety
of a community

valuable.

I

have ever considered as an object more

In VJar it is often impossible to conform to all

the ceremonies of Law and equal justice

;

and to attempt it

would be productive of greater misfortune to the public from
the delay than all the inconveniencies which individuals may

Greene

,

^^Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December
Nat han ael G re ene 3:552, 551

6,

1730,

,

^^Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, February 15,
1780, Boyd, Papers o f Thomas Jefferson, 4:616.

521

suffer."

That summer he made

a

similar explanation of actual

and expected misconduct to Governor Nelson.

"'"^^

As one might expect, General Lee often cited military

necessity as justification for his unauthorized actions.
Early in 1776, he wrote Congress that "These are times

v;hen

it is impossible, without great danger to the publick cause,

to wait for formal instructions; but as

I

shall never take

this liberty, unless urged by necessity, and a view to the

public service,

I

flatter myself

censure of Congress."

I

shall never incure the

A few months later, when he took

unauthorized actions in Virginia, he wrote the president of
their committee of safety "there are occasions when the

necessity will excuse deviations, and this

I

hope will

appear to the Committee to be one of these occasions."

Later

that year, he wrote the president of the Massachusetts Council

that "Affairs appear in so important a crisis" that even the

resolves of Congress should not always be followed.

"We must

save the community in spite of the ordinances of the Legislature.

There are times when we must commit treason against

the laws of the State for the salvation of the State.

The

'"^^Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, March 31,
ibid.,
1781, ibid., 5:302; Same to same [April 28, 1781],
568; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Nelson, Jr., July 18,
6, no. 4 (October 1907): 242
1781, "Original Documents,"

.
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present crisis demands this brave, virtuous kind of
treason

..101

Other officers, such as Generals Sullivan, Stephens,
Mcintosh, and McDougall, justified their unauthorized imprcs-

smg

on military necessity.

102

Staff officers responsible

for supplies also justified their actions on military neces-

sity.

As a Deputy Quartermaster General told Pennsylvania's

chief executive, after having impressed illegally, "You may
be assured

I

will not incroach upon the Rights of Civil

Authority,

&

exert Military force but in Cases that will not

admit the Delay of an Application to you."

103

Congress and the state governments often accepted
the excuses and justifications and did not reprimand or

punish the offending officers.

It is important to remember

Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, February 27, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC,
4
(1872): 331; Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776,
ibid., 469; Charles Lee to the President of the Massachusetts
Council, November 22, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 303.
Sullivan to the President of the Council of
Massachusetts, August 1, 1778, Hammond, Lette rs and Pape^
2:163; Minutes of the Maryland Council,
of John Sull ivan
October 5 "l776 Browne, Maryland A rc hives 12 :232-324
Lachlan Mcintosh to Archibald Steele, October 19, 1778,^^
Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779,"
Westmoreland
146; Lachlan Mcintosh to the Magistrates of
p
McDougall
County, October 21, 1778, ibid., p. 147; Alexander
Alexander
to. George Clinton, January 20, 1779, Champagne,
McDougalA, p. 154.
"""^^John

,

,

,

;

,

"^Jonathan Mifflin to Thomas Wharton, September 7,
5:596; see
1777, Hazard, Pennsylv ania Archives, 1st ser
1777,
also Charles Pettit to William Livingston, June 19,
Selections from_ tj2e_Corre spondence of the^.xecutive_oOew
jiFsey, From 17 7 6 to_ 17^86, pp. 70-71.
""^

.

,
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that the civilian leaders were practical men, who realized
that their principles relating to civil supremacy and

civilian control would have to be bent or broken in order
Thus, they frequently allowed the

for the war to be won.

military to take unauthorized actions, as long as such
actions were infrequent, not long-lasting, did not question
the dignity and ultimate authority of the civil authorities,

and as long as the military acknowledged their wrong-doing.

Congress certainly operated in this manner.
Congress often let the military take unauthorized
actions without reprimanding or punishing them.

Washington,

on September 2,
for instance, without consulting Congress,
1775,

issued orders creating

a

October appointed prize agents.
fleet had made several prizes.

Continental Navy and during
By the end of October his
It was at that time Washing-

ton informed Congress of his actions.

Congress, probably

the necessity of his
assured by their committee at camp of
It probably did not hurt
actions, approved his conduct.
after the congressional
Washington naming three of his ships

committee to camp.

104

to the President of the Contia
l^^Georqe
(ceuxye Washington
VJritmqs of
T77cr
F-i i-7Datrick
FitzpatricK,
nental Congress, October 5 1775
k

,

,

F^FdT JCC, '3:364

,

375

.

,

—

.
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Although Congress did not approve their actions,
they certainly did not reprimand Washington or Greene for
not investigating Gates' conduct at Camden as they had

ordered.

Congress also overlooked violations of their

resolution of the fall of 1778 which prohibited soldiers
and officers from performing in or attending the theater.

This was probably because the military were often accompanied
to the theater by members of Congress

.

Congress also

"'^

generally overlooked commanding officers, such as Schuyler,
Montgomery, and Mcintosh, who made unauthorized appointments
of line and staff officers.

In part,

this was because

Congress understood the military necessity, knowing to obtain

congressional approval would take weeks or months, and
because those making the appointments notified Congress of
the fact, generally with the understanding that Congress

would make the appointment permanent or would appoint someone else.

Congress

v;as

not, however,

so generous with

William Croghan to Barnard Gratz, March 4, 1779,
"Notes and Queries," im 1, no. 6 (June 1857): 180; Lieuten'], September
], 1781, John B.
ant Enos Reeves to
Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-books of Lieutenant Enos
Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 1 (1897):
1778,
83; Samuel Adams to Samuel Phillips Savage, October 17,
Burnett, LMCC, 3:451-452.
[

[

^^^Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, Novem3:1683;
ber 19 17 75, Force, Amer ican^_Archi ves 4 th ser
Lachlan Mcintosh to George Washington, February 16, 1776,
R.
White, Histori^]^ Co_lle_ct j^ns_o£_Georg3_a, p. 93; Don
Gerlach7"Philip Schuyler and 'The Road to Glory': A
Question of Loyalty and Competence," NYHSQ 49, no. 4
350
(October 1965)
,

,

:

.

,
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respect to a string of appointments Lee made during the
spring of 1776 on his way south to take command of that

department.

Upon learning of his appointments, Richard

Henry Lee wrote the general that Congress had "a jealous
eye" v;ith respect to "every instance of deviation (in a

Military or Naval Commander) from the line of instructions,
and every undertaking productive of expense which is not

warranted by express of Congress."

He reminded Lee that

"the spirit of liberty is a jealous spirit, and that

Senators are not always wise and candid, but that frequently

they are governed by envy, enmity, and
bad passions."

a

great variety of

Therefore, where prudent, and where the

common cause would not be threatened by delay, he suggested
Lee obtain consent of Congress to make such appointments or

simply make recommendations to Congress.

107

There were many times when Congress did not ignore
civil supremacy by the military, especially when it appeared

the military were questioning
or its authority.

a

decision made by Congress,

Early in the summer of 1777, Knox, Greene,

and Sullivan publicly announced they v;ould resign rather
'^^'^Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, March 21, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC,
434;
(1872): 360; Same to same, April 19, 1776, ibid.,
4
Charles
109-11(3
ibid., 5 (1873)
1776
same to same, July 2
ibid., 4 (1872):
Lee to Richard Henry Lee, April 12, 1776,
:

,

,

;

July 1, 1776, ibid.,
416; Charles Lee to George Washington,
to Charles Lee,
(1873): 102, 102-103; Richard Henry Lee
5
May 11, 1776, ibid., 24, 25.

than have Congress appoint du Coudray head of the Continen108
tal artillery.
Some members of Congress shared their

desire that Congress not acknowledge the agreement made in
France between Silas Deane and du Coudray, but they believed
the generals should have complained privately to individual

members of Congress, rather than writing Congress in such
public and threatening manner.

a

John Adams told Greene that

the du Coudray problem was "one of the most delicate and

perplexing Transactions that has ever fallen in our Way;
but those three Letters instead of relieving Us has only

encreased our Mortification."

Adams informed him that not

one member of Congress justified their letters, and very
few could say a word in mitigation or excuse.

"It was

universally considered, as betraying the Liberties of the
People, to pass them by uncensured.

Some were even for

dismissing all three of you instantly from the service,
others for ordering you to Philadelphia, under arrest to
answer for this offense."

VJhat

Congress did do was give

them the option of apologizing for questioning congressional

Knox to the President of the Continental
1777, [copy], Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #4); Nathanael Greene to the President of
the Continental Congress, July 1, 1777, Nathanael Greene
Papers, vol. 1 (photostat), WLCL; John Sullivan to the
President of the Continental Congress, July 1, 1777,
1:403
Hammond Letters and_Pape£S_of _ John _Su^^

"''^^Henry
Congress, July 1,

.

,

.

,
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authority or resign.

They apologi zed

.

'''^^

Three years later,

Greene apologized again for having written

letter to

a

Congress which that body considered improper, one member

describing it as being "very insolant" in nature. "^"^^
During the summer of 1780, in the process of attempting to resign as Quartermaster General, Greene wrote Congress
a

letter he admitted contained "more tartness

.

.

.

than was

A congressional committee on the third of

prudent."'^''""'"

August reported that Greene's letter had been written in
"very exceptional terms" and suggested he apologize.

Two

days later, the committee suggested Greene be relieved from
But, as Congress was busy with other matters and, as

duty.

it was assumed by most members that Greene had or would

acknowledge his letter may have been improper. Congress
John Adams to Nathanael Greene, July 7, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC, 2:404, 405; James Lovell to William Whipple,
Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull,
ibid., 403
1777
July 7
July 7, 1777, ibid., 405-406; Same to same, July 8, 1777,
ibid., 408; Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, July 13, 1777, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #4); Ford, JCC, 8:537,
553-554; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continental Congress, July 19, 1777 Greene, ^^^^iiael_Greene
1:422-426
,

,

;

,

^^°John Fell Diary, Burnett, LMCC

,

4

:

292-293

.

Greene to Joseph Reed, August
Nathanael Greene to
1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:336;
July 26, 1780,
the President of the Continental Congress,
Greene, July 29,
ibid., 314-316; Ezekiel Cornell to Nathanael
1780* 'ibid., 320; Same to same, August 1, 1780, ibid., 322;
ibid
i;780
Joseph Jones to George Washington, August
17dU, iDiQ.,
327-328; John Cox to Nathanael Greene, August 7,
"'""^"'Nathanael

[

'

324

.

]

,

,
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allowed Greene to remain in the army, postponing the question
of his conduct to another day.

That day never arrived, as

Greene went on to successes as commanding general of the
112
Southern Department.

Other generals risking the ire of Congress by their

letters were Schuyler and Lee.

The latter offended Congress

when, after being taken prisoner, he wrote Congress requesting a committee of Congress visit him to arrange his release

and discuss other matters.

Congress refused, treating Lee's

letter with what Elias Boudinot called deserved contempt

Schuyler's letter had

a

stronger response.

"'"'^'^
.

Upset Congress

had removed the surgeon of the Northern Department in

January 1777, Schuyler wrote Congress, suggesting he should
have been notified or the reasons as he had appointed him.

Most members of Congress, believing Schuyler's letter questioned their authority, on the fifteenth of March, resolved
that Schuyler's letter had been highly derogatory and

suggested that in the future he write them in
suitable to their dignity.

style more

a

Shortly thereafter. Gates was

sent north to replace Schuyler who, elected as

a

delegate

plead his
to Congress, arrived in Philadelphia in April to

Pettit to Nathanael Greene, August 20,
ibid., 2:334-335; Ezekiel Cornell to Nathanael Greene,
1780
17:690[August 20, 1780], Burnett, LMCC, 5:323; Ford, JCC,
"^"''^Charles

691,

697.
'•'-^Boudinot,

D

.

7 3.

Journ£]_^rJf istori^^
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case for reinstatement.

In the process of pleading his case,

he explained his letter had not meant to question or chal-

lenge the authority of Congress.

Accepting this explanation,

Congress, on May 15, 1777, reinstated him in command of the

Northern Department. 114
It was not just the generals who were threatened

with reprimand and punishment for questioning the authority
of Congress.

For example, early in 1776, a major was made

to apologize to Congress for having abused them for not

giving him

a

higher rank.

afoul of Congress.

Additionally, naval officers ran

Late in 1777, when the congressional

naval committee instructed Captain Barry to sink his fleet
in the Delaware, he lost his temper and demonstrated his

insubordination to committee member Francis Hopkinson who
When Kopkinson

had been sent to oversee the operation.

reported the incident to Congress, they resolved on

February 21, 1778, that Barry had twenty days to acknowledge
his wrongdoing or be relieved.

Apparently acknowledgment

Philip Schuyler to the President of the Continental Congress, February 4, 1777, Lossing, Ph ilip Schuyler
2-165; see also ibid., 1:347; John Hancock to Philip
Schuyler, March 18, 1777, Burnett, LMCC 2:304; William
Duer to Robert R. Livingston, May 28, 1777, ibid., 377;
James Duane to Robert R. Livingston, May 28, 1777, ibid.,
Depart^
387; Harvey E. Brown, The_ Mediae a
JCC,
States Army f rom 17 75 to_l87 3, pp. 21-23, 26, Ford,
,

8:336,

364;

8:375.

,
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was made, for Barry was not punished or

relieved.''""'"^

Besides threatening punishment, Congress simply
exercised their prerogative to dismiss officers who violated
the tenets of civil supremacy.

During the summer of 1777,

twelve naval lieutenants were ordered dismissed for making
an improper demand for an increase in pay.

The following

summer, a lieutenant was ordered dismissed for opening pack-

ages from the British commissioners addressed to Congress

"'"'^^
.

Early in 1777, John Trumbull, upset with the congressional decision of not making his commission as deputy

adjutant general of the Northern Department effective the
date he assumed that position, informed Congress that he

wanted his commission backdated or they could accept his
resignation.

Congress immediately accepted the resignation.

James Lovell, afterwards, wrote Trumbull that "Congress is

greatly piqued at the style and manner of your demand."
Similarly, Elbridge Gerry wrote Trumbull's brother that

although the claim was proper, he could not altogether
^""^Richard Smith Diary, Burnett, LMCC, 1:381-382;
Ford, JCC, 4:188, 190; 10:189; "Memorials of the RevolutionarTlTavy, " HM 3, no. 7 (July 1859): 202-204; George
Everett Hastings, The Li fe and Works of Fr an cis Hopkmson
222-223,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), pp.
225-226.

Laurens to John Lev/is Gervais, July 25,
First Penn1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:423-424; Orderly Book,
sylvania Regiment, Linn, Pe^nnsylvand^_j.
Revolution, 2:327.
"''''^Henry
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approve the style in which the legislative authority of the

continent was addressed.

"It is the fixed Determination of

Congress," he wrote, "to preserve the civil above the
military, and the authority of that will not be surrendered,
should it be necessary to disband the army in preserving
the same."

117

It should not be surprising that Generals

Lee and Conway, particularly the former, would eventually
run afoul of Congress and be dismissed from service.

While Lee was suspended from command during 1779, he

frequently questioned the propriety of the French alliance.
This upset many members of Congress; so much so that, on

December

4,

1779, one day before his suspension was to

expire, it was moved and seconded that he not be taken back
into service.

Despite the motion being defeated, Lee, upset

that Congress even considered dismissing him, wrote them an

insulting letter expressing his displeasure.

Congress

responded by dismissing him, and refusing to change the

decision despite Lee's explanations and apologies.

118

James Lovell to John Trumbull, March 22, 1777,
John Trumbull, Autobio graphy, Reminiscences and Letter s of
John Trumbu ll, from 17_56_to 1841, pp. 4 3-4 5; John Trumbull
to the President of the Continental Congress, February 22,
1777, ibid., p. 36; John Trumbull to James Lovell, February 22, 1777, ibid., pp. 40-42; Same to same, March 30,
1777, ibid., p. 46; Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull,
March 26, 1777, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 1, CSL,
Ford, JCC,

5:753;

7:176,

185,

187,

281.

16:33-34 Charles Lee to
1780
the President of the Continental Congress, January 30,
Same to
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 6 (1874): 407-409;
-^-^^Ibid.,

15 1348-1349;
:

;

532

Conway suffered

a

to resign early in 1778.

similar fate, when he attempted

Henry Laurens, on the first of

May, reported to South Carolina's chief executive that

Conway "lately for the second time taunted Congress by an

application for leave to resign his Commission, and in notes
so extremely rough as secured a Majority of

his favor."

States of

8

9

in

Indeed, with only four delegates supporting

Conway, Congress, on April 28, 1778, accepted his resignation, and did not relent despite his subsequent attempts
119
to be reinstated.

Although Conway had his difficulties with Congress,
he did not have trouble v/ith any of the state governments.
In this he was somewhat unique among the Continental generals.

Most of them, and many other officers, at one time or another,
ran afoul of the state governments with respect to violations
to the tenets of civil supremacy.
in this chapter,

As was discussed earlier

the military often became engaged in diffi-

plundering,
culties with the state governments because of

impressing and improperly dealing with the Tories.

They

to questions of
also had their difficulties with respect

authority and minor procedural points.
same, April 22

,

1780

,

ibid.,

"

Genera]^Charle^J,eej^^
283,

423-426;

The remainder of

^^^2-

^^^^^^^^f
^59 260, 282
PP
•

285.

May 1, 1778,
^^^Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes,
Ford, JCC, 10:399; 11:536, 567.

Burnett, LMCC, 3:211;
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this chapter will explain what the military did to irritate
the state governments, and how the latter responded.

During the first two years of the war, there was

much confusion among the army, the state forces, Congress,
and the provincial and state governments with respect to

their authority.

As a result, the military often took

actions which the provincial and state governments considered

challenging their authority.

As one might have guessed, the

general who had the most difficulties with the provincial

governments the first two years of the war was Charles Lee.

Throughout 1776 Lee antagonized the provincial
governments of New York, South Carolina, North Carolina,
Virginia, and Maryland, as he consciously and unconsciously
took unauthorized actions.

The latter

tv;o

instances, relat-

ing to impressing, quartering, and making war upon the

Tories, have already been discussed, and it should be noted
that, although Lee was not formally reprimanded by the pro-

vincial governments, they nevertheless made it perfectly
clear that they would not tolerate repeat offenses.

In the

confusion of authority between Congress and the New York

provincial government, Lee, during his short stay in New
York state frequently offended the government, as he authorized actions the civilians believed they only had authoriza-

tion to approve.

Before a major confrontation took place

between the general and the provincial congress, Lee was

rc-ssianed to the southward.

Three months later, Lee had
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similar difficulties in South Carolina, with similar results.

Before a major confrontation took place, Lee vacated the
state.

Lee offended the North Carolina government by

authorizing Georgia and South Carolina officers to fill up
their battalions by enlisting troops from North Carolina
then serving in Georgia and South Carolina.

The civilian

leaders were so upset with Lee's action that they had the

legislature pass

resolution condemning his action and

a

recalled their troops back to North Carolina.

12 0

Although Lee was probably the general who most often
consciously or unintentionally offended civilian leaders
early in the war, he was by no means the only general having

difficulty with the provincial congresses.

Artemas Ward

inadvertently offended the Massachusetts Committee of Safety
during the latter part of June 1775 when he issued orders

informing his officers who needed arms for their men to make

application to the committee of safety.

Taking a provincial

congress resolution literally, he added that "the committee
of safety are hereby ordered to deliver out arms to such

commanding officers as make application to them for the
"The Charles
"-^Bliven, Under t he Gu ns, pp. 84-186
Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 '(1872): 234-352 passim; Drayton,
Memoirs of _jtl2e_ American Revolution, 2:280; Edward McCrady,
The~llistory of South Carolina in t he Revolut ion_r77 5^17^,
177 7,
14 0-141; Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, April 15
858-859,
Clark, NCSR, 11:357; Saunders, NCCR, 10:795-796,
Rankin, 7lie_J^or th^Carol ijTa_
8 80; Hugh F.
pp. '80, 80-81n.20.
;

,

^

,

.
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same."

The committee of safety reprimanded Ward, and

despite his assurances that he had not meant to set the

military above the civilian government, they complained to
the provincial congress "that it is of vast importance that
no orders are issued by the military, or obeyed by the civil

power, but only such as are directed by the honorable repre-

sentative body of the people, from whom all military and
civil power originates."

They stated they

v;ere

satisfied

with Ward's explanation of the misunderstanding, and that
he "does not mean or intend to set up the military power

above the civil, yet lest this order of the general, should
be adduced as a precedent in future, we think it our indis-

pensable duty to protest against the general's said order."
Agreeing, the provincial congress made Ward reword his
order.
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Such misunderstandings continued throughout the

war

Another source of confusion, as well as

a

constant

source of irritation between the civilian and military

leaders was the matter of flags of truce under which people
and goods moved between the American and British camps.
The military generally viewed flags as a means by which

unscrupulous men were able to trade with the enemy and thus,
they frequently undertook operations to prevent their use,
"'^"'"Lincoln,

Journals of Each Pro vincial Congress

of Massachusetts, pp. 579,

580.
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even when they had been properly authorized by the civilian

governments.

These actions, as well as those instances

v;hen

the military authorized flags without civilian knowledge

or approval, upset the state governments.

12 2

Because of

the ill feelings surrounding the use of flags, Washington

and his subordinates often issued instructions and reminders
to their officers,

stressing the need to be cognizant of the

rules of each state governing flags, and to cooperate with
the state executives

m

the issuance and use of them.

12

3

Despite such orders, the matter of flags continued to be
a

problem till the end of the war, as the military viewed

flags as a military function, and the civilians viewed them
as coming within their purview.

Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, March 8,
5:98-99 Thomas
17 81, Boyd, Papers of Thomas_jJe£^f er_son
Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, March 10, 1781, ibid.,
117-119; George Clinton to William Denning, November 29,
177 9, Hastings, Public__Papers of Geo rge Cl inton, 5:377;
George Clinton to William Heath, November 29, 1779, ibid.,
378-379; Same to same, December 2, 1779, ibid., 393-394;
William Heath to George Clinton, December 2 1779, ibid.,
390-391; Same to same, December 3, 1779, ibid., 397.
,

;

_

,

Washington to Alexander McDougall,
November 24, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington, 13:
November 27, 1778,
321; George Washington to Israel Putnam,
January 7,
ibid., 341, George Washington to William Maxwell,
1779, 'ibid., 483; Instructions to Samuel H. Parsons,
December 13, 1779, ibid., 17:257; George Washington to
Benedict Arnold, August 13, 1780, ibid., 19:370; George
24:92;
Washington to Elias Dayton, March 28, 1782, ibid
J4U.
Instructions to John Greaton, June 14, 1782, ibid.,
"'"^"^George

,

^^^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, April 9,
WLCL; Nathanael
1783, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 86,
1783, Calendar
Greene to [Otho Holland Williams], April 11,

'
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The return of captured property was another source
of confusion of authority.

General Greene and the South

Carolina government, who had their problems over the matter
of flags, were also at odds on the matter of the return of

captured property.

In 1782,

the governor and council

demanded that Greene return to private ownership horses that

Kosciuszko had carried off during

a

raid on James Island.

Rather than give the horses to citizens who claimed the

British had taken them from them, Greene wanted to auction
the horses, and use the money to support the army.

Congress

finally adjudicated the matter by ruling that the recaptured

property be returned to its original owner after one-fourth
of the value of the horses was given to the army.

125

Another source of difficulty between the military
and the state governments involved the question of whether
of the General Otho_Hol landj^inian^
M"storrc'aT~SocIety p. '80; Nathanael Greene to the Sheriff
1783 Adele Stanton Edwards,
of Charles tonT^pril 6
Journals of the_Privy Counc il 1783-17 89 (Columbia: University
of
of South Carolina "Press for the South Carolina Department
Archives and History, 1971), p. 16; Nathanael Greene to
Benjamin Guerard, April 6, 1783, ibid., pp. 16-18; Minutes
Minof a Council of War, April 7, 1783, ibid., pp. 22-26;
19-21,
utes of the Privy Council, April 9, 1783, ibid., pp.
27-28
,
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tion', Polish Institute, ser. no. 4 (New
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or not soldiers should be turned over to state courts to

face civilian charges.

Although the military generally

resisted turning over soldiers to state courts, they usually

complied with

court order to do so.

a

But not always.

When

they resisted, the state government normally exerted itself.

Early in the war, when Colonel Oilman refused to turn one
of his soldiers over to the civil magistrate, stating that

soldiers were only subject to military law, the New Hampshire

legislature resolved that Oilman "is ignorant of the Laws
received Rules

&

&

Regulations always practiced in the English

Constitution; and the military Power setting up an authority

uncontrollable by the Civil magistrate is Subversive of
Rights

Lav;s

Privileges of Englishmen, and what our inveterate

&

Enemies never attempted."

Oilman was made to appear before

the General Assembly, and the situation was resolved to the

satisfaction of the civilians.

126

Inadvertent violations of civil supremacy and debates
over authority were generally resolved without too many

recriminations and with the civilians generally successfully
exerting the principle of civil supremacy.

Not so were the

Bouton, Documents ^nd_^cords_Relati^ to New
Hampshire, 8:182, 190; Robert Oorden to Philip Schuyler,
1775, Howard Swiggett, \^_out__o^i^garaj_JVal ter
August 4
Butler and the Tory Range rs, p. 56; John Stark to George
rri7 81. Stark, John_Stark, pp. 213-214; John
ClTHt^T^
Stark to William Heath, September 11, 1781, ibid., p. 248;
Division Orders, First Pennsylvania Orderly Book, Lmn,
Pennsylvania in the War _o f _t h^_Revoljrt ion pp. 364 366
,

,

,

.
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more direct violations of civil supremacy.

Throughout the

war, civilians complained about the military trampling on

civilian authority.

127

This was particularly true on the

frontier, where the military acted forcefully where the

civilian government was

v;eak.

12 8

Frequently the civilian

authorities, because of the weakened condition of their
government, did not respond to military violations of

civilian authority.

12 9

Additionally, they often overlooked

12 7

John Dowdney et al. to Thomas VJharton, July 26,
1777, Hazard, Penns ylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:111-112;
Joseph Donaldson et al to Thomas Wharton, August 6 1777,
ibid., 1st ser., 5:496; Thomas Burke to John Rutledge,
March 6, 17 82, (extract) Gibbes, Documentary History o f the
American Revolu tion 3:265-266; John Davenport to Joshua
Huntington7~^anuary 28, 1779, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC,
20 (1923): 111; Same to same, February 3, 1779, ibid., 114;
Same to same, February 28, 1779, ibid., 123-124.
.

,

,

""^^Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd, May 21, 1779
Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records 1778-1790," pp. 83-89; Petition
of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia,
May 4, 1781, ibid., pp. 234-238; The Magistrates of Kaskaskia
to John Rogers, November 10, 1780, ibid., p. 208; Same to
same, January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 212; Memorial of the
Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to Mottin de la Balme, September 29,
ibid., pp. 189-191; Richard Winston to John Todd,
1780
1780, ibid., p. 195; Richard McCarty to John
October 17
1778-1790,
Todd, September 18, 1779, Alvord, "Cahokia Records
Montgomery, Septempp 614-615; Richard McCarthy to John
Inhabitants of
ber 19, 1779, ibid., p. 616; Memorial of the
ibid.,
Cahokia to Mottin de la Balme, September 21, 1780,
January 24,
543, 545; John Todd to Thomas Jefferson,
pp 537
1781, Palmer, Calendar_o^^^ginia_St
ibid.,
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violations when they believed them necessary.

Such were

the instances when Washington had citizens around his Morris-

town camp innoculated against smallpox and when he seized

money the Massachusetts legislature had sent to pay their
troops and used it to pay for the transportation of

supplies

130

Most violations of civil supremacy, however, were

met with prompt civilian action.

The offending party was

generally informed that such violations would not be tolerated, and often this notification was accompanied by

reprimand.

Thus, one officer

v;as

a

reprimanded by the

Pennsylvania Council of Safety for having violated the
privacy of bawdy houses in the process of searching for
deserters.

Three years later, the Pennsylvania government

rebuked Colonel Brodhead for his conduct toward the civilian

authorities of Westmoreland County.
when Arnold refused to cooperate with

Earlier in the war,
a

committee

the

Massachusetts Provincial Congress sent to oversee the military activities at Fort Ticonderoga, the committee chastised

him and forced him to resign his commission.

In 1775, the

for
New Hampshire Committee of Safety reprimanded Sullivan
appoint
suggesting the military were better qualified to

"^^Ward The War of t he Revolut_ion, 1:320; George
Congress,
Washington to the"PF¥iTdint of 'the Continental
ZZ: zij
Mav 1 1781, Fitzoatrick, Wr itings_of J;Jash3^gton
Thi:;Di^s_oL^eorge J^^^
John i. Fit^patrick, ed
1748-1799, 2:208.
,

.

,
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officers than the provincial congress.

When he went ahead

and made appointments without authorization, New Hampshire

sent a committee to Washington to complain about Sullivan

usurping their authority.

Learning the government was not

pleased with his actions, Sullivan assured them of his
subordinate position in a letter that could have been
Nevertheless, the

couched in more conciliatory terms.

committee of safety decided not to take disciplinary actions
him.
against K•

4-

131

Offenses against the civilian governments, such as
Sullivan's, were often more directly addressed by the

civilian authorities, than offenses against the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people.

Generally, the

state governments were greatly irritated when the military
Hindle, David Ritten house (Princeton:
Reed
Princeton University Press, 1964), ppl 176-177; Joseph
February 14 1780 Hazard, Penr^ylvania
to Daniel Brodhead
7:466-467; Samuel Mott to Jonathan
Archives, 1st ser.
1775 Force, Amer ican_Archives 4th ser.,
T^^TIJHb^T, June 30
Walter
2-1140; Same to same, July 6, 1775, ibid., 1592;
York ConvenSpooner to the President and Members of the New
Walter Spooner to
tion July 3, 1775, ibid., 1539-1540;
1^^0-1541; Walter
Jonathan Lu^bull July 3, 1775, ibid.
Congress,
SDOoner's Report to the Massachusetts Provincial Committee
Hampshire
1775, ibid., 1596-1598; The New
Tulv 6
28, 1775, Hammond,
of safety to John Sullivan, September
Same to same,
Letters and Papers of John S ullivan 1:92;
ibid
1^75
Hampshire Committee of Safety, September ^^/^
4, 1775, ibid., 101, Douton,
October
same,
to
Same
96-97;
96,
54
Nev^Hampshire_, 8 48
to
Relating
Records
and
Documents
HampshTre General Assembly,
?l^^l8-'J^hn'sOTwan-tb-^^^
56, ilB, Jonn bux
Sullivan to the New Hamp•-,
January 18, 1776, ibid., J/,
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1776,
14,
March
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made improper suggestions, did not keep them informed, and

when they verbally or physically abused members of the
government.

Of a more serious nature, which will be

discussed in the next chapter, were instances where the

military interfered with the political, electoral, governmental, and judicial processes.

Civilian leaders often complained about the lack of
information received from their military commanders. 132
They and Congress both urged m.ilitary leaders to keep them

informed of their plans and actions, reminding them of their
Some officers were even reprimanded

obligation to do so.

for not doing so, such as William Smallwood, who was taken
to task by the Maryland state convention during the fall of
133
1776 for not reporting to them in a timely manner.
132

William Hooper to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr.,
August 6, 1776, Burnett, LMCC 2:40; Cornelius Harnett to
William Wilkinson, December 8, 1777, ibid., 584; John
Banister to George Washington, April 16, 1778, ibid., 3:169;
Pierce Butler to James Irdell, April 6, 1782, Griffith J.
McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Irdell, One of the
Ass ociate Justices of the Supreme Court of the Un ited States,
2:9; John Adams to Abigail Adams, August 30, 1776, Butterfield, AFC 2:114; Same to same, September 22, 1776, ibid.,
131; Same to same, October 8, 1776, ibid., 140.
,

,

""^^William Smallwood to Mathew Tilghman, October 12,
1776, David Ridley, ed., Annals of Annapolis, Comprising
Sundry Notices of that Old City from the Period of the First
Settle ment in its Vicinity in the Year of 1649, Until the
1812; Together with Var ious Incidents in the History
Wqr
2565f~Mar yTand (Baltimore: Gushing and Brother, 1841), pp.
257- see also Thomas Burke and Henry Laurens to George
Thomas
Washington, March 15 1779 Burnett, LMCC, 4 104-105
Mcllwame,
Nelson to Nathanael Greene, September 5, 1781,
Benjamin
Official Letters of the Governors of ^^^9^-111^; ^ 35 ibid., 340
H^Ii^'to George Rogers Clark, October 14 1782,
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As has and will be discussed, the military frequently

took the opportunity to keep the civilians advised of their
needs, plans, and actions, as well as occasionally offering

Political suggestions were generally

political suggestions.

made in an informal manner, and when they were formally made,
they were usually done so with apologies and explanations,

generally to the effect that military and political questions
were blended and that the exigencies of the moment demanded
they go out of their province to make such suggestions

"'""^^
.

As one might have assumed, Charles Lee often made

such political suggestions.

In giving

Congress his views

on Howe's peace overtures, he voiced his hope they would not

think him impertinent and presuming, but would attribute
welfare."
his views to his "anxiety and zeal for the publick
chief
Similarly, in his giving his views to Rhode Island's

England
executive about the selection and quality of New

must entreat you not to impute the

generals, he stated,

"I

freedom with which

shall offer my thought upon this

occasion, to

a

I

petulance of disposition, but to the most

Continental
^^^Uuqh Mercer to the President of the
AmericanAchr^es 5th
congress, September 4, 1776, Force,
,-oHt^ 6 1776
2-158; Robert Howe to John Ru t ledge
se?
Journals of the General ^Asseir^l^a^^^
Hemphill,
MempjiJ-x
130- WilITam Moultrie to
T-T-7Z"iTfin
^
,

,

J-

,

AP?n"2 2VV7ao,|^nf
145-146.
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(copy),

DuoU,

m^.fus_Putn2!l.
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pure and disinterested zeal."

""-^

Washington was hesitant

early in the war to publicly express himself on political
topics, but by 1780, he increasingly did so, always explaining why he was stepping into the political realm and asking

that he not be thought impertinent. 1

Most suggestions of

a

fi

political nature were received

without charges that the military were violating the principle of civil supremacy.
the civilians unrest.

However, certain subjects did cause
One such was the impost.

Washington's

circular to the states calling for support of the impost was
not well received in Virginia, nor was Greene's letter to

South Carolina's chief executive calling on him to have the

legislature support the impost.

137

Greene v/rote that his

letter was met with "some alarm and much disgust," and
1

OCT

Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, October 10, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC
5 (1873): 260; Charles Lee to Nicholas Cooke, December 7,
177 6, Bartlett, Records of Rh ode Isl and, 8:111; see also
Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress,
January 22, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872):
,

249.

247,

Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, August 20 1780 Fitzpatrick, Writings
ibid.,
of Washington, 19:413; Same to same, January 30, 1783,
26^2^"Circulars to the States, October 18, 1780 January 22,
1783 MHSC, 5th ser
1782 and June 8
1782 'May 4 [-8]
24:237;
10:212, 258; Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Wash ington,
•'"^^George
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491n.30; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard,
ibid
Nathanael Greene,
March's, 1783, Autograph Letters of General
1:27, WLCL.
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caused the legislature to reject immediately the impost.

Despite subsequent apologies, Greene was widely condemned
in South Carolina, and was frequently referred to as a

Cromwell

Upsetting the civilian leaders even more than
improper suggestions were those instances where the military

verbally or physically abused civilian authorities, as well
as those instances where the military insulted the state

governments.

Such abuses and insults were generally

acknowledged and punished.

With respect to insulting

governments, during the May 1775 session of the Connecticut
Assembly, a captain was cashiered for speaking contemptuously
of the General Assembly's measures.

John Stark avoided a

.

similar fate the first winter of the war, after having

written what he described as warm and illiberal reflections
upon some of the members of the New Hampshire Provincial
Congress.

He was saved from being punished by asking for-

giveness, stating the remarks came from passion not from
settled design, and subsequently making the same acknowledge-

ment of wrong-doing to

a

military court of inquiry.

Later

"^^Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April 3,
Greene to
1783 Sparks, Gouv erneu r Morris 1:252; Nathanael
George Washingt^HT^^li^ 15, 1783 Sparks, Correspondence
Greene to Benjamin
of the American Revolution, 4:4; Nathanael
Autograph Letters of General
1783
Guerard, Mai^FT4
to Nathanael
Nathanael Greene, 1:29, WLCL; Captain
McCrady The
Greene, April 9, 1783, ibid., 2:64; Edward
Hi^torv_c^ South Ca rolina in the^e vol u^n^ ^Z 8 0^:1^^
pp. 690-694
,

,

,

_
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in the war,

General Maxwell came very close to being

disciplined by the New Jersey legislature, after having
written them

a

letter they considered as containing indecent

and undeserved reflections upon themselves.

nate was Commodore Oliver Bowen

,

Not so fortu-

commander of Georgia's

navy, who was suspended from command in 1778 for having
139
written an insulting letter to Governor Houston.

Physical abuses were also generally acknowledged
and punished.

This was particularly true in Pennsylvania

where Chief Justice McKean and President Reed did not

tolerate the military physically abusing the civilian

authorities in any manner whatsoever.

McKean and Reed were

quite upset with the military during 1778 and 1779 as the
state's attorney general was beaten up three times by

Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony of
Connecticut, 15:54; Bouton Document s a nd Records Relating
8:71, 96; Stephen Moylan to Matthew
to New Hampshire
Thornton, February 7, 1776, ibid., 70; John Sullivan to the
Court of New Hampshire, January 17, 1776, ibid., 32; Samuel
Hobart to the New Hampshire Provincial Congress, January 1,
Winter
1776, Lawrence Shaw Mayo, "Colonel John Stark at
Hill' 1775," P MHS 57 (October 1923-June 1924): 331-333;
William MaxwellT^Apr il 25, 1779, Select ions from the
Correspondence of the Ex ecutive of New Jersey_;_^on]_1776^
_New
t^-lT86TTP^ 146-148; Esaac S. Mulford, Hi^ory_of
Civil and Pol itical p. 457n.ll; Chandler, RevoluFTT^KiRTR^^^^^T^orgia 2:78-88 92 118-119 Kenneth
Coleman,' 'The American Revolution in Georaia_1^163^:llQ9_,
pp. iii-iir:
,

,

,

,

,
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military officers.

14 0

McKean himself was even struck by

General William Thompson, who believed McKean and Congress
had not been aggressive enough in getting him exchanged

while he was a prisoner of war.

When Thompson was called

before Congress on November 20, 1778, to answer for his
conduct, he admitted he had called McKean a rascal and

villain, but denied being disrespectful to Congress.

a

After

much debate. Congress, late in December, ordered Thompson
to apologize to Congress, which he did.

But when the

apology appeared in print, it contained the accusation that

McKean was

a

coward.

Although

a

duel was discussed, McKean

settled the matter by taking Thompson to court for libel
and won a judgment in the amount of £5,700, which he

declined taking.

141

Thomas Wharton to Thomas McKean, February 15,
1st ser., 6:266-267
Hazard, Pennsyl\^d^_Arcl^^
1778
Joseph Reed to George Washington, May 8, 1779, ibid.,
7:382; Nathanael Greene to Thomas McKean, June 3, 1778,
Coleman, Th omas McKean p. 225; Thomas McKean to Nathanael
Greene, June 9, 1778, ibid., p. 225; Roberdeau Buchanan,
Lif e of Hon. Thomas McKean (Lancaster, Pennsylvania:
Inquirer Printing Company, 1890), p. 60.
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^^^Ford, JCC, 12:1146-1147, 1148, 1149, 1151-1152,
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1199, "T200
1153, 1161
Burnett,
Scudder to Richard Henry Lee, December 9, 1778,
December ib,
LMCC, 3:523; Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes,
1778
ibid., 537; William Thompson to Joseph Reed,
2d ser.,
January 7 1779, Hazard, Pennsy Iv^ani^^^rchiv^
Congress:
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Continental
Thomas McKean, Delegate from Delaware to the
234n.20,
congress, 1774-1783," PH 38, no. 3 (July 1971):
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The Pennsylvania courts also took two other officers
to task for striking public officials.

Upset at being asked

at the 1782 election poll to show his certificate of having

taken the oath to the Constitution, Thomas Proctor assaulted
the poll inspector, maintaining that as a veteran he con-

sidered demonstrating

a

certificate an insult.

Brought to

trial, Judge McKean fined him t80, stating "You gentlemen
of the army hold your head too high, but

down, we shall be overrun else."

I

will bring you

At the same term of the

court. Colonel Francis Nicholas was fined tSO for assaulting
a

member of the council.
When

a

142

state government was unable to have a

Continental officer acknowledge his wrongdoing, or when they
were unable to properly chastise or punish him, or when they

believed Congress should administer the rebuke, they called
upon Congress to determine the degree of guilt and the

appropriate punishment.

Thus, upon the complaint of the

Pennsylvania government, Pulaski, for resisting the serving
County,
of a writ upon him by the Sheriff of Philadelphia
state
was ordered during the fall of 1778 to submit to the
to
authority and was informed Congress was determined

civil
resent any opposition made by any officer to the

Independent Gazetteer, October
1:4"26.
Scharf, Hi^toryjof JPhiladel
-'-'^^The

1,

1782

.
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authority. 14 3

Already, the previous year. Congress had

resolved that it would "discountenance and punish any
indecent behaviour of any officer

authority of the several states."
be made again during 1779.

"^"^"^

.

.

towards the civil

.

Such a statement would

And Congress was true to its

word, as many officers were reprimanded and punished by them

for their actions against the state governments and state

officials
Late in April 1777, Congress received complaints
from Maryland that naval Captain James Nicholson had impressed citizens of their state and had been disrespectful to

the civil authority of the state when queried about his

Congress, believing Nicholson had acted improperly,

actions.

suspended him, giving him five days to provide such satisfaction as the governor and council of Maryland shall accept,
and failing that, he was to be dismissed from the navy.

In

giving him this ultimatum, one member of Congress wrote that
it had been done so as to "convince officers that they were

very inferior to the Magistrates of States, and must treat
them with the most profound respect."

Nicholson made amends

October 20, 1778
Burnett, LMCC, 3:458-459; Ford, JCC, 12:974.
"''^

14

"^Samuel Adams to James VJarren,
4

Ibid.,

8:656; 13:413.

,

.
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with the Maryland state officials and Congress
lifted his
suspension 145
Later that year, Lieutenant Colonel Edward
Carrington
faced

a

similar dismissal, for having unduly attempted to

influence the Virginia government's appointment of officers
for the Virginia Continental regiment of artillery.

Upon

Governor Henry's complaint. Congress gave Carrington five
days to apologize to the governor or be dismissed.
ton complied.

Carring-

The following year, as has already been

discussed. General Thompson was forced by Congress to

apologize to Chief Justice McKean for having verbally and

physically abused

him."*"^^

Benedict Arnold and his aide-de-camp, Matthew
Clarkson, after the former became military commander of

Philadelphia, constantly ran afoul of the Pennsylvania
145

Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, May 2, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC, 2:354; William Paca to the Governor and
Council of Maryland, May 24, 1777, ibid., 372; Richard Henry
Lee to Samuel Purviance, May 3, 1777, ibid., 372n.3; Maryland Council to James Nicholson, April 24, 1777, Browne,
Maryland Archi ves, 16:226-227; Same to same. May 8, 1777,
2 4T"r Maryland Council to the President of the Contiibid
nental Congress, April 26, 1777, ibid., 229-230; Maryland
Council to the Maryland Delegates in the Continental
Congress, April 26, 1777, ibid., 230; Robert Morris to
Thomas Johnson, May 1, 1777, ibid., 237; Thomas Johnson to
William Paca, May 29, 1777, ibid., 264; James Nicholson to
Thomas Johnson, April 25, 1777, Beverly W. Bond, Jr.,
"State Government in Maryland 1777-1781," p. 22, Ford, JCC,
7:312, 318; 8:665.
.

,

8:655-656 675 11:527-529; 12:1146-1147
1148, 1149, 1151-1152, 1153, 1161, 1199, 1200, 1227, 1239,
1249-1250, 1250-1255.
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When that government had no success in curbing

government.

what they considered violations of civil supremacy by the
two officers, they turned to Congress.

When Congress learned

that Clarkson had been disrespectful to the Pennsylvania

government, they suspended Clarkson on February 18, 1779,
and a week later resolved they would "not countenance any

military officer in disrespectful conduct to the civil
magistracy

"''^^
.

Clarkson offered to serve in the southern

theater as a volunteer and was allowed to do so, but before
and
leaving, he was called before Congress late in March

reprimanded

With respect to Arnold, the Pennsylvania government
1779, chargformally complained to Congress during February
general with profiteering and misconduct towards

ing the

Two months later, after an

the Pennsylvania government.

Washington to have
acrimonious debate. Congress ordered
during January 1780,
Arnold court-martialed. Eventually,
guilty of being "imprudent and
Arnold
found
court-martial
a
to transport his personal
improper" in using public wagons
permission for
property and having given

a

ship to leave

the state authorities.
Philadelphia without permission of
250

1^'^Ibid.,

13

l^^Ibid

360-362

:

206

,

,

,

363;

oelegat^fr^e^se^^
61,

61.

249-250
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Donald W. Whisenhunt,
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and was ordered reprimanded by VJashington.

Congress approved

the sentence and he was reprimanded during April

1780."'''^^

Arnold, as we know, was so dissatisfied with the

civilian authorities, that within six months of his repri-

mand

,

he switched sides

soldiers shared Arnold

'

Many American officers and

.

dissatisfaction with the civilian

s

authorities, and with the American people, as has been dis-

cussed in the preceding chapter, but few joined Arnold in

becoming traitors.

Nonetheless, as has been demonstrated

in this chapter, many American soldiers violated the princi-

ples of civil supremacy

as well as the

,

1

iberties and

properties of the people they were fighting to defend.

The

next chapter will show how the military, dissatisfied with
the American revolutionary governments, including Congress,

attempted to influence, change, and even overthrow them.
Like the Puritans of English Revolution, many in the military,
and some civilian leaders, believed the military offered the

only hope of guiding the revolution to

a

successful conclusion

Greene,
""^Nathanael Greene to
], July 25, 1778
Nathanael Greene, 2:103; John Cadwalader to Nathanael Greene,
December ~57 1778 NYHSC 3:270; Francis Lewis to Governor
George Clinton, March 8, 1779, Burnett, LMCC 4:92; General
Orders Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:222-225;
16:161Ford, JCC, 13:184, 188-189, 324-326, 379, 412-417,
,

[

,

,
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CHAPTER

IX

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AND INTERFERENCE
WITH THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS
AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Throughout the war the military involved themselves
in and interfered with the civilian governments and the

political process.
tionally.

They did so individually and organiza-

To some degree, as will be demonstrated, their

involvement and interference was encouraged and expected,
for,

after all, these military leaders to great extent had

been civilian leaders before the war.

The military involved

themselves in the operations of the governments and interfered with them in the belief they could make them function

more effectively.

In a few isolated instances some civilian

and military leaders actually contemplated the military

replacing establ ished governments
them.

And in

a

,

or at least control ling

few instances the military did control or

replace the civilian governments for
limited basis.

a

limited time or on

a

The military also interfered with the actual

operations of all branches of governments and with the
operation of the political process.

Most military involve-

ment in government and politics, however, related to
553
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individuals participating directly or indirectly in their

operations
Just because Americans put on uniforms, they did
not discard their civilian beliefs nor their desire to

participate in the political process and government. The
military, with

few exceptions, were first and foremost

a

civilians, with civilian concerns and desires.

During 1775

and 1776 many civilian leaders, temporarily in uniform,

played active roles in forming the revolutionary wartime
governments.

Those that decided to take permanent positions

in the military continued to express their interest in the

adoption of the new state constitutions and the implementation of the governments under them.^

Many in the military, reflecting the desires of their
communities, desired that Congress declare independence.
This desire was prompted in part by ideological considerations, and in part because the rebellious soldiers realized

Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, April 26, 778,
[Copy], Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5)
John Sullivan to Meshech Weare, December 12, 1775, Hammond,
Letters and Papers of John Sullivan 1:141-148; John Haslet
to CaesaF" Rodney, [Fall 1776], Harold B. Hancock, ed
"Letters to and from Caesar Rodney," DH 12, no. 1 (April
72; Lachlan Mcintosh to George Walton, December 15,
1966)
1776, Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan Mcintosh,
1774-1799," GHQ 38, no. 3 (September 1954): 256; George
Washington to John Augustine VJashington, May 31, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wash ington, 5:92; Charles Lee to
Patrick Henry; July 29, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers,"
178
NYHSC, 5 (1873)
;

,

.

,

_

:

:
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they were representing revolutionary governments
unrecognized
by any nation and, should the war be lost, legally
they would
be traitors.
Thus, the soldiers, even more than their

civilian leaders, were potentially more apt to lose their
life,

liberty, and property should independence not be

established and the war lost.

"We are high Gamblers," one

officer wrote two weeks before independence was declared,
"who are playing for all we are worth.

"^

Although Washington did not express his desire for
independence, many of his subordinates did.

As early as

October 1775, Greene informed his colony's civilian leaders
that the people wanted independence and that they might as

well declare that fact, for they should begin the war in
earnest, "for we have no alternative," he told Samuel Ward,
3
"but to fight it out or be slaves."

Stephen Moylan, after

reading the King's speech calling the Americans rebels,

wrote Joseph Reed, who had left the army early in November
to lobby for independence, asking whether Congress would

"not declare what the Most Gracious Majesty insist on they

have already done?"

In another letter, Moylan asked

"shall

2

Thomas Mifflin to Elbridge Gerry, June 26, 1776,
Elbridge Gerry Papers, Russell VJ. Knight Collection, MHS;
see also Jeremy Belknap, "Journal of My Tour to the Camp,
and the Observations I Made There," PMHS 4 (1858-1860): 78

.

"^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 23, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL.
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we never leave off debating and boldly declare
independence?"
He believed "That and that only will make us
act with spirit

and vigour."^

James McHenry learning of the King's speech,

and believing reconciliation impossible, wrote that
"Strength

must decide the present dispute."^

For many, strength could

only come by having direction, and direction meant independence.
Lee.
fame.

One person who certainly believed this was Charles
He had much to gain if America won the war--honor and

But if she lost, as a retired British regular

officer, he had much to lose, including his life.

Thus,

from the beginning of the war, he pleaded with the civilian

leaders to declare independence.

After hearing the King's statements concerning the
war, he wrote Robert Morris that "We must be Independent or

Three months later, with independence not declared,

Slaves."

he again wrote Morris, urging Congress to act, reminding him

that if Congress would not act the people would, and this,
he added,

"must produce a noble anarchy."

pleaded with Morris.

In May, he again

"For God's sake," he wrote,

"declare

yourselves at once what you really are and must be-an
4

Stephen Moylan to Joseph Reed, January 2, 1776,
Griffin, Stephen Moylan p. 27; Same to same, January 30,
,

1776,

ibid.

^James McHenry to John McHenry, January
Steiner, James McHen ry, p. 6.

[

],

1776,
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independent state.

Several days later, he told Patrick

Henry that if independence was not declared, the people

might take the direction of the war into their own hands.
During April and May, he also appealed to Richard Henry Lee
and Edward Rutledge, writing the latter that "unless you

declare yourselves independent, establish

a

more certain

and fixed legislation than that of a temporary courtesy of
the people you richly deserve to be enslaved."

Lee,

like

Washington, also took actions which pushed the colonial

governments towards independence."9
By June, the call for independence had increased,

with the military continuing their appeals on
scale.

larger

a

Early that month, over two thousand officers and

soldiers of four battalions of Associators of Philadelphia

Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 3, 1776, "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 233; Same to same,
April 16 1776 ibid., 426 Same to same, May 3 1776, ibid.,
467; See also Same to same, January 23, 1776, ibid., 255-256.
,

7
5

(1873)

:

;

,

Charles Lee to Patrick Henry, May
1-3

,

7,

1776,

ibid.,

.

p

Charles Lee to Edward Rutledge, April 3, [1776],
ibid., 4 (1872): 372-373; Charles Lee to Richard Henry Lee,
April 5, 1776, ibid.; 380; Same to same, May 10, 1776, ibid.,
20; see also Charles Lee to John Dickinson,
5 (1873)
January 18, 1776, John Richard Alden, General C harles Lee:
Traitor or Patriot?, pp. 91-92; Same to same, February 22,
Same to same, July 3 1776 ibid.,
ibid.
1776
pp. 93-94
pp. 116, 327n.52.
:

,

,

;

,

,

^E.g., Benjamin Rumsey to William Rumsey, June 3,
James F. Vivian and Jean H. Vivian, eds., "'A Juris1776
Letter,
diction Competent to the Occasion': A Benjamin Rumsey
June 1776," MHM 67, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 152.
,
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and its suburbs were polled on the question of independence

Less than thirty voiced any opposition.

Mifflin pleaded with
Mr

[

.

]

Gerry, give

a

a

Later that month,

member of Congress, "For Gods sake

little more velocity to Congress-you do

not know the situation of your Country, or your conduct

would be more Decisive.

,.10

From the first days of the war, the military were
not content to let the provincial governments and Congress

make military and political decisions without contributing
their ideas and beliefs, usually in the form of suggestions.

These suggestions were generally conveyed in

a

polite and

decorous manner, but, as was noted in the preceding chapter,
some suggestions were, or were thought to be, threatening
or in some way improper.

Civilian leaders, as we have

already seen, generally chastised the military for such

intemperate behavior.

For the most part, military sugges-

received,
tions were properly made, and generally were well

governoften being encouraged and expected by the civilian

ments

.

Realizing how closely military and political quesdid not hesitate
tions were often intertwined, Washington
and its members
publicly and privately to suggest to Congress
He made
take.
courses of action he wished them to

l^The Pennsylvania Eveniiig_P^' '"'""^^^^ Llbridge
J ^
29, 1776,
June
'Gerry
ffrnTtB-Elbr-Idg^
Thomas Mi
Collection, MHS.
Ge?ry Papers, Russell W. Knight
•

,

;
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suggestions relating to the organization and operations of
the support departments;

the recruitment of foreign officers;

military and naval strategy; recruitment of soldiers, apprehension of deserters; powers of congressional committees
at camp;

test oaths; promotions; the refugee problem;

exchanges of prisoners; and the status of

Vermont."'"'^

With

respect to Vermont, Washington did not publicly get involved
in its status, but he did so privately, writing members of

Congress and state officials of New York and New Hampshire,
as well as the leaders of Vermont, expressing his desire to

see the problem of its status resolved.

12

George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, July 4, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 5:216; Same to same, July 10, 1775; ibid., 3:324;
Same to same, December 18, 1775, ibid., 4:172; Same to same,
July 22, 1780, ibid., 19:236; Same to same, November 19,
1782, ibid., 25:350-351; Same to same, December 31, 1775,
ibid., 4:197; George Washington to Henry Laurens, July 24,
1778, ibid., 12:224; George Washington to James Duane,
December 26, 1780, ibid., 21:15; George Washington to
Benjamin Franklin, August 17, 1777, ibid., 9:85-87; George
Washington to Silas Deane, August 13, 1777, ibid., 9:63;
George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, November 27, 1775,
ibid., 4:117; George Washington to John Jay, April 23, 1779,
ibid., 14 :435-437 "^George VJashington to the Secretary at
War, 'October 7, 1782, ibid., 25:240; Ford, JCC, 8:593;
President of the Continental Congress to the Several States,
June 15, 1781, Burnett, LMCC 6:120; Arthur Lee to James
Monroe, August 23, 1783, ibid., 7:277.
,

;

,

^^George Washington to Philip Schuyler, November 28,
Same
2 3 361-36 2
1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings_c^f VJashington
Same to same, Febru4 32
to same, January 8 TT8T7"^bid
arv 6, 1782, ibid., 487; Same to same, January 29, 1-8
2
2 2 8
Same to same. May 14, 1781, ibid
ibid., 468
J:^^,
i^id
George Washington to Joseph Jones, July 10, 1781,
1, 1782,
Georae Washington to Thomas Chittenden, January Weare,
23-419-421; George Washington to Meshech
ibid"^
,

,

.

,

;

:

;

:

;

,
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Washington was frequently successful in having
Congress adopt his suggestions and recommendations.

James

Duane wrote him during 1779 that "You will find that most
of the Acts you recommend are passed in Congress."

13

Other Continental officers were also relatively

successful in having Congress consider and adopt their

suggestions and recommendations.

This was particularly true

of Charles Lee, who could not resist giving his opinion on a

variety of matters, including the size of the army, strategy,
opening up ports to foreign trade, and the treatment of
Tories.''"'^

Greene also made frequent suggestions, generally

when he was the Quartermaster General.

Early in the war,

northern and
he suggested to one member of Congress that if

southern

troops were exchanged it would cure the itch for

them wanting to go home on furloughs.

In the same letter,

Continental soldiers
he expressed hope Congress would send
spirited, confirm the weak
to every colony to "support the
into submission, for there
and wavering, and awe our Opposers

George Washington to Jacob
July 31 1782, ibid., 24:449-450;
25:216.
Bayler, 'September 29, 1782, ibid.,
March 16, 1779,
^^James Duane to George Washington,
Curtis P. Nettles, G^eorge
also
see
4:106;
LMCC
Burnett,
P'
Washi^TgtoH^ln^
1775, "The
^"^rharles Lee to John Adams, October 5
Charles ee o
(1872,:
4
NVHSC,
Lofp^p^^s,"
Charles
October 10,
^^.^is^^^^r^.
ZTreT.enroTT.l
r'^^o'
Lee to the
J^^"^ J., _^lcs Lee tto Samuel Ward, [January
^^^^
259-260, Charles
,

,

.

1776, Ibid
Corresponaenct^uo.
1776], Knollenberg,
,

p.

170.

^

^^^^ Samuel Ward,
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are no Arguments however well supported by Reason that

carries such conviction with them as those that are enforced
from the Muzzle of a Gun or the Point of

a

Bayonet.

"'^^

Hamilton also frequently contacted members of Congress
giving them his opinion on promotions and financial matters."*"^
Other Continental generals, such as Benedict Arnold and
Lafayette, also made suggestions to Congress about policies
that legislative body should adopt.

17

The military probably made more suggestions and

recommendations to the provincial and state governments and
their leaders than they did to Congress.

Washington was

quite active in contacting state leaders, making recommendations and suggestions relating to political, military, and

other matters.

Eleven times during the war v^ashington sent

circulars to all the states, and thirty times to

a

particular

Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 31, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; see also Nathanael
Greene to John Jay, February 1, 1779, Morris, John Ja y,
pp. 542-543.
"""^Alexander Hamilton to William Duer May 6, 1777
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:246; Same to same,
],
June 18,~1778, ibid., 498; Alexander Hamilton to

,

,

[

[December 1779-March 1780], ibid., 2:236-251; Alexander
400-418,
Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], ibid.,
ibid.,
Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 30, 1781,
604-635
Continental
-^"^Benedict Arnold to the President of the
4th ser.,
Congress, June 13 1775, Force, America n_M;chjA^es,of the
2-976-977- Marquis de Lafayette to the President
"Letters f^^^ ^he
1778
April 21
,

continental Congress,
Laurens, 1777-1780,
Marquis de Lafayette to the Hon. Henry
SCHGM 8, no. 1 (January 1907): 65-66.
,

,
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region or state.

1

He also wrote letters to state leaders.

He urged state governments to give more powers to their

executives; made recommendations for promotions; suggested

Virginia send more and better qualified delegates to Congress;

suggested laws be adopted to stop trade with the

enemy and allowing the military to administer an oath and
sv;ear

any person to the truth of matters relative to public

suggested Virginia delay opening her land office in

service;

for to open it would cause officers to leave the

the west,

service to become land adventurers: and requested New Jersey

prohibit their chief justice from rendering decisions regarding the status of the enlistments of New Jersey's Continental

Ke was careful to always couch his letters in the

soldiers.

most unoffensive manner, and normally prefaced or concluded
his remarks by apologizing for interjecting himself into

civilian affairs.
1

"''^

R

Douglas Southall Freeman, George W ashington: A
Biogra phy, 5:443-444.

Washington to Benjamin Harrison, December 18, [-30], 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washingtoji,
17:22-23;
13:466-467; Same to same, October 25, 1779 ibid.
George Washington to William Livingston, February 19, 1780,
ibid., 18:28-31; Same to same. May 27, 1781, ibid., 22:117;
Same to same, November 13, 1782, ibid., 25:337; Same to
Selecti^n£_from_the_Corr^^
177 9
same, October 4
188-189;
the Executive of New Jer sey^_f £om _17 7_6_to_1^786^, pp.
], 1782,
George Washington to William Greene, January
9:525 Same to
Circular, Bar tie tt. Record s _o fJR^^^^
ibid'., 555'; George Washington to Nicholas
same. May 4, 1782
Cooke, March 17, 1776, ibid., 7:503; Same to same, Octo1776,
ber 12, 1776, ibid., 8:34-35; Same to same, January 6,
FitzDatrick, Writings of Washing ton, 4:216-217; George
1780, ibid., 18:439; Same
28
Washington to^lHi^ITPeed
"'"^George
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Throughout the War, General Greene was quick to
express his opinion regarding civilian matters, and fre-

quently informed civilian leaders and state governments of
them.

20

With the encouragement and assistance of General

Wayne, Greene lobbied the chief executive of Georgia during
the winter of 1781-82 to allow the "disaffected" to return
to Georgia from Florida,

to the state,

if they would give their allegiance

or at least remain neutral during the remain-

der of the war.

Wayne, supported by Greene, appealed to the

Georgia legislature to issue

a

proclamation opening the door

for absent citizens and encouraging desertion from the enemy.

The legislature agreed.

21

Earlier in the war, several

generals, among them Smallwood, riaxwell, and Lee, suggested
same, July 4, 1780, ibid., 19:113-114; Same to same. May 5
[-7], 1781, ibid., 22:50; Same to same. May 27, 1781, ibid.,
118; George VJashington to John Trumbull, November 13, 1782,
ibid., 25^334-334; Circulars to the states May 24, 1781,
January 22, 1782, March 5, 1782, and June 8, 1783, in ibid.,
22:111; 23:458-461; 24:44-46; 26:487-488.
20

Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, November 20,
1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson 4:130; Nathanael
Greene to Nicholas Cooke, October 16, 1776, Bartlett, Records
of Rhode Island, 8:37; Nathanael Greene to Henry Marchant,
November 17, 1111 Greene, Nathanael Greene 1:511.
,

,

,

^^Nathanael Greene to John Martin, December 27 1781
"Original Documents," MH 14 (1911): 204 Same to same,
January 9, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC
(Microfilm Reel #1); Same to same, March 12 1782 ibid..
Same to same, January 7, 1782, "Letter from General Greene
to Governor Martin," GHO 1, no. 4 (December 1917): 336
Stevens, A Hi story oil Georgia, 2:272: Chandler, Revolutionary
Records of Georgia, 2:320.
,

;

,
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policies the states should adopt with respect to
the Tory
22
problem.
Even Washington got involved in the Tory

problem,

calling on the provincial governments to seize and try
those

who were inimical or suspected to be.^"^
Steuben lobbied the Virginia legislature and chief

executive frequently during the winter of 1780-81.

He made

so many suggestions regarding recruiting, drafting, prevent-

ing desertion,

the militia law, the supply system, and

strategic policies that he was generally considered

a

nui-

He even suggested that Jefferson call the assembly

sance.

into session so they could adopt the proper measures, including those he had suggested, to prevent the loss of the

state

^'^
.

Other generals in the south, including Gates,

Moultrie, Lafayette, and Lee, made suggestions to the chief
2 2

William Smallwood to
Jenifer, March 3, 1777,
Browne, Maryland Archives 16:157-159; William Maxwell to the
New Jersey Legislature, April 26, 1779, Selections from the
Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to
1786 pp 151-15 4; Charles Lee to the President and Council
of the State of Georgia, August 28, 1776, "The Charles Lee
Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 248.
[

]

,

,

.

23

George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, November 15, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 4:90;
George Washington to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,
November 9, 1775, ibid., 78.
,

^'^Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, December 28,
1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:244, 245; Same to
7, 'l 9 3-1 9 4
Same to same, Decemsame', DGcembeF~97" 17 80, Ibid
ber 16, 1780, ibid., 213-214; Same to same, December 18,
ibid., 216; Same to same, January 2, 1781, ibid., 299;
1780
Same'to same, January 21, 1781, ibid., 423; Archibald Gary
596-597.
to Thomas Jefferson, February 13, 178], ibid.,
;
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executives respecting policies their states should consider
and/or adopt.

25

Generals also made suggestions in the

northern theatre of operations and on the frontier.

Putnam,

for example, early in 1777, suggested to Pennsylvania's

Council of Safety they consider adopting price controls
similar to those adopted by the New England states.

George

Rogers Clark lobbied with Virginia's chief executive to have
a

certain individual appointed County Lieutenant of the

newly created Jefferson County.

Later that year, 1781, and

the following year. General William Irvine lobbied v/ith both
the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council and Virginia's

governor to have their respective states run

a

mutually

satisfactory boundary line.^^
The military were probably the most active in lobbyOn one hand this meant

ing for a more effective Congress.

^^Charles Lee to Cornelius Karnet, President of the
North Carolina Council of Safety, July 24, 1776, "The Charles
Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 164; Charles Lee to John
Rutledge, June 16, 1776, ibid., 71-72; Same to same, August 1,
1776, ibid., 187; Horatio Gates to Abner Nash, July 19, 1780,
"Original Documents," MAH 5, no. 4 (October 1880): 284;
William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 14, 1779,
Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revol ution, 1:262; Marquis
Chinard,
de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, July 1, 1781,
Lafayette in Virginia pp. 19, 19-20.
,

,

^^Israel Putnam to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety,
1st ser.,
January 31, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, January
2i,
5.209- George Rogers Clark to Thomas Jefferson,
William Irvine
1781 'soyd. Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:420;
Butterfield, ^^hington::
to William Mo^F¥7"De^ember 3, 1781,
William J^vine to
Irvine Correspondence, appendix g, p. 232;
Bi^fa^Ti^Ha^rTs^^ril 20 17 82 ibid., appendix h, p. 267.
,
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making it more efficient, and on the other, and more importantly, making the whole system of Continental government

equal to the exigencies of the war.

With respect to the

former, a good example is the military's desire that Congress

give more authority into the hands of single executive

department heads, or at least boards

v;ith

to properly conduct the public's business.

sufficient power
27

The military's

lobbying efforts for these changes were somewhat successful,
as Congress did improve the functioning of some of their

boards and in 1781 did create relatively strong executive
departments.

The military were not as successful in getting

the states to give Congress sufficient authority to conduct

the war as the military wished.

Although most revolutionary leaders looked to Congress
of
to play the primary role in directing the military forces

necessary
the continent, few were willing to give Congress the
forauthority to oversee properly the military and economic

tunes of the continent.

From 1775 until 1781, the powers of

on the
Congress were exercised by an authority based solely

1779
^"^Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25
Washing ton and th_e _General£_ol_tl2e
fRufus W. Griswold]
TT298T" Alexander Hamilton to James Duane,
,

,

,

American Revolution,
Ham^^
-[Si^tiSb^rTT^rTTSr, Syrett, Papers_of_Alexander
October 12,
2-404-405; Alexander Hamilton to Isaac Sears, Morris,
Robert
ibid., 472; Alexander Hamilton to
1780
Washington to James
Aoril 30 1781, ibid., 604-605; George ^^rj^_s_c^V^Hl^^'
Duane Decelle^ 26 1780, Fitzpatrick, Livingston, January 31,
R.
2^t?5; George Washington to Robert
,

1781,

ibid., 164.
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tacit acquiescence of the states.

Even after the ratifica-

tion of the Articles of Confederation, for the most part,

sovereignty, authority, and power remained in the states.

Congress did not raise revenue nor levy taxes, but only had
the delegated authority to make requisitions on the states.
If the states ignored them, Congress had no coercive force

to require the states to comply.

limited war-making powers.

Congress, similarly, had

Under the articles, it took nine

states to act on many things, and freauently nine states

were not even represented.

Because of these deficiencies,

the military were very critical of Congress and the Conti-

nental system of government, both before and after the

adoption and implementation of the Articles of Confederation.
As will be discussed later,

some members of the military

actually contemplated gaining partial or total control of
Congress in order to make it function more effectively.
Most, hov;ever, lobbied peacefully for change, desiring the

civilian leaders would realize that only with

a

nationalis-

tic program, even a temporary one, would Congress be able to

effectively give direction to the war effort.
Americans, to a large extent, lacked

nationalism before 1775.

a

sense of

The Revolutionary War changed that.

another,
As the Americans came into closer contact with one
a feeling of

nationalism developed, especially among the

568

military.

28

March

1782, Thomas Paine wrote "The union of America is

5,

In his The American Crisis No,

the foundation-stone of her independence,"

10,

dated

Most Continen-

tal officers agreed with this assessment, as the war had

given a nationalistic outlook towards themselves and the

central government.

This was more true as the war progressed

and many in the military began to lose their local attach-

ments.

Only

a

unified army under

unified central govern-

a

ment was victory possible, so believed many in the military.
Thus they desired the influence of the individual states to

decrease, and that of Congress to increase.

Captain

Samuel Shaw wrote that unless power was "vested in some

supreme head, sufficient to enforce

a

compliance with such

regulations as are evidently calculated for the general good.
28

Henry Steele Commager The Empire of Reason How
Europe Imagined and America Realized the Enlightenment,
,

pp.

182,

185.

:

~

"

on

.

Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Writings of
Thomas Paine 1:204.
,

Knox to Gouverneur Morris, February 21,
1783, Callahan, Henry Knox p. 200; Nathanael Greene to
Charles Pettit, December 21, 1782, Merrill Jensen, The New
Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 407-408;
Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, September 14, 1780,
Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 277; Nathanael Greene to Robert
Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris
1782
Morris, January 24
4:109; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, July 25, 1782,
Palmer, Calendar of Virqinia State Papers, 3:229-230;
Timothy Pickering to [Joseph] Orne August 18, 1782, Timothy
Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); Timothy Pickering
to Stephen Higginson, April 17, 1783, ibid.
"^'^Henry

,

,

,

,
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adieu to all government-

[.]

"

He believed that the "Thirteen

wheels require a steady and powerful regulator to keep them
in good order,

and prevent the machine from becomming use-

Similarly, Greene wrote one of New Hampshire's

less."

principal civilian leaders that Congress "must have powers
to control all the States, or America is forever lost."

31

Hamilton, sharing this belief, was most active in lobbying
for the nationalistic point of view, most notably in a

series of letters to the newspapers, as "The Continentalist

.

He wrote James Duane during the summer of 1780 that "the

confederation itself is defective and requires to be altered;
"It may be appre-

it is neither fit for war nor peace."

"that this may be dangerous to liberty.

hended," he wrote,

But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run

much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal
government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the
rights of the people."

33

1782
[John] Eliot, December 22
Quincy, Major S amuel Shaw p. 100; Nathanael Greene to
Nathaniel Peabody, D'^S^er 8 1780, Moore, Nev^ampshire
^'"Samuel Shaw to

,

,

,

,

2:374

.

^^The New-York Packet, and the Amer ican Advertiser
1782
July 12, 19rAn^^^it-9r30 1781; April 18, July 4,
Alexander Hamilton to Isaac Sears, [October 12, 17B0J,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton 2:472.
;

,

,

^^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane,
1780]

,

ibid.

,

402

.

[September

3,

,
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Washington was perhaps the most active in lobbying
for a stronger and more effective central government.
ing the summer

Dur-

of 1780, he wrote the President of Congress

that it was the wish of the army "that every matter which

relates to it should be under the immediate direction and

providence of Congress." 34

Throughout 1780 and 1781, he

complained constantly that Congress did not have sufficient
power to properly conduct the war effort, and called for
power to be given or taken by Congress.

"^^

As the summer of

1780 began, he wrote Joseph Jones that unless Congress was

vested with powers by the states competent to the great

purposes of the war, or assumed them as

a

matter of right,

and unless Congress acted with more energy,
lost."

36

"our Cause is

He continued the same theme that fall in letters
34

George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 19:412.
,

35

George Washington to George Mason, October 22,
1780, ibid., 20:242; George Washington to William Fitzhugh,
October 22, 1780, P.S., ibid., 246; Same to same, March 25,
1781, ibid., 21:375-376; George Washington to John Parke
Custis, February 28, 1781, ibid., 320; George Washington to
Joseph Jones, March 24, 1781, ibid., 374; George Washington
to Philip Schuyler, February 20, 1781, ibid., 261-262; George
Washington to James Duane October 4 1780 ibid., 20:117;
ibid., 21:14; Same to same,
1780
Same to Same, December 26
February 19, 1781, ibid., 248; George VJashington to Fielding
Lewis, May 5 [-July 6], 1780, ibid., 19:131; Circular to the
States, October 18, 1780, ibid., 20:210; George Washington
to John Sullivan, February 4, 1781, ibid., 21:183; George
Washington to Robert R. Livingston, January 31, 1781, ibid.,
,

,

164

,

,

,

.

^^George Washington to Joseph Jones, May
ibid., 19:412.

31

,

1780

,
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to members of Congress and other civilian leaders.

"Unless

there is a material change both in our military, and civil

policy," he warned George Mason late in October 1780, "it

will be

m

vain to contend much longer." 37

After Congress

appeared to be straightening itself out by creating executive
boards and giving the Superintendent of Finance extraordinary
powers, Washington curtailed his lobbying efforts for a

stronger Congress.

His attention during 1781 was primarily

focused upon military matters.

However, after the victory

at Yorktown, he renewed his lobbying efforts.

He believed

there should be a stronger union of the states, under a

Congress with sufficient powers; otherwise, he warned, the
states would be like a rope of sand with the result being

anarchy and confusion.

"It is clearly my opinion," he wrote

one member of Congress during the spring of 1783,

"unless

Congress have powers competent to all 'general* purposes,
that the distresses we have encountered, the expences we
have incurred, and the blood we have spilt in the course of
an Eight years war, will avail us nothing."

38

^"^George Washington to George Mason, October 22,
James
1780 ibid., 20:242; see also George Washington to
to
Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 117; George Washington
George
John Mathews, February 14, 1781, ibid., 21:226-227;
Washington to Joseph Jones, March 24, 1781, ibid., 374.

^^George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 4,
3:279; seealso
1783 Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton,
Fitz
Georoe Washingt^ to A^^^hibaTd^rey June 15, 1782
George Washington
Patrick, writin gs of Washington, 24 347
184-185,
,

,

:

to

BenjamiHnTI?FiWri^1^Fa^r^l78 3

,

;

ibid., 26:184

,
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In many instances the military made their recommenda-

tions and suggestions without invitation to do so, but most
times they did so because a public official had asked them
to, either publicly or privately.

Members of Congress

frequently asked Washington to privately correspond with
them, desiring he would share things with them that he could

not publicly.

39

Washington appreciated the attention shown

him, as well as the practical effect such communication

Members of Congress wrote other officers,

afforded.

soliciting their thought about political, economic, and other
Hamilton, for example, having

non-strictly military matters.

George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 31, 1783,
ibid., 276-277; George Washington to Tench Tilghman,
April 24, 1783, ibid., 359; Circular to the States, June 8,
Augustine
1783, ibid., 487, 488; George Washington to John
Washington, June 15, 1783, ibid., 27:12.
^^Thomas McKean to George Washington, July 14, 1781,
Burnett, LMCC, 6:146; John Hanson to George Washington,
George
November To7~lV81, ibid., 261; Elias Boudinot to Mathews to
Washington, November 27, 1782, ibid., 550; John
John Sullivan
George Washington, April 16, 1781, ibid., 56;
1780, ibid., 5:463to George Washington, November 9, [-30],
6:74; Same to same,
464; Same to same. May 2, 1781, ibid.,
to George WashingJune 11, 1781, ibid., 114; Robert Morris
1:97;
1781, Ferguson, Paper^ol^obertMorris
ton May 29
September 17, 1775,
Samiel Ward, Sr., to George Washington,
of the Revolutionary
John ward, "Lieu; -Colonel Samuel Ward, Thomas Lynch to
war?" NYGBR 6, no. 3 (July 1875): 115;Force, American
George-Wi^ington, January 16 1776
Archives 4th ser., 4:687.
_

,

,

,

.

,

,

,

1781,
June
^°George Washington to John Mathews, George7, Washing22:176;
FitzDatrick Waitings of Washington,
Revolutionary
ton ^fjoh^ j!77^#ir-r3VT7^^
3:132.
D i p 1 oma tj^c__Cor£espondence
,
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just been elected to Congress, wrote Greene,

happy to correspond with you

.

.

.

and

I

"I

shall be

shall entreat you

not to confine your observations to military subjects but
to take in the whole scope of national concerns."'^"'"

Civilian

leaders frequently urged military leaders to voice their

opinions respecting purely political matters.
war, Benjamin Rush,

Early in the

for instance, urged Wayne to join

Generals St. Clair and Thompson in publicly condemning

Pennsylvania's

constitution.

Gouverneur Morris later in

the war urged Greene to lobby with the governments of the

southern states to agree to

a

congressional plan for raising

revenue for the central treasury.

42

Many in the military wanted to do more than just
give their opinion about public affairs.

participate in a more active manner.

They wanted to

After all, some mili-

tary leaders had been active in political life before they

donned their uniform.

Frequently those with political

inclinations were encouraged by their peers to leave the

military for positions in government, believing they could
influence the legislative bodies to take actions which
"^^Alexander Hamilton to Nathanael Greene,
Hamilt on,
[October 12, 1782], Syrett, Papers of Alexander
3:183.

^^Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, May 19 1777
Morris to Nathanael
Stille, Anthony Wayne, p. 68; Gouverneur
Gouverneur_^^^ 1:241.
Greene, D¥^¥SblF-2T7'l781 Sparks,
,

,

,

.
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would benefit the military. 4 3
Civilian leaders also believed the country would

benefit from having military men serving in the political
arena.

John Adams, for one, believed that annual elections

of generals would result in many generals being removed from

military command and many of them would eventually serve in
the civil government, thereby benefiting the governments by

their military experience.

44

James Duane

,

however, was

opposed to military men, particularly his friend, Philip
Schuyler, coming to Congress.

"Your lips," he told Schuyler,

"will be sealed; and your knowledge and Abilities in

Measure lost to your Country."

45

great

a

Schuyler did not heed this

advice and took his seat in Congress.

William Ellery told

Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 2, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 2 (1873): 263; [Edward]
Giles to Otho Ho[lland] Williams, November 15, 1781, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the
Maryland Historical Society, p. 56; Elias Boudinot to Mrs
Boudinot, March 15, 1778, Boudinot, Elias Boudinot 1:109;
Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, October 26, 1778, Roche,
Joseph Reed, p. 149; George Washington to James McHenry,
December 11, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
33:381; George Washington to Alexander McDougall, October 24,
Th e
1780, ibid., 20:254; Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion,
Swamp Fox, pp. 265-266; Moultrie, Memoirs of the American
Revolution, 2:29; William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln,
William
July 17, 1779, ibid., 26; Benjamin Lincoln to
Hamilton
Moultrie, July 19, 1779, ibid., 28-29; Alexander
Paper s of
to John Laurens, [August 15, 1782], Syrett,
Alexander Hamilton 3:145.
,

,

,

,

"^^John Adams to Nathanael Greene, March

],

[

1777

Burnett, LMCC, 2:300-301.
ibid.,

January
"^^James Duane to Philip Schuyler,
4:4.

3

,

1779,

,

his friend, William Whipple, a general of New Hampshire's

militia, that he preferred him to serve in the cabinet, not
in the field, but would support him in either.

would serve adequately and often in both, being
Congress for over four years,

a

VVhipple
a

member of

member of the state legisla-

ture for numerous years, and commanding New Hampshire's

militia at Saratoga and those serving in Rhode Island.
Many revolutionary leaders did not believe military

officers should hold civilian positions while holding military commissions, not even after they departed military
service.

Benjamin Rush, before the war, wrote that military

men, because of their "knowledge in arms and their popularity

with the soldiers and common people would give them great
advantages over every other citizen, and v/ould render the
transition from democracy to anarchy, and from anarchy to
monarchy, very natural and easy."

Thus, Rush believed,

"it

would be best that military officers should be entirely
excluded from having any share in the legislature."

47

When

Greene learned that Schuyler might be made president of the

Continental Congress and allowed to retain his military
"^^William Ellery to William Whipple, October 30,
The Book of the Signers: Containing
1777 Brotherhead, ed.
Fac-Simile Let ters of the Signers of the Declaratio noj
73
Independen ce (Philadelphia: William Brotherhead, 1861), p.
,

Benjamin Rush to Catherine Macaulay, January 18,
Rush 1:70.
1769, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin
"^"^

,
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commission, he wrote John Adams in objection.

"No free

people," he wrote, "ought to admit

a

and military."

commission under that

"I

will not hold

a

junction of the civil

State who blends those two characters together.
them incompatible with the safety of
can assure you,

I

am not fighting for

but to have not but the law."

I

Think

free people, and

a
a

I

change of masters,

Responding, John Adams told

him not to worry because no member of Congress would allow
an individual to hold two positions simultaneously.

4 R

Governor Henry wrote George Rogers Clark he thought
it improper to put the top civil and military authority in

the same hands, otherwise Clark would have been made county

lieutenant of Illinois County.

49

Frequently during the war.

Congress ruled that an individual could not hold
tal commission while holding

a

a

Continen-

state office.

Because many colonial governments had restrictions

regarding plural military-civil office holding, it is not
4 R

Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 28 1777
Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 3
John Adams to Nathanael Greene, June 2,
(July 1942): 74
ibid., 75; see also John Adams to Benjamin Rush,
1777
February 8, 1778, Revolutionary War Correspondence, BPL.
,

,

;

,

^Patrick Henry to George Rogers Clark, December
1778, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 64.

15,

^^Ford, JCC, 14:861; Thomas Jefferson to the Virginia Delegates in^Congress, March 26, 1781, Hutchinson,
Papers of James Madison, 3:31-32, 32n.l; The Virginia
Delegates~Tt Congress to Thomas Jefferson, April 17, 1781,
ibid., 74-75.

n

t
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surprising to find the issue debated in Lhc provincial

congresses and constitutional conventions.^''^

Elbridge Gerry,

during December 1775, informed Samuel Adams that the revolu-

tionary legislature had before it

bill to "Exclude

a

Gentlemen of the Army from the legislative, that military
Influence may never reach our senate." 52
the war adopted restrictions regarding

Many states during

Llie

military liolding

civilian positions, to keep, for the most part, the military
influence from having too large
tions.

a

role in civilian delibera-

53

51

William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of
the State Constitutions of the American Revolution," AAAPSS
9

389-390

(J,in\]nry-Junc 1897):

.

52

Elbridge Gerry to S.iinucl Adams, December 13, 1/75,
Gerry-Knight Papers 1713-1825, MlIS; see also John Gary,
Phy sician Politician, Patriot p 2 00;
Joseph Warrc
BrennarT, Plur al Office-Holding in Massachu setts, p. 27; John
Wendell to Elbridge Gerry, June 25, 1776, Jere R. Daniel!,
Experiment in R epublicanism: Ne w Hampshire Politics and lie
AmericalT'RevbTution 1741-1794~ p. 165; Portsmouth Instructions to their Representatives in the New Hampshire General
Assembly, July 31, 1776, Bouton Do cuments and Records
Relating to New Hampshire, 8:301; Proposed New Hampshire
bTd
9:840
CoHstrtTTtion of'l 7'7 9
:

,

,

.

I

,

,

,

.

.

,

101 0; Foote, Sketches
0:210, 579
p. 71; Hemphill, E xtracts from the Jourof North
r Caroljlrm,
fraTs~cf ~t he~T"Fjvincia l Congresses of South Carolina r77517T6~ passim, 63-259; A. S. Salley, ed.. Journal of the
Gener al Assembly of South Carolina, September 17, 1776bctober 20, 1776 (Columbia, South Carolina: Historical CornDelapl.iine,
mi ss ion "^r^uth Carolina, 1909), pp. 1 54-155n.2;
Thomas Johnson, pp. 184, 198; Silver, "The Provisional
G^^nmelit~^^Maryland (1774-1777)," p. 49; Ronald Hoffman,
A Spirit of Pi ssension Economjxs P olitics, andJJTgJRevqluj^
tion~rn~M"a'fyiand, p "1 6T; Rowland, Cha£les__Carron__jof
ChandJor,
CarrollTon, "2V4 7; Browne, Ma r\Oji_nd_ Ajrc hives 11:71,
Peyton
289
288
Re vo 1 u i^n a rx_Recor d s of G^r^Ta, 1 277
George Washington, September 6, 1775, Sparks,

^^Saunders, NCCR,

1

,

,

:

,

.

,

:
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,

,
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Despite the restrictions and beliefs against the

military serving in the government, or being involved in the
governmental affairs, the military did involve themselves in
the governments

•

They were involved in several ways, includ-

ing voting and holding office.

John Adams told

a

friend during the early summer of

1776 that to open a controversy on suffrage would be asking

for trouble.

maintained.

Once opened, "there will be no end of it" he
"Women will demand a vote," as well as men with-

out a farthing.

54

But it was opened, particularly by men

in arms, who believed their willingness to shed their blood
in the revolutionary cause entitled them to the vote.

55

This was especially true in Maryland and Pennsylvania.

During the summer of 1776, Maryland was beset by
disturbances by the militia who demanded suffrage for all
who were willing to support independence by shouldering arms.
They maintained that bearing arms and paying taxes should

entitle an individual to vote, but the revolutionary

Correspondence of The American Revolution 1:33; Journals
of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee
of Safety and Council of S afety of the State of New York,
1775-1776-1777, 1:488, 495, 551; "The Militia Resolves,"
The Maryland Gazette July 18, 1776.
,

,

^"^John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26

Works of John Adams

,

,

1776

,

9:378.

^^Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from
Property to Democracy 1760-1860 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960), p. 103.

Adams,

legislature declared that in order to vote for members of
the convention which would write the constitution, one would

have to possess fifty acres or property worth t40 sterling.

Upset with this decision, a large number of the militia and

members of the Flying Camp attempted unsuccessfully during

August 1776 to vote in Frederick, Prince Georges, and Kent
Counties, and in Annapolis.

Frightened by this outburst by

the military, the conservative faction who controlled the

convention wrote

a

constitution, which to some degree, was

far more restrictive and less democratic than the proprie-

tary charter.
When the Pennsylvania Assembly convened in February
1776, they were met by demands from the disenfranchised

Associators for more representation and greater suffrage.
These demands continued throughout the spring and into the
summer, as committees of privates lobbied for the suffrage,

maintaining those risking their lives for the state should
be entitled to vote for the civilian leaders who would be

making decisions respecting their lives as soldiers.

The

Provincial Congress on June 20, 1776, agreed, allowing all

military Associators who had paid

a tax or

who had been

assessed, to vote in the ensuing elections to create

a

new

Ibid., pp. 108-109, 109; David Curtis Skaggs,
Root s of Maryland Demo cracy^_1 7 5 3-17 76 pp. 181-182, 182,
the
r90"-191, 194-19 5; Crowl, "Maryland During and After
,

Revolution,"

p.

30.
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machinery of government. 57
Most states provided for those eligible to vote
before they had entered military service to be allov;ed to
do so while in the army.

58

Maryland was

a

notable exception,

denying the military the right to vote and to hold seats in
the convention during the summer of 1776.

59

It is impossible

to calculate how important the military vote was during the

war; however, it is safe to suggest that on occasion their

vote played an important role in certain elections.
Besides voting for public officials, many soldiers

during the war left military service to take positions in
the government.

This was primarily a southern phenomenon.

The Pennsylvania Packet, and General Advertiser
July 1, 1776; The Pennsylvania Gazette March 6, 1776;
Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 p. 86; see
petitions in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives ,~2"d ser., 3:640
ibid., 8th ser., 8:7397-7405, 7406, 7409, 7422, 7438-7439,
and 7449.
',

,

,

;

^^

Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial
Convention, Co mmittee of Safety and Council of Safety oT~the
State of New York, 1775-1776-1777, 2:948, 957, 957-958;
Alexander C. Flick, ed.. History of the State of New York
4:169; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett p. 143.
,

,

^^Silver, "The Provisional Government of Maryland
(1774-1777)," p. 46; Crowl, "Maryland During and After the
2:239-240.
Revolution," p. 30; Scharf, History of Maryland
,

^^Alexander C. Flick, ed.. History of the State of
92; Gerlach,
NewYork, 4:169; Spaulding, George Clinton p. Sellers,
The
PhTTTF^chuyler, pp. 309-310 Charles Coleman
,

;

AFETit^rtfe-^evolution :_jrhej^^
Good, 1939),
P^a le" (H¥b^^ Connecticut: Feather and
,

roT7~22i.

pp.

iui

1
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especially during 1781 and 1782 when many officers left the
military, either temporarily or permanently, to take positions in the state legislature.

During those years over

tv/o

dozen South Carolina officers, including Thomas Sumter,
Francis Marion, and Andrew Pickens, left military service
to take positions in the state legislature.

6

Many North

Carolina officers also left the military to take civilian
positions.

62

Among them were Colonel Alfred Moore who

became Attorney General in 1782, and Colonel Alexander Martin
63

who became a senator and subsequently governor in 1782.

Virginia officers also left military service for positions
in the state government.

Captain John

T-larshall

left to

serve in the House of Eleegates and Privy Council; Brigadier

General Andrew Lewis also served on the council after leaving the military.

Major General Adam Stephen, after leaving

the military, served in the assembly and senate.

Militia

Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion; The Swamp Fox
pp. 262, 265, 270; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and
Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter pp. 215, 217; Reynolds,
Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South
Carolina, pp. 172, 222, 239, 244, 261, 292, 293, 299; David
Ramsay, Ramsay's History of South Carolina from its first
Settlement in 1670 to the year 1808 2:257-258.
,

,

,

^^Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina
pp. 475-476;
pp. 134, 212-213; Draper, King's Mountain
History of
J. B. 0. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary
Upper South Carolina (Greenville, South Carolina: Shannon
and Company, Printers and Binders, 1897), pp. 167-169.
,

,

Biographical History of North Carolina
3:275-277.

^"^Ashe,

2:303-305;

,
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General Andrew Moore, who served earlier as

a

Continental

officer, served in the House from 1780 until the end of the
war.

James Monroe, after leaving the Continental Army,

served in the House before going to Congress.
Mercer, who spent time as both

a

militia and Continental

officer, left military service for
gress.

John Francis

position in the Con-

a

Also going to Congress was John VJalker, who had

served as an aide-de-camp to Washington.

Another Washington

aide-de-camp, Edmund Randolph, left military service to
serve as Attorney General and as

a

member of Congress.

John

Tyler, who served as a militia and Continental officer, left

military service to serve in the House and Council.
Archibald Gary served as

a

And

militia colonel during 1775 and

1776, before becoming Speaker of the Senate during the latter
year.^"^

Many Maryland officers left military service for

positions in government

.

Among the most notable were

James McHenry, who left service in 1781 to serve in the

senate and later in Congress; Robert Hanson Harrison became

Chief Justice in 1781; and Alexander Contee Hanson, who, in
^"^Albert J. Beveridge, The L ife of John Ma rsha^l^
Revol ution,
1-161-164, 209; Kirkland, Letters on the American
Leon G.
2;25n.2; BDC, pp. 1399-1400, 1425, 1429, 1584, 1870; (Richvols
Tyler, Thi^etters an d_Times_ of the T ylers, 3

1884-1896)
mond and Williamsb{l??rwhittet and Shepperson,
IbJ;
1-54, 64, 67; Brock, Archibald_Cary pp. 100, 133, 191n.Jb.
p.
Thwaites, Documentary~HT¥to^jDl Du^nmore^^_^
,

,

65

Scharf,

Hi^tnrv^^ e stern

Maryland

,

1:455

,

479

^

.

,
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1778, became a judge of the Supreme Court.

Georgia

officers also left military service to take positions in
the government

.

^

Many officers from the middle states, particularly
Pennsylvania, left the field for the cabinet during the
68

war.

Among the more notable examples are Joseph Reed,

who served as military secretary to Washington and Adjutant

General of the army before going to Congress and serving as
chief executive of Pennsylvania

Samuel At lee and John

.

Armstrong both served as Continental officers before going
to Congress in 1778 and 1779,

respectively.

And William

Bradford, Jr., left the army during 1780 to become the

state's Attorney General.
66

BDC

,

Schar f

69

New Jersey, Delaware and New

Hi story of Maryland

,

,

2:575n.l, 560n.l;

1378.

p.

67

Thomas Gamble, S avannah Duels and Duell i sts 17331877 (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company,
1923)
pp. 37-38; William Omer Foster, Sr., Jame s Jackson:
Duelist an d Militant S ta tesman 1757-1806 (Athens University
of GeorgTa Press, 1960), p. 17.
,

:

Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution,
Morton L. Montgomery, History "oT^erTcs
64 6
l: 238n., 39 7
County, Penn sylvania in the Revolution, fr om 1 774 to^/7^83/
Philadelphia
pp. 262'^26T7 W. A. Dor land, "The Second Troop
City Cavalry," PMHB 45, no. 3 (1921): 289-290n.65; George R.
Powell, Contin ental Congress at York, Pen nsylvania and York
County in the Revolution {York: York Printing Company 1914
^^7T52~-^54 Kirkland, Letters on the Amer ican Revolu tion,
2 lOln 3
"

,

;

,

,

;

:

.

^^George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20 1780 Fitzpatrick, Wri_t_ings^ of
Washington 19:413; BDC, pp. 523-524, 531-532, 1594.
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left the field for positions as secretaries to the Board

Colonel John H. Stone becaine

of War.

of the secretary of foreign affairs.

a

clerk in the office

And Lieutenant Colonel

Henry Brockholst Livingston left the army in 1779 to accompany John Jay to Europe as his secretary and Major David

Franks left the army the following year and, during 1781,

carried messages to Europe for Congress.

73

About three weeks before the Declaration of Independence, a Maryland delegate to Congress introduced a motion

that members of Congress not be allowed to hold any office

under the new governments.

John Adams seconded the motion,

with an amendment that no member hold any office, civil or
military, under any government, old or new.
Samuel Chase,

"This," he wrote

"struck through the assembly like an electric

for every member was a governor, or general, or judge,

shock,

under the old
or some mighty thing or other in the militia,

government or some new one."
as Adams wrote Chase,
it

""^^

"I

The motion was dropped, and

have never heard another word about

in his
John Adams was, for the most part, accurate

"^^Scharf, History of Maryland,

2:571n.l; Morton L.

Montgome
Revolut
of Robe
Troup; Ag
167
1942)
:

.

^Sohn Adams

to Samuel Chase, June 14

Works of John Adams, 9:397.

,

1776

,

Adams,

586

observation about members of Congress holding several

military and civilian positions at the same time.

He would

have been just as accurate if he had expanded his observation to include revolutionary leaders serving in the

provincial and state governments.

Despite some opposition

to members of the military being involved in the political

process, especially holding civilian office while possessing
a

military commission, many revolutionary leaders served in

a

military and civilian capacity at the same time.
It was a common colonial practice to have civilian

officials hold militia positions, and this practice carried
over into the early revolutionary civilian bodies, especially
the provincial congresses and committees of safety.

75

In

Massachusetts, for example, over 60 percent of the delegates
to the 1774 Essex County Convention and over half of the

Salem Committee of Correspondence held militia commissions.
And approximately one-third of the members of the Provincial

Congress that met in May 1775 held military positions.
Serving in the military and in

a

76

civilian capacity

remained a frequent occurrence in Massachusetts, as well as

of

^^Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety
the American Revolution p. 154.
,

a
"^^Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as
36,
1764-1775 ,"
Social Institution: Salem, Massachusetts
American Archives, 4th
no. 4 (December 1973): 127; Force,
ser., 2:1375-1379.
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the state level where individuals in New York held military

and civilian positions at the same time.

At the county level

there were many individuals serving in dual roles. 8 4

For

instance, four members, including James Clinton, of the New

Windsor nine-member Committee of Safety were active in the
85

•1-^
military

New York's neighbor. New Jersey, particularly early
in the war, had numerous individuals serving in civil and

military roles at the same time.

Militia officers, who were

active in the field. General Philemon Dickinson, Colonels

Elijah Clark, Ephraim Martin, and Theunis Dey all served in
either or both the Provincial Congress and first state

Assembly

Pennsylvania probably had as many, if not more,
individuals holding both military commissions and civil

positions as any other state.

During 1776, approximately

half of the members of their provincial conference and later
^^Ibid., pp. 104-146.

^^Russell Headley, ed., The History of Orange County,
New York (Middletown, New York: Van Deusen and Elms, 1908),
p.

82.

^^New Jersey Archives, 2d ser., 3:2n.l; l:170n.2;
ReminisJoseph Fulford Folsom, "The Preakness Valley andMansion,
Dey
cences of Washington's Headquarters in the
Edmund J.
PNJHS, new ser., 6, no. 4 (October 1921): 222 Ephraim
j^Hi¥, "Some Additional Information Concerning
Marti^, Esquire, Colonel of the Fourth
no. 2 (1912): 146 149.
of the Continental Line." PMHB 36,
;

f

590

constitutional convention held military titles.

Colonels

John Nixon, Thomas Hartley, and Timothy Smith were all quite
active in the field and in the cabinet.

The latter, during

1779, served as a Deputy Quartermaster General, a militia

colonel, and as a member of the assembly.

88

Delaware and Maryland also had many individuals
serving in
time.

89

a

military and civilian capacity at the same

During December 1777, fifty of the eighty members

of the Maryland convention were field grade or general offi-

cers.

90

Two of the three Delaware militia generals, John

McKinly and Caesar Rodney, during late 1776, were active in
both the field and cabinet, with the former being the chairman of the Council of Safety.

91

87

James E. Gibson, "The Pennsylvania Provincial Conference of 1776," ibid., 58, no. 4 (1934): 328-330; Selsam,
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 pp. 136-137, 147-148.
,

8R

Charles Henry Hart, "Colonel John Nixon," PMHB 1,
no. 2, (1877): 194; John W. Jordan, "Biographical Sketch of
Colonel Thomas Hartley of the Pennsylvania Line," ibid.,
Burton Alva Konkle, T he Life and
25, no. 3 (1901): 303-304
Times of Thomas Smith 1745-1809: A Pennsylvania Member of
the C ontinental Congress (Philadelphia: Campion and Company,
;

1904)

,

pp.

113,

115,

123,

126.

^^Delaware Archives, 3:945; Minutes of the Council
of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792 p. 35; Clayton
rnlman Hall, aen ed., Ba ltimore: Its History and Its Peop le,
3-514; "Committee of Observation for Elizabeth Town District,
MHM 12, no. 4 (December 1917): 324, 325, 345; 12, no. 3
TSeptember 1917): 266; 13, no. 1 (March 1918): 29.
,

.

^^David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy
1753-1776 p. 167.
,

^-"-Christopher L. Ward,
1776-1783, pp. 111-112.

The Delaware Continentals
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The southern states also had many individuals serving

simultaneously in civilian and military positions.

Numerous

Virginia militia officers served also in the state's legislature.

92

Edward Stevens, for example, served from 1776 until

1790 as a member of the senate;

from 1776 to 1778 as a

Continental colonel; and from 1778 until 1782 as

brigadier general.

93

militia

a

Militia generals Evan Shelby and

William Campbell served often in the legislature, with the
former also serving

m

the North Carolina legislature.

94

North Carolina also had many militia officers serving in the legislature during the war.

95

During the first

two years of the war. North Carolina had many officers holding militia or Continental commissions, who served at the

same time in Provincial Congress or committees of safety.

96

92

Thwaites, Documentary History of Dunmore s War
pp. 106-107n.53; Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest
Virginia 1746-1786, Washington County 1777-1870 pp. 817-820
'

,

,

93

p

.

39 3n

.

2

Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence

,

.

^^Draper, King' s Mountain pp. 383, 387, 396-397,
412, 414; J. B. O. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary
History of Upper South Carolina pp. 221-223.
,

,

^^Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina
2:74, 84, 86, 110; Ashe, Biographical History of North
Carolina, 1:154-155; 2:17-19; Leora McEachern and Isabel M.
Williams eds., Wilmington-New Hanov e r Safety Committee
Minutes 1774-17 76, Appendix, 4:123, 124, 128, 132.
,

,

^^Ibid., 121, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131; Ashe,
Biographical History of N orth C arolina, 2:65-66, 178-179,
307'^rr3TT68^70"r^5 31-32, 368-369 398; 6:114-116.
=

,
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Benjamin Cleveland, Isaac Gregory, and Griffith
Rutherford

were North Carolinians who served in civil and military

capacities at the same time during the war.

Cleveland,

while a member of the House and later the Senate, was
active
in the field as a militia colonel. Gregory, who served
as a

colonel and general of the militia, served at the same time
in the Provincial Congress, and from 1778 until 1782 in the

Senate.
a

And Rutherford, who served during 1775 and 1776 as

militia colonel and general, was also

a

member of the Pro-

vincial Congress; and between 1777 and 1780, he served as

militia general and as

member of the Senate.

a

a

97

South Carolina, probably more than any other southern
state, had more individuals serving in the military and as

state officials at the same time 98
.

.

.

Among them were Charles

Cotesworth Pinckney, Andrew Pickens, William Moultrie, Isaac
Huger, and Stephen Bull.

officer the whole war
gress

,

tives.

,

Pinckney served as

a

Continental

whi le serving in the Provincial Con-

Council of Safety

,

Assembly

,

and House of Representa-

Pickens, who served most of the war as

militia

a

97

Ibid., 1:139-140; 5:70-71; J. B. 0. Landrum,
Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina,
2:71; J. G
pp. 224-227; Wheeler, Sketches of North Carolina
DeRoulhac Hamilton, ed., "Revolutionary Diary of William
Lenoir," JSH, 6, no. 2 (May 1940): 250n.5.
,

no

Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate of
the State of Sou th Carolin a, pp. 195, 198, 207, 209, 218,
^30",

321,

242
324,
,

239
328, 329,
,

212
330,
,

251
337.

,

255

,

269

,

299

,

305

,

311,

319

,
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lieutenant colonel of the militia, he served
in the legislature during 1782, and in January 1783, he
became governor.

a

Because of the lack of leaders on the frontier,

individuals were often required to hold various civil
and

military positions at the same time.

This was particularly

true in the western areas of New York, Pennsylvania, and

New York.
Dual serving did create some problems.

Frequently,

state legislatures could not obtain quorums to meet because

many of their members were in the field with the military,
in their military capacity. 10 3

Often the military was weak-

ened when many of its officers had to leave the field to

"Official Letters of Governor John Martin,
1782-1783," GHQ 1, no. 4 (December 1917): 282-282; White,
Historical Collections of Georgia p, 214.
,

102

Jack M. Sosin, The Revolut ionary Frontier
1760-178 3 (New Yo r k Holt, Rinehart and" ¥in s'ton 1967
pp. 167, 167n.l0; Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During
the Revolutionary Wa r, new ed., passim; William W. Campbell,
Anna Is of Tryon County or, The Border Warfare of New York,
During the Re volution, 4th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead and
Company, 1924), p. 5; John Floyd to Thomas Jefferson,
April 24, 1781, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 17711781," p. 541; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The Settlement of
Illinois 1778-1830," Chicago Historical Society Collections
:

,

)

,

,

5

(1908)

:

10

18.
3

John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton, July 14,
1779, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton 2:103; George
Clinton to John Jay, June 7, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers
5:54; Se 1 sam The PcnnsylvanTa ConstT
of Geo r ge Clinton
tution of 1776 pp. 2 35-2 36; Burton Alva Konkle, The Life
and TTmcs o f Thomas Smith 1745-1809: A Pennsylvania Member
of the Continental Congress p. 87.
,

,

,

,

,

^
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return to the sessions of the legislature

"^^"^

Another set

.

of problems related to whether a person was acting his

military or civilian capacity.

Early in 1777, for instance,

Washington was informed that Artemas Ward was present in
Boston, but whether he was acting as

a

member of the council

or a Continental general was "difficult to say."

About the

same time, Maryland's Thomas Johnson was confused as to

whether his first duty was to Congress or to the Maryland

contingent of the Flying Camp, of which he was

a

brigadier

General McDougall was more certain of his status,

general.

upon being elected to Congress during the fall of 1780.
He informed Washington that the New York legislature con-

sidered his civilian responsibilities secondary to his

military duties.
situations.

105

Often dual service created interesting

For example, after the failure of Spencer's

1777 Rhode Island expedition, the Rhode Island Assembly

appointed

a

committee to investigate Spencer's conduct.

At

the first meeting, one of the committee members. Senator

John Sayles, was absent, standing guard as
at Spencer's headquarters.

When

a

a

militia private

sheriff was sent to fetch

William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17,
1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolut ion, 2:26;
Benjamin Lincoln to William Moultrie, July 19, 1779, ibid.,
28-29

.

'"^^Henry Knox to George Washington, February

1

1777,
pp. 209
,

Delaplaine, Thomas Johnson
231; Alexander McDougall to George VJashington, October 30,
3:
1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolut ion,

Drake, Henry Knox

.12

6.

,

p.

41;

,
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him, Sayles declined to attend the cominittee
meeting, stat-

ing he could not leave until relieved.

Upon learning of

this situation. Spencer had him relieved, and Sayles
made

his appearance at the committee meeting, ready to
pass

judgment on his commanding general

"''^^
.

Although some problems did result from this inter-

mingling of the civilian and military functions in single
individuals, it is my belief that, to some degree, it

explains why the American Revolution did not suffer

a

mili-

tary tyranny as had beset England during the seventeenth

century and would the French Revolution.

This belief will

be discussed in some depth in the last chapter.
The military involvement in politics and government

did have its negative aspects, such as the military inter-

fering with the electoral process, the operations of the

government, and in some isolated instances, the existence
of the governments.

Often during the war, the military interfered with
the electoral process, at times preventing people from voting,

intimidating voters, and in other ways disrupting

elections.

This happened despite both a heritage and state

prohibitions against such activities.

Part of the Whig

heritage was prohibitions against the military being present
or near polling places during elections.
"^^^Cowell,

250

.

S pirit

In their recent

of '76 in Rhode Island

,

pp.

249-

;

.
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past, many revolutionaries recalled the great outcry when
the British troops attempted to interfere with the Massachu-

setts general election of 1769. 10 7

Most states adopted a

variety of provisions in their constitutions prohibiting
the military being present at polling places, having armed

persons at polling places, holding muster day on election
day, having the military voting by units, and setting the

distance from and time at which the military could be at

a

polling place.
The military interfered with elections

VN7hen

they

thought it was necessary to prevent those they suspected of

being Tories from voting; when they desired to vote, and
were not authorized to do so; and in

a

supporting one candidate over another.

partisan manner,
Tories, or those

suspected of being so, were generally prevented from voting
during most of the war.

However, beginning in 1782, many

10 7

Burgh, Political Disquisitions 1:433; Samuel
Adams in an unsigned letter in The Boston-Gazette
February 13, 1769, Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams 1:306;
A Report of the Record Gommissioners of the Gity of Boston
containing the Boston Town Records, 1758 to 1769 p. 278;
Boston Selectmen to Governor Francis Bernard, February 16,
1769, A. L. Elwyn, Papers Relating to Public Events in
Massachusetts Preceding the American Revolution p. 116
Same to same, February 23, 1769, ibid., pp. 120-122
,

,

,

,

,

"''^^Proceedings of the Gonv ention of the Delaware
State, p. 34; Scharf, Hist ory of Maryland 2:239; Silver,
f^"The~Provisional Government of Maryland [1774-1777)," p. 46;
Saunders, NCCR, 10:874 Albert B. Saye, New Viewpoint s in
Geo rgia History (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1943),
1:286^7~T81; Ghandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia
,

;

,

287.

.
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state governments, hoping to rehabilitate the Tories, gave

them the right to vote.

This was displeasing to many in

the military and they responded, particularly in Delaware

and Pennsylvania, by preventing Tories from voting or, at
"""^^

least, helping anti-Tory tickets to prevail

.

Problems with the military interfering with elections

began the first year of the war, as that summer at Braintree,
Massachusetts, one company of militia opposed another in
support of different candidates for that city's representative to the Congress.

The following summer in Georgia,

Continental Major Joseph Habersham, while working at the
polls, became involved in a squabble in counting ballots,
and in the process killed another officer of the opposing

political faction.

A grand jury found no cause for trying

him and he was promoted soon thereafter.

Complaints about

the military being illegally involved in elections were

numerous during the middle years of the war, especially in
New York and the middle states, where there were many
soldiers during those years.

Pennsylvania experienced

Richard P. McCormick, Experiment in Independence:
New Jersey in the Critical Period 1781-1789 Rutgers Studies
in History, no. 6 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1950), pp. 76-77, 76n.23, 93; Scharf, History o f
1:432; Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the
Phi ladelphia
Confederation [1783-1784], trans, and ed. by Alfred J.
"The RevoluMorrison, 1:374-375; Harold B. Hancock, ed
tionary War Diary of William Adair," DH 13, no. 2 (October
,

,

.

1968)

:

165

,

165n. 46

,

n
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difficulties with the military at the 1781 and 1783
elections.

For most, the military's involvement in the

electoral process was more of
to civilian control.

a

nuisance than

real threat

a

Similarly was their unwanted presence

at the seat of government.
In keeping with James Otis' opinion, expressed dur-

ing November 1768, with the British troops occupying Boston,

that it was "utterly derogatory" to the people to have

government administered "at the point of bayonets, and
mouths of cannon," most chief executives did not desire the

military to be present at the seat of government, particularly when it appeared the military would influence the

operations of

government.'^''""'"

Governor Clinton objected to

Abigail Adams to John Adams, July 16, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC 1:248-249; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett
pp. 99-100; David Forman to George VJashington, November 7,
1777, Worthington C. Ford, ed.. Defences of Philadelphia
in 1777, pp. 92-93; George Washington to George Reed,
February 22, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
10:497; George Read to George Washington, March 2, 1777
Read, George Read p. 303; Memorial of the Citizens
[1778]
of Philadelphia to the Supreme Executive Council, unsigned,
undated [1778], Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives 2d ser.,
3:220-223; Jno Graham et al., to George Clinton, April 18,
1781, Hastings. Public Papers of George Clinton 6:786-878;
Scharf, History of Philadelphia 1:419; Staughton Lynd,
"The Tenant Rising at Livingston Manor, May 1777," NYHSQ
48, no. 2 (April 1964): 175; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution
pp. 105-107, 144.
in Pennsylvania
,

,

,

,

,

,

.

,

,

,

Tudor, The Life of James Otis of
Massachuse tts: Conta i ing Al^Q—^-^^Lj:^^ of "Some Con temporary
57""( Bo s ton
Characte rs and Events'" from the Ye aFi:760 to~T77
Wells and Lilly, 1823), p. 338.
''""'"''William

:
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General McDougall's efforts to billet

a

regiment at

Poughkeepsie, then the seat of government.

Clinton relented

when McDougall assured him that "sooner than they should
interrupt the Del iber tat ions of the Legislature,

I

will

remove them to the most dreary valley in the Highlands,

altho they, and

I,

should share the fate of their unfortu-

nate Brethern last Winter, at the Valley Forge."
The military's presence at the seat of government

did influence the operations of government at times, but
for the most part their involvement was more of a nuisance

than a threat to civilian control.

Nevertheless, there were

occasions when the military's presence and influence was

believed to pose a threat of military control.

This was

especially true in Pennsylvania and Georgia.
Georgia had many difficulties between the military
and their chief executives, especially between General

Lachlan Mcintosh and Governor Button Gwinnett.

113

Both had

strong personalities and belonged to opposing political
factions.

If this was not enough to create a tense situation

McDougall to George Clinton, December 15, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton
4:38 6; see also Same to same, earlier letter of same date,
ibid., 377; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall,
December 15, 1778, ibid., 382-383.
"'"•^^Alexander

,

1777
'-'^john Wereat to Henry Laurens, August 30
Frank Moore, Ma t e r i als_fo r Uis t ojLy /_PJ in t^d^ Frojn_Or i g i n a 1
(New
and Illustrations 1st ser
M;^nnscrj.pts_^Wj^hrN^
YorkT^ZorTger Club, 1861), pp. 39-52.
,

,

.

,
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between them, there were other problems involved in their
relationship.

For instance, George Mcintosh, brother of

the general, as a member of the council refused to sign

Gwinnett's commission as governor and was later jailed by

Gwinnett for treasonable activities.

Additionally, Gwinnett

believed he should have been made general of the Continental
line, not Mcintosh.

Thus, on many occasions he interfered

with military affairs and undermined Mcintosh's authority.

114

The problems between them, and between Gwinnett and

General Howe, began in March 1777, when the governor did
not desire Mcintosh to lead an expedition against Florida

and Howe refused to allow Continental soldiers to go on such
an expedition.

Upset with the military, Gwinnett wrote

Independence
Congress reminding them that the Declaration of
render the
addressed the issue of the military affecting to
power.
military independent of, and superior to, the civil

And because Howe and Mcintosh had such

a

poor opinion of the

from the state.
civil authority, he asked they be removed
seeing the necessity of
Not waiting for Congress to act, and
an expedition against
using Mcintosh's troops, Gwinnett led

The

them.
Florida in April, with Mcintosh commanding

ll'^Huqh M'Call, The_Iiistory^f_Georgia_Co^
Events_jap_to_the
n^^^-F qketches of the Most Remarkable
^J;'
T^TT-"m6')"^Tr"33T; Jenkins, Button Gw innett, PPMarch 28,
•

sl-

B^ton'Gwlnneti to PresidiHW^Hancock

1777,

ibid., pp.

215-220.

,
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campaign faltered way short of its goal because of the
constant bickering between Gwinnett and Mcintosh.

This

bickering continued later in April, when Mcintosh actively
supported Gwinnett's opponent for the governorship.
to settle the difficulties between them,

Hoping

the Assembly called

them before the legislature to explain their actions.

\Vhen

the Assembly vindicated Gwinnett's conduct, Mcintosh publicly

called the governor

a

scoundrel and

a

lying rascal.

resulted in Gwinnett challenging Mcintosh to

This

a duel.

It

took place on May 16, 1777, with both parties being wounded
in the leg.

Mcintosh's wound healed, but not so Gwinnett's,

as he died of gangrene three days after the

duel."'""'"^

The civil-military dispute did not end with

Gwinnett's death, as his supporters did their best to discredit Mcintosh.

Mcintosh did not help matters.

Shortly

after the duel. Continental officers sent to arrest his
brother, George Mcintosh, were, on the general's orders,

arrested by Colonel Joseph Habersham, and George Mcintosh
was allowed to proceed to Philadelphia to plead his treason
case.

It should be added that by the end of 1777 George

Mcintosh was cleared, although the evidence would suggest
he was somev/hat guilty by association, as his business
ibid., pp. 220-221
to same, March 28, 1777
Lyman Hall to Roger Sherman, May 16 [-June 1], 1777, ibid.,
pp. 228-229; see also ibid., pp. 151-154.
''""'"^Same

,

;

603

connections were often Tories

.

''"'^

In June, Governor

Treutlen wrote Congress complaining that Habersham and

Mcintosh had subverted the civil power by allowing George
Mcintosh to escape answering charges levelled against him
by the state's executive council.

"Such

a

stretch of mili-

tary Power will undoubtedly be taken notice of by

Congress, who have always asserted

&

.

.

.

shewn the greatest

tenderness to the Liberty of the Subject

&

are duly convinced

of the necessity of the Subservience of the military to the

Civil Authority."

Gwinnett, according to Treutlen, had

"lost his life in endeavouring to maintain the civil Power
in opposition to the cunning

man."

&

subterfuges of

a

designing

"While the Command of the Continental Troops remains

in the hands of the Mclntoshes," he concluded,

will never think themselves safe."

117

"our People

Later in the summer,

the Georgia Assembly sent a petition to Congress calling on

them to remove Mcintosh, and about the same time they sent
to Congress a petition signed by over five hundred residents

^118

of Chatham County with a similar request.
.

159-160 John Adam Treutlen to
138
John Hancock, August 6, 1777, ibid., pp. 244-249; Ford, JCC,
8:9, 757; 9:764-765, 787-789.
"'""'^Ibid.

,

pp.

,

;

Adam Treutlen to John Hancock, June 19
Jenkins, Button Gwinnett pp. 244-245, 245, 245-246.
""""^^John

,

1777,

,

^Petition of the Georgia Assembly to Congress,
Chatham
September 13, 1777, ibid., pp. 265-266; Petition of
Governor
County to Congress, July 1, 1777, endorsed by the
266-271.
and Council on September 26, 1777, ibid., pp.
"""^

.
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Mcintosh responded to the various charges against

him by writing Henry Laurens that the civilian leaders, by

criticizing him, were undermining his authority which was
sapping the foundation of the military and the subordination
and respect so necessary in the army.

"Unless the Congress,"

"fixes some line between the government of their

he wrote,

army and the interference of the civil government of this

restless and unsettled State, it will not only become useless, but a nuisance to the inhabitants."
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In mid July,

he wrote a Georgia delegate to Congress that "the unhappy

divisions of our State now infect the army who are takin[g]
sides and

I

fear will ruin all military order and subordina-

He maintained he had not been disrespectful to the

tion."

civil authorities.

In fact, he argued, the civil authori-

ties were trying to subvert his officers to their views on
all matters.

"In short," he complained,

"officers now are

Therefore, he requested

at a loss who to obey properly."

Congress fix some line between the authority and responsi-

bility between the civil and military officials.

120

Congress

did address this question and also addressed the pleas

of

the Georgia officials by removing Mcintosh from their borders,

assigning him duty elsewhere.

ibid

.

,

-^^^Lachlan Mcintosh to Henry Laurens, May 30
p. 254

^2°Lachlan Mcintosh to
ibid., pp.

256,

258.

[

,

1777

,

July 14, 1777,

Before going on to discuss the civil-military

difficulties involving politics in Pennsylvania, it
should
be noted that the Gwinnett-Mcintosh situation was not
unique.

There were numerous quarrels between military and

civilian leaders over both political and personal matters.
Several were settled by duels, or involved the threat of
duels.

During 1780, another chief executive of Georgia,

George Wells, was killed in

a

duel by

a

member of the

opposing political faction. Major James Jackson.
the summer of 1778

,

General Howe fought

a

During

duel with South

Carolina state leader, Christopher Gadsden, who had been
critical of him.
at each other,

Although they shook hands after having fired

Howe would be removed from his southern

command for having upset the South Carolina government.
General Sullivan, believing that Thomas Burke,

a

member of

Congress, had been critical of his actions at Brandywine,

challenged him to

a duel.

The duel did not take place and

the two men would eventually serve together in Congress on
a

somewhat amicable basis.

And Charles Lee challenged

member of Congress William Henry Drayton to
had criticized Lee's actions at Monmouth.

a

duel as he

Drayton, though

sanctioning duelling, declined, explaining that duels
should not be participated in by members of the judiciary.

,

,
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He was also South Carolina's chief judge.

Probably nowhere else did the military involve themselves in the political and governmental affairs more than
in Pennsylvania.

This involvement began early in the war,

as the Associators were quite active in lobbying to be

recognized as the legitimate body of the colony and that
a committee of safety be appointed to oversee their military

activities.

Their efforts resulted in the House recognizing

them and appointing

a

committee of safety.

The Philadelphia

Associators urged throughout the spring of 1776 that
provincial conference write

a state

constitution.

a

They

were joined in their lobbying efforts by some of the more
radical members of Pennsylvania's navy, by

a

Philadelphia

Committee of Privates, and by Associator battalions throughout the colony.

With Associator backing, county committees

William Omer Foster, J ames Jackson: Duelist a nd
Milit ant Statesman 1757-1806 p. 6; Thomas Gamble, Savannah
Duels and Duellists 1733-1877 pp. 37-38; Thomas U. P.
Charlton, The Life of Majo r James Jackson (Augusta, Georgia:
Geo. F. Randolph, and Company, 1809), p. 18; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin"and Company, 1905), p. 52; John H. Wheeler,
Re miniscences and Memoirs of North Carolina and Emi nent
North Carolinians (Columbus, Ohio: Columbus Print Works
1884), p. 135; Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences p. 2 04;
John Sullivan to Thomas Burke, April 18, 1778, [draft]
Hammond Letters and Papers of Joh n Sullivan, 2:35; John
Sullivan to Alexander McDougall, January 27, 1781, ibid.,
3:271-275; Same to same, March 16, 1781, 296-298; Alexander
McDougall to John Sullivan, May 22, 1781, ibid., 320-321;
Drayton, M emoirs of the American Revolution l:xxiii-xxv.
,

,

.

,

,
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early in June 1776 elected representatives for

a

provincial

conference, which would decide what should be done
about
lack of energy in the existing government.
its members held military titles.
a

Over half of

Faced with the call for

new government, the conference assumed the powers of

government and issued
With

a

call for

a

a

constitutional convention.

majority of its members Associators, the convention

met on July 15, 1776

A constitution

.

v;as

adopted two months

later and elections for its approval were called for on the

fifth of November.

Organized opposition to the constitution

began in mid October, with memibers of the military playing
active roles as detractors and supporters of the document.
The common Pennsylvania Continental soldier and the

Associators were perhaps the most ardent supporters of the
new constitution, and it was charged in The Pennsylvania

Packet on October 22, 1776, that like Cromwell, the convention was defending its work with armed men, allowing no

opportunity for the people to pass free judgment on it.
Selsam, The Pe nnsylvania Constitution of 1776
117-118 "T26^28 136-137 147-148 212n. 23, 223,
pp. 78-79
225, 2 27; Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety
of the American Revolution, p. 89; Roberdeau Buchanan, Life
Member of the Continental
of the Hon. Thomas McKean LL. D.
Congress from Delaware, Chief Just ice and Governor of
Pe nnsylvania, S i gner of the pFcla r ation of Indep e ndence, a nd
Presid ent of Congress p. 50; The Pennsylva nia Evening Pos t,
Miy~TT, June 1, 6 1776 Thg,_Pggnsy lvania Gazette May 22,
June 5, 12, 19, 1776 The_^Pe]p_sylvania__Jo^
V7eekly Advertiser, June 5, 1776; The Pennsylvania Packet,
5Fr"nie~Ge neral Advertiser, June 17, 1/76.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

;

,

;

,

.
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Debate on the constitution was limited during the
fall and winter when the British army was in New Jersey and

again during the spring of 1777
invade Pennsylvania.

,

v/hen it

appeared they would

In May, when fear of a British inva-

sion abated, the debate was renewed.

To demonstrate their

opposition to the government operating under the constitution,
several military leaders, including Joseph Reed, John Cad-

walader

,

and Samuel Miles

,

refused positions under it

numerous officers resigned their commissions

.

and

,

Others

including Generals Mifflin, St. Clair, Thompson, and Wayne,

publicly condemned the constitution

.

"

I

pronounce it

"
,

Wayne wrote during the summer of 1777, "not worth defending."

12 3

At the prompting of Thomas Mifflm and others,

Wayne left the army for

a

short period during the winter

of 1778-1779 to return to Pennsylvania to lobby against the

constitution
During 1779 and 1780, opposition to the constitution
and the government operating under it by the military

Wayne to Benjamin Rush, [June or July] 2,
1777, Stille, Anthony Wayne p. 71; Benjamin Rush to Anthony
Wayne, May 19, 1777, ibid., p. 68; Rossman, Thomas Mifflin
'"^^ Anthony

,

,

pp.

87-88.

"^^^Thomas Mifflin, Mark Bird, Jonathan Potts, Edward
Biddle, Samuel Potts and James Wilson to Anthony Wayne,
to
[Fall 1778], Moore, A nthony Wa yne, p. 72; Anthony Wayne
Thomas Mifflin et al., November 23, 1778, ibid., p. 73;
ibid.,
Anthony Wayne to George Washinqton, February 10, 1779,
pp 75-7 6
.

.
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continued.

125

Many in the military, particularly the

militia, supported the constitution and the government, at
times demonstrating their support by physically attacking
its opponents, such as during the riots of the fall of
1779, which culminated in the "Fort Wilson" riot.
VJilson,

James

fearing that his opposition to the constitution

would result in his being run out of Philadelphia by the
militia, gathered about thirty supporters in his house to
fend off the militia.

Among his supporters included Colonel

Stephen Chambers, a militia officer and member of the
supreme executive council; General William Thompson; Thomas
Mifflin; David Franks, General Arnold's aide; Robert Morris;

George Clymer; and Mark Bird, Wilson's brother-in-law and

colonel of the Berks County battalion.

The attack on

Wilson's house resulted in the defenders having one killed
and three wounded and the attackers having five killed and

fourteen wounded.

The fighting was stopped by President

Reed and the City Troop of Light Horse, with the assistance
of some of Baylor's Dragoons.

Arrests were made and Wilson
Those

left town for several weeks until tempers calmed.

arrested

v;ere

soon released by the authorities when it
The

appeared they might be released by military force.
'"^'^Arthur St.

Clair to Joseph Reed, March

6

,

1779

,

188,
Rood, Joseph Reed, 2:62; Roche, Jose^^h Reed, PPOctober 16, l/«u,
262n 105lTr'ancT¥~Johnston to Anthony Wayne,
250.
"Notes and Queries," PMHB 31, no. 2 (1907):

,

63 0

following spring the supreme executive council granted

general pardon to all those involved in the

a

The

riot."*"^^

military opponents to the constitution were somewhat more
circumspect in their actions of opposition.

Progressively,

they tempered their criticism, believing as did Generals

Wayne and St. Clair, that they should concentrate on winning
the war, and once won, they could devote their energies to

adopting

a

12 7

constitution more to their liking.

In a few instances,

for the most part at the insist-

ence of the civilian authorities, the military leaders were
the supreme authority for a state or area.

There were

instances when some individuals desired the military to
take over the whole country, and at two critical times,

during 1780 and 1783, the possibility of this happening
existed.

But in only one instance did the military actually

seize control of

civilian government, and that was on the

a

frontier, and just for

a

limited period of time.

Page Smith, "The Attack on Fort Wilson,"
ibid., 78, no. 2 (April 1954): 177-188; Samuel Patterson
Ryden Letters to and
1779
to Cac^sar Rodney, October 9
from Caesar Rodney pp. 323-324; Jacob Cox Parsons, ed.
of Philadelphia
1 tzheimer
Extracts from the Diary of Jac ob
1765-1798 (Philadelphia: Wm. F. Fell and Company, 1893),
C.

,

,

,

,

11 i

p.

,

41.

Clair to Joseph Rood, March 6 1779
Smith, The St. Clair Paper s, 1:466-4 67; Anthony Wayne to
Robert Morris et al., October 17, 1780, Moore, Anthony
Wayne p. 120.
"^^"^Arthur St.

,

,
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During the summer of 1778, George Rogers Clark's

Virginians captured the western cities of Kaskaskia, Cahokia,
and Vincennes.

Early in December 1778, the Virginia legis-

lature provided for the newly captured area to be consoli-

dated as Illinois County and established

a

government for

its inhabitants, which were mainly French-speaking.

Governor

Henry named John Todd Colonel and County Lieutenant, and

instructed him to prevent the military from alienating the
French inhabitants.

12 8

Todd believed he could control the

military, as Clark was instructed by the governor and council
to cooperate with him,

friends.

129

and because he and Clark were

Todd arrived

m

the area during the late spring

of 1779, and found that the military did pretty much what

they pleased.

Todd, not able to control the military, nor

able to get Clark to control them, as he was involved in

other projects, such as an expedition against Detroit and
laying out the town of Louisville, resigned in November,
12 8

Honing, The St atutes at Large: Be ing a Collection
9:552; Patrick Henry to John
of all the Laws of Virginia
Todd, December 12, 1778, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers
1771-1781," pp. 83-87.
,

""^^The Virginia Council to George Rogers Clark,
December 12, 1778, ibid., pp. 78-81; Patrick Henry to George
"Kaskaskia Records,"
Rogers Clark, December 15, 1778, Alvord
the Inhabitants of
p. 61; Speech of George Rogers Clark to
Kaskaskia, May 12, 1779, ibid., p. 82.
,

_
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leaving behind Richard Winston to act in his stead.
V7hile

^"^^

Todd was present, Colonel John Montgomery showed the

minimum of respect to the civilian authorities, but once
Todd left, Montgomery became an absolute dictator at

When the magistrates reminded him that the

Kaskaskia.

thirteenth article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights

provided "that in all cases the military must be under the
most exact subordination to and governed by the civil
131
power," Montgomery increased his tyranny.

Throughout

1780, Montgomery controlled the Illinois country with a

strong hand, paying little or no attention to the civilian

authorities.

132

Montgomery's successor. Captain John Rogers,

assisted by Captain Richard McCarthy, during the winter of
1780-1781, continued to ignore the civil authorities.
13 0

Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd, May 21, 1779,
ibid., pp. 83-89; John Todd to the Governor of Virginia,
August 18, 1779, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 17711781," p.

357.

"^^

December
Citizens
December
Winston,

"^Magistrates of Kaskaskia to John Montgomery,
9, 1779, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 142;
of Kaskaskia to the Magistrates of Kaskaskia,
Richard
8, 1779, ibid., p. 137; John Montgomery to
March 5, 1780, Alvord, "Cahokia Records," p. Ixxxii

^"^^Memorial of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to
Mottin de la Balme, September 29, 1780, Alvord, "Kaskaskia
Records," pp. 189-191; Richard Winston to John Todd,
October'l7, 1780, ibid., p. 195; Memorial of the Inhabitants
1780
of Cahokia to Mottin de la Balme, September 21
Alvord, "Cahokia Records," pp. 537, 543, 545.
,

,
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despite their pleas they obey Virginia's laws

.

^^

V7hen

Rogers departed, John Dodge, the Indian agent, became the

Captain-Commandant of the militia at Kaskaskia, and during
the winter of 1781-1782 attempted to be the supreme ruler
of the area.

This resulted in a debate with Deputy County

Lieutenant Richard VJinston, which ended in late April 1782
when Dodge had VJinston arrested and jailed for treason.
For the two weeks Winston was jailed. Dodge ran the government.

His domination of affairs continued even after

Winston was found innocent by a Kaskaskia court and released.
This domination by the military finally ended early in 1783

when the military finally departed.

Thus ended the only

example where friction between the civilian and military

authorities resulted in the military supplanting the civilian
authority with their own power.

134

The military's involvement in civilian affairs in
the Ohio country was the rare exception to general positive

Magistrates of Kaskaskia to John Rogers,
November 10, 1780, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 208;
Same to same, January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 212; Petition of
the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia,
May 4, 1781, ibid., pp. 2 36, 2 38; John Todd to Thomas
Jefferson, January 23, 1781, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia
State Papers, 1:460; Richard McCarthy to John Todd,
October 14, 1780, ibid., 380.
"'"^^The

Dodge to Israel Dodge, April 29 1782
see also ibid., pp. 274
Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 272
Settle304, 320-322; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The
293
284
ment of Illinois 1778-1830 ," Chi^goJIi^stori^al^^^
Collections, 5 (1908): 41-42.
-"-^^John

,

;

,
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military involvement in civilian affairs throughout the war.
As we have seen in this chapter, and in earlier

chapters,

the military's relationship with the civilian governments,

though often stormy, for the most part had the positive

influence of allowing the military to participate in

civilian affairs without the necessity of seizing power or
using military force to have their views heard or accepted.
It also had the influence of reinforcing the belief that the

civilian governments were the suprem.e authority and if any
changes were to be made, especially those relating to how
the military was controlled and directed, they would be made

by the civilians, not by the military.

Additionally, such

involvement had a way of reinforcing civilian values,

especially when the military assumed civilian roles, either
while in the military or once leaving the military; or

upholding the civilian governments

Although the civil-military relationship was
relatively tranquil throughout the first five years of the
war,

it became sorely tested beginning with the winter of

1779-1780 as the army suffered, and it appeared to them that
the civilians were incapable or unwilling to assist them.
In the next chapter,

this testing will be discussed.

CHAPTER

X

A DELICATE BALANCE: THE CIVIL-MILITARY

RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TIME OF CRISIS
1779-1781
The American military, as we have seen, frequently

involved themselves in civil affairs and in

a

few instances

subordinated the civilian authority to their own.

But at

no time did they, as the military in England in the previous

century, take control of the primary civilian governments.

There were times during the war, however, when this might
have happened.

The first was during 1780, when the collapse

of the civilian governments and the war effort seemed
imminent.

The other was during 1783, when it appeared that

the military was to be disbanded without being compensated

sufficiently for their efforts.
chapter will analyze why

a

This and the following

military take-over might have

taken place during 1780 and 1783 and the reasons why military

control did not replace civilian control of American affairs

during the last years of the Revolutionary War.
on the
A military take-over of civilian affairs was
the war, not
minds of the revolutionary leaders throughout
From the beginning,
just during the last years of the war.
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many Americans feared

a

Cromwell rising from the military

to assume the authority of the weak Congress and
state

governments.^

Americans were quite familiar with James

Burgh's admonition that "when

country is to be enslaved,

a

the army is the instrument to be used."^

mindful that

a

They were ever

parliamentary army in England

a

little more

than a century before had turned upon its creator and erec
ted a military dictatorship under Cromwell and the major

generals.

From Paris, late in 1777, Arthur Lee wrote his

brother that "next to entire slavery,

a

standing army is

the greatest evil than can exist in a young state; and the

continuance of

a

civil war

ambition of some Cromwell."

.

.

.

may kindle the fatal

By the end of 1778, many

Americans shared Benjamin Rush's belief that there was no
longer serious danger of tyranny from Great Britain, and

that if any tyranny was to take place it would be "only in
3
the shape of a Whig,"

See Ebenezer Elmer's August 7, 1776, speech in The
Pennsylvania Journal and VJeekly Advertiser, August 28, 1776;
Wi 1 n-ajri"'Tirdor s MaFch 5", ry79"'Boston Massacre Oration in
N i 1 e s P incip les and Act s of the Revolution in America
p. 37; Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, October 28,
1:176.
17 78, Sparks, Gouverneur M or ris
'

,

,

2

Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:349.

^Arthur Lee to Richard Henry Lee, October 4 1777
Lee, Arthur Lee, appendix 8, pp. 114-115; Benjamin Rush to
William'Gordon, December 10, 1778, "Exceipts from The Papers
of Dr. Benjamin Rush," PMHB 29, no. 1 (1905): 21-22.
,

,
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Although some Continental officers thought about
taking temporary control of the government if the
civilians
could not properly manage the war effort, such thoughts

were not often openly expressed, nor seriously contemplated

during the first five years of the war.^

After all, most

of the officers were former civilians who shared generally

held fears of military tyranny.

There was, however, one foreigner, the Comte de
Broglie, who, early in the war believed that if he had control over the civilian authorities he could produce military

victory.

A born intriguer and lover of adventurous schemes,

he had served in the French army as a general and as France's

Ambassador to Poland.
De Kalb,

During 1776, using his protege, Baron

as his spokesman, he attempted to get Silas Deane

and Benjamin Franklin to back his plan to have Congress make

him

a

Stadtholder of the American states.

Broglie, knowing

that Deane and Franklin would be somewhat chary of his proposal,

informed them that he would only hold the position

for three years.

On the other hand, he demanded that

Congress agree to grant him absolute control over the army,

without interference, and that he be allowed to carry on
negotiations with foreign powers.

Franklin and Deane did

in The C onnecticut Courant,
November 25, 1777; Alexander McDougall to John McKesson,
January 24, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 151;
Dexter, Liter a_ry_Diary of Ezra Stiles_ 2 306

^E.g.

"A Continental"

,

:

.
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not support Broglio-s plan, nor
did Dc Kalb, once he
arrived
in America.
He wrote his mentor that it
would be an injustice to Washington and an affront
to America's honor to
lobby for the plan.
Congress, learning of the plan
early
in 1777, did not consider it.^

Although few in the iniUtary contemplated
dictatorship during the first years of the

rni

1

i

1

ary

war, and few

civilians were amenable to military control,
by 1779, the
number of leaders who wanted some type of
military control
increased as it was believed that the revolutionary
war
would be lost otherwise.
Financially, America was in poor shape by 1779, and
the condition worsened during 1779 and 1780.

and the states

Both Congress

their paper money depreciate to the point

liad

5

Baron De Kalb to Comte de Broglie, Sepgember 24,
1777, Honri Doniol
Histo rie do la Participation de la
,

F-L^^^_j?_J-_[_!l^tab]J^s^^
5 vol s
fPar i s7~France"^
PPI^il^^^TP^^'^liSJ:^?. _® t Documon
Imprimerie NationaTe, 'I8W-T892)
3:227; Silas Dcane to the
Coimnittee of Secret Correspondence, Docomber 6, 1776, "The
Deane Papers," NYIISC 19 (1887): 404-405 Baron De Kalb to
Silas Deane, December 17, 1776, ibid., 427-431; Comte de
Broglie to Baron De Kalb, [December 19-20?, 1776], Charles J.
Still^, "Comte de Broglie, the proposed stadtholder of
America," PMHB 1 (1888): 380-381; A. E. Zucker, General De
Kalb, L afayette's Mentor, pp. 94-107; Louise Burnh.nn Dunbar,
"A Study of 'Monarchical' Tendencies in the United States
from 1776 to 1801," University of Illinois S tudies in th e
Social Sciences, vol. 10,^ no." 1 (1922)", pp\" 27-35 James
Breclc Perkins, France _in jthe Ainorican Revolution, (Boston:
Hought on M f f in' Company", 1911), pp. I'9 3-20 3
t

,

,

,

;

;

i

1

.

^

G19

of worthlessncss during these years.

^

By the end of 1780,

one member of Congress reported that
Continental bills were
"fit but for little else but to make the tail
of a paper
kite with." The previous spring, Washington
complained
that

a

wagon load of money would scarcely purchase

load of provisions."^

a

wagon

Instead of alleviating their financial

plight by taxing and confiscating Tory estates, the
states

experimented with ant i -monopoly laws, prohibitions on export
of necessities,

laws requiring the acceptance of paper money,

loans, wage restrictions, and price controls; as well as

continuing to print large sums of paper money.
6.

Anne Be z an son. Pr ices and Inflation Du ring the
American Revolu t ion: Pennsylvania, 1770-1790 Univer¥ity
of Pennsylvania Research Studies, no. 35 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 67; ibid..
Table 1, pp. 334-337; Bulloch, "The Finances of the United
States from 1775 to 1789," pp. 133, 135; George Washington
Greene, Histo ri cal View of the American Revolu tion (Boston:
Ticknor and Fields, 1865), appendix, pp. 455 457'.
,

,

7

Oliver VJolcott to Jonathan Trumbull, December 18,
1780, p.s., MHSC, 7th ser., 3:168; George Washington to
John Jay, April 23, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wash i ngton
14:437; see also Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina
in the Confederation
p. 15; Richard S. Rodney, Colonial
Finances in Delawar e (Wilmington, Delaware: Wilmington Trust
Company, 192 8)
pp. 50-51.
,

,

,

g

Ralph Volney Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary
Finance, 1775-1783," AHR 25, no. 1 (October 1929): 66; chart
between pp. 50-51; William G. Sumner, The Financier and
Finances of the American R cvoTution (New York: Dodd Mead,
5'5, '59,~ 60
74
84
92
65
93;
1:29
and Company, 1892)
Albert S. Bol]os, The Financial Hi story of the United States
from J. 7 74 to 1 7 89 "Embracing tlie Period of the American
Revolu tion, 4th ed'. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896),
pp'.
r58-17 3 Ralph V. Harlow, "Economic Conditions in Massachusetts During the American Revolution," Publications of
,

,

:

;

,

,

,

,

,

,

n

.
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Congressional attempts to improve the nation's
finances during 1780 were ineffective and, in
some instances,
worsened the situation.^ By the summer of 1780,
the states
were financially exhausted, the Continental treasury
was

nearly empty, and the central government lacked any real
credit.

This financial exhaustion resulLcd in the dimin-

ishing activity and influence of Congress
the Colo nial Soci ety of Mass achusetts. Transactions (19172U: 168-1837 Kenneth Scott
1919),
"Price Control in Nc^w
England During the Revolution," NEQ 19, no. 4 (December
472
1946)
:

9

Elbridge Gerry to James Warren, January 25, 1780,
"Warren-Adams betters," MHS^, 73 (1925): 124; Philip
Schuyler to George Clinton, November 29, 1779, Burnett, LMCC,
4:529; Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11,
1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; Robert D. Arbuckle,
Pen nsylvania Spe culator an^ Patriot: The Entr eprene urial
JoK n Nicholson, 1757 -1800', p. 6'; Jonnings B."Sanders"
Evolution of tfie Executive De p artments of the Cont i enta"~
1
Congress 1774-1789 pp. 73-74.
,

,

"^^Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr.,
December 29, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC,
8
(1896): 475; James Duane to George Washington, December 9,
Burnett, ],MCC, 5 :477; John Sullivan to Mcshech V-Joare,
1780
November 15, 1780," ibid., 447; Whitmill Hill to Thomas Burke,
October 9, 1780, ibid., 413; Elbridge Gerry to John Adams,
May 5, 1780, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:189; Nathanael
Greene to Jonathan TruTnburr7 May" 7rT780 MIISC, 7th ser.,
3:36-37; Oliver Wolcott to Jonathan Trumbul 1 'December 18,
ibid., 168; David Humphreys to Natli.m.ir Greene, May 30,
1780
1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from the Papers
of Ma jor-General Nathanael Greene," UM, 2d ser., 2, no. 3
(September 1867): 133; Ford, JCC, 16:326.
,

,

,

,

1

"'"^Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 3,
1780, Greene, Nathanael Green e, 2:258; Robert R. T,ivingston
to Philip Schuyler, January 27, 1780, Burnett, J.MCC, 5:19;
Philip Schuyler to Nathanael Greene, M<irch 22, 1780, ibid.,
90.
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The continent was suffering from other causes
than

financial exhaustion.
lands.

States were quarreling over western

New state moveinents were on the rise in the

There were boundary disputes between states.

v;est.

The Articles

of Confederation still had not been adopted by all the
The internal war was at its zenith.

states.

living off impressments and by plundering.

The army was

Greene resigned

as Quartermaster General, disgusted with Congress.

Arnold defected.

Benedict

Cornwallis was on the move in the south.

During the summer, Gates was defeated at Camden and Lincoln

surrendered his army at Charleston.

Colonel Burfort's Vir-

ginia regiment was annihilated at Warhawks and Fort 96 was
captured.

And the French still had not arrived in force.

If the country suffered and was demoralized, the

army suffered even more so during 1779 and 1780.

The winter

of 1779-1780 was the coldest in memory, and the army at

Morristown suffered greatly.

Its condition continued to

worsen during 1780, so that by the summer, the northern
army was in

desperate shape.

a

This situation continued

through the summer and fall, despite increased impressing.

12

'"^John Paterson to William Heath, May 7, 1780
Egleston, John Paterson p. 115; William Irvine to Joseph
Reed, May 26, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:201; Nathanael
Greene to Joseph Reed, May 10, 1780, ibid., 191; Nathanael
Greene to Clement Riddle, June 29, 1780, ibid., appendix,
July 15, 1780,
p. 469; Samuel Cogswell to Mr. Cogswell,
"Unpulbished Letter from the Camp, July 1780," KM, 2d ser.,
Robert Howe,
8, no. 2 (Auaust 1870): 102; Rufus Putnam to
July 14 1780 Buell, Rufus Put nam, p. 172; Eb [enezer]
,

,

,

,
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Conditions in the Western Department were just
as bad, as
soldiers at Fort Pitt suffered from the lack
of food and

clothing.

1

During the summer and fall of 1780, the

southern army also suffered from the lack of supplies.

"^^

Besides not receivinq supplies and clothing, the

military received little or no pay, and when thoy did, it
was generally depreciated to the point of worthlossness
Not only did this result in the soldiers sufferiiuj, but also

their families.

Thus, there were many pay complaints begin-

ning during the winter of 1778-1779

.-^^

Certain categories

Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 7, 1780, Blanchfield,
Letters Written by Ebe nezer Hunt ington, p. 87; Ephraim
Blaine to Isaac Carty, May 20 1 7 80 ,~~Delaware Archives,
3: 1355; Ephraim Blaine to Samuel Huntington
Octobe'r~T7,
copy
17 80
Hastings Pjj^blij2_Pa_pers^ of Geor ge Clin ton
6:298-299; William Heath to George Clinton, November~17",
1780, ibid., 418; Ephraim Blaine to George Clinton,
August 14, 1780, ibid., 100-101; The Congressional Committee
at Camp to the Several States, May 25
1780
Burnett, LMCC,
Francis
5:165;
Johnston to Anthony V^ayne May
], 1780
"Notes and Queries," PMUB 29, no. 3 (1905): 362-363.
,

,

,

[

]

,

,

,

,

,

,

[

1

Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, September 16,
1780, Hazard, Pennsylvan ia Ar chives, 1st ser., 8:558-559;
Same to same, October 17, 1780, ibid., 589.
14

Baron De Kalb to Chevalier de la Luzerne,
August 14, 17 80, Garden, Anecdotes of t he Revolutionary War,
October 12," 1780,
p. 298; Horatio Gates to Peter Muhlenberg
Paul A. W. Wallace, The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania p. 201;
Nathanael Greene to George Washington December 28, 1780,
3:191;
Sparks, Correspondence_of the American R e volution
Same to same, Decembe'r 7/1780 Greene, Nathan ael Gr eene
3:543; Nathanael Greene to Baron von Steuben, December 7,
,

,

,

,

1780,

ibid.,

,

541.

to Benjamin Rush, October 10, [1778],
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 212; Anthony
Wayne to Richard Peters, October 21, 1778, "Original Letters
and Documents," PMHB 5, no. 2 (1881): 231; Anthony Wayne to
''"^Charles Lee

6
8
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of officers suffered more than others,

such as those of the

sixteen additional regiments which had no
particular state
to look after their interests.
The generals also suffered
disproportionally.l^ Lord Stirling, for example,
who entered
the war in debt, had creditors hounding him
throughout
the

war, and was unable to get his tenants in New Jersey
and Now

York to pay their rent.

By the end of 1779, his farm had

been sold to pay his debts and he was virtually broke. '^

McDougall, who also had financial problems, complained to

Joseph Reed, December 28, 1778, Still^, Anthony Wayne,
pp. 162-163; Charles Pope to Caesar Rodney, OctobeF~28, 1778,
Harold B. Hancock, ed., "Letters to and from Caesar Rodney,"'
DH 12, no. 2 (October 1966): 155; Eb[enezer] Huntington to
Ja[bez] Huntington, December 21 1778 Blanchfield "^Letters
Writ ten by Ebene zer Huntington p. 77; Israel Putnam to
Jonathan Trumbull,
], 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:339;
Egleston, Jo hn Pa terson, p. 110; Christopher Ward, The
Delaware C onti nental s 1776 -1783, p. 2 85 George V/ashirTgton
to the Congressional Committee of Conference, January 29,
1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14:26-32; George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
May 27, 1780, ibid., 18:430; George Washington to John
Sullivan, November 20, 1780, ibid., 20:374; The Congressional
Committee at Camp to the Several States, May 25, 1780,
Burnett, LMCC, 5:165; Other citations on this subject found
later in this chapter on threats of and actual resignations
and on lobbying by officers.
,

,

,

,

[

;

1

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 27, 1779, Fitzpatrick, V7ri tings
15:330; Same to same, April 3, 1780, ibid.,
of Washington
,

18:207.
17

1779,

George Washington to Joseph Reed, October 22,

ibid.,

17:30; Ford, JCC, 15:1286; 17:689.

1

Alan Valentine, Lord Sti rling pp. 137-143
Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution pp. 88-89.
,

,

,
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;

9
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Greene that the generals had been "insulted and
neglected ."
Not only did the officers complain about pay deficiencies,

but they were upset with the civilian leaders and the

American people for

a

variety of reasons, many of which

have been discussed earlier.

Many officers were upset with the whole country.

Early in September 1780, Hamilton wrote, "We begin to hate
the country for its neglect of us."

Five weeks earlier, an

officer described his plight as being "Injured by my country,

destitute of money

&

consequently Friends."

Also during

July, Ebenezer Huntington wrote "The Insults

&

Neglect v;hich

the Army have met with from the Country, Beggars all description,

it must Go no farther they can endure it no longer."

His brother, Jedediah, two weeks later, complained that "the

Country are triffling with their
own salvation."

20

Array or

Rather with their

The army was also upset with the American

people

During 1779 and 1780, the military became increasingly upset with the lack of virtue demonstrated by the
1

Alexander McDougall to Nathanael Greene, Hay 29,
1780, Champagne, Alexander McDougall p. 159.
,

2n

[September 3,
Alexander Hamilton to James Duane
2:406; James
1780], Syrett, Papers_o_fMexander^ Ha milton
Duncan to John Clark, July "28 1780 """Original Documents,"
MH 2 (1905): 67; Eb[enezer] Huntington to Andrevs? Huntington,
July 7, 17 80, Blanchfield, Letter s Written b y Ebenezer
Huntington, p. 88; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
"The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 441
jin:y~r77T780
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

625

American people.

McDougall wrote Greene during the summer

of 1780 that he told

a

member of Congress that "our Army no

longer considers themselves as fighting the Battles of
'Republics in principle,' but for Empire and Liberty to
a

people whose object is property."

General Davidson believed

the people were so tied to their property that the loss of
it seemed "to touch them with more Sensibility than the loss

of their Country's Freedom."

22

The military, by 1779, had

lost faith in Congress.
"0-the C[o]ngress-I wish my cursing them would make

them better-" one officer complained during the summer of
1779.

23

Many officers shared a similar view, as the military

developed an increasing frustration and dissatisfaction with
21

Alexander McDougall to John McKesson, January 24,
Champagne Alexander McD ougall p. 151 Alexander
17 79
McDougall to Egbert Benson, February 9, 1779, ibid., p. ISCJohn Paterson to William Heath, October 23, 1780, MHSC, 7th
ser., 5:114-115; Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody
Apr i 1 2, 1779, Coffin, The Lives a nd Services of T homas
Knowlto n S camme ll Dea rb orn p 90 Francis Johnston to
Anthony Wayne, July 2"57~T780 "Notes and Queries," PMHB 30,
115; David Humphreys to Nathanael Greene,
no. 1 (1906)
May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from
the Papers of Ma jor-General Nathanael Greene," HM, 2d ser.,
2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133.
,

,

,

,

,

,

.

;

;

,

:

22

Alexander McDougall to [Nathanael] Greene,
August 8, 1780, Feinstone Collection #844; William L.
Davidson to Horatio Gates, October 6, 1780, Davidson,
William Le e Davidson p. 82.
,

17 79

,

Samuel B. Webb to Jeremiah Wadsworth, July
Jeremiah V?adsworth Papers, Box 128, CHS.

9,
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that body, and the state governments, who seemingly were

letting the army suffer unnecessarily and were seemingly

indifferent to the exigencies of the times.

For many, this

frustration and dissatisfaction turned to hatred,
used by some officers.

complained that "The

24

During the spring of 1780, Greene

[Congress]

as ever got together."

term

a

are a great set of

[rascals]

Later that year. General Parsons

observed that "the wretches who have crept into Congress
are almost below contempt.

,,25

By the summer of 1780, many in the army believed

the people had lost faith in Congress to direct success-

fully the war effort, and certainly many in the army had

^^Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody,
September 29, 1779, [extract], "Colonel Alexander Scammell
'Love
and His Letters, from 1768 to 1781, Including His
Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d ser., 8, no. 3
Irvine,
(September 1870): 144; Anthony Wayne to William
General Irvine,
March 10 1780, "Letters of General Wayne to
David
1778-1784," ibid., 6, no. 10 (October 1862): 323;
George
Humphreys 'to Nathanael Greene, May 30, 17 80,
of MajorWashington Greene, "Selections from the Papers
no
2
3
r.^^^^
General Nathanael Greene," ibid., 2d ser
[August
Cragie
Andrew
to
Craik
James
(September 1867): 133;
PMHS 35 (1901 1902).
1780], "Letter of Dr. James Crailc,"
[September 12,
Laurens
373; Alexander Hamilton to John
Nathanael
42 8
Svrett, Paoers of Alexan der Hamilto n, 2
1 7801
Green; tl sl^nueT^^^^^TJ^
|^"-^^f^#^F
29, 1780,
Joseph Reed, April
to
Greene
Nathanael
2:269;
Webb,
H. Parsons to
sfnEson Nathanael Greene, 1:172; Samuel SamueLHolden
Hall,
1780
5
Bened?ci
Parsons, p. 303.
_

,

,

.

,

:

P^^T^^^t^r

,

;

,

April 11,

^^Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah ^'^^^f^^^^^h
CHS; Sa-el H Pa.sons^t^
1780 Nathanael Greene Papers,
Hall, bamuei
Benedict Arnold, September 5 1780
Parsons, p. 303.
,

,

,

.
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lost confidence in Congress.

^

During September 1780,

Hamilton wrote one member of Congress that the army had "lost
all confidence in them, and give the worse construction to
all they do" and Greene wrote an ex-member of Congress that

"there is hardly remaining the shadow of confidence in

Government

27

.

A primary reason the military had lost confidence
in Congress was that they believed they had been led astray

by false or unfulfilled promises.

wrote during May 1779,

"Promises," one officer

"cannot feed or Clothe

Performance is sometimes necessary to make
intend to Perform."

Later that year,

a

ton's staff asked a member of Congress,

a

a

Man always-

man believe you

member of Washing"Does Congress mean

to make the officers any permanent consideration? or do they

intend to coax them on by doing a little and promising them
a

great deal, till the war is over, and then leave them with-

out money

(consequently without friends)

,

without estates

and many without property or constitutions, the two latter
26

Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth April 11
1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; George Washington to
John Laurens, [January 15, 1781], Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Was hington 21:109-110; Marquis de Lafayette to Joseph Reed,
May 31, ITS 0 Wharton Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspond,

,

,

ence

,

3:147.

,

^"^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane [September 3,
Syrett Pa^rs of Al exander Hamilton 2:406
17 80
Nathanael Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780,
"Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 469.
]

,

,

,

,

;
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of which they have generously sacrificed in the defence
of

their country." 2 8

This lack of confidence, coupled v/ith the sad
state of the country and the suffering of the army,

caused many contemporaries to see this period, from the
spring of 1780 until the following spring, as the most

critical period of the war.

29

Late in April 1780, Washing-

ton wrote General Howe that "We are at

crisis;

I

a

most delicate

dread with you the consequences."

In a circular

to the northern states in June, he wrote "The present crisis
is by far the most important and delicate that this Country

Eb[enezer] Huntington to Joshua Huntington, May 3,
1779, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington
p. 81; and Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody,
September 29, 1779 [extract]. Coffin, The Lives and Services
of Thomas, Knowlton, Scammell, Dearborn p. 90.
,

,

29

Extracts from the Diary of Christopher
Marshall p. 248 Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, May
],
James
1780, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 29, no. 3 (1905): 362;
Craik to Andrew Cragie, [August 1780], "Letter of Dr. James
Craik," PMHS 35 (1901, 1902): 363; Alexander Scammell to
Nathaniel Peabody, September 5, 1780, [extract], "Colonel
Alexander Scammell and His Letters, from 1776 to 1781,
Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d
ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 144; James Craik to
Jeremiah Wadsworth, August 17, 1780, Kirkland, Letters on
the American Revolution 1:67; Nathanael Greene to Alexander
McDougall, February
], 1780, Douglas Southall Freeman,
George Washington: A Biography 5:152; Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, February 29, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene
2:273; Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, February 14, 1780,
ibid., 266; Tench Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22,
1780, NYHSC, 11 (1879): 456.
,

Duane

,

;

[

,

[

,

,
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has ever experienced

"Our present situation," John

Hanson wrote in September,

"is truly alarming-our Army in

want of every thing; no money in the Treasury, and
our
Credit exhausted. "^^

Early in February 1781, James Varnum

wrote that unless Congress exercised its powers,
months will put an end to their existence

What would make things better?

"a few

."

Many believed a

stronger army, a stronger central government, and the means
of bringing forth the wealth of the continent would bring
a

successful conclusion to the war.

33

Most agreed a

30

George Washington to Robert Howe, April 28, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 18:308; Washington's
circular, June 30, 1780, ibid., 19:104-105; see also George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
March 18, 1783, ibid., 26:231.
,

31

John Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee, September 10, 1780,
Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor
Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 2
(June 1954)

:

126

32

James M. Varnum to Innis Clarke, February 3, 1781,
Wilkins Updike, Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar (Boston:
Thomas H. Webb and Company, 1842), pp. 157, 163.
33

Tench Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22, 1780,
NYHSC, 11 (1879)
457; John Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee,
"Revolutionary
September 10, 1780, Helen Lee Peabody, ed.
Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 17791782," MHM 49, no. 2 (June 1954): 127; John Sullivan to
George Washington, January 29, 1781, Hammond, Letters and
3:227; Jesse Root to Jonathan
Papers of John Sullivan
Trumbull, December 27, 1780, MHSC 7th ser., 3:172, 173;
Oliver Wolcott and Jesse Root to Jonathan Trumbull,
January 16, 1781, ibid., 188; Joseph Jones to Thomas Jefferson, April 16, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson
5:469-471; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 16, 1781,
ibid., 473-474; Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody,
December 8, 1780, Moore, New Hampshire 2, no. 12 (December
:

,

,

,

,
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stronger central government was
two.

a

prerequisite to the other

"Our perplexities/' one member of Congress
wrote early

in 1781,

"do not arise from poverty, or the want of men,

but from the absolute want of government ." "^"^
however, little hope of

a

But there was,

stronger government being adopted

or Congress adequately using the powers they possessed.
"To effect an entire reformation of the plan and politics

of this country," Greene observed late in 1780,

"would be a

greater task than that attempted by Martin Luther in the
Romish church.

What is the true interest of this country

appears to be least likely adopted."

John Sullivan who left

camp for a position in Congress, wrote Washington early in
1781 that he was not hopeful for change, believing that the

old members of Congress would be in heaven or at home before

they adopted powers to bring forth the resources of the

continent.

Gouverneur Morris wrote Greene that he had no

expectation that Congress would acquire adequate powers and
no hope that the union of the states could subsist under
the current arrangement.

optimistic.

Robert Morris was somewhat more

He wrote Greene "That more power ought to be

given to Congress is evident now to many, and will probably
1823): 374, 375; Alexander Hamilton to James Duane
ber 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton
402, 408-409.

,

,

[Septem2:401-

Varnum to Innis Clarke, February 3, 1781,
Wilkins Upkike, Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar, p. 157.
^"^James M.

,
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become soon very apparent to all."

Many military and

civilian leaders did not share this belief,
nor did they
see the war being successfully concluded.
"I foar,"
General Huntington wrote during the summer of
1780, "the
period of our Deliverance is at a great Distance. "^^
With
little or no expectation of the civil governments,
particularly Congress, being able to bring forth the
resources
of

the continent many feared the military,

like Cromwell the

century before, would turn on the civil governments.
Early in 1779, the president of Harvard College wrote
that "it is to be feared our Soldiers, who have been greatly

oppressed while fighting for their Country, will become
I

mutinous and turn their Arms against their Neighbors, or
disband."

36

Such fears grew during 1779 and 1780 as the

condition of the army worsened.

Early in April 1780,

Washington wrote Congress that "There never has been

a

stage

35

Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody December 8
1780, Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 12 (December 1823): 374;
John Sullivan to George Washington, March 6, 1781, Burnett,
LMCC 6:12; Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene,
December 24, 1781, Sparks, Gouver neur Morri s, 1:240; Robert
Morris to Nathanael Greene, October 3, 17 817 VJharton,
Revoluti onary Diplomatic Correspondence 4:765; Jedediah
Huntington to Andrew Huntington July 17 1780
"The
Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 441; see also Ezekiel
Cornell to William Greene, May 30, 1780, Staples, Rhode
Isla nd in the Continental Congress p. 29 3,
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

36

Samuel Langdon to William Whipple, March 9, 1779,
"Samuel Langdon s Critique of Early
Charles F. VJetherell
Revolutionary War Era Finance," HNH 28, no. 3 (Fall 1973):
193-194.
,
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of the War in which the dissatisfaction
has In-.n r.o cj.noral
or alarming." 37
summer, (here were great fears the
,

acru,nul,.lr.d

distresses in

1

ho

a

nuy would cause their patience

to give wcy to "some viol(Mit convul sion

Connecticut
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.

"

After the
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Two months earlier
^-^ler,

in
m

^
a

^^^^ ^
coded
letter, Greene

Observed that affairs were
verging on revolt, as
the people
no longer had confidence
in Congress, and
there was nothing
else left to save the..
March, willia. Gordon
expressed
h.s fear to Washington that
"the unhappy

m

state of our

•currency and finances .ay
occasion so.e internal
convulsion

among ourselves."

During the sunder, one member
of Congress
informed its president that he
soon expected the army to
disband or turn upon their civilian
leaders.
A .onth later,
Greene confided in Pennsylvania's
chief executive that "The
change of sentiment which has taken
place in the army
respecting civil government, has for
the first time given
me apprehension." Early in October,
a member of Congress
observed, "In short, I know not what is
to become of us.-^^
Out of this situation grew the belief
that extraordinary power ought to be placed in
someone's
hands.

this was not done, Robert

R.

If

Livingston wrote James Duane

the people would take matters into their
own hands and "will

vest elsewhere what Congress are unwilling to
trust
41

Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsv/orth, April 11
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George
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PMHS_63 (October 1929-June 1930): 428; John Mathews to'the
President of the Continental Congress, Auaust 6, 1780
Burnett, LMCC, 5:310, 311; Nathanael Greene to Joseph'Reed,
September 2 1780, Johnson, Na^th anael Green e, 1:166-167;
Whitmill Hill to Thomas Burke, October 9, 1780, Burnett,
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themselves with-Or some daring Genious, with
necessity for
his plea, shall seize what they dare not give."
Many

believed that this extraordinary power should be
lodged in
Congress.
After all, as one member of Congress wrote

Greene,

"This power is certainly more safely lodged in the
hands of

such a body as Congress, than any other. "^^

Many military, and some civilian, leaders did not
believe that Congress, even with additional powers, would
be able to guide America through this critical period.

They

believed, as did young Lewis Morris, that the spirit of their

governments were "illy adapted" to the spirit of

war."^"^

What

they desired was some form of military dictatorship.
By 1779, many civilian and military leaders believed

that a limited military dictatorship needed to be established
in order to prevent anarchy and to bring a successful conclu-

sion to the war, even at the expense of civil supremacy and

civilian rights.

As General Moultrie stated early in 1779,

"it has always been the maxim of all communities to abridge

the people of some of those liberties for a time, the better
42

.

.

Robert R. Livingston to James Duane May 2, 1780,
George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New
York 1746-1813 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960),
pp 12 3-124; John Mathews to Nathanael Greene, May 20, 1781,
Burnett, LMCC, 6:94.
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to secure the whole to them in the
future."

previously, McDougall wrote

a

Two days

civilian leader it was one

of his first wishes to see the "civil at
all times superior
to the military," but he believed the military
may have to
seize control of government to ensure victory.
Earlier, he

wrote the people would have to support the army,
or else the
generals would take over, or they would be conquered—

either

way, the people would lose their liberties/"^

Calls for some form of military dictatorship con-

tmued during

1780

45
.

During September of that year,

Lafayette wrote Luzerne that there was much talk of making

Washington

a

dictator, and though by nature he was opposed

to it, he believed Washington shared his belief that it

might be necessary for the public v/elfare.'^^

Such talk by

the military declined the following year, with the approval

of the Articles of Confederation and the establishment of

executive departments, but nevertheless some in the military
44
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William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney,
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Marquis de Lafayette to Chevalier de la Luzerne,
September 10, 1780, Waldo G. Leland and Edmund C. Burnett,
eds., "Letters from Lafayette to Luzerne, 1780-1782," AHR
20, no. 2 (January 1915): 374.
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still believed a n^ilitary dictatorship was
necessary

.

^

Some civilian leaders believed that
extraordinary

power needed to be placed in the hands of the
military in
order to save the country from military defeat and

anarchy/^

As was pointed out earlier, the congressional committee
at

camp during the summer of 1780 favored

a

limited military

dictatorship and that fall the Hartford Resolves called on
Congress to give the military extraordinary power.

Many Americans, fearing anarchy, were willing to
sacrifice their civil supremacy principles and republican

beliefs for a strong government which would be able to pre-

vent anarchy.

And if not a strong government,

on horseback, a military dictator.

a

strong man

Many revolutionary

leaders did not believe America had the virtue to experiment

with democracy, while others believed that their only hope
lay in the form of an absolute monarchy.

"There are some

amongst us," Thomas McKean complained to Samuel Adams, "who
47

John Armstrong, Jr., to John Armstrong, Sr.,
May 10, 1781, "Original Letters and Documents," PMHB 5,
no. 1 (1881): 109; Simeon DeWitt to John Bogart, May 8,
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,
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William Livingston to John Witherspoon,
December 28, 1780, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Philip Schuyler to James Duane, May 13, 1780, "The
Duane Letters," Sout hern Histo ry Association Publications
380-381 Ezekiel Cornell to
8, no. 5 (SeptembeF^19 04)
William Greene, August 1, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:305; James
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Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 460.
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are so fond of having a great
and powerful Man to look
up
to, that, tho' they may not
like the name of king, seem
anxious to confer kingly powers.""
Washington was the most
likely candidate for such powers
to be conferred upon, for
by the critical period the army
was devoted to him and most
civilian leaders saw in him the glue
that held the revolutionary cause together.
By 1779, Washington was honored,
respected and loved
by most of the army.
He had slowly won their respect
and
gained their confidence.
This was most aptly

demonstrated

during the Conway Cabal, when they rallied to
his support.
John Laurens wrote his father, then President
of Congress,
that "If ever there was

a

man in the world whose moderation

and patriotism fitted him for the command of

a

republican

army, he is, and he merits unrestrained confidence."

A week

later, the adjutant of the First Connecticut Regiment
wrote

that any general could be replaced but Washington,

country, even Congress, he believed,

The

"are not aware of the

Confidence the army Places in him."^^
49

Thomas McKean to Samuel Adams, July 8, 1781,
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Silas Deane to Simeon Deane, May 16, 1781, "The Deane Papers,"
NYHSC, 22 (1890)
340-342 Silas Deane to Jesse Root, May 20,
1781, ibid., 367; Silas Deane to Benjamin Tallmadge, May 20,
1781, ibid., 388.
,

:

_

50

;

John Laurens to Henry Laurens, May 7, 1778, Simms,
The Army Cor res pondenc e^ _o£ Colone 1 J ohn Laure n s p 17 0;
Ezra Selden to Samue l"'Ma ther May "TS 7^1 778V~Johns ton Yale
and Her Honor-Roll in the American Revolution, p. 88.
,

,

,

.

,

The younger officers,
especially, had great faith
in General Washington.
"when I contemplate the
virtues of
the .an," a young Massachusetts
officer wrote of Washington
during the spring of 1778,
"uniting in the citizen and
soldier, I cannot too heartily
coincide with the orator of
the Fxfth of March last who so
delicately describes hi.,
as a person that appears to be
raised by Heaven to show how
high humanity can soar." Another
young officer, on learning
that Washington might be replaced,
wrote a friend that the
army, almost to a man, had the highest
opinion of their

commander in chief, and he doubted they
would submit to
another.
"They," he added, "love" and "adore
him."^^
The army's confidence and adoration
increased during
the critical period, so that by the summer
of 1781 the Abbe
Robin observed that Washington's subordinates were
"rivals
in praising him."

during 1781.

Other Frenchmen made similar observations

One wrote in July that the soldiers regarded

Washington as their "friend and father," and earlier that
year another wrote Washington was "beloved and respected by
his men."

By the time of the Yorktown campaign, a young

French officer observed that the army had "supreme confidence
Shaw to John Eliot, April 12 1778
Quincy, Samu el Shaw p. 45; Nathaniel Chipman to Elisha
Lee, April 10, 1778, Johnston, Yale and He r Ho nor-Roll in
the American Rev olutio n, p. 86; see also Mercy Otis Warren
to James Warren, March 10, 1778, "Warren-Adams Letters,"
MHSC, 7 3 (1925)
7.
^"'"Samuel

,

,
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in General Washington."

The following year, young
Prince

Broglie noted that around Washington
his officers exhibited
an air of "respect," "confidence,"
and "admiration ." ^2
On July 4,

1779, Steuben wrote that Washington's

"authority is as unlimited as that of

Holland can be.""

a

Stadtholder in

Although this is an exaggeration, cer-

tainly with respect to control over the civilian
government,
Washington, nevertheless, during the critical
period had
great authority over his officers and soldiers.

They looked

to him for leadership and were quite willing
to follow wher-

ever he lead. 54

what of the civilians?

During the spring of 1779,

young officer wrote

a

that Washington's "fortitude, patience, and equanimity of
soul, and the discouragements he has been obliged to encounter, ought to endear him to his country."

It already had,

he added, done so "exceedingly to the army."^^
52
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battles of Trenton and Princeton, Washington's
popularity
grew, and he was perceived by nany to be
the savior of his
country.

56

One member of Congress wrote early in 1777
that

"America has been rescued from ruin by the mere
strength
of his Genius, conduct, and courage," and believed
"an

Impartial world will say with you that he is the
Greatest
man on Earth." 57

So popular was Washington that early in

1777 one person observed that "The ignorant and deluded part
of the people look up to him as the Saviour and Protector
of their Country, and have implicit confidence in everything
he does

.

Washington's popularity increased during the middle
years of the war, even though victories were few and far
between.

59

"A Citizen,"

in the April 1,

1778,

issue of the

New-Jersey Gazette wrote that Washington's uncommon abilities, patience,

fortitude, and humanity "furnished the most

convincing proofs that Heaven directed their choice" of him
56
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as commander in chief.

Just keeping the army together

without them turning on the civilians
earned him much praise
And, as soldiers and officers came and
went, only Washington
remained, and was thus seen by many as the
revolution itself
"IVhile

early in 1777,

Washington survives," Caesar Rodney wrote
"the great American cause cannot Die."^°

Actually, from the beginning of the war, many people
viewed
Washington in this light.
Lacking national symbols,

Washington, especially after his dramatic successes at

Princeton and Trenton, came to be viewed as the national
symbol, the embodiment of the aspirations of the American

revolutionaries and their revolution
60^
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By 1781, before Yorktown, Washington
had endeared'
himself to most Americans ^ ^ Greene,
early that year,
.

reported that wherever he went Washington
was "little less
than ador'd; and universaly admir'd." During
the summer,

the Abbe Robin observed that in all the
states Washington

was considered in the light of

"benef icient God

a

.

"

"The

Americans," he observed, "that cool and sedate people,
who
in the midst of their most trying difficulties,
have attended

only to the directions and impulses of plain method
and
common reason, are roused, animated and inflamed at the very

mention of his name." 6 4

This was certainly true during the

Yorktown campaign, as everywhere he traveled, people vied

with one another "in demonstrations of joy and eagerness to
see their beloved countryman." 6 5

Despite this adulation for and confidence in
Washington, most civilian leaders were loath to give him

dictatorial powers.

As was noted earlier, Washington and

some other generals were given dictatorial powers for a
6 3

Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, March 8, 1781,
MHSC, 5th ser., 2:87; Ebenezer Hazard to Jeremy Belknap,
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limited time, but these grants were
reluctantly given, as
it was feared once given, it
would not be relinquished,
even by Washington
As has been pointed out throughout
this dissertation,

the revolutionary generation, which
was a jealous one, had a
strong fear of military tyranny in any form.
They were

especially fearful of generals who were too
popular or
powerful. When Gates was victorious at Saratoga,

John Adams

was pleased Washington had not been present,
for had he been
in command,

"Idolatry, and Adulation would have been

unbounded, so excessive as to endanger our Liberties

."

But as we have seen, by 1779, there was great adulation by

both the army and the civilian population for Washington,
so much so that the civilian leaders feared that Washington

would seize power.
"Are you sure we have no Caesars nor Cromwells in

this country?"
on July

3,

66

'Leonidas'

1779.

68

asked in The Pen nsyl vania Packet

Earlier that year there were some who

Dexter, Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles
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2:262.
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John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 26, 1777,
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believed Washington was to become
dissolve Congress.

a

Caesar or Cromwell and

Francis Dana, a member of Congress,

spread the story in Philadelphia that he had heard said that

Hamilton had stated that "it was high time for the people
to rise,

join General Washington, and turn Congress out of

doors."

It is probable that Hamilton did not make this

statement; however, it was very easy for civilian leaders
to believe such rumors.

During May of 1779, the French minister to the
United States reported the eastern party in Congress, i.e.,
Adams, Lee, had affected a dread of the army's power "and

allowed itself every sort of proceeding and imputation in

justification of this pretended dread." 70
was

a

Although this

slight exaggeration. Congress nevertheless attempted

to limit the military power when they believed it was get-

ting too powerful.

Late in 1779,

for example, John Sullivan

wrote Washington that the faction in Congress which had
raised against him during the Conway Cabal was still alive,

waiting to "collect Strength
to appear in force."

&

Seize Some favorable moment,

"Their plan is," he explained, "to

take Every method of proving the Danger, arising from

a

^^John Brooks to Alexander Hamilton, July 4, 1779,
Syrett, Papers of A lexander Hamilton 2:91; for related
correspondence see ibid., 99, 108-109, 127-128, 141-143, 149,
153-156, 187-188, 222, 224, 313, 313-315, 316-317.
,
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Commander, who Enjoys the full
Army,

&

unlimited Confidence of his

Alarm the People with the Prospects of
Imaginary
Evil."
Sullivan believed this faction intended
to persuade
Congress that the military power of America
should be
&

placed

in three or four different hands, each
having a separate

quarter of the continent to command, answerable
to Congress,
not to a supreme military commander.
Sullivan told

Washington that this faction believed splitting the
military
power would prevent an aspiring commander from enslaving
the
country.

71

This plan was not adopted.

During 1780, there were also rumors of
coup.

rumors.

a

military

That summer, Joseph Reed wrote Greene to explain such
"I have made inquiry at

headquarters whether there

was such a proposition made to the general, either by an

officer or officers of any rank, to assume dictatorial
powers," Greene wrote, "and am assured by Colonel Hamilton
that no such thing ever took place.

And you may depend upon

that the principal officers of the army are far from

it,

proposing any such thing to the general.

Nor can

I

see what

he could effect by dictatorial powers, without the helping
.

72

.

hand of civil-government.

"

As we know, the civilian

helping hand was present in the form of the congressional
71

John Sullivan to George Washington, December 1,
3:169,
1779, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan
,

170

.
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Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, September
1780, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:167.

8,

conmiittee to camp, which supported
some form of dictatorial

powers being authorized.

It was pointed out earlier
this

committee was recalled when it appeared
they were becoming
too attached to the military, and when
one
of its members,

John Mathews, attempted to introduce
legislation giving

Washington dictatorial powers he was severely
condemned by
the members of Congress.
This concern continued into

1781.

Early in 1781, John Adams told

a

European nobleman

that the American people were "keeping

a

watchful eye over

the army to see that it does not ravish from them
that

liberty for which all have been contending."

certainly kept a watchful eye.

Samuel Adams

John Armstrong, Jr., wrote

his father that Adams, because of the continued discussions
of making Washington a dictator, had left Congress "much

displeased and in

a

temper to awaken the jealousies if not

the resentments of his countrymen and constituents

""^"^
.

A

loyalist newspaper that summer played on this fear of making

Washington a dictator by reporting the French had given
Washington

a

considerable amount of money and intended to

make him the king of the United States.

"^^

Although the

73
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story was far-fetched, there was

a

small grain of truth

contained in it, one that certainly touched on the
jealousies
and fears of the civilian leaders.

During the late spring

the French king made a substantial loan and guaranteed

another from the Dutch, with the stipulation that it be
drawn by Washington.

Luzerne, realizing how upsetting this

was to the Americans, told Congress that Washington could
be interpreted to mean Washington or some other person.

Congress designated Robert Morris as the person authorized
to receive the loan.

75

The civilian leaders had reasons to be fearful of

a

military dictatorship or anarchy taking place, other than
those that have been mentioned.

During the critical period,

the military often made threats, officers threatened to

resign, the military was often unruly, and at times mutinous.

"Without
is now a mob,

.

speedy change the army must dissolve; it

a
.

.

,

without cloathing, without pay, with-

out provision, without morals, without discipline," Hamilton

wrote James Duane early in September 1780.

Two days later,

St. Clair wrote Pennsylvania's chief executive that if the

army was not helped, it v/ould either disband or turn "'free-

booter'."

"If relief cannot be afforded," Heath wrote Rhode

Silas Deane to Jesse Root, May 20, 1781, "The Deane
Papers," NYHSC, 22 (1890): 377; William G. Sumner, The
Financier and t he Financ es o f t he American Revolution,
TT296-29T.
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Island's chief executive later in September,

"i

cannot hold

myself answerable for consequences to which necessity
will
drive the troops to sustain life."^^ Such threats
were made

frequently during 1780, even by Washington.

Early that year,

knowing of the military's dislike of the inequality of
the
terms of enlistments and bounties, their growing distrust
of
the civilian authorities, and realizing some soldiers and

officers had not been paid for lengthy periods of time,

Washington wrote Congress he was afraid the "seditious combinations" would result in the army becoming uncontrollable.'^^
During May, he informed Congress that he had ever tried to
"preserve order and promote the public service," but in the

accumulation of present distresses, it would be difficult
to continue to do so.

Late in August, he wrote Congress

that something must be done or else the army would cease to
exist, or it would stay together, exhibiting "an example of

more virtue,

fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance than

perhaps ever yet been parallelled in

.

.

.

history."

A week

later, he informed the states that, if they did not act, he
76
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would soon be forced to disband the
army or let it reinain
intact by plundering "^^
.

These threats increased the fears of
the civilian
leaders, who desired neither anarchy or
military tyranny to
subvert the war and the revolution. Also of
great concern
to them was the fact that officers, who they
placed great

faith in to control the army, began threatening
during 1779
"^^
and 1780 to resign unless their situation was
improved.
Not only were there threats, there were actions
by
the military which raised great concern and fear among
the

civilian leaders.

During the summer of 1780, one member of

Congress reported that "The army now live principally by
plunder" and that if they were kept together, will "soon

become

f ree-booters

.

"
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During 1780

,

the army, especially
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the southern forces, lived by plunder.

This was in great

part because of necessity, but also because
of lack of
discipline, and continued plundering further
eroded

discipline
Between the summer of 1779 and the spring
of 1781,
the discipline of the army was at its lowest
point, as

evidenced by numerous instances of mutinous behavior
and
several mutinies.

82

During 1779, there were numerous

potential and actual mutinies.

The most serious, as far as

the civilians were concerned, were the threats by Hunting-

ton's brigade to march on the Connecticut legislature to

present their grievances and Pawling

regiment to march on

's

the New York legislature to present theirs.
8

John Henry, Jr., to Thomas Sim Lee, September
1790, Browne, Maryland Archives
45:80; A. E. Zucker,
General De Kalb, Lafayette's Mentor pp. 213-214.
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[Otho Holland VJilliams] to General [Nathanael
Greene?], December 18, 1780, Calendar of the General Otho
Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society
p"^
31; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, December 6,
1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson
4:183; Alexander
Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], Syrett,
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 2:405.
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1778 MHSC
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Services (Hartford: Case, Lockwood and Brainard Company,
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George Washington to Jeremiah Wadsworth, November 22, 17 79,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 17:163; for other potential and actual 17 79 mutinies see George Washington to John
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The chief executive of Pennsylvania
early in

December 1779 wrote General St. Clair that
it gave him
"great satisfaction to see harmoney so prevailing

in the

military line.

God grant it may continue and increase

This did not happen.

."

Throughout 1780, the army, after

having suffered through the coldest winter in memory,
fre-

quently exhibited mutinous behavior and in several instances

threatened to march on the civilian authorities for redress
of their grievances.

As 1780 came to a close, there was a

Washington to VJilliam Ma>avell, May 10, 1779 ibid., 15:32-33;
Buell, Rufus Putnam, p. 89; Duane Extracts from the Diary
of Christopher Marshall, p. 214; John Ashe to Richard ~c¥swel
1
March 17, 1779, Clark, NCSR, 14:43; VJilliam Moultrie to
Benjamin Lincoln, July 17, 1779, Moultrie, Memoi rs of the
American Revolution 2:27; Israel Angell, Jeremiah Olney
and Simeon Thayer to John Sullivan, March 3, 1779, Hammond,
Letters and Pape rs of John Su llivan 2:525-526; John Sullivan
to George Washington, March 3, 1779, ibid., 528; [Samuel
Smith]
Memoirs of the Life of Samuel Smith: Being an
Extract from a Journal Wr it ten by H imself from 1776 to 1786
(Middleborough, Massachusetts: n.p., 185 377 PP. 12~-^r4";
Edward Field, ed.. Diary of Col onel Isra el Angell, Commanding the Sec ond R hode Is land Continenta l Regim en t duri ng~"the
American Revolut ion 177 8-1781 p 4~7 A r t ur~ St. Clai r~to
Joseph Reed, July 25, 1779, Smith, The St. Cl air Papers
,

,

'

,

,

,

.

,

,

1:481.
84

Joseph Reed to Arthur St. Clair, December
ibid., 1:492-493.

9,

1779,

85

John Glover to VJilliam Heath, December 12, 1779
George Athan Billias General John Glover and His Marblehead
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growing concern that if the army suffered
through another
winter a major mutiny would take place. A
major
mutiny,

it was feared,

could result in the revolution being
undone,

by military defeat, or even worse, by anarchy
or military

tyranny.

Two weeks before the end of the year General

Wayne wrote,
&

"I

sincerely wish the Ides of Jany was come

past-I am not superstitious, but can't help chershing

disagreeable Ideas about that period. "^^
Abbatt, Memoirs of Ma jor-General William Heath p. 20 8;
Benians, A Journal by Thos Hughes pp. 79-80; George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, May 26, 1780, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 18:425; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress, May 28, 1780, ibid.,
428-432; Same to same, June 20, 1780, ibid., 19:36-37;
George Washington to Goose Van Schaick, June 20, 1780,
ibid., 45; William Irvine to Joseph Reed, May 26, 1780, Reed,
Joseph Reed 2:201; Thacher, Military Journal of the American
Revolution pp. 197-198, 242; [Samuel Richards], Diary of
Samuel Richards; Captain of Connecticut Line: War of the
Revolution 1775-1781 (Philadelphia: Leeds and Biddle Company
1909), pp. 67-68; Scheer, Private Yankee Doodle pp. 182-187;
Christopher Kucker and Thomas Edwards to Samuel J. Atlee,
September 30, 1780, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives 2d ser.,
13:545-546; Edgar W. Hasler, Old Westmoreland: A History of
Western Pennsylvania During the Revolution pp. 110-114^
Henry Augustus Muhlenberg, The Life of Ma jor-General T'eter
Muhlenberg of the Revolutionary Army pp. 218-219; Edward VI.
Hooker, The Fighting Parson of the Tunerican Revolution: A
Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg p. 110; Anthony Wayne
to Francis Johnston, December 16, 1780, Stille, Anthony
Wayne p. 241; John Glover to John Sullivan, November 19,
3:209;
1780, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan
John Stark to John Sullivan, December 10 1780
Tdraft]
ibid., 240.
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Anthony Wayne to Francis Johnston, December 16,
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John Sullivan, December 10, 1780, [draft], Hammond, Letters
3:240 Anthony V7ayne to Robert
and Papers of John Sullivan
Morris et al., October 17, 1780 Moore, Anthony VJayne, p. 120
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Wayne's worst fears came true on January

1,

1781, as

over one thousand soldiers of his division
mutinied, and
began a march on Philadelphia, after having
wounded and
kiUed several officers, and even fired upon him.
within two
weeks this mutiny was quelled after the civilian
authorities
promised the soldiers would receive som,e of the
monies owed
them:
clothing; those that had enlisted for three years
or
the war, having served three years would be discharged;
and

many others would be furloughed until April.

when the

mutiny began, Wayne commanded 2,500 soldiers; by the summer
when he headed south, he commanded less than half that
number.

87

The New England troops almost mutinied as well,

but the promise of pay and supplies calmed them.^^

Not so

87

Anthony VJayne to George Washington, January 2,
1781, Stille, Anthony Wayne p. 242; Same to same, Janu,

ary 29, 1781, ibid., p. 260; Enos Reeves to
],
January 2, 1781, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letterbooks of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line,"
PMHB 21, no. 1 (1897): 72-75; Thacher, Military Journal of
the American Revolution p. 24 7; George Kyte, "General Wayne
Marches South, 1781," PH 30, no. 3 (July 1963): 302, 305;^
Diary of Joseph McClellan, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of
the Revolution
2:631; see also ibid., 649-673.
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William Heath to George Washington, January 23,
7th ser., 5:159-160; William Heath to John
1781, MHSC
Hancock, January 17, 1781, ibid., 165; Samuel H. Parsons to
Jonathan Trumbull, January 31, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden
Parsons, p. 324; Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton,
January 25, 17 81, Syrett, Pa pers of Al exander Hamil ton 2:542;
John P. Wyllys to Hezekiah Conneet, February 10, 1781,
Seymour, A Digressive History p. 196; Washington Circular to
the New EngTand Stat^es^ Janilary 5, 1781, Fitzpatrick, VJritings
of Washington, 21:61-63; George Washington to Timothy
Picker ing7 January 5, 1781, ibid., 60.
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easily quelled was the New Jersey Line, which
mutinied on
the twentieth of January, when nearly three
hundred soldiers
marched on their brigade headquarters with the
intention of

continuing on to Trenton to make demands upon the
civilian
authorities. 89

Mutinies and the spirit of mutiny continued

throughout 1781, despite the increased military activity and
the numerous provisions made by Congress and the states for

the physical well-being of the military.

These threats of and actual mutinies were of great

concern to the civilian leaders, but even more so to the
89

The New-Jersey Gazette February 7, 1781; Lundin,
Cockpit of the Revolution p. 4 41; Abbatt, Memoir s of Major"
General William H e ath by Himself p. 2 52.
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John Taylor to Thomas Jefferson, December 5, 1780,
Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson 4:180-181; James Innes to
Thomas Jefferson, February 21, 1781, ibid., 675; Same to
same, February 24, 1781, ibid., 699; Daniel Brodhead to
Joseph Reed, August 23, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives
1st ser., 9:365; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major
General James Ja c kson pp. 34-36, 91; James Clinton~to George
Clinton^ July 11, 1781, Hastings, Public Pa pers of George
CI inton
7:70; William Gordon, The History of the R ise,
Progress, and Establishment, of the Independence of the
United States of America: I nc luding an Account of the Late
War: and of th e Thirteen Colonies, from their Origin to that
(London: printed for the author, 1788)
Period 4 vols
4:172-174; John Stark to William Heath, December 12, 1781,
Frederic Kideer, History of the First New Hampshire Regiment
in the War of the Revolution p. 75; Moore, John Stark
p. 474; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, April 3, 1781,
Joseph Reed, to Arthur
1 544
Smith, The St. Cl a ir Papers
St. Clair, April 3, 1781, ibid., 544n.l; Samuel H. Parsons
to Jonathan Trumbull, July 10, 1781, Hall, Sam uel Holden
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military leaders who believed that, with

a

well-disciplined

army and the help of the French forces, they could
win the
war.
And, like their civilian brethren, they also feared

anarchy and military tyranny.

This was especially true of

Washington
It has been suggested that VJashington, by
1780, was

held in the highest esteem by most Americans and that, if
he desired, could have imposed his will upon both the mili-

tary and the civilian authorities by force of personality
and arms.

In 1847, a biographer of General Lincoln observed

that if V7ashington "had willed it, the revolutionary war

might have ended in the establishment of
ism."

a

military despot-

This view was held at the time as well.

The Abbe

Robin, during August 1781, wrote that Washington's "reputa-

tion has at length arisen to a most brillant pitch; and he

may now grasp at the most unbounded power without provoking
envy, or exciting suspicions."

Two years earlier, the

French minister to America reported to Vergennes that if

Washington was ambitious and intriguing it would have been
entirely in his power to lead

a

coup, but that nothing on

Washington's part had justified the shadow of suspicion.

In

fact, Washington, he wrote, was constantly operating under

the principle that one must be a citizen first and a soldier

•

,
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afterwards

Washington indeed put the citizen before the soldier
A neighbor wrote in his diary on May 23, 1776, that he
"never knew but one man who resolved not to forget the

citizen in the soldier or ruler and that is G. V?."^^

civilian leaders greatly appreciated this.

^he

The Maryland

legislature addressed him on November 22, 1781:
Your military talents, eminent as they are, form
not the most admired part of your character;
your
inviolate regard to the civil authority manifested
on all occasions, and in situations the most trying, claims the warmest acknowledgements of the
guardians of the rights and liberties of the
people ^
.

Washington had no desire for any form of military coup, for
the various reasons discussed in this dissertation

;

but

primarily because of his fear that the revolution would be
subverted by anarchy and military tyranny.
family motto was "Exitus Acta Probat"
means)

,

Although his

(the end justifies the

Washington placed great importance upon the means
He had no desire to shake the

of accomplishing his ends.
91

.

Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln p. 37 3; Robin, New Travels
Through North -America pT 3T; Conrad Alexandre Gerard to
Comte de Vergennes, March 8, 1779, Meng, Despatches and
Instructions p 5 6 9.
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Jack P. Greene, ed., The Diary of Colonel Landon
Carter of Sabine Hall 1752-1778 Virginia Historical
(Charlottesville University
Society 'Documents T~~&~'5', 2 vols
Press of Virginia for the Virginia Historical Society, 1965)
2:1042-1043.
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Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:463.

:

social or political order by military
means, even if such
means shortened the war.
"I do

most heartily pity General Washington,"

Jedediah Huntington wrote late in 1777.

"He bears his dis-

appointments with the greatest equanimity,
and is anxious to
do the best he can in his circumstances."^'^
One historian
has noted "the patience and forbearance
displayed by

Washington in his relations with Congress
are perhaps not
the least of his titles to greatness; he
might
well be

accorded rank alongside Job."^^

Washington indeed took his

disappointments in stride, believing that things would
work
out for the best. Early in the war, he wrote that "Time
only can eradicate and overcome customs and prejudices of
long-standing; they must be got the better of, by slow and

gradual advances." 96

Self-restraint and patience were among the most
notable aspects of Washington's character

^"^
.

He,

for the

94

Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull,
November 10, 1777, MHSC 7th ser., 2:190.
,

95
p.
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John C. Miller, Triump h of Freedom 1775-1783,
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96

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, May 11, 1776, Fitzpatrick, W ritings
of Washington
5:33.
,

97

Henry T. Tuckerman, Bio graphic al E ssays. Essays,
Biog r aphical an d Criti cal; or. Studies o f~cFaTa c t e r (Boston":
Phillips Sampson and Company, 1857), pp. 5-28^!
,
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-St

part, accepted things he
could not or did not desire
to change.
As he told Joseph Reed, "i
will not lament or
repine at any act of Providence
because I am in a great

measure a convert to Mr. Pope's
opinion, that whatever is,
is right."
v,hen Schuyler complained
about his plight,
Washington wrote him, "I must recommend
to you what I
endeavour to practice myself. Patience
^
and Per severance
He told the army in his general
orders of January
30,

1781,

after the mutinies of the Pennsylvania
and New Jersey Lines:
We expected to encounter many wants
and distresses
and we should neither shrink from
them
happen nor fly in the face of Law and when they
Government
to procure redress.
There is no doubt the public
will in the event do ample justice to
men fighting
and suffering in its defence.
But it is our dutv
to bear present Evils with Fortitude
looking
ward to the period when our Country will have forit
more in its power to reward our services. 99

Most soldiers did not want military tyranny, and
were willing to wait to be compensated

"^^^
.

For the most

part, they shared Washington's belief they should
not take

matters into their own hands, for the result would inevitably
98

George Washington to Joseph Reed, March 7, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, W ritings of Wa shington, 4:380; George Washington to Philip Schuyler, July 28, 1775, ibid., 3:374.
99

Ibid., 21:159.

100^

Samuel Cogswell to Mr. Cogswell, July 15, 1780,
"An Unpublished Letter from the camp^ July, 1780," HM 2d
ser., 8, no. 2 (August 1870): 102; David Humphreys to
Nathanael Greene, May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene,
"Selections from the Papers of Ma jor-General Nathanael
Greene," ibid., 2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133.
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be the subversion of the revolution,
by
or military dictatorship, or both.

a

form of anarchy

Thus, while some offi-

cers contemplated or wished for more
power, most were
content to adjust themselves to their
circumstances.
This
is not to suggest they did nothing, for
as we have
seen,

the military frequently lobbied for change
and involved

themselves in the political process.

But they did not,

except in rare instances, effect change themselves.
During the critical period, Washington and his

generals were well aware of the

p]

ight of the country and

the army, and although they could not always improve the

former, they knew they could improve and control the latter.
As was dicussed earlier, the military officers went to

great lengths to control the army.

This was especially true

during the critical period, when the army was as great

a

threat to the success of the revolution as was the British
army

Washington and other officers frequently used force
during this period to quell mutinies and mutinous behavior
This was especially true during 1781.

"'^^^
.

Soldiers, and even

officers, were confined, sentenced to death, executed, or
Glover to Wi 1 i am Heath, January 1 1780,
George Athan Rillias, Gen e ral John Glover and His Marblehead
Mariners pp. 181 232n.20, 21; William Heath to George
Washin'gton, January 10
1780 MHSC, 7lh sor.
5:8-9; Abbatt,
Memoi rs o f Ma j or- General William H eath p. 208, Benians, A
Journal by Th6¥T H u g h e"i", pp 79-80
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in some other way punished for
mutinous behavior.

Washington showed great restraint when
the Pennsylvania Line
mutinied early in January 1781, but
such was
not the case

when the New Jersey Line mutinied later
that month.
Washington believed he needed to act
immediately, as "This
spirit of mutiny will spread itself through
the remainder of
the Army, if not extinguished by some
decisive measure."

This decisive measure was to send General
Howe with over
five hundred well-clothed and properly officered
New England

troops to New Jersey to force an unconditional
surrender

with orders to "instantly execute
and incendiary leaders."

a

few of the most active

To ensure his orders were com-

plied with, Washington went to the scene of the mutiny.
Once the mutiny was quelled, two of the leaders were executed, by twelve of the foremost participants, who were

James Clinton to George Clinton, July 11, 1781,
Hastings, Public P aper s of George Clinton 7:70; William
Gordon, The History of the Rise, Prog ress, and Establishment
of the Independ e nce of the United S tates of Am er i c a 4 :Tl2174; John Bell Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the'^urnal of
Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 17811782," PMHB 19, no. 1 (1895): 52; The New-Je rsey Gazette,
March 28, 17 81; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major'
General James Jackson pp. 34-36, 91.
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George Washington to John Sullivan, January 21,
1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 21:128; George
Washington to Robert Howe, January 21, 1781, ibid,, 128;
see also David Humphreys to William Heath, January 21, 1781,
MHSC, 7th ser.
5 :165.
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sentenced by

a

court-martial to be the executioners

When the Pennsylvania Line threatened
mutiny during May,
General Wayne was also severe in his
punishment.

He had

twelve leaders court-martialed on the spot.

Friends of six

of them were forced to be the executioners.

With tears run-

ning down their cheeks, they obeyed the order
to fire.
Five
died instantly, and the sixth, badly wounded,
was bayoneted
by another of the mutineers by order of Wayne.
Wayne then

marched the Line, by divisions, around the dead and,
to make
the point plainly clear, he ordered the remaining
six
muti-

neers hanged.

''"^^

Early in May 1779, twenty-one officers of the New

Jersey brigade sent

memorial to their legislature

a

threatening to resign if the depreciation due them was not
made good.

Washington, very upset by this action, told their

commanding general that the officers had used the wrong means
to obtain their desired end. 106

Washington and most of the

officers believed that threats, mutinies, and military coups

were not the best way to improve things.

The means they

104^
George Washington to William Livingston, January 27, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washingto n, 21:149;
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considered most effective was by lobbying peacefully
and
forcefully.

Many generals and officers went to their state's
executives and legislative bodies to personally plea for
assistance or to present petitions on behalf of their
soldiers and themselves. 10 7

For example, during the late

summer of 1779, General Paterson and Colonel Tupper left
their Highlands camp to visit the General Court of Massa-

chusetts on behalf of their officers.

The next year,

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ward appeared before Rhode
Island's General Assembly and Colonel Marinus Willett and

other officers went to the New York state legislature to
lobby on behalf of their respective line's officers. 10 9

Also in 1780, Heath went to the Massachusetts General Court
to lobby on behalf of the officers and that year and the

107

Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, June 26,
1781, Hall, Samu el Holden Parsons, pp. 370-371; Louis
Gottschalk Lafayette and t h e Close of the American Revolu North Carolina Continentals
tion, p. 193; Hugh Rankin, The
"
7:250.
p. 36 6; NHHSC
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next Knox personally lobbied with the legislatures
of
several of the New England states.
And the Pennsylvania
Line sent three colonels to Philadelphia to lobby
the legislature on behalf of the officers.
Some officers, unable
to personally lobby their state legislatures,
frequently

^

sent memorials and petitions to them.^^^

Others wrote

Heath to the Massachusetts Council
March 3, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:43; William Heath to the
Massachusetts General Assembly, April 7, 1780, ibid., 51-54;
William Heath to George Washington, March 2, 1780, ibid.,
36; Same to same, March 27, 1780, ibid., 38; George
Washington to Henry Knox, January 7, 1781, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 21:66-68; Henry Knox to Benjamin
Lincoln, April 24, 1781, Benjamin Lincoln Paoers, MHS,
(Microfilm Reel #6)
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directly to the legislatures
or councils.
During the
critical period, soi.e officers
wrote state executives,
hoping they could use their
influence with the state legislatures to make immediate and
future provisions for the
officers and rneir
their soldiers.
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circulars to the states, wrote personal
letters to the chief
executives, asking them to help their states
comply with
past promises, as well as to encourage them
to have their
states adopt new provisions for the officers and
soldiers
of their respective state 1 ines
"'""''^

.

Washington continually wrote Congress about the
plight of the army. 116

So did his generals, often in the

form of a memorial or petition

"^-^"^

Others wrote to indivi-

.

dual members of Congress, hoping they could influence
their

Joseph Reed, November 19, 1780, Moore, Anthony Wayne,
pp. 121-122; Same to same, December 16,~T780, ReedT^Joseph
Reed, 2:316; Marquis de Lafayette to Joseph Reed, MaiTTi^
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Smith, The St. Clair Papers
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George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 27, 1779, ibid., 15:330; Same
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Blaine to Samuel Huntington, October 17, 1780, Browne,
Maryland Archives, 45:150-151.
,

,

G66

colleagues to support the army.^^^

And some, like Lafayette

and McDougall, did not hesitate visiting Congress
to person-

ally plea on behalf of their officers and soldiers

"'^

.

These lobbying efforts not only had the effect of

keeping the army's dissatisfaction within peaceful bounds,
but also made the civilian leaders realize that something

needed to be done for the military, before the military took

matters into their own hands.

Having the same effect on the

civilian leaders was the large number of desertions and

officer resignations during the critical period.
During 1780 and 1781, the desertion rate was very
high."'^^^

Numerous officers resigned during the summer and
118

Alexander Scanmiell to Nathaniel Peabody, April 2,
17 79, Coffin, The Lives and Services of Thomas, Knowlton,
Scanmiel l, Dearborn
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fall of 1779. 121

The winter of 1779-1780 took its
toll on

the officers. Rather than suffer in
poverty and nakedness,
or continue to listen to complaints from
their families and
soldiers, many officers resigned before the
spring.

number of resignations declined somewhat during
the summer,
but nevertheless, Washington reported during October
that

160 officers had resigned since January.

These desertions

and resignations served somewhat as a safety valve,
as many
of the discontented in the army departed.

They also served

to show the civilian leaders that they must do something
for

the present state of the army, as well as to make provisions
for the future veterans.
121

William

Weeden, "Diary of Enos Hitchcock; D.D.,
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July 13, 1779, Edwin M. Stone, History of
Beverly [Mass a chusetts], Civil and EcclesiasFical
from
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William Woodford 2:1070-1071.
B.

'

,

.

.

.

,

,

122

Samuel H. Parsons to John Jay, May 30, 1780, Hall,
Samuel Holden Parsons p. 289; John Paterson to William Heath,
March 31, 1780, MHSC 7th ser., 5:44; Thacher, Military
Journal of the American Revolutio n, pp. 194-195; Letter of
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George Washington in Hastings, Public Papers of George
Clinton, 5:478-480; Michael Jackson to William Heath,
April 13, 1780, Ryan, A Salute to Courage pp. 184-185.
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Circular to the States, October 18, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Washington 20:210-211; see also
George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, August 20, 1780, ibid., 412; Samuel Adams to
Sally Adams, August 17, 1780, Feinstone Collection r44.
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Many civilian leaders agreed with Oliver
Wolcott
that "To pay and Provide for the Army ought
certainly to be
the primary Objects in every Deliberate Council."
Fearing
the consequence of not making such provisions,
James Lovell

wrote they must get money to the army so as to "prevent
stupid plans of creating absolute Dictators to get
supplies

without paying for

them.""'"^'^

Congress and the states frequently responded to the
pleas for helping the officers and soldiers, and improved
their own affairs, so the army would not have to intercede.

With respect to the latter. Congress certainly improved
The critical period caused many leaders to realize

itself.

that Congress had to have more power, and many of those once

leery about giving Congress too much power were now willing
This was especially true after the January 1781
125
^
^
^ ^
mutinies.
During February,
Congress established a
to do so.
•

•

.

Department of Finance and elected Robert Morris its
Superintendent.

Morris accepted the position that summer

after obtaining from Congress almost unlimited control over
124

Oliver Wolcott to Tapping Reeve, January 16, 1781,
Burnett, LMCC, 5:537; James Lovell to Samuel Holten, September 5, 1780, ibid., 363; see also Pierre Van Cortlandt to
Philip Van Cortlandt, February 8, 1780, Judd, Memoir and
Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt, p. 146.
125

John Sullivan to George Washington, January 29,
1781, Burnett, LMCC, 5:548; James Duane to George Washington,
January 29, 1781, ibid., 551.

the expenditure of public monies. ^^6

with the support of

Congress, Morris set about to increase and expend
the

public revenue in the most frugal, fair, and honest
manner
possible.

In May, at his prompting, Congress authorized
a

national bank, believing it would revive public credit

"'^'^
.

That summer. Congress placed in Morris's hands all the

monies borrowed from France; gave him authority to import
and export goods on the account of the United States; placed
the Marine Department under his control; allowed him to

replace the specific supply system with

a

contract system,

as well as the authority to secure and dispose of any speci-

fic supplies; and granted him other economic powers.

"^^^

During the summer and fall, Morris worked diligently
to meet the needs of the army, particularly their pay.

Helping in this regard

v/as

the arrival of the French loan.

This hard money not only paid the army

a

small portion of

the monies due them, but also provided the capital for the

Bank of North TVmerica which was chartered by Congress on
12 6

Young, Robert Mor ris p. 92; Jennings B. Sanders,
Evolution of the E xecutive Depa rtments of the Cont i nental
Congress7'l7 74-1789 pp. 128-173 2
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Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, May 17, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris
1:66, Ford, JCC, 20:545-548.
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'"^^Ibid., 19:290-291
180, 4 32-433
597-598, 721, 723, 724-725, 734; 21:813-814, 908, 943,
954-955, 1024-1025, 1027, 1062, 1068, 1070, 1135, 1149-1150.
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the last day of 1781, and opened its
doors for business

during January 1782.

This quasi-public institution
began

loaning the government money in anticipation
of revenue and
was, because of Morris's solid reputation
and prospect of
high dividends, able to attract merchants to
invest in its
stock.

129

Morris was successful in reducing the cost
of

operating the government, and making it more efficient.

He

also helped the financial state of the government
by trans-

ferring his ovm money to the government and issuing
money

under his own name. 1^0

Congress did not sit still and expect Morris alone
to solve all their problems.

They also took actions and

adopted measures to improve their operations and the Continental finances, realizing that an effective Congress and
adequate funds would inevitably result in the improved

condition of the army. 131

In February 1781,

Congress asked

for an impost on all goods imported into the states, with
129

Ibid., 1186-1190 Young, Robert Morris pp. 95,
98; Lawrence Lewis, Jr., A History of the Bank of North
America, the first Bank Chartered in the United States~
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1882) pp. 2730, 32-34, 35, 36, 37.
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Young, Robert Morris pp. 137, 139-140; Ver Steeg,
Robert Morris p. 87; Robert Morris to Benjamin Harrison,
January 15, 1782, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris 4:46.
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Joseph Jones to George Washington, October [2],
1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:396; Thomas McKean to Samuel Adams,
August 6, 1782, ibid., 6:430; Herbert James Henderson,
Party Politics in the Continental Congress, p. 181.
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the revenue raised to be applied to discharging
the princi-

pal and interest of debts arising from the war.

Two months

later Congress devalued the Continental money, and
later

that year abandoned the paper money program and asked
the

states to repeal all laws making any kind of bills
tender.

a

legal

Also, because the monies had depreciated so badly,

Congress, to help calculate the debt and help people holding
the worthless money, urged the states to set up tables of

depreciation.

Most did so during 1781.

Early in 1781,

Congress created executive departments for marine and war,
as well as for finance;

and, with Morris's help, they

reorganized the medical and treasury departments, and consolidated the clothier general's department.

Realizing the

seriousness of the times. Congress, although opposed to
impressing and having only authorized it infrequently

earlier in the war, now felt compelled to make such authorizations.

132

The states also became actively involved in

authorizing impressing, and in

a

few instances, even

authorized the military to plunder.

133

The states did more

Ford, JCC, 17:758-759; 18:1157-1164; 19:102-103,
110-113, 126, 225; 20:501, 516, 555-556, 598; Ralph Volney
Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary F'inance, 1775-1783," AHR
35, no. 1 (October 1929): 62, 64, 64n.75.

Elizabeth Cometti, "Impressment during the
American Revolution," Vera Largent, ed.. The Walter Cl inton
Jackson Essays in t he Soci al Sc iences by members of the
Woman s College of th e Un iv ersity of North Caroli na (Chapel
Hill: University of^North Carolina Press, 1942), pp. 99-109;
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than just authorize impressing
and plundering to help the
army.
Pennsylvania authorized Robert
Norris, already the
Superintendent of Finance, to use their
monies to procure
specific supplies for the Continental
Army.134
^^^^
also helped by the fact that some
states, particularly those
no longer actively battlegrounds,
improved both politically
and economically during the 1779-1781
per iod
"'^

.

Realizing the importance of mutual
cooperation, and
prompted by political expediency, the states
during
this

period increasingly took

Continental position.

a

During

1780, New York ceded her western land claims and
Virginia

did so the following year.

These actions, as well as

Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaians of General
Thomas Sumter ppT 144-146
'

'

'
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,
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p. 47; Bullock, "The
Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789," p. 147;
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because of diplomatic and
military pressures,
prompted
Maryland to ratify the Articles
of Confederation early
in
1781.
These actions had a
positive influence
on the

army, as they must have
believed that they were
indeed

fighting

a

continental war for

a

nation's independence.

As

will be discussed later in
this chapter, the Continental
outlook with respect to the
western lands was a very
important factor in the army's mind,
as they were fighting
for
their own stake in society in
many respects, for a piece
of land.

Help for the army not only came
from the governments,
it also came from private citizens,
in the form of
loans and

voluntary contributions, and from some
military officers,
who supplied their soldiers from their
^^"^
own
funds.
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and on the twentieth, as a means
of keeping the soldiers
ties to the cause. Congress prohibited
them from transferring the bounties during the war.-""^?-

The states, almost from the beginning
of the war,
were rather generous in giving land bounties
as a means of
not only recruiting, but giving those already
enlisted a

stake in society; making them truly citizen-soldiers."^^^

During the war, eight states gave land to the
soldiers,

often with the provision that it would be given at the
end
of the war or the soldier's enlistment, provided he had
not

been punished for plundering
141
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.
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William Hooper to Robert Morris, May 27, 1777,
"unpublished Letters by William Hooper," HM, 2d ser. 4,'
no. 1 (August 1868): 90; Hemphill, Journals of the General
Assembly and House of Representatives 1776-1780 pp. 149150, 151; Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried' to Raise
Her Continental Quotas," MHM 42, no. 3 (September 1947):
188; Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the
American Revolution University of Virginia Institute for
Research in the Social Sciences Monograph No. 25 (New York:
D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937), p. 211; C. H. Laub,
"Revolutionary Virginia and the Crown Lands (1775-1783),"
WMQ 2d ser., 11, no. 4 (October 1931): 308; Hening, The
Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of
Virginia 9:375; 10:23; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of
Georgia 1:279-2 80; Edward McCrady, T he History of South
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Most southern states provided slaves
in addition to
other induceinents, hoping that by having
slaves, the soldiers
would believe their status would be
increased once their
military service was completed.
Northern states, with no
slaves to give, joined the southern states
in providing
the

soldiers with other forms of property, such
as confiscated
estates

Another important factor in controlling the
army by
self-interest was by giving the officers a special
stake in

the cause.

This was done by granting them pensions,
usually

in the form of half-pay for seven years or life.

Many

believed that by granting such pensions the officer's commission would become more desirable, which would make for a

more disciplined officer corps, which in turn would result
144

Ibid., 2 32; Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being
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27, no. 1 (January 1926)
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2 vols.
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in a more disciplined army.^^^

Elbridge Gerry believed that

the pension system would "introduce that
subordination to
civil authority which is necessary to produce
an internal

security to liberty, and to the high officers of
the military department such authority as to enable them
to

establish discipline, without which an army can be
neither
vigorous nor successful." 14 7

Despite some opposition to a

pension system, which was not in keeping with republican
ideology, Congress, believing in the absolute necessity of
the measure, on May 15,

1778, granted half-pay for seven

years after the war to all line of f icers

"'"'^

^

.

During the critical period, 1779-1781, realizing
something must be done for the army, five states extended
the promise of half-pay to life.

Pennsylvania, during this

time, gave pensions to widows and exempted all lands given
to officers and soldiers from taxation.

North Carolina also
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Elbridge Gerry to George Washington, January 13,
1778, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution 2:67
,

^^^Ford, JCC, 11:495-496 501-503; Elbridge Gerry
to James Warren, May 26, 1778, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspondence, p. 120; Henry Laurens to William Livingston,
April 19, 1778, Sedgwick, William Livingston pp. 272-276;
Same to same. May 6, 1778, ibid., p. 284; Henry Laurens to
George Washington, May 5, 1778, Burnett, LMCC 3:220-221;
Roger Sherman, Samuel Huntington, and Oliver Wolcott to
Jonathan Trumbull, May 18, 1778, ibid., 255; James Lovell to
William Whipple, May 25, 1778, ibid., 262; William Ellery to
William Whipple, May 31, 1778, ibid., 270.
,

,

,
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gave a tax exempt status to land
given to soldiers. Georgia
provided that soldiers be given a tax
exempt status for ten
years after leaving military service. "^^^

Congress also realized they needed to
make provisions
for the military during this critical
period; or
at least

encourage the states to do so.

During the first part of

1779, Congress authorized special bonuses for soldiers
who

had enlisted before that year, so they would not
feel pen-

alized for having enlisted early in the war when
bounties
were much smaller.

That summer. Congress strongly urged

the states to extend half-pay to life; provided to pay
up

deficiencies of food and clothing in cash; provided for
pensions for orphans and widows; and increased the pay of
officers.

During the latter part of the year. Congress made

149

Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, April 2,
1779, "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters from 1768'
to 1781, Including his 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop,"
HM,

2d ser.,

no.

(September 1870): 143; Joseph Reed to
William Irvine, April 11, 1780, "Letters of Gen. Joseph Reed
to Gen. Irvine," ibid., 8, no. 4 (April 1864): 131; Francis
Johnston to Anthony Wayne, October
], 1779, "Notes and
Queries," PMHB 31, no. 2 (1907): 248; Sam[uel] Smith to Otho
Holland Williams, April 4, 1779, Calendar of t h e General
Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Mary land Historical
Society p. 12; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6,
1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers
1:462-466, 464n.5; Stille,
Anthony Wayne pp. 65, 165; Clark, NCSR 14:301-302, 335;
Christopher Ward, The Dela w are Continentals 1 776-1783,
pp. 285-286; Saffell, Records of the Re v olutionary War
p 50 8; Minutes of the Counci l of the Delav/are State, fr om
1776 to 1792
pp. 4 34-4 36; Chandler, Revolutionary Records
2:73-74; Wm. H. Glasson [ed. by David Kinley]
of Geor gia
Federal Military Pension s in the United States (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 18.
8,

3
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attempts to make up arrears in pay
and to provide for
depreciation losses.
The following year, Congress
promised
to make up all depreciation losses
and adopted
a

depreciation allowances.

On August 12,

scale of

1780, Congress

increased the land bounties for generals
and recommended to
the states they make up compensation
to the officers and
soldiers for the depreciation losses they
had incurred,
as

well as to pay their respective lines for
arrears of pay for
the period before August 1, 1780.
Later that summer. Congress extended half-pay for seven years to orphans
and
widows, repealed a restricting clause prohibiting
half-pay

officers from holding public office, provided for the
half
pay

of the general officers to be in proportion to their

pay, and provided for hospital officers to receive land
150
^.

bounties

,

Probably the most important provision made by
Congress for the officers during 1780 was to extend half-pay
from seven years to life.

Late in August, and again early

in October, Washington told Congress that the most politic

150

Ford, JCC, 13:299; 14:758, 826, 908, 946-949,
952, 971, 973-978; 15:1304-1306, 1335-1337; 16:344; 17:725727, 770-773, 773, 778; 18:847-848; John Fell Diary, Burnett,
LMCC, 4:345, 36 3; James Lovell to Samuel Adams, August 17,
1779, ibid., 381; William G. Sumner, The Financier and the
Finance s of the America n Revolut ion 1:91; "Journ aT 'of
Samuel Holten, M.D. WhTle in the Continental Congress, May
1778, to August 1780," HCEI 56, no. 2 (April 1920): 91.
,

,
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and effective thing they could do
would be to grant half
pay for life.
Hamilton, early in September,
wrote a member
of Congress that granting half pay
for life "would be a
great stroke of policy, and would give
Congress a stronger
tie upon them than anything else they
can do."^^^ Although

some members of Congress believed that
half pay for life

would create a pensioner class, and thus was
"inconsistent
with the genious & spirit of our constitution,"
as one

member of Congress wrote, most members of Congress
saw the
absolute necessity of granting half pay for life;
as a means
of retaining their officer corps, and thereby ensuring
the

continued discipline, as well as the existence of the army."^^^
On October 21,

1780, by a substantial majority, half pay for

life was voted for company and field grade officers.

The

following month, it was extended to generals; in January
1781, to officers of the medical department; and in May 1781,
to chaplains.

With the army relatively passive after the mutinies
of January 1781, Congress made fewer provisions for

them."''^'^

Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 19:412; Same to same, October 11, 1780 ibid.
20:158-159; Alexander Hamilton, [September 3, 1780], Syrett,
Papers of Al e xander Hamilton 2:410.
''"^''"George

,

,

,

152

Samuel Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull,
October 26, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:153.
"""^-^Ford,

-^^^Jbid.,

JCC,

18:958-962

19:204

;

,

21:1187.

1100

;

19:68-69

;

20:488

.

.
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But Congress frequently called upon
the states to make up

depreciation and pay owed the army.

with respect to the

latter, the states were quite dilatory in
complying
But the states were not inactive in making
other provisions
for the officers and soldiers.

To keep the military calm during the critical
period,
the states frequently voted special one-time
monetary grants
to their officers and/or soldiers.

Most often the money and

other material goods were to be given the military at
the
end of the war.

However, often seeing the immediate need

to get the money in the military's hands, the states sent

specie to camp.

1

S

fi

The states, especially toward the end of the war,
made numerous attempts to settle the depreciation problem of
their soldiers, by establishing depreciation tables and
155

Ibid., 20:702-704; 21:1020, 1186-1187; William G.
Sumner The Financier and the Finances of~ the American
Revolution 1:272.
,

,

156

Min utes of the C ouncil of the Delaware State,
from 17 7 6 to 1792 pp. 575-577; John Palsgrave Wyllys to
Hezekiah Wyllys, February 10, 1781, "Wyllys Papers 1590-1796,"
CHSC 21 (1924): 469-470; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan
Trumbull, July 12, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons p. 376;
Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution
Larry R. Gerlach "Connecticut and Commutation
pp 2 54-255
1778-1784," CHSB 33, no. 2 (April 1968): 52; Scharf, History
of Maryland
2:352-353; James McSherry [ed. & cont. by
Bartlett B. James], History of Maryland p. 202; Lundin,
Cockpit of the Revo lution, pp"^^ 4 37-4 38 Hoadly, Publi c
Recor d s o f the State of Connec ticut 2:180, 181; Hening, The
Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of
Virginia 10:373; Pennsylvania Colonial Records 12:431.
,
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making promises to make good
the depreciation
The most important provision
the states made for
recruiting and rewarding their
veterans during this period
was the granting of land bonuses,
including increasing
previous grants of land.
The southern states were
particularly generous during this time as
their states were the
ones most involved in the fighting,
and needed the support
of the military more than ever.
In most instances, the land
was not to be given until the end of
the war, thereby ensuring, supposedly, the good behavior of
the military.
157^
Brunhouse, Counter -Revolution in Pennsylvania
nc:
p. 95; Champagne, Alexander McDougall7~57"T8T^~AFEh\IT^^'
Alexander, "How MaP^Tand Tried t5~RiTse Her
Continental*
Quotas," MHM 43, no. 3 (September 1947): 190;
Frederic
Kxdder, History_of the First New Hampshire Reg
iment in the
War of th^evolutT^, p. 79; Paul V. LuTiT~^^LiHd~G?iHtFTor
Service
the Revolution," NYHSQ 48, no. 3 (July
1964): 234.

m

15 8

Ibid., 224, 225, 232; Clark, NCSR, 24:337, 338
368-369, 419-422; Hening, The S tatute s at-L^^ge BeiAg
a
Collection o f all the Laws of Virginia, 10:23, 159 3T6~ 331Louise Frederick Hays, Her o of HorneT^ s Nest: A Biograohy
of'
Elijah Clark 1733 to_1799 p. 142; Ale^TTfrHi tz "Georg
Bounty Land Grants," GHQ 38, no. 4 (December 1954): 345-346Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," MHM 43, no. 3 (September 1947): 188, 190-191;
Edv/ard McCrady, The H istory of South Ca rolina in t he Revolu-'
tion 1775-1780 pp. 299-300; Saffell, Records of the Re volutionary War pp. 494-496; Thomas Cochran, New York in the
Confederation: An Economic Study (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), pp. 108, 108n.ll7; Joseph Reed
to William Irvine, April 11, 1780, "Letters of Gen. Joseoh
Reed to Gen. Irvine," HM 8, no. 4 (April 1864): 131; Division
Order, Orderly Book of Colonel Walter Stewart of the Pennsylvania Line, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 27, no. 4 (1903): 504;
General Orders, "Order Book of John Faucheraud Grimke,
August 1778 to May 1780," SCHGM 19, no. 2 (April 1918): 104.
:

,

,
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To demonstrate that their promises of
land would be
fulfilled, several states during this critical
period set

aside land to be given to the soldiers

""^

.

Another way by which the military wore tied
to the

civilian institutions and kept under control was by
the
civilian governments and institutions recognizing and
reward
ing them for their bravery and fidelity.

This was done in

the form of presentations of medals, swords and horses;

granting honorary degrees; erection of monuments; naming

geographical areas for them; and giving them individual
grants of land and money.

This was especially true during

this critical period.

Early in the war, Greene wrote John Adams that
giving the military medals was

great idea, especially

a

since they did not cost much to produce and "They will also
serve to fix the honors of the Army, dependent upon the

dignity of Congress; and

I

conceive it an object of great

importance to unite the wishes of the army with the views
of Congress."

16 0

Congress, agreeing, during the war

159

Hen mg The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection
of all the Laws of Virginia, 10:564-566; Philip A. Crowl,
"Maryland During and After the Revolution," p. 57; Saffell,
Records of the Revolutionary War p. 494.
,

,

160

Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 2, 1777,
Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The Revolutionary
Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH
no.

2

(April 1942)

:

50

.

s.

nulhorized eleven different medals for
thirteen individuals.
They also voted swords, horses, and
stands of
colors to nuuKM-ous officers and ,n,l],orized
monuments for
several fallcMi lieroes.^^^
The state governments also especially rewarded

individual members of the military.

Marion

a

South e-.ioUna vottnl

medal; North Carolina voted Evan Shelby and Sevier

swords and pistols, and Klijah Claik (lurty thousand

Virqinia voted William Campbell

a

horse,

sword; New Hampshire voted Joseph Cilley

and Georgia voted James Jackson

a

liouse

.

dollai.-,

rmnituK^, and
a
''^^"^

rewarded individual officers with land.^^'^

a

pair of pistols;
The states also
The most gener-

ous grants were made by Georgia, which duriny the spring of
1782 granted Generals Greene and Wayne two-thousand acre

plantations; by South Carolina, which voted Greene an estate
plus slaves; and by North Carolina, which voted him 25,000
161

no.

9

Bailey Myers, "Our National Medals," MAH
(September 1878)
530
T.

2,

.

:

JCC, 7:243, 323, 379
8:579-580, 580; 9:862
15:1324, 1357; 18:923; 19:246-247; 21:978-979, 1085, 1081,
1082; [Rufus W. Griswold]
Wa shington and Lhe Generals of
the American R e volution
1:310.
"""^^Ford,

;

;

,

,

16 3

Ibid.,
413; John Scales,
Omer Foster, Sr.,
man 1757-180 6 p.
Nest: A Biography
,

164

2:219; Draper, King' s Mounta in, pp. 390,
Life of Gen. Joseph Cill ey7~p. 53; William
James Jack son: Du elist and Militant States24; l^^uise Frederick Hays, Hero of Mornot
S'8
of Elijah C lark 1733 to' 1799' pp f 3 9
'

,

.

,

1

Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 3:116.

685

acres; and by Virginia, which granted
Gates 17,000 acres.

Geographical areas were also named after
military leaders.
North Carolina, for example, named counties
after Generals
Wayne, Lincoln, and Gates, in 1779, and
Greene and

Davidson

in 1783.^^^

Throughout the war. Congress never really
gave
Washington symbolic or personal awards or gifts.

During

1779, they gave him a suit of clothes and after Yorktown

they voted him

a

stand of colors.

At war's end, they pro-

vided for an equestrain statue of him to be located at
the
seat of government. 16 7

The state governments were somewhat

more generous.

Virginia, during 1778, presented him with

four geldings.

Pennsylvania in 1779, and Maryland in 1781,

commissioned Charles Wilson Peale to paint portraits of

Washington for their respective legislative chambers

"""^^Ibid., 108-109
109
171; Johnson, Na_thanael
p. 400; Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates:
,

Greene
A Biography
,

"'"^^
.

,

pp.

,

283-284.

166

Wheeler, His torical Sketches of Nor th Carolina,
Samuel Cole Wi 11 iams ,~~Tennessee~~During the
2 159
225
454
Revoluti o nary War pp. 232-233, 233; ClarkTHNCSR 1974237;
24:569.
:

,

,

;

,

,

21:1081; 24:494-495 George
Washington to Samuel Griffin, November 6, 1779, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 17:80.
'"^'^Ford,

JCC,

;

,

16 8

George Washington to Benjamin Harrison,
December 18, 1778, ibid., 13:422-423; The Penn sylvania
Packet, and Daily Adv ertiser August 26, 1780, Chastellux,
TravelT'ln Nor th-America, 1:222-22 3; William S. Baker, "The
History of a Rare Washington Print," Pni|B 13, no. 3 (1889):
257-258, 260, 262; Thomas Sim Lee to Charles Wilson Peale,
December 7, 1783, Helen Lee Peabody, "Revolutionary Mail Bag
,

.
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Virginia, early in the war, named

county for Washington

a

Civilian institutions also made
acknowledgements of Washington's efforts.
Several schools gave him honorary
degrees.
And during 1782, a college was even named
after him.^^°
By continuing to make the army feel

civilian society, by giving them

a stake

a

part of

in society,

the

civilian leaders were able to keep the army from
turning
against the existing political and social structure.

But

there were several other factors which kept the army
from

becoming the source of military tyranny.

Many of these have

been discussed in earlier chapters. And in this chapter
we
have seen the various means and factors by which the army

kept itself from turning on the civilian governments and
the civilians were able to prevent

a

military coup.

Perhaps

the most important factor was that the army, for the most

part, did not desire a military tyranny of any form for even
a

short period of time.

Often the opportunity was there for

Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM
50, no.

2

(July 1955):

104.

169

Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest
Virginia 1746-1786, Washingt o n County 1777-1T70 p. 254
,

170

George Washington to Ezra Stiles, May 15, 1781,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of VJashington 22:90, George
Washington to William Smith, August 18, 1782, ibid.,
25:37-38; George VJashington to the Trustees of the University of the State of Pennsylvania, [December 13, 1783],
ibid., 27:267-268.
,
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the military to directly involve themselves
in the political

process, but as we have seen, the military did
not desire to
intervene.
This was especially true during the 1779-1781

critical period.
As we will see in the next chapter, the
opportunity
for military tyranny again was present during the winter
of

1782-1783 and the following spring.

But, as before, the

military did not take matters into their own hands, despite
a

greater desire by some civilians for them to do so.

CHAPTER

XI

THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP TESTED

1782-1783

With Yorktown behind them, most Americans believed
the war had been won, and that it was only a matter of time

until

a

peace treaty was signed and ratified, and the army

disbanded.

Therefore, they turned their attention away

from the war and the army, and only thought of domestic

concerns as

a

free and independent people.

For the most part, the military shared the same

beliefs about the peace and disbanding, hoping that both

would soon take place.

They desired, however, to be

properly compensated before disbanding, or at least
guaranteed they would be in the not-so-distant future.

As

we will see in this and the following chapter, the military

became upset with their civilian brethren the last year of
the war because it appeared they would not be compensated

before they were disbanded; nor would they obtain everything
that was due them once they were home.

This situation, as

we will see, created the conditions whereby the civil-

military relationship was greatly tested during the last
year of the war.

And tested it was, as some civilian and
688

,
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military leaders attempted to use the
discontent in the army
to further certain political aims.
That the discontent did
not develop into mutiny or some form of
military
tyranny,

was the result of numerous factors, which
will be discussed
in this and the last chapter.
The army was pleased with the money they
had received

from Robert Morris during the fall of 1781,
particularly
since it was in the form of hard specie.^

Not all the mili-

tary, however, got paid, nor were the amounts
received

enough to offset the large amounts owed to the officers.^
In December, Glover complained that he had not been
paid in

over two years.

Another officer early in 1782 complained

that he had received only $120 since January 1780.

Also,

Popham to George Clinton, September 8, 1781,
Henry P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender
of Cornwallis 1781
appendix 5, p. 1747 Enos Reeves to 1
],
October 4, 1781, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the LetterBooks of Lieutenant Enos Reeves of the Pennsylvania Line "
PMHB 21, no. 2 (1897): 237.
"'"William

'

,

2

Robert Wharry to Reading Beatty, January 5, 1792,
Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., [ed.], "Letters from Continental
Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," ibid., 54,
no. 2 (1930)
163; William Allen to Theodore Foster,
DecemJDer 15, 1781, RIHSC, 6 (1897): 291; Oliver Rice to
Jonathan Rice, March 9, 1782, Feinstone Collection #1206;
Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 9, 1782,
Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC
(Microfilm Reel #1)
Nathanael Greene to the President of
the Continental Congress, March 9, 1782, Edward McCrady,
The History of South Carolina in t he Rev olut ion 1780-1783,
p. 615; John Lamb and Ebenezer Stevens to Ge^ge~Washington
February 12, 1782, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, pp. 255-256.
:

;

.
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early in 1782, McDougall complained that
he had only been
paid twice since 1775, and was owed about
seven thousand
dollars 3

Throughout 1782, financial problems continued
to
plague the officers, and by the fall many had been
driven
to despair and poverty/
St. Clair complained that

he was

not the "master of one single shilling."

"i am," he

wrote

Washington, "in debt, and my credit exhausted, and, were
it not for the rations

starve."

5

I

receive, my family would actually

One officer wrote his brother during November

3

John Glover to Benjamin Lincoln, December 11, 1781,
"Letter of General John Glover," HCEI 36, no. 1 (January
1900): 39; Stephen Abbott to Joshua Ward, February 12, 1782,
"Revolutionary Letter Written by Ma j Stephen Abbott," ibid!,
38, no. 2 (January 1902): 54; Alexander McDougall to George
Clinton, March 28, 1782, Champagne, Alexander McDougall,
pp. 182-183.
.

4

Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17, 1782,
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); Henry
Knox to
], October 8, 1782, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL; Silas Goodell to Joshua Huntington, November 11,
1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 166, Samuel
Shaw to Mr. Shaw, November 13, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw
p. 98; George Washington to James McHenry, October 23, 1782,
Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington 25:285; George
Washington to John Armstrong, Sr
January 10, 1783, ibid.,
26:26; George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 2,
1782, ibid., 25:227-228; Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew
Huntington, December 9, 1782, Blanchfield, Letters Written
by Ebenezer Huntington p. 102; George Athan Billias,
General John Glover an d His Mar ble head M ariners pp. 190-191.
[

,

,

.

,

,

,

5

Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, November 26,
1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:572.
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that he was "entirely destitute of
money.

This same

officer, receiving his discharge that
December, wrote that
he was now a "private gentleman,
'gentleman indeed,' destitute of 'money' 'Horse' or anything that this
World calls
Valuable- [.]
Another officer that fall wrote "To enter
into

a

to you,

detail of my circumstances would not be
entertaining
and must be painful to myself."^

Especially when

payment had been promised so often it was particularly

upsetting to the military not to be paid.^
The military were not only upset because they did

not get paid, but also .because it appeared they would not
be fully compensated until Congress and the states resolved

their differences with respect to whose responsibility it

was to pay them, as well as provide their pensions."*"^

And

^Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, November 15, 1782,
Feinstone Collection #1208; see also Same to same,
October 23, 1782, ibid., #1207.
7

ibid.,

Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, December 25, 1782,

#1209.
g

Robert Gamble to Peter Muhlenberg, November 1, 1782,
"Correspondence of Col. James Wood," TQHGM 3, no. 1 (July
1921)

:

37
9

.

.

William Heath to George Washington, March 13, 1782,
MHSC 7th ser., 5:354; William North to Baron von Steuben,
October 29 178 2 Kapp, Steuben p. 50 3; Baron von Steuben
to Benjamin Walker, December 27, (1782), "Notes and Queries,"
PMHB 42, no. 3 (1923): 278.
,

,

,

,

"'^Benjamin Lincoln to Artemas Ward, Septem.ber 13,
1782, Artemas Ward Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Alexander McDougall and Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 7,
Burnett, LMCC, 7:35-36n.3.
178 3
,
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it appeared that the differences
would not be expeditiously

resolved.

Initially, Morris refused to pay
the army on the
grounds it was a state responsibility and
thus had to come
out of Continental requisitions.
Consequently, the army
received only a little over $500,000 from
the central

government during 1781 and 1782, an amount less
than two
months' pay. When the states attempted to pay

their soldiers

directly, Morris and Congress informed them these
monies

would not be counted toward their Continental
requisitions.^^
Doubtless many in the military approved this, particularly
those officers attached to independent commands who were
not

paid by

a

particular state.

And undoubtedly many New

England officers favored Continental funding of their
pensions, knowing their own states' opposition to pensions.''"^
Some officers, of course, did not care who paid them, as
long as they got paid, and it appeared they were more likely

Ferguson, Papers o f Robert Morris, l:176n.2; Ford,
JCC, 24:206-210; 23:630-6 31; Robert Morris to Nathanael
Greene, April 24, 1782, Wharton, R evolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence 5:328; Robert Morris to the Governor of
Rhode Island, June 26, 1782, ibid., 524; Robert Morris to
William Livingston, July 29, 1782, Sele ction s from, the
Correspondence of the Executive of New Je rsey7 fr6iTrT776 to
1786
p. 318.
,

,
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Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Matthias
Ogden and John Brooks, December
], 1782, Smith, The
1 576
Alexander Ham.ilton to George
St. Clair Papers
Washington
[April 8, 1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexand er
Hamilton, 3:320; Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics
in the Continental Congress, p. 331.
[
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,
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Many officers were also quite upset with Congress
and the confederation system itself."*"^

With respect to

Congress, the small attendance by its members was, for Knox,
"a good

proof of the badness of the present Constitution.""^'^

One officer complained early in 1783 that Congress was "weak
as water and impotent as old age."

1 8

Another officer

com.plained that, although his soldiers have confidence in

their officers and Washington, they had "not the least

confidence in the government-

[.]

19

This lack of confidence in government also applied
to the state governments, with whom the army became

increasingly dissatisfied the last years of the war.

Most

of the reasons related to the inability or lack of desire
of the state governments to directly support the army or
to indirectly support them, by failing to support Congres-

sional requisitions.

20

Rhode Island

'

s

objection to half-pay

General Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall,
John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden, December
], 1782,
Smith, The S t. Clair Papers 1:575.
[

,

1

7

Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, March
Drake, Henry Knox p. 79.

3,

1783,

,

John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, May
1783, Burnett, LMCC 7:160n.3.

9,

,

'"^Charles Armand-Tuf f in to George Washington,
September 10, 1782, NYHSC 11 (1879): 350.
,

^^Otho Holland Williams to Thomas Sim Lee, July 7,
Scharf, Hi_story_of Maryland, 2 486-487 Benjamin
1782
Harrison to the President of the Continental Congress,
January 21, 1782, Elizabeth Cometti, "Impressment during
the A-merican Revolution," Vera Largent, ed., The_Walter
:

,

;

,
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pensions and its failure to adopt the
in^post elicited strong
opposition fror. the military. ^1 Washington
complained early
in 1783 that the states seemed perfectly
indifferent to the
cries of the army and late that spring a
young officer
complained the states were "obdurate and
forgetful "^^
.

Besides being upset with the Congress and
the states,
the military were particularly upset with the
American
people.

As one officer observed,

"I

think with you that

every honest good citizen are our friends, but the
honest
and good compose but
day."

23

a

very small part of the world at this

Most Americans appeared to the military to be too

Clinton Jackson Es says in the Soc ia l Scienc es by members of
the Woman's C ollege of t he Universi ty _of_NoFth~CaroTIn"a~
3: 316, 32 3; Johnson, Nathanael G reene, 2:3To", 3T57'~DavTd
Jones to Anthony Wayne, December 25, 1781, Stilled Anthony
Wayne, p. 2 85 Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, ApriT^37~
1783, Reed, Joseph Reed
2:395; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin
Lincoln, February 6, 1782, Harry M. Ward, The Dep artment of
War, 1 781 -1795
p. 25; George V7ashington to James~McHenry
October 23, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
25:289.
"

;

,

,

21

Caleb Gibbs to Henry Knox, July 13, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #13)
George Washington to
Benjamin Harrison, March 4, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 26:184 James Madison's "Notes on Debate¥7^^
Hutchinson Papers of James Mad i son 6:31-34.
;

,

,

;

,

22

George Washington to John Armstrong, Sr.,
January 10, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
26:26; John Arstrong to Horatio Gates, May 9 17 8 3, Burnett,
LMCC, 7:160n.3.
,

,

23

[Joseph] Wright to Samuel B. Webb, February 28,
1783, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 3:4.

.
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self-interested, more concerned about their
own well-being
than that of the military
The civilian leaders feared this would
happen; that

revolutionary virtue would turn to materialistic
vice.
Warren, in his July

John

1783, oration, warned that peace and

4,

tranquility at war's end was bringing with it

a

time of

great danger as virtue may be given over to luxury and
corruption.

Fearing this had happened, the Reverend Oakes
Shaw

of Barnstable, Massachusetts, told his congregation on

April 25, 1782, that the Revolution had been

a

moral failure,

for it had brought vice and iniquity into the land.^^

Self-interest, corruption, and vice were indeed

abundant in the land the last years of the war, as the

business of the country shifted from supporting the war and
the army, to business itself.

26

Also abounding in the

24

Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, March 9,
1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Nathanael Greene Letterbook,
LC (Microfilm Reel #1)
Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot,
December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw p. 101.
;

,

25

Gordon Wood, ed.. The R ising Glory of America
1760-1820 p. 67; Lemuel Shaw Papers, MHS

'

,

.

26

Mercy Warren to Wmslow Warren, December 18 1782
Mercy Warren Letterbook, Mercy Warren Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, July 10,
1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL: James Manning to John
Ryland, November 8, 178 3, Reuben Aldridge Guild, Life, Tim es,
and Cor respondence of James Manning, and the Ea rly History of
Brown University (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1864), pp. 308309; Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, September 9, 1783,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:286; Jacob E. Cooke,
Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early T^erican
History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1978), pp. 56,

,

.
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country was an interest in the western
lands.

Thus, the

last years of the war found many giving
more attention to
moving west or profiting from the westward
movement than to
the plight of the army.^^ aisq
g^^^^ interest to the

civilians the last years of the war was their
social life.
While the military barely survived during 1782
and 1783

Philadelphia took on

,

gay appearance with balls, theaters,

a

and new women's fashions capturing its citizens'
attention.

When the military reminded the civilians, who were
now busy in their own pursuits, of the obligations to the
army, they were met often with indifference and, not infre-

quently, with contempt.

The army,

for many civilians, were

now considered, according to one officer, as the "Harpies

Locusts of the Country."

Indeed,

for many T^ericans,

&

the

John Beatty to Reading and Eurkies Beatty, July 16 1782
Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers
of the Continental Army, 1774-1794 ," PMHB 44, no. 3 (1920)60;

229

,

,

.

27

.

William Croghan to Michael Gratz, April

20,

1782,

Byars, B and M. Gratz p. 208; John Neville to George
Rogers Clark, April 14, 1782, James, "George Rogers Clark
Papers 1781-1784," pp. 57-58.
.

,

28

Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, February 1,
178 3, Jeremiah VJadsworth Box CSL Lynn Montross The Reluctant Rebels The Story of the Continental Congress 1774-1789
(New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers 1950), p. 328;
Bonsai When the Frenc h Were Here pp. 218-222 William S
Dye, "Pennsylvania VeTsus the Theatre," PMHB 55, no. 4
(1931): 360-361; J. Thomas Jable, "The Pennsylvania Sunday
Blue Laws of 1779: A View of Pennsylvania Society and Politics During the American Revolution " PH 4 0 no 4 (October
,

,

:

:

,

,

,

;

,

,

,

1973)

:

424

.

.

1

s

,

.
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army had become the last enemy to rid
themselves of. As
the French minister observed, "No voice
is raised in favor
of the army."

?Q

This indifference and contempt was of great
concern
to the army,

as they v/ere afraid they would be soon
forgot-

ten and not provided for, once they were discharged

They

.

were all too aware of the old refrain:
God and a Soldier all men doth adore
In time of War, and not before;
When the War is over, and all Things righted,
God is forgotten, and the Soldier slighted. 31
For officers visiting Philadelphia late in the war, this

seemed very true.

Visiting that city during December 1781

29

Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer
Huntington p. 106; Chevalier De la Luzerne to Comte de
Vergennes, August 4, 1783, William Emmett O'Donnell, The
Chevalier De la Luzerne: French Minister to the United
States 1779-1784 p. 244.
,

'

'

,

30

Mercy Warren to Wmslow Warren, December 18 1782
Mercy Warren Letterbook, Mercy Warren Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Anthony Wayne to Robert Morris, October 26, 1781,
Stille, Anthony Wayne p. 283; Walter Stev;art to Anthony
Wayne, December 24, 1781, ibid., p. 284; George Washington
to the President of the Continental Congress, May 10, 1782,
Fitzpatrick, Writi ngs of Washington 24:243; Nathanael
October 9, 1782, "Notes and
Greene to [Daniel Morgan?]
Queries," PMHB 14, no. 1 (1890): 83-84; Joseph Orne to
Timothy Pickering, June
], 1782, Pickering, Timothy
Pickering, 1:365; William Irvine to Arthur St. Clair
April 17, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers 1:582.
,

,

,

,

,

[

,

3

Malcolm Decker, Brink of Revolution: New York
Crisis 1765-1776, p. 106; Mabel Lorenz Ives, V7ashing ton
Headquarters (Upper Montclair, New Jersey: Lucy Fortune,
'

1932f, p.

300

m

.

.
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and seeing that nothing was being
done for the military,
Chaplain David Jones observed "The old
adage is true, 'Out
of sight out of mind.'"

A little over a year later,

McDougall reported the people of Philadelphia
had their
minds on two things, rejoicing at the news
of peace and

hoping for profits; their concern for the army
was mini32
mal
Some officers expected this attitude on
the part of
the civilians.
During late December 1782, St. Clair told
the army's committee to Congress that he had seen
it written

somewhere that "kings may be ungrateful, but republics
must
be."

Similarly, Washington told General Putnam that ingrati-

tude seems common to republics.

Most officers, however, believed they were owed

a

debt of gratitude, as well as the monetary debt by the
civilians.
War,

"It appears to me," Knox wrote the Secretary at

"to be highly reasonable that America, who under heaven

is indebted to the army for her existence."

who had served since May 1775, wrote

a

Samuel Shaw,

civilian friend during

32

David Jones to Anthony Wayne, December 25, 1781,
Stille, TVnthony Wayne p. 285; Alexander McDougall to Henry
Knox, February 19, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #11)
,

33

Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Matthias
Ogden and John Brooks, December
], 1782, Smith, The
St. Cla ir Papers, 1:576; George Washington to Israel Tutnam,
June 2, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:462.
[

.
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May 1783, that many civilians "think
the distinction of a
uniform coat and the spleandor of a
military character a
sufficient compensation for the hardships
and dangers it is
obliged to encounter." Shaw wrote, however,
we do not

expect gratitude, "but we have

a

right to justice."

simi-

larly, Washington sent a circular letter
to the states

a

month later explaining the officers deserve
the half-pay
they had been promised, as it was a reasonable

compensation,

and that it should not be seen in the odious light
of a

pension 34
The military were quite upset with the American

people as the war came to

a close,

learning that they v;ould

probably not be compensated and the fact that this did not
appear to bother the civilians; now that they were more

concerned about their own affairs than those of the army.^^
34

Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln,
Callahan, Henry Knox p. 196; Samuel Shaw
May 3, 1783, Qumcy, Samuel S haw, p. 107;
Circular of June 8, 1783, in Fitzpatrick,
,

VJashington
35

,

26

:

492

August 19, 1782,
to [John] Eliot,
Washington's
Writings of

.

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, May 10, 1782, ibid., 24:243; Nathanael
Greene to John Barnwell, July 31, 1781, Johnson, Nathanael
Greene 2:351; John Beatty to Reading and Eurkies Beatty,
July 16, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four
Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," PMHB
44, no. 3 (1920): 229; Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice,
November 15, 1782, Feinstone Collection #1208.
,

,

"The hour of danger is past, and avarice
and meaness have
usurped the places of gratitude and justice/'

Pickering

complained during May 1783.^^

Ebenezer and Jedediah

Huntington held similar feelings about the

;^jnerican people.

The former wrote that he hoped

a

"with all the care

will permit-[.]"

&

Comfort,

return to

a

...

private life

an ungrateful Countryman

A month later, September 1783, Ebenezer

Huntington wrote that he and Joshua Huntington would
probably head west,

with

a

"for we can not be very happy to continue

people who criminate us for making them free."

Jedediah Huntington, also in September, wrote that the value
of the commutation they expected to receive "bears no Proper

tion to a Sense of the Ingratitude of the People.

""^^

Despite the financial plight of the army, there was
little the civilian governments or populace could do to

support them; to

large extent as they had their own prob-

a

Jeremiah Wadsworth observed late during 1782 that

lems.

Robert Morris was
Money."

38

a

good financier,

This was true.

"But he cannot create

For money, he had to rely on

36

Timothy Pickering to Horatio Gates, May 28, 1783,
Pickering Timothy Pickering 1:468; see also Timothy Picker
ing to
September 22, 1782, ibid., 376.
"1 Pickering
,

,

[

,

37

Eben [ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer
Huntington p 10 6; Same to same September 2, 1782, ibid.,
p. 107; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, Septem20 (1923): 465
1783
*'The Huntington Papers," CHSC
ber 3
.

,

,

,

38

,

,

Jeremiah Wadsvjorth to Nathanael Greene
December 12, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL.

.
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requisitions from the states.

And they had little to give.

Between July 1781 and April 1782, he continually
sent
circulars to the states, reminding them of the

sad state of

the nation's finances, and the necessity
of them complying

with congressional requisitions.
ears as, by the beginning of 1782

These appeals fell on deaf
,

the civil departunents did

not have any money to pay their creditors.
1782

,

And, by March

it became impossible to pay even the interest
on the

loan office certificates.

Late that month, Morris complained

that since his appointment the year before, he had not

received a single farthing from any state.

Also upsetting

to Morris was his inability during 1782 to get Congress to

adopt various taxes to fund the public debt."^^

Continental finances continued to suffer into and
through 1783, as the states failed to meet their requisitions.

40

The national debt was over $35 million as the year

began, and by March, Morris reported to Congress that there
39

Robert Morris Circulars, Ferguson, Papers of
Robert Morris, 1:305 380-383; 3:83-87; 4 191TT75-376 519520; Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, February 11, 1782, ibid., 205-213; Robert Morris
to William Smallwood, March 28, 1782, ibid., 472-473;
Ephraim Blaine to Robert Morris, February 19, 1782, Ephraim
Blaine Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #2); Bullock,
"The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789 ," p. 145;
Ford, JCC, 22:439; 23:545-546.
:

,

40

.

...

,

Samuel Huntington and Benjamin Huntington to
Jonathan Trumbull, July 30, 178 3, HHSC, 7th ser., 3:437;
Lynn Montross, The Reluctant Rebels: The Sto ry of the
Continental Conq¥ess'TTlA'-lT3 9~i~'pT''36'2'.
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could no longer be any doubt "that our
public credit is
gone ",.41
.

The states could do little to help Congress
meet
its financial obligations during the last
years of the war
as most were financially

exhausted/^

The southern states

suffered in part because their wealth was tied up
in slaves,
a cominodity

of war.

that was not so easily converted into the sinews

And,

to make matters worse, many slaves were lost

during the war.

4 3

Southern trade was hurt by not only the

British army and navy, but by pirates operating out of St.
Augustine.

44

The northern states had their unique financial

problems, such as the illicit trade with New York City,
41

Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, March 17, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionar y Diplomatic
"
Correspondence 6:309; Young, Robert Morris p 14 2.
,

.

,

42

Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in
Congress, January 31, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
Madison, 6:176; Stille, Anthony Wayne, p"! 287 Hugh F\
Rankin, The North Carolina Con tinen t a"ls p. 38 6 William H.
Masterson, William Blount, p. 65; Stephens, A History of
Georgia 2:336; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, April 12,
4:564-565, 565.
1782, Ferguson, Papers of Rob ert Morris
;

,

;

,

,

4 3

Benjamin Harrison to Nathanael Ggeene, January 21,
1782, Mcllwaine, Official Lette rs o f the Governors of
Virginia, 3:132; Benjamin Guerard to John Hancock,
October 6 1783, Feinstone Collection #438; Lewis Cecil Gray,
in the Southern United States to
History of Agriculture
~
,

1860

,

2:59^

^'^Thad [deus] Kosciuszko to O[tho] H[olland] Williams,
February 11 178 3 Ca_lendar of the General Ot ho Ho ll and
v:illiams Papers in tlTe" Maryla nd Histo r ical Soci ety p. 78.
,

,

,

.
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which drained off what little hard currency
that existed/^
Internal problems also plagued the states the
last

years of war.

Besides the domestic war with the Tories,

other internal problems tore at the social, economic, and

political fabric of the states/^

Additionally, problems

continued to exist between and among the states during the
last years of the war, generally relating to boundary
47
1^
disputes

These domestic factors which prevented the states
and Congress from supporting the army were made perfectly

clear to the military during the fall of 1782 and the following winter.

Such civilian leaders as the Superintendent of

Finance and Secretary at War frequently informed the military
leaders of the inability of Congress to act on behalf of the
army, particularly with respect to pay and pensions.

Morris,

45

John Taylor Oilman to Meshech VJeare, June 19, 1782,
Burnett, LMCC, 6:374; James Madison to Edmund Randolph,
June 18, 1782 ibid., 373.
,

4 6

Robert E. Moody, "Samuel Ely: Forerunner of Shays,"
NEQ 5, no. 1 (January 1932): 108-109; John Dickinson to
Finley February 6, 178 3, Hazard, Pen nsylvania Archive s, 1st
Finley to John Dickinson April 28,
ser., 10:163-165;
1783, ibid., 40-41; Same to same, March 18, 1783, ibid.,
41-44; W. S. Long, "Judge James Moore and Major James Moore,
of Chester County, Pennsylvania," PMHB 12, no. 4 (1888): 470.
[

]

,

[

,

]

^"^Adele Stanton Edwards, Journa_ls_of th e Privy
Council 1783-1789, pp. 4, 9, 101-103, 107-110; William
irvine to George Washington, April 20, 1782, Sparks,
Correspondence of th e Ainerica n Revolution 2:503, 504
\^lTTaml:F6ghTn~to~Michael Gratz, April 20, 1782 Byars,
and M. Gratz, p. 208.
;

,

,

B.

^
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in doing so,

painted

the country.

a

bleak picture for the military and

He wrote Washington in September
1782,

unless revenues were forthcoming,

consequences."

"I

that,

need not describe the

A month later, he wrote Washington that "if

the States cannot be prevailed on to make greater
Exertions
if is difficult to forsee where the Thing is to terminate

."

^

During January and February, Morris and other nationalists
in Congress informed the army's committee to Congress of

the unlikelihood of the army being compensated, at least

until a nationalist funding system was established.^^

And

that was not likely.

Because of the poor condition of the army, and the

apparent inability or desire to help them, many officers
feared the army might turn on the civilians, as plunderers,

mutineers, or even worse, as an organized military tyranny.
4 8

Robert Morris to George Washington, September 9,
1782, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomat ic Correspondence 5:
715; Same to same, October 15, 1782, Fitzpatrick^ Wri tings
of Washington, 25:231n.42; see also Benjamin Lincoln to
George Washington, October 13, 1782, ibid., 229n.38;
Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, December 3, 1782, Henry Knox
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel ^10).
,

49

Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 8, 1783,
Alexander McDougall to Henry
ibid., (Microfilm Reel trll)
Knox, February 19, 1783, ibid.,; Same to same, March 15,
1783, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #12).
;

50

Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris, April 23, 1782,
"Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 502;
Nathanael Greene to Otho Holland Williams, June 6, 1782,
2: Appendix, 470; Benjamin VJalker to Baron
Reed, Joseph Reed
Kapp, Steuben p. 501;
17 82
von Steuben November 20
William Van Lear to Reading Beatty, June 9, 1782, "Letters
,

,

,

,

,

,

.

706

"The patience and forbearance of the
army," General Greene

wrote during the

suiimier

of 1782

,

"under their sufferings,

have no equal; but, despair will, in time,
break throuqh
the best disposition, all the force of
discipline "^^
.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1782,
military officers
informed the civilian leaders of this potential
explosive
situation, warning them of the dangers, and urging
them to

^
action
.

52

Such warnings continued throughout the fall and
winter, as the military officers informed their civilian

friends and the civilian leaders of the uneasiness of the
army and the possible consequences if the army was not

calmed by expeditious civilian action.

During October,

Washington wrote Lincoln the "patience and long sufferance
from Continental Officers to Doctor Readina Beatty, 17811788 ," PxMHB 54, no. 2 (1930): 168
.

51

Nathanael Greene to General [John?] Barnwell,
July 31, 1782, Johnson, Nathanael Greene 2:351.
,

52

Nathanael Geeene to Benjamin Harrison, April 22,
1782, Nathanael Greene Collection 58, WLCL; Nathanael Greene
to John Mathews, April 1, 1782, Greene, Nathanael Greene
3:488; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, January 24, 1782,
Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris 4:109; Nathanael Greene
to Benjamin Lincoln, March 9, 1782, Thayer, Nathanael Greene
p. 396; Also, O[thoi H[olland] Williams to T[homas] S[im]
Lee, July 7, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society p. 67.
,

,

,

53

Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782,
Quincy, Samuel Shaw p. 100; Arthur St. Clair to Thomas
Fitzsimmons, January 21, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Pap ers,
,

1:579.

,

of this Army are almost exhausted"
and that there "never
was
so great a spirit of Discontent
as at this instant."
He
believed that while in the field they
could be kept under
control, but once in winter quarters,
there could be bad
consequences. 54 During mid December, he
warned one member
of Congress that the army had "become
more irritable than at
any period since the commencement of the
War."^^ A week
later, Knox wrote the Secretary at War that
"The expectation
of the Army, from the drummer to the highest
officer fare]
so keen for some pay,

that

I

schudder at the idea of [them]

not receiving it."

Such warnings were also frequently made to members
of Congress by the army's committee to Congress during

January 1783.

At one of their first meetings with members

of Congress, Colonel Brooks declared that "the temper of the
54

October

2

,

George Washington to the Secretary at War,
Fitzpatrick, Wr^itij2g£_o^_W£sh^^
1782
,

25:230

55

George Washington to Joseph Jones, December 14,
1782, ibid., 430; see also George Washington to the
Superintendent of Finance, October 2, 1782, ibid., 230.

^^Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, December 20, 1782,
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); missing
portions provided from Knox's copy in his papers in the MHS
(Microfilm Reel #10)
see also Henry Knox to the Hon.
esq., October 8, 1782, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL;
Copy of the same letter, addressed to John Lowell in Sidney
Kaplan, "Pay, Pension, and Pov;er: Economic Grievances of
the Massachusetts Officers of the Revolution," BPLQ 3, no. 1
(January 1951): 31; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln7
liovember 25
1782
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Jlicrofilm
Reel #6)
;

,

.

,

[

]

.
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army was such that they did not reason or
deliberate cooly
on consequences and therefore a disappointment
might throw
them blindly into extremities." A week later,
on
the

thirteenth of January, Colonel Ogden told

congressional

a

committee that he would hate to go back to camp with
news
that Congress was unable to do anything for them.

He

explained the problem of maintaining discipline among the
soldiers was becoming more difficult and that the officers

were becoming more unruly themselves.
was a real possibility.

Mutiny, he explained,

McDougall and Brooks informed them

the officers were ready to resort to extreme measures.

Early in March, worried by the temper of the
officers, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., wrote his father that
"affairs are in a more critical situation, perhaps, than

they have been for some time."

A week earlier, Knox wrote

the Secretary at War a private letter telling him of the

impatience of the army, stating
Let the public only comply v;ith their own promises,
and the Army will return to their respective homes,
the Lambs and Bees of the Community.
But if they
should be disbanded previous to a Settlement, without knowing who to look to, for an adjustment of
accounts and a responsibility of payment they will
be so deeply stung by the injustice and ingratitude
of their country as to become Tygers and wolves.
A little over a week later, after an anonymous letter was

circulated throuahout camp urging drastic action, Knox again
JCC, 25:846-847, 850-853 James Madison's
"Notes on Debates," Papers of James Madison 6:31-34.
^'^Ford,

;

,

.

:
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wrote Lincoln, explaining the impatience of the army had
turned to despair and urging Congress to act.

Washington,

on the tv;elfth of March, wrote similar letters to two mem-

bers of Congress.
In the south,

Greene informed the chief executive of

South Carolina that "Nothing short of permanent and certain

revenue can or will keep them subject to authority," referring to the army.

lie

explained that the northern army was

in a high state of discontent and that unless the states

acted to support Congress, there could only be bad conse-

quences

59

Despite efforts to keep the army under control after
Yorktown, there v;ere many instances of lack of discipline on
the part of both the northern and southern armies during
1782 and 1783.

In part,

this was because many of the soldiers

were new recruits, not used to military discipline.

60

It

was also the result of the lack of leadership in the army
5P

Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr.,
March 10, 1783, MHSC 7th ser., 3:405; Henry Knox to Benjamin
Lincoln, March 3, 1783, (copy), Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #11); Same to same, March 12, 1783, ibid.,
George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 12, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writin gs of Washing ton, 26:213-216; George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 12, 1783, ibid., 217.
,

March

8,

^^General Nathanael Greene to [Benjamin] Guerard,
1783, Nathanael Greene Papers (Read Collection),

1:27, WLCL.

^^David Richard Palm.er, TheJRi ver and the Rock
The Historv of Fortress V7est Point 17 75-178 3, p. 342
.

1

,
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at the end of the war, as many
experienced officers had
retired or left active duty on extended
furlough.
Most
instances of undisciplined conduct on the
part of the

soldiers was the result of inadequate
supplies.

During the

last years of the war, soldiers frequently
plundered foodstuffs and firewood, and sold their uniforms
in order to

buy food and other needed supplies.

^"^

Lack of adequate supplies plagued the army
during
1782 and 1783, as it had throughout the war.

especailly true of the southern army.

This was

Greene's army was

not that well fed, clothed, or housed during most of 1782.^^
6

General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:130; Jer. Clark to Henry Knox, October 16, 178"3',
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #14); General Orders,
Lauber, Or derly Books pp. 695, 702-703, 706, 732; Regimental
After Orders, ibid., p. 621; Acomb, Revolut ionary Jou rnal of
Baron Ludwig von Clos en, p. 259; Regimental" Orders,
January 13, 1783, Peter Casper Order Book, Special Collections, USMAL; Timothy Pickering to
Pickering,
September 22, 1782, Pickering, Timo thy Pickering, 1:376;
Brooks to David Humphreys, August 22, 1782, Humphreys,
D[
L ife and Times of David Humph reys, 1:248-249.
,

[

]

]
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Nathanael Greene to Jethro Sumner, February 2,
1783 [1782], Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene
Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Otho H. Williams to George
Washington, June 2, 1782, Calendar o f the General Otho
Holland William s Papers in the M ary land Historical So ciety,
p. 65; Otho H.^Williams to Thomas Sim Lee, July 7, 1782^
Scharf History of Maryland 2:486-487; Nathanael Greene to
John Mathews, April 1, 1782, Greene, Nathana el Greene 3:448;
Nathanael Greene to Otho H. Williams, June 6, 1782, Reed,
Joseph Reed 2 Appendix 4 70; Same to same September 7
Appendix 4 72; Nathanael Greene to Clement
ibid
1782
ibid
Biddle September 1 1782
38 0; Nathanael Greene to
Benjamin Harrison, April 22, 1782, Nathanael Green Collection, vol 58, WLCL; Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris,
April 24, 1782, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC,
Nathanael Greene to the President of 1:he
502
8
(1876)
,

,

,

:

,

,

.

,

,

,

,
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This contributed to much sicknuss, inc]udinq Wayno
nnd
Greene, who wore both quite ill for a period of time
during
the summer of

1

the south died

782

Tn all,

.

some two hundred soldiers in

sickness during 1782

f i-om

.''^

Early that year,

r,roone described his army to Washington as "really
deplor<ilxle."

luilcM-,

nnother officer informed

troops are naked and discontented,

,ind

liis

brother that

"The

ihc spirit of mutiny

and desertion prevails to a vory great degree. "^^

Continental Congress, March 9, 1782, Edward McCrady, The
H istory of South Ca rolina in th e Revo lutio n 1780-17837^. 615;
Alexander Roxburgh to William Smallwood, May~31 17 82, Thomas'
Balch, ed.. Papers Rela t ing C hie fly to the Marylan d Line
Durin g the Revolution p 1 82
exander Dick toHBenyamTn
Harrison June 18
782
Palmer, Calendar of Virgi nia S tate
Pa pers
p. 19 6; Jolin Bol field to Will i.im Davies, March "2T,~~
1782, ibid., p. 105; Churchill Jones to William Davies,
January 17, 1782, ibid., p. 30; William Ronald to Benjamin
Harrison, January 20, 1782, ibid., p. 39; Christian Febiger
to William Davies, January 23, 1782, ibid., p. 44; Same to
same, March 10, 1782, ibid., p. 94.
,

.

,

,

,

1

;

,

,
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Alexander Dick to William Davies, January 17, 1782,
ibid., p. 30; Christian FobiqtM- to VJilliam Davies, March 10,
to William Smallibid., p. 94; Steward [John Stewart
1782
1782
Thomas l^alch, od., P apers Relatin g
wood, July 1
Chiefly to the Jiaryland Line During the R el^lution, p. 186;
July 1 4,
ibid.,
782
IViTriTam Sma Iwood
Alex a rTd e r~ Ro xbur gl^^^
782
p. 187; Willi.iin McKennan to John Dickinson, July 8,
1.782,
Delaware Ai-cli vi^n 1:132; Same to same, Aucnist
Mo
tnaii
October 9,
134
N<illianael Greono to [D.miol
Tbid
(1H90): 83;
"Notes and Queries," I'MIM'. 14, no.
1782
[Nathanaol] Greene to [Otho llollandl Williams, Sc^ptembtM- 17,
Calendar of the General Otho Holland VVilli ams l\ip(M-s
1782
Mil it a ry
in the M aryland Historical Societ y, p. 7"51 (Denny
Journal pp. 47-48; Thayer, Nathanael Greene pp. -lOd OTi
1

,

1

,

,

1

1

,

,

1

i

.

1

,

;

,
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,
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,

1

Nathanael Greene to George Washington, M.n eh 9,
1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers,
LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris,
April 24, 1782, "Letters to Geneial Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8
(1876)
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AlLhoucjh

.-uMuo

officers and soldi, mt. believed that

force of arms could resolve their

prol)l(Mns,

most were will-

ing to lobby peacefully the civilian aulhoiities
for rodress

of their grievances.

appeal, during

1

Using

tlu-

tiaditional methods of

782 many officers instil ioncul

I

Ium

state

r

legislatures, chief exomlives, and civilian leaders
for
redress of lioir grievancos.
Thoy did so individually
t

as groups,

and

in parson and by monu^-ial.^^

including McDougall and Otho
in person,

llollaiui

Many of

i

ho generals,

Williams, by lettor and

contacted chief executives and state legislatures

about supporting their state's line, as well as themselves/'^'
Some officers left military service for positions in thoir

state legislaturos

,

\ho belief

in

(

could directly influ-

lioy

ence the legislature to provide for the military/'^
65

William Davios to the Governor in Council,
February 28, 1782, Palmer, Cal endar of Virginia State _Pagers
3:79-81; Journal of the House oT'Pelega tes of Vi rq i n i'a".
General Assemb 1 y _Bc g un ^qnd^ Ho 1 den at the "Publ ic Hu iTd i n"g_s i
the" City "of Ric Hmon d, on Monda y t he fif th "of Ma"y7~in~rhe
year of our Lord One TFousan'^T'Seven Hu ndred an d Eiqh y rh ee
(n.p., n.d.), pp. 22-23, 39, 52; CommXssioners on Uoha 11 ol
the North Carolina Continental Line to the Genct .il A;-,;;oiiil)l y
[April 1783], James R. Morrill, The__P£actice and Poll tics of
'iat Finan ce: North Carolina in t he" Co"n7e ^l(M a ic^n, 1 783-1789
University of North Carolina I'ress, 19 69)
(Chapel HiTl
"

t

l^

l

:

pp.

t

58,

,

173n.9.
to ('(xucje Clinton, Majch 28,
McDougall, pp. 1H2-181; O[tho]

^^'Alexander McDouc|<il

Champagne, Aloxandor
W n
ll[olliUid] Williams to
Calendar of tlio Gen eral Otho
M^ylaTTd' Historical Society,
1782,

on
Juiu^ 2, 17»2,
llo 11 and Will
ams Papers in tlie
p. 65; Ottho] iilolland] Willi. mis
ibid., p. 67.
Lee, 'July 2, 1782
f

to 'r[homa's]
67

S[im]

]

c

>

i

>

'

1

Wal'Jii nc

1

1

,

i

,

Robert n. Bass, Gamecock; Life and Campaigns of
General Thomas Sumter, pp. 219-221.

713

Probably the

i.ost

active line in petitioning
their

legislature was that of Massachusetts,
which had the largest
number of Continental officers. During
the
summer of 1782,

deciding that Congress would not be able
to discharge the
obligations due them, they turned to their

state legislature,

hoping thoy would discharge the half-pay
debt, or at least
pay them a lump sum commutation.
They did so knowing they
would be criticized by the nationalists, but they
believed
if they could get the state legislature to
act,
that other

states, singularly, or in conjunction, would do
likewise.

During July 1782, the officers of the Massachusetts
line drew up a petition calling upon the General Court
of

their state to adjust their depreciation claims and table
of rations, and to make good on the depreciation of money

promised to the soldiers in lieu of clothing.

They requested

the state send a committee to camp, with authority to adjust

claims and to give the officers interest-bearing certificates
for the amount due.

They also asked the state to assume

their half-pay obligation, or give them
tation.

a

lump sum in commu-

The petition indicated that if the state did not

comply, they would make the request of Congress.

petition, with

a

69

The

letter from General Knox to Governor

68

Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, August 26, 1782,
Louis Clinton Hatch, The Adminis trat ion of the American
Revolutionary Army pp. 14 3-1-14.
,

69

.

...

Petition in ibad.,

p,

144,

714

Hancock, asking for his help, was carried
to Boston by
Colonels Putnam, Brooks, and HulL^^ Before
the legislative
committee to which it was referred could
formulate a recommendation, the legislature learned from one
of the

Massachusetts delegates to Congress that
Congress planned
to take up the question of half-pay early
in January 1783.

That delegate, Samuel Osgood, informed them that
although

Massachusetts might make a special provision for her
own
officers, this would not free the state from its
responsi-

bility for contributing to the half-pay for the officers
of
the other states.
Thus, the legislature tabled the issue,

waiting to see what Congress would

do.'^"'"

This action, or lack of action, caused the officers
to turn their attention back to Congress for relief.

Actually, throughout 1782, the officers, both in person and
by letter, contacted Congress requesting financial relief. 72
70

Henry Knox to John Hancock, September 2, 1782,
ibid., pp. 144-145; George Washington to William Heath,
August 29, 1782, MHSC 5th ser., 4:277; John Brooks to Henry
Knox, September 27, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #10); Same to same, October 17, 1782, ibid.
,

71

Knox and Paterson, Greaton, Brooks, Crane, Maxwell,
and Lowell to Benjamin Lincoln, November 28, 1782, PMHS 13
(1873-1875): 127; Samuel Osgood to Henry Knox, December 4,
1782, Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of t he American
Revo luti onary Army p, 14 6.
,

72

Baron von Steuben to the President of the Continental Congress, December 4, 1782, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 505506; Henry Knox to Samuel Osgood, July 9, 1782, "Original
Documents," :m 12 (1911): 239; John Paterson to Henry Jackson, February 3, 1782, Egleston, John Paterson, p. 128; Henry
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Washington was quite active in lobbying
on the army's lumbal
especially for its officers.
During February 1782, he,
Rc.bcM-t Morris and Robert
Livingston signed a secret

f,

agree-

ment wUli Thomas Paino to write essays
on behalf of the
aimy and the
inancial program of the nat
iona 1 i st s

1

During October, many officers thcnujht

t

l,oy

"^"^

.

would

apply pressure to Congress by LhroaUMiiny to losiqn
en masse
in successive groups until their demands
were met by
Congress.

Washington and several generals talked them out

of this, suggesting they present their desires to Congress
in a formal

jcvint

petition.

Several meetings were held dnrinq November by the

officers of the different lines at which they drew up
petitions for redress.

76

On the first of December, a

Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, November 25, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6), Same to same, December 20,
1782,

ibid.
73

George Washington to the Superintendent of Finance,
June 16, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wash ington, 24:348351; Same to same, October 2, 17 82, ibid., 25:230; George
Washington to tlie Secretary at War, October 2 1 782 ibid
,

226

,

,

.

74

Robert Morris Memorandum on the Paine Agreement,
and the agreement itself, dated February 10, 1782, are found
in Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris
4:327-328, 201.
,

75

George Washington Lo James McHonry, October 17,
17 82, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Was hington, 25:269; George
Wasliington to Joseph Jones, December 14, 1782, ibid., 4 30.
For reports of the meetings held by the Massachusetts T,ine, see Henry Knox Papers, M!1S (Microfilm Pool ^10)
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general committee, chaired by Knox, drafted
an address and
petition of the officers to Congress. Five
days later, the

committee selected McDougall, who was in

a

financial plight,

and Colonels Brooks and Ogden, to take the
address and

petition to Congress.

On the seventh and eighth, officers

of the army affixed their names to the petition.

It set

forth the failure of Congress to meet their obligations
to
the army and the hardships the army had suffered as
It specifically mentioned their ration allowance,

a

result.

the cloth-

ing arrears, balance due for forage purchased, settlement
of

their accounts, lack of pay, and the unfortunate situation
of those officers who had been previously retired.

The

officers stated they would accept commutation in lieu of
half pay and begged Congress to include in any arrangement
full provision for disabled officers and soldiers, and for
the widows and orphans of those who had lost their lives in

service.

"Our distresses are now brought to a point," they

informed Congress.

"We have borned all that men can bear-

our property is expended-our private resources are at an end,
and our friends are wearied out and disgusted v;ith our

incessant applications."

The petition also warned that "The

uneasiness of the soldiers, for want of pay, is great and
dangerous; any further experiments on their patience may
have fatal effects."

77

JCC 24 291-293; see also Henry Knox to
Benjamin Lincoln, November 25, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
"^^Ford,

:
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By the time the army's committee
arrived in

Philadelphia late in December 1782, several
of the nationalist leaders had decided to use the plight
and uneasiness of
the army as an ally in their attempt to get
Congress and the
states to agree to a stronger central government
and to the
nationalist financial program. The arm.y and the war
were

important factors in the nationalist's plans.

They believed

that America could only be secure with a stronger central

government and this could only be accomplished during wartime, when the states needed a strong national government

and its army for their survival.

Once peace was established,

there would no longer be a need for the army or

central body to direct it.

a

strong

78

After Yorktown, the nationalists realized their

chances of getting approval of their program were slim, and
by the time the committee arrived from the army, chances

seemed non-existent, especially since Rhode Island rejected
the impost and Virginia repealed its earlier approval.

MHS (Microfilm Reel #6)
Results of the meetings of
December 1, 5, 7, 8, and draft of the address and petition
found in Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reels HO, 11).
;

78

Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24,
1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris
1:239, 240; Gouverneur
Morris to Matthew Ridley, August 6, 1782, BPL; Same to same,
October 6, 1782, Young, Robert Morris pp. 149-150; Jeremiah
Wadsworth to Major General Nathanael Greene, December 12,
Jeremiah V.'adsworth Box, CSL.
1782
,

,

,

e
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several of the nationalist leaders decided
the only way they
could get their financial program enacted
was for the army

to be kept together, hoping the states
would give Congress

sufficient finances to provide for it.

But with peace

approaching, the only way to keep the army
together was by
having them refuse to disband until they were
assured that
they would be adequately provided for.
The way the nationalists attempted to use
the army

and the way the army responded has been labeled the
Newburgh

Conspiracy.

The complete story of what happened will
proba-

bly never be known. 79

certain

a

From the available evidence, it is

group of nationalists wanted to join together the

civilian and military creditors and use this alliance to
coerce Congress and the states into accepting their funding

system to pay off the wartime debts.

It should be noted

that this group, as well as the nationalists themselves,

were not united in means and ends, nor were their efforts

well organized.

80

Nevertheless,

a

small group of them believed

79

For good treatments of the Newburgh Conspiracy,
see Richard Kohn
"The Inside History of the Newburgh
Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ, 3rd ser.,
(April 1970)
187-220 Paul David~lTel son with
27, no.
rebuttal by Richard H. Kohn, "Horatio Gates at Newburgh,
1783, A Misunderstood Role," ibid., 29, no. 1 (January 1972)
14 3-158; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Be ginn ings of
the Mil itary Establishmen t in Amer ica 1783-1802 pp TT^ 39
,

]

:

;

,

,

.

80

Herbert James Henderson, Pa_rty P^J^^itics in the
Contin ental Cong ress, p. 334; Don Higginbotham, The V7aF~of
Am e r i c an_ Indepen d nee: Attitud es Policies, and Practices
'

176 3- r7¥9',"p7~4l'r7'

,

,

1

they could use the army as the
means to achieve their ends.
It is certain this small group
did not want a military coup d'etat to take place, and
thus they did not push
the army in this direction.
They knew all too well that
if
the army was pushed in this direction
the result could very
well be anarchy and military tyranny, the
two things
they,

and the other revolutionary leaders feared
most.

As

Hamilton explained to Washington, "any
combination of 'Force
would only be productive of the horrors of a
civil war,

might end in the ruin of the Country
in the ruin of the army."^^

&

would certainly end

These nationalists desired to

strengthen the national government, not discredit it;
something a threatened or actual coup d'etat would do.
This group v^anted to take advantage of the potential

and actual unrest in the army and play this off against the
fears of the civilians.

If necessary,

they believed they

could stir up the army, forcing them to declare they would
not disband until they were provided for, including

a

commu-

tation of the officers' half pay pension and the means of

funding the commutation.

With the help of the military

leaders, they believed they could keep the army in check.
Thus, they did not fear the army with the sword in its hand
as the war cam.e to a close.

As Gouverneur Morris, a member

of this group of nationalists, wrote John Jay on the first
8

Alexander Hamilton to George Washington,
1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:293.

Ilarch

7,

720

day of 1783,

"Depend on it, good will arise
from the
situation to which we are hastening."
He explained "that

much convulsion will ensue, yet it
must terminate in giving
to government that power, without
which
is but a name."^^

the army's committee arrived
late in December
1782, this small nationalist group, consisting
of Robert
V7hen

Morris, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander
Hamilton, Richard
Peters, and several others, decided the
time was right to
implement their plans. Their plans consisted
of getting the
committee and the army's leaders to object to
anything but
a nationalist funding system and to have
the military

leaders stir up the army.

8 3

With respect to the funding system, the nationalists
lobbied both the army leaders and the army's committee from
camp.

Gouverneur Morris, during February, wrote Greene and

Knox that the states could do nothing for the military and
therefore the military should stop wasting their time
82

Gouverneur Morris to John Jay, January
Sparks, Gouverneur Morri s, 1:249.
83

1,

1783,

Ibid., 249; Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, March 17, 178 3, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Ha milton,
3:290-293; Same to same, April 8, 1783, ibid., 318-319;
Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, January 12, 1783, ibid.,
240-241; Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); James Madison
to Edmund Randolph, December 30, 1782, Hutchinson, Papers of
Jame s Madison, 5:473; Same to same, March 18, 1783, ibid.~
6:355-356; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid,, 348;
Richard H. Kohn "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ
3rd ser., 27, no. 2
(April 1970): 191-192.
,

,

appealing to the.

"it is

.

conviction," he wrote Knox,

.

.

not .y persuasion but

"that the only wise n^ode is
for

the army to connect themselves with
public creditors of

every kind

...

and unremittingly to urge the
grant of

general permanent funds."

He suggested to Knox that
"The

army may now influence the legislatures
and if you will
permit me a metaphor from your own profession
after you have
carried the post the public creditors will
garrison it for
you.

„84

Similar tlioughts were expressed to Greene.

Throughout February, Gouverneur Morris wrote Knox
urging him to action and supplying him with
information
favorable to the nationalists' program.
by Morris that "If the army,

creditors,

Greene was told

in common with all other public

insist on the grant of general permanent funds

for liquidating all the public debts,

there can be little

doubt that such revenues will be obtained."

He was told

also that Congress, with permanent funds, could obtain

a

degree of influence essential to the happiness of the country.

But without the army's support, the public creditors
84

Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, February
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).

7,

1783,

85

178

3,

Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, February
Johnson, Nathanael Gr eene, 2:395.
86

11,

Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, February 15, 1783,
Sparks, Gouv erne ur Morris
1:251; Same to same, February 28,
1783, Henry Knox"Papers ,"MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).
,

.

,
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could not produce relief for the army.^'^

committee to Congress were also lobbied,
ments put forward.

The army's
v/ith the

same argu-

They were told the army's only chance

of getting what was due them was for the army to
join with
the other creditors in urging the states to accept
the

nationalists'

financial system to fund the national debt.

They informed the committee if they did not support this

position they would oppose referring the army's claims to
the states till all prospect of obtaining Continental funds

were at an end.

88

The committee was urged, therefore, to

support the Continental funding of the national debt and to
keep the army's uneasiness before Congress.
It was left to Hamilton, VJashington

OQ

'

s

former aide,

to inform the commander-in-chief of the role the army needed

and to urge him to moderate the discontent of the

to play,

army and to direct it into proper channels, i.e.
ends

90

During February

.

,

nationalist

Hamilton v/rote Washington several

,

87

17 83

,

Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene
Sparks Gouverneur Mor ris 1:250-251.
,

,

February 15

,

8 8

Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11) Alexander
McDougall and Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 8, 1783,
Burnett, LMCC, 5:35-36n.; Arthur Clairy to Alexander
McDougall"!^ John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden, January 5, 1783,
Champagne Alexander McD ougall, p 187
;

.

,

OQ

Richard H. Kohn *'The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ, 3rd
,

ser.,

27,

no.
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(April 1970): 192-193.

^"^James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson,
Papers of Jam.es Madi son 6 266
,

:

.

1

,

723

times, urging him to have the army join the civilian

creditors in demanding

a

nationalist funding system.

He

urged him to act discreetly in the forthcoming crisis.

He

must not forfeit the army's confidence by opposing any action
it might take,

but neither should he espouse the army's case

too openly, or he would lose the confidence of the civilians.

At the moment of decision, he would have to "guide the

torrent" and "bring order perhaps good, out of the confusion

Hamilton told him that the army had confidence in Knox, and
that he could be safely used; this based on Hamilton's

belief that Gouverneur Morris had won Knox over.

Hamilton's friend, John Brooks,

a

member of the

army's committee, was indoctrinated with the nationalist's

plans and was sent back to camp early in February with

instructions to prepare the junior officers to support the

nationalist's plans and to participate in some form of protest,

if necessary

.

Brooks

,

however

,

apparently was not

convinced of the nationalist's means to their ends, informed

Washington and Knox of what was happening in Philadelphia,
and did not stir up the officers.
9

92

Although Brooks was not

Alexander Hamilton to George Washington,

February 7, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:33-35; Same to same,
February 13, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton
3:253-255.
qn

,

Forrest McDonald, The Formation of the Tvmerican
Republic 1776-1790 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 26;
John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29, 1 7 8 3 Burnett
LMCC, 7:155n.3; Richard H. Kohn Eagle and Sword; The BeginnTnas of the Military Establishment in America, p. 312n.36.
,
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willing to

along with

(JO

tlic

nationalist's plans, other

officers were.

nationalist conspirators found

Tlie

who, for

a

a

few officers

variety of reasons, were willing to support

Llieir

plan of joining the army and civilian creditors together
to
force Congress into funding the dobt
wlio

was in

Plii

1

adelphia

,

Arthur St. Clair,

seems to have been won over by

argument of using the army as
creditors.

.

a

t

he

lever by the civili.m

Additionally, he feared once the

at

my was dis-

banded any resolutions adopted to pay them would not be
implemented.

Thus, he informed the committee from the army

late in December 1782 that the debts due to the army had to

be funded by the nationalist plan, and that the army should
93
be kept together until that happened.

Gates's aide, John Armstrong, Jr., also desired to
keep the army together, in part because he did not, it
appears, want to return to civilian life.

officers, Armstrong did not have
return.

a

Unlike many other

set future to which to

Late in February 1783, he wrote his father, asking

what he was to do when the war ended, mentioning he was not
suited for law or business, nor sure he wanted to be

a

farmer

Arthur St. Clair to Alox<inder McDougall, Matthias
Smith, The
], 1782
Ogden and John Brooks, December
St. Clair Papers, 1:575-576; Arthur St. Clair to WillTam
1783, ibid., 583.
lYvTne May" 6
[

,

,

,

^'^John Armstrong, Jr., to John Armstrong, Sr.,
February 26, 178[3], "Original Letters and Documents," PMjlB
108.
5, no. 1 (1 8H1)
:
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Armstrong's mentor, Gates, was also amenable to
the
nationalist's plans, but for different reasons.

Gates, in

many respects, was an unlikely candidate to be used
by the
nationalists, as all his congressional friends were
anti-

nationalists.

And, according to his most recent biographer.

Gates would not have allowed himself to be used as

especially by the nationalists.^^
Although not

involved.

a

a

tool,

Nevertheless, he got

proponent of

a

coup d'etat, he

"knowingly launched into activities that bordered upon
mu tiny," according to his biographer
a long

with the nationalists as he

.

sav7

Gates probably v/ent
an opportunity to

replace Washington if the commander-in-chief did not support
the officers in their demands and was ousted as a result.
He explained after the collapse of the nationalist plan to

use the army that his only reason for supporting the

nationalists was that he saw having the army cooperating

with the civil creditors "as the way most likely to obtain
justice" for the army.

9 7

Sharing this view was the officer

who set the nationalist plan in action at camp. Colonel

Walter Stewart,
95

Biography

,

96
97

1783,

former aide-de-camp to Gates.

a

Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A
p.

Ibid

2

.

71.
,

p

.

2 7 7.

Horatio Gates to John Armstrong, Jr.

ibid., p.

274.

,

June 22,

.

,
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During the winter of 1782-1783, Stewart,
a

a

holder of

huge amount of public securities, spent sick-leave
in

Philadelphia.

While there, he spent much time in conversa-

tion with the nationalist group.

They were able to convince

him he should go back to camp at Newburgh and stir up the

officers, as well as sound out V7ashington as to his willingness to support them, and if he was unwilling, to get Gates
to organize a military protest to being disbanded without

being fully satisfied the debt due them would be paid.

He

arrived at camp on or about the eighth of March and, finding

Washington would not support using the army as

a tool,

98

turned his attention to Gates

Many civilians, knowing of these plans, strongly

objected to them, believing that once the military were
unleashed in civilian affairs, the revolution could be undone
by a military tyranny.

99

Horace Walpole predicted "the

American loaders will not easily part with dictatorships and

consulships to retire to their private ploughs " once the war
ended ^-^^^

In his March

5

,

1119

,

Boston massacre oration

98

Douglas Southall Freeman G eorge Washington A
Biography 5 4 36-4 37n 4 8 Louis Clinton Hatch, The Adminis
tration of the American Revolutionary Army p. 168.
:

,

:

,

.

;

,

1783

Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27,
Ford Letters of Joseph Jones pp. 99-100
,

,

,

.

1775-1783

John Richard 7\ldcn The Americ a n Revolution
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row,

1962)

266.

"'"'^'^

,

,

p.

,
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William Tudor warned that at the end of the

v;ar,

a

triumphant

army, headed by a popular general "may become more formidable

than the tyrant that has been expelled

At the end of

the war there was a great fear held by many that the army

would not disband until they were assured they would be
adequately provided for.

A few even feared that not only

would the army not disband, but would, by the force of arms,
assure themselves of being compensated 10 2
.

Southall Freeman
5:102-103,

''"^"'"Douglas

Bio graphy

,

,

These fears

George Washington, A

102

Ben3amin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in
Congress, January 31, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
Madison 6:176; James Madison s "Notes on Debates " ibid
259, 261, 265-266, 266; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton,
February 14, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton
3:256; William Livingston to Ephraim Harris, February 16
1783, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #8);
Moses Hazen to William Henry, February 23, 1783, Francis
The Life of Wi lliam Henry of Lancaster, PennsylJordan, Jr.
V a n i a 1 729-1786: Patri ot, Military Officer, Inventor of the
Steamboat A Contribution to Revolutionalry History (Lancaster
New Era Printing Company, iTlO)
p. 161; James Madison to
Edmund Randolph, February 13, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:44;
Same to same, February 25, 1783, ibid., 57; Hugh Williamson
to James Irdell, [February 17, 1783], ibid., 46-47; Robert R.
Livingston to John Adams, February 13, 1783, Wharton,
Revolutiona ry Diplomatic C orrespondence 6:251; Joseph Jones
1783 Ford, Letters of
to George "Washington, February 27
Joseph Jones, p. 99; Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, December 3 7~T7W7 Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10);
Robert Morris to George Olney, August 20, 1783, Merrill
Jensen, The New Nation: A H istory of the United States During
the Confederation 1781-17 89", p. 408; Theodore G. Tappert and
j^hn W. Doberstein, (trans.). The Journals of Henry Melchoir
Muhlenberg, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press for the
EvangeTTc^l Lutheran Ministerium of Pennsylvania and Adjacent
States, 1942-1958), 3:535; Alexander Hamilton to George
Washington, [March 25, 1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexander
Hamilton 3:307.
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seemed all the more real early in 1783 as
the civilian
leaders learned from the army's committee
to Congress of the
discontent of the army and the possible
consequences if

Congress did not act soon to soothe the temper
of the army.
The army's committee was willing to let the
members
of

Congress believe the worst was about to happen and
did not
try to dissuade their fears. "'"^'^
As will be shortly discussed, some nationalists

played on these fears in hopes that Congress would adopt
their financial program.

At a private meeting of members

of Congress on the twentieth of February, Hamilton and

Peters reported that the army had secretly determined not
to lay down their arms until satisfactory measures were

adopted.

104

Such reports prompted Arthur Lee to observe

that "The terror of

siderable ef f icacy

a

mutinying Army is played off with con-

" "''^^
.

The immediate response to these fears was the urging
of the military to take no drastic action.
fall.

As early as the

Congress sent, at Washington's prompting, the Secretary
'^'^

"^Champagne

,

Alex ander McDougall

,

p.

198.

104

James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson,
Papers of James Madisoii, 6 266
:

Lee to Samuel Adams, January 29
7:28.

"'"'^^Arthur

Burnett, LMCC,

.

,

1783,

;
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at War to camp to urge calm.l^^

This visit was followed by

letters to military leaders urging restraint.

Hamilton

wrote Washington that •'Republican jealousy
has in it a
principle of hostility to any army whatever be
their merits,
whatever be [their] claims to the gratitude of
the community
It acknowledges their services with unwillingness
and

rewards them with reluctance."

What could be done?

Hamilton told Washington the army must submit to its fate,
for to seek redress by arms would mean its ruin.

Elias

Boudinot wrote Washington in March expressing his hope the
army would not dishonor itself and explaining that violent

measures would not help them.

Several weeks earlier, Joseph

Jones v;rote Washington, expressing his hope the army would
show patience in their plight.

He wrote:

To you it must be unnecessary to observe that v/hen
all confidence between the civil and military
authority is lost, by intemperate conduct or an
assumption of improper power, especially by the
military body, the Rubicon is passed, and to
retreat will be very difficult from the fears and
jealousies that will unavoidably subsist between
the two bodies
To avoid therefore the adoption
by the army of any hasty and rash measure should
employ the attention and draw forth the exertions
of every worthy officer in it; for from these
alone can opposition be expected. The ambition of
some, and the pressure of distress in others, may
produce dangerous combinations, founded on the
pretence that justice is delayed, and will be
•

,

Champagne Alexander Mc Dougall, pp. 184-185
Ford, JCC, 23:657n.4; George Washington to the Secretary at
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wa shington,
1782
War, October 2
25:226-229.
,

,

,
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refused to them.
The pretext is plausible and
ensnaring, and may draw into engagements
the
unsuspecting, honest soldier, from which it
will
be difficult to extricate himself, even
when he
sees the dangers they lead to.l07

Although a few officers were willing to let the
army
be used by the nationalist conspirators, most
did not.
Fortunately, those that did not included Washington,
Greene,
Knox, McDougall, and the Secretary at War, Lincoln;
the

military leaders of the continent.

The latter was probably

the only member of the executive leadership

refused to

v;ho

endorse the nationalist plan to use the army.

Samuel Osgood,

late in 1783, wrote John Adams it was fortunate that Lincoln
"was a true Republican,

&

aristocratic Measures."

totally oppos'd to Intrigue

&

Osgood feared that if Schuyler had

been the Secretary at War the army might have been used by
the nationalists.

Robert Morris, according to Osgood,

"wanted a Person in that Office who would go any Lengths

with him."

Lincoln, however, refused to be drawn into

Morris's plans.

108

Greene, although sharing m.uch of the

philosophy of the nationalist conspirators, was against
using the army as

a

tool.

"When soldiers advance without

107

Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [March 25,
1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexander H amilton 3:306; Elias
Boudinot to George v7aFhington, March 17 1783, Burnett, LMCC,
7:84; Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27, 1733,
Ford, Letters of Joseph Jones pp. 99-100.
,

,

,
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8

Samuel Osgood to John Adams, December
Burnett, LMCC, 7:380-381.
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authority," he wrote Gouverneur Morris,
"who can halt them."
"We have many Clodiuses and Catilinies
in America, who may
give a different direction to this business,
than either you
or I expect," he wrote Morris.
He reminded Morris that using
the army was "a critical business [,
pregnant with
.

]

dangerous consequences

,

"

.

.

"'''^^

McDougall and Knox also shared

a

nationalist

philosophy, and both probably considered going along to
some

degree with the nationalist's desire to use the army, in
limited manner.

a

McDougall was heavily lobbied by the

nationalists to declare openly the army would accept commutation only if it were funded by the nationalist funding
system.

He remained silent, knowing if he sooke out for the

nationalist plan, the nationalists' opponents would kill the
commutation.

If he supported the anti-nationalists,

nationalists would block commutation

.

McDouqall

'

the

first

s

concern was getting both sides to agree to the principle of
commutation, believing the funding part could be worked out
While walking

later.

a

tightrope

,

McDougall kept Knox

109

178 3,

Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April
Sparks, Gouve rneur Morris 1 :251, 251-252 252.
,

,

Knox to Ben j amin Lincoln March
Henry Knox Papers, MHS, (Microfilm Reel #11).
"'''^Henry

3,

,

3

,

1783,

McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9,
1783 Champagne, Alexand.er McDougall, p. 188; Same to same,
February 8 1783 "TbTd., p. 194; Alexander McDougall, John
Brooks and Matthias Ogden to General Henry Knox
February 8, 1783, ibid., pp. 192, 192-193.
'''"'"''"Alexander

,

,

,

,

advised, and sought his advice, as
well.

On February 21,

1783, Knox wrote McDougall that he was
opposed to uniting
the army with the civil creditors
against the government,
and hoped the army would "never be directed
but against the

enemies of the liberties of America."
thing that could take place was
the peace took place.

a

He believed the best

convention, called before

Such a meeting could recommend ways

of strengthening the national government, which
would result
in the army eventually being taken care of."^^^

Three weeks

later, he wrote McDougall his hope that "we shall
not be

influenced to actions which may be contrary to our uniform
course of service for eight years.

violence we can obtain

a

I

know not how by any

settlement of accounts, and the

half-pay placed upon proper principles, except by the applications we have made." 113

Knox shared similar thoughts with Gouverneur Morris.
During February, he wrote Morris that "a hoop to the barrell"
and "cement to the union" were favorite toasts of the army,
and that the army would gladly help strengthen the govern-

ment, but that it "must be directed in the mode by proper

authority."

He suggested that if the present constitution

112

Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, February 21,
1783, draft, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).
113

Papers,

Same to same, March 12, 1783, draft, Henry Knox
ibid., (Microfilm Reel #12).
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was so defective the states hold a convention
to form a
better one,
"This appears to us
the most efficacious
.

remedy." 114

.

.

Knox's efforts to prevent the army from
being

used by the nationalists was seen by John
Armstrong, Jr., as
a primary reason that it was not used.^^^
The person most
responsible, however, for keeping the army from being
used
by the nationalists was Washington.

Throughout the war, Washington had opposed using the
army in any unauthorized activity, as he believed strongly
in the necessity of the subordination of the military to the

civilian authorities.

This was all the more important now

that it appeared the Revolution would be safely concluded.

Although Washington's beliefs were widely known, the
nationalists hoped to have him use the army to further their
His response to them was the same as it had been to

plans.

those that were suggesting the year before that he become

a

monarch.

Mercy Otis Warren in her history of the Revolution
wrote that Americans had little desire for

a

monarchy when

the war began, but such ideas were suggested during the war

by aspiring individuals, nurtured by designing characters.
'^Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris,

178 3,

Sparks, Gouv erneur Mo r ris
115

,

February 21,

1:256.

John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 22,
7:150n.4.
1783, Burnett, LMCC
,

v

.
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and matured by circumstances

Monarchy was indeed a

.

subject of some speculation during
the last years of the
war, as it was viewed as one
solution to overcoming the
defects of a weak Continental
government

Gouverneur Morris, in

a

despondent mood, wrote

Greene late in 1781 that he had "no
expectation that the
government will acquire force; and no
hope that our union
can subsist, except in the form of
an absolute monarchy,"
but "this does not seem to consist with
the taste and temper
of the people. ""'"'"^
One person who believed that

a

monarchy, with

Washington as the monarch, was the answer to
America's
salvation, was the commanding officer of the Invalid

Regi-

ment, Lewis Nicola.

On May 22,

1782, believing a stronger

form of government was needed to control both the military
and civil authorities, Nicola wrote Washington proposing

monarchy be established by the military.

a

Washington res-

ponded immediately, telling him it was "With

a

mixture of

Mercy Otis Warren, Histo ry of the Rise ^Progress
and Termination oJ_the_ American _Re olution
Interspersed
with Biog r aphica l, Pol i ti'cal^^nd_Moraj^Observ^
s
(Boston: Printed by Manning and Lorinq, for E. LaFkin, 1805)
3:278.
,

.

Dexter Litera ry D iary of Ezra Stiles, 3:76;
"Proposals for Monarchy in the U. S.," June 28, 1781,
unsigned, Feinstone Collection #1173; David Cobb to Timothy
Pickering, November 9, 1825, Pickering, Tinothv
Pickering,
'
1 431-4 32
,

~

:

.

Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24,
1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1:240.
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great surprise and astonishment"
he had read his sentiments.
•YOU could not have found a person
to whom your schemes are
more disagreeable," Washington wrote
Nicola.
He told him to
banish such thoughts from his mind, and
to never mention them
again.
In three letters, written between
the twenty-third
and twenty-eighth of May, Nicola assured
Washington he would
comply with his desires "'"^
.

Another person who suggested

monarchy was James M.

a

Varnum, a general and member of Congress.

During the summer

of 1782, he suggested to Washington the only
salvation of

America lay either with

a

monarchy or

a

military state.

Washington replied that he did not believe America
was so
badly off they had to resort to either form of government
Washington, learning of the plans of the nationalist
conspirators, was quick to explain to Hamilton his opposition to using the army to further their ends, as it might

result in civil discord.

He told him that redress by force

"is too chimerical to have had a place in the imagination

119

George Washington to Lewis Nicola, May 22, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of VJash ington 24:272-273; see also
ibid., 273n.81, and Louise Eurnham Dunbar, "A Study of
'Monarchical' Tendencies in the United States from 1776 to
1801," University of Illin ois Studies in the Soci al Sciences
vol. 10, no. 1 (March 1922), pp. 41-46; ibid., appendix A,
pp. 129, 130-131, 131-134.
,

120

Mitchell Varnum to George Washington,
June 23, 1782, ibid., p. 47; George Washington to James
Mitchell Varnum, July 10, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 24:415.
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of any serious Mind in this Ar.y,"
reminding him that the
army was "a dangerous instrument
to play with.-^^l
^^^^^

March, Washington told Hamilton it
"Would be impolitic to
introduce the Army on the Tapis; lest
it should excite
jealousy, and bring on its concomitants."
What he would do,
Washington explained, was to "pursue the
same steady line of
conduct which has governed me hi therto " ^^2
This was indeed
what Washington did.
.

The military allies of the nationalist
conspirators,

realizing that Washington would not go along
with their
plans, decided to act without him. On March
10,

1783,

Gates' aide-de-camp, John Armstrong, with the
help of

several officers, issued an anonymous address to
the

officers, inviting them to

a

meeting the following day to

discuss securing redress of their grievances.

The address

called on them to "change the milk-and-water style" of their

previous memorial and urged them to "Assume
tone

.

a

bolder

123
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George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April
1783, ibid., 26:292, 293; see also Same to same, April 16,
1783, ibid., 324.
122

Same to same, March
Alexander Hamilton 3:278.

4,

178

3,

4,

Syrett, Papers of

,

12

3

The Nev/burgh Addresses are printed in Ford, JCC,
24:295-299; Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16,
1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering 1:440; George Washington
to Benjamin Harrison, March 19, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of V7ashington, 26:239-241.
,

.

Trying to avoid an unauthorized meeting
of officers,
Washington requested a postponement until
the fifteenth, at
which time they could hear the report from
the committee of
the army to Congress and adopt measures
"best calculated to
attain the just and important object in view.""'-^'^
He

explained to Hamilton that he had taken this action
"to
prevent the Officers from being taken by surprise while

the

passions were all inflamed, and to rescue them from plunging
themselves into a gulph of Civil horror from which there
might be no recovering."

Washington called for the general and field grade
officers, one officer from each company, and

a

proper

representation from the staff departments to meet at noon
in the Public Building,

"The Temple," and directed the

senior officer present to preside and report the results to
,

.

him.

126

Armstrong responded to Washington's postponement
issuing, on the twelfth

,

a second

by-

address hinting that

VJashington was secretly in favor of the original meeting,

but

v;as

prevented by his pos it ion from taking an open stand
124

George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 12, 1783,
ibid.
208-215; see also George Washington to the President
of the Continental Congress, March 12, 1783, ibid., 211-212.
,

12 5

George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 12,
216-217.
1783, ibid.
,

"^^^General Orders,

ibid., 208

.

.
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By calling an official ineeting,
he was giving additional
weight to any declaration by having
it originated and transmitted by and through regular channels.
Thus, despite

Washington's seeming disapproval, the
officers were told
not to be deterred from acting boldly
at the official
meeting 12 7
There was great concern during the following
days
with respect to what would happen on the f if
teenth "^^^
.

Pickering wrote his wife that he believed if the
meeting was
conducted with prudence, it might have the effect
of prompting Congress to settle with the army and the other
creditors
"But," he worried,

"should rashness govern the proceedings,

the consequences may be such as are dreadful even in idea.

God forbid the event be so calamitous

""^^^
.

On the morning of the fifteenth, one officer, prob-

ably Rufus Putnam, released an address in reply to the

anonymous addresses, stating the army could not extort the

monies owed them.

Not only would it be wrong, but there

were not enough men in arms to carry out such an extortion.
127

Ford, JCC, 24:298-299.

12 8

Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 12, 1783,
(copy made from the draft), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel ^fl2)
Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, March 12,
1783, draft, ibid.
;

129

1783

,

.

Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 13,
Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel ^=1)
.
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Even if they had enough soldiers
to support them, they
would
have to live by plunder and face
the threat of civil war.
Additionally, he correctly en^phasized
the soldiers siniply
wanted to return home, and would not
support
them.

business," he wrote, "lies within
a

warm

a

"Our

very narrow compass-Viz.

affectionate address to our 'Illustrious
Chiefpointing out the disadvantages that will
arise
&

to the Army

if they should be disbanded before
their Accounts are

settled.

""^^^

The meeting began at noon as scheduled,
with Gates,
as the ranking officer present, in the
chair.
Before the

meeting could begin in earnest, Washington arrived
unexpectedly.

Silence came over the room and every eye fixed
upon

the commander-in-chief, who "appeared sensibly
agitated .""'-

After apologizing for his appearance, he explained that
he
had not intended- to come to the meeting, but the second

anonymous address forced him to state personally his views
on the role the army should play in obtaining redress of

their grievances.

He told the gathering to give greater

130

"To Officers of the Army," March 15, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12). On the back of the
manuscript is the endorsement that it had been written by

Rufus Putnam.
131

Wright to Samuel B. Webb, March 16, 1783,
Ford, Samuel Blach ley Webb
3:6; for reports of the meeting,
see Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16, 1783,
Pickering, Timoth y Pi ckering, 1:437-440; Samuel Shaw to
[John] Eliot, April f
], 1783, Quincy, Sam uel Shaw
pp. 103104; Judd, 'Memoir' and Selected Correspondence of Philip
Van Cortlandt, p. 68,
J.

A.

,

,

,
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lucidity to his views he had
co:n.itted the. to writing
and
desired to read the.. He bagan
by criticizing the
un.ilitary character of the anonymous
addresses, as they are
addressed ".ore to the feelings
and passions, than to the
reason and judgment of the ar.y."
He told the. the addressee
only gave two alternatives; either
deserting the country for
western lands or turning ar.s against
it, if Congress could
not be compelled into instant
compliance. Washington

questioned the .otives behind the person
proposing these
alternatives, suggesting they .ight have
originated in New
York City, as the British desired to
sow
the seeds of

discord and separation between the civil and
military powers.
Congress, Washington told the., would do
them

complete justice, once that body was able to
establish funds
for that purpose.
He told them Congress would not
cease

attempting to get the funds until they had succeeded,
but
reminding them that "like all other large bodies, where
there is a variety of different interests to reconcile"

their deliberations were slow.

He promised to help the ar.y

in any way he could to obtain justice and entreated them

"not to take any measures, which, in the calm light of

reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have

hitherto maintained."

"Let me request you," he asked,

"to

rely on the plighted faith of your country, and to place

a

full confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress
that, previous to your dissolution as an army, they vjill

74]
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sentiment, Washington continued
reading the letter, which
explained the plans and efforts by
Congress to obtain revenue,
declaring that if a discrimination
was to be made in paying
the public debt, it would be made
in favor of the army;
explained the delay in answering the
officers' petition was
due to the slowness natural to a body
like Congress and
referred to the dependence of Congress
upon the states.

Washington most emphasized that portion of
the letter that
pointed out that once the military assumed
undue powers,

there was no telling where they might be led,
and they may
be carried farther than at first they meant to
go.
Washington did not read all the letter, purposely omitting
the

negative portions of

it."'""^'^

Finished reading the letter, Vv^ashington left the
building, believing the temper of the officers had been

sufficiently cooled so as to allow them to deliberate in
moderation.

Gates assumed the chair, and rather than

attempting to sway the officers against Washington's call
for a moderate appeal to Congress, he recognized

a

motion

by Knox, seconded by Rufus Putnam, to have the gathering
give their thanks to VJashington for his "excellent address"
and to assure him the "officers reciprocate his affectionate
134

Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27,
178 3, Sparks, Correspo ndence of the American R evolution
3:554-560; For what Washington deleted, see Pickering,
Tim othy Pickering, l:444-4 4 5n.; J. A. Wright to John VJebb,
March 16 1783 Webb, Samuel B. V7ebb, p. 60.
,

,

,
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expressions with the greatest
sincerity of which the hu.an
heart is capable." This was
unanimously agreed to.
Then
the December memorial to
Congress, the resolutions of
Congress acknowledging the right
of the soldiers to security
and promising to obtain revenue,
and the report of the comniittee to Philadelphia were read.

That finished, Israel

Putnam moved, and Edward Hand seconded,
that a three-member
committee be appointed to draw up
resolutions and report
back in half an hour.

This approved, chosen were Knox,
John

Brooks, and a Captain Howard.

They prepared three resolu-

tions and presented them to the gathering.

After

a

minimum

of discussion, they were adopted.

The first resolution professed the patriotism
of the

officers and their resolution to preserve their reputation
despite any distress or danger.

The second affirmed their

confidence in the justice of Congress and their country, and
their conviction that the army would not be disbanded before
its accounts were adjusted and adequate funds provided for

securing the amount due, including the commutation for halfpay.

The third requested Washington write Congress and ask

for speedy action with respect to their December memorial.

The third resolution declared prompt action "would produce

immediate tranquillity in the minds of the army, and prevent
any further machinations of designing men to sow discord

between the civil and military powers of the United States."
Tv;o

more resolutions wore also adopted.

The fourth thanked

744

the com:nittee at Philadelphia
for their work and requested

McDougall reinain in Philadelphia until
the objects of his
mission were accomplished. The fifth
resolution stated "the
officers
view with abhorrence, and reject
with disdain,
the infamous propositions contained
in a late anonymous
address to the officers of the ari.y, and
resent with indignation the secret attempts of some unknown
persons to collect
the officers together in a manner totally
subversive of
.

.

.

all

discipline, and good order.

""^"^^

With few exceptions, most officers were pleased
the
meeting had been conducted with "Order, Moderation
and
Decency," and that it had not resulted in the military
turning to extreme measures to obtain redress of their
grievances. 136 Knox believed the officers' performance

would set the military character of America on
of view.

a

high point

"It was a proud day for the Army," Colonel

Humphreys declared, and "aught not to be forgotten in the
Annals of America." 137
135

Ford, JCC

Especially praised was Washington,

24:31-311; Boynton, General Orders of
George Washington pp. 61, 103-104; Timothy Pickering to
Samuel Hodgdon March 16, 1783, Pickering, Ti mothy Pi ckering,
1:437-440.
,

,

,

136

Wright to John Webb, March 16, 1783, Webb,
Samuel B Webb p. 60; George Washington to Lund Washington,
March 19, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Was hington 26:245;
George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, March 16, 1783, ibid., 228,
,

J.

A.
,

,

137

Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 16, 1783,
[copy m^ade from the draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm, Reel ^12); David Humphreys to Benjamin Lincoln,

:
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who was seen as the key in keeping
the meeting from being
the starting point of a form of
military tyranny. ^^B Knox

believed Washington's address had been

a

"masterly perform-

ance."

Schuyler reported on the seventeenth
of March that
"Never, through all the war, did his
Excellency achieve a
greater victory than on this occasion-a
victory

over jealousy,

just discontent, and great opportunities."

Schuyler reported that

"I

After the meeting,

rode with Knox to his quarters in

absolute silence, because of the solemn
impression on our
minds.
I have no doubt that posterity
will repeat the
closing words of his Excellency's address

Had this day

been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage
of

perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining.'"
Samuel Shaw was also impressed by Washington's address.

He

observed
rejoice in the opportunities I have had of seeing
this great man in a variety of situations -calm and
intrepid where the battle raged, patient and persevering under the pressure of misfortune, moderate
and possessing himself in the full career of victory.
Great as these qualifications deservedly render him,
he never appeared to me more truly so, than at the
assembly we have been speaking of. On the other
occasions he has been supported by the exertions of
an army and the countenance of his friends; but in
this he stood single and alone.
There was no saying
where the passions of an army, which were not a
little inflamed, might lead; but it was generally
I

;

March 19, 1783, Humphreys, Life an d Ti mes of David Humphreys

,

1:270.
1783,

Jedediah Huntington to Androv: Huntington, March
"The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 460.

18,
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allowed that longer forbearance was
dangerous
and moderation had ceased to be a
virtue.
Under
these circumstances he appeared,
not at the head
of his troops, but as it were in
opposition to
them; and for a dreadful moment the
interests of
the army and its general seemed to
be in competition!
He spoke, -every doubt was dispelled,
and
the tide of patriotism rolled again
in its
wonted course.

Learning what had happened. General Weedon
wrote, "Nothing
rejoyces me more than to hear the disturbances
in the Army
are reconciled, it would have been a sad stain in
the

History of the war had they gone to extremes

""'"^^
.

Not all the military were pleased with what had

happened at the meeting, especially when it seemed likely
that the army would take

stand that would send

a

a

message

to the nation that they would stand for nothing less than

being fully compensated.
officers had acted in

a

Pickering believed his fellow

hypocritical manner at the meeting.

Writing an assistant on the sixteenth, he reported that four
days previously "most of them had read

v/ith

admiration, and

talked of v/ith rapture" the anonymous addresses.

change?

Pickering wrote his

Why the

eighteenth that,

v;ife on the

like the greater part of mankind, the officers had been over-

awed by "'great men.'"

Tv70

days earlier, he had written her

139

Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 15, 1783,
[copy made from the draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12)
Philip Schuyler to
Van Rensselaer,
March 17, 1783, Lossing, P hilip Sc huyler, 2:427n.; Samuel
Shaw to [John] Eliot, April
], 1783, Quincy, Samu e l Shaw
p. 104; Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History, p. 124.
[

;

[

]

,
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the result of the n^eeting
demonstrated the fickleness of

popular assemblies and how easily

fluent orator, with only

a

plausibility to support him, may govern
at will.
John
Armstrong, Jr., was similarly upset,
believing Washington
lacked the will to support the officers'
desire for compensation.

He told Gates they should not
have trusted

Washington.

-^"^^

The civilian leaders, on the other
hand, were

pleased they had trusted Washington as he had,
in his
actions at Ncwburgh, apparently prevented the
military from
undermining their revolutionary principles and
goals.

They

really appreciated what Washington and the army had
done, or
actually had not done, at this critical moment of the
Revolution. 141

John Jay, upon learning what had happened

at Newburgh, wrote from France that "The general and
the

army have, by their late moderation, done themselves infinite honor."

William Peartree Smith wrote the President of

Congress that Washington's conduct had been "truly admirable"
and "Superior to what the common principles of Human Nat
140

iire

.

Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16,
1783, Pickering, Ti mothy Pickering
1:439-440; Timothy
Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 18, 1783, ibid., 443;
Same to same, March 16, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel ^tl); John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates,
May 30, 1783, Nelson, General Horatjo Gates; A Biography,
p. 2 79; Same to same, April 2 9 ~ 1 7 8 3 "Thid^
,

,

,

14

1

The Virginia Delegates at Congress to Benjamin
Harrison, June 17, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
Madison, 7:155.
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would have dictated to

Soaring Genius."

a

commanded a republican army at such

a

"Had an Oliver

delicate and critical

Juncture," he wrote, "his towering brain
would have traced
out instantaneously a very different Line
of
Conduct.

Washington is the Patriot of Patriots.
y^ Brutus,

&

Talk of your Catos,

y^ Cassius-they are meer Fools to
him."

suggested that each state erect

a

But

Smith

statue to Washington.

Congress, v^hich would itself make provision for

a

statue,

voted Washington their sincere thanks for his
actions at

Newburgh .'^^^

Washington and his officers believed their restraint
and moderation in the face of adversity deserved more than

appreciation and statues

'"'^
.

^

They believed once the American

people learned what had happened at Newburgh, they would

promptly and properly reward them, by paying them what was
owed and making provision for post-war compensation.

They

consequently set about making sure all the facts about the
142

John Jay to V7illiam Livingston, July 19 1783
Jay, John Jay 2:122; William Peartree Smith to Elias
Boudinot, April 22, 1783, "Letters from Wm. Peartree Smith
to Elias Boudinot, on the Suspension of Hostilities Between
the United States and Great Britain," PNJHS 4, no. 3 (1849)
123, 124; Ford, JCC, 24:306, 305-306n.l.
,

,

,

143

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, March 18, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings
26:229-232; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to
of \Jas hington
Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., March 18, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser.,
,

3

:406

.

.

,
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Nevvburgh incident were niade public,
particularly Washington's

address

"^'^

^

.

The civilian loaders, for a variety of
reasons,

including the fear of military tyranny, believed
the military
were indeed entitled to what was owed them, and
perhaps, even
more.

This belief was, of course, strengthened by what
had

happened at Newburgh.

But it was

a

belief that was fre-

quently expressed throughout 1782 and 1783, often with the
provision that the compensation be consistent with republican

principles 145
,

.

From January until early March, Congress debated the

question of compensating the officers by way of
of their lialf-pay pension to
14

specific

a

nurnl^er

a

commutation

of years.

4

Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, July 2S, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #13); Henry Knox to
Benjamin Lincoln, March 16, 1783, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #6)
Timothy Pickering to Rebecca
Pickering, March 16, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel ^1)
;

.
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Samuel Osgood to Henry Knox, December 4, 1782,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10); John Chester to
Joshua Huntington, March 21, 1783, "The Huntington Papers,"
CHSC, 20 (1923): 171; William Paca, In Council, to the Maryland General Assembly, May 6, 1783, Browne, Maryland Arc hives
48:407; John Dickinson's message to the Delaware Assembly,
January 19, 1782, Minutes of the Council of the Delaware
State, from 1776 to 1792 pp. 69 5-700^; William Gordon to
Arthur Lee, April 2, 1783, "Letters of the Reverend William
Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799,"
Willi, im Gordon to
PMI[S 63 (October 1929 -J\ine 1930): 490
George VJashington, February 26 1783, ibid., 4 95; Jfilin
Collins and Jonathan Arnold to William Greene, February 4,
178 3, Staples, RIt ode I s la n d in the Continental Cong re
Edmund RandoTph to" James Madison, ApriT 26,
p. 4 25
Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:499.
,

;

,

.

;

^

r,

,
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There was much opposition to the
conn^utation
as well as to
the half-pay pension itself,
but with the lobbying efforts
of the army's committee and news
of the Newburgh incident.
Congress, on the twenty-second of
March, agreed to a commutation of five years pay for the
officers and voted the
soldiers three months pay.^^^ ^^^.^^
following two
months. Congress also made provisions
for the relief of disabled veterans and adjusted final rank of
officers
,

in

meritorious cases.

It should be noted that earlier,

in

January, Congress called on the states to
complete settle-

ments with the army up to August

1,

1780, and provided that

they would take care of the rest, once the states
paid

Congress the monies they owed

it."'"'^'^

As has been noted, the states were very dilatory in

paying Congress and their soldiers during 1782 and 1783.

Nevertheless, some attempts were made by several states to
pay their soldiers in specie, and when this was not possible,
to pay them in goods,

such as tobacco.

Some individuals.

James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 348,
355, 370, 375; Ford, JCC, 24:207-210, 253, 364; 25:926;
Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, March 15, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Benjamin Lincoln to
Henry Knox, March 22, 1783, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #6)
14 7
14

8

Ford, JCC, 24:93-95, 321-324.

John Montgomery to William Irvine, July 26, 1783,
Burnett, LMCC, 7:235; Clark, NCSR, 24:419-422, 484; Thos.
Posey to Benjamin Harrison, July 30, 1782, Palmer, Calendar
of Virginia State Papers, 3:241-242.
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Congress "the Liberal allowance of
Congress in lue of half
pay must give general satisfaction and
will enable we poor
Continentals to drink our Beer with a contented
niind."^^^

Had Weedon been with the main army, he
would have seen there
was not a general satisfaction, as the problem
still remained
as to how Congress was going to pay for the
comm.utation and
how the states were going to satisfy their financial
obligations.

The army also had other concerns and were still

upset with the civilian leaders for several reasons.
One of the first concerns of the military was the

actual payment of the commutation, especially since there

was great objection to it in New England and also in New
York.

154

As the chief executive of Rhode Island explained
152

George Weedon to John F. Mercer, April 1, 1783,
Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary H istory p. 124; see also
George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, March 30, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 26:273.
,

,

153

.

VJilliam Irvine to Arthur St. Clair, April 17,
1783, Smith, The St. Clair P apers
1:582.
,

154

Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 14, 1733,
Reed, Joseph Reed
2:409; Noah Webster to Daniel Webster,
September 6, 18 34, Harry R. Warfel, Letters of Noah W ebster
(New York: Library Publishers, 1953), p. 434; William H.
Glasson [ed. by Divid Kinley]
Federal Military Pensions in
the United States pp. 4 3-4 9; Louie M. Miner, Our Rude Fore"fa thers: American Po lit ical Verse 1783- 1788
Cedar Rapids,
Iowa: Torch Press, 1937), pp. 88-90; James Madison to Edmund
Pendleton, September 8, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
Madison 7:306; James Madison to Edmund Randolph, September 8,
T783, ibid.
308; Same to same, July 21, 1783, ibid., 242
The New York Packet, July 24, 178 3; Dexter, Lite rary D iary
of ~E"z ra" ~sTi l"es7 3:74; Van Beck Hall, Poli t ics without Parti es:
Massachuse tts 1780- 1791 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 152-155.
,

,

,

(

,

;

,
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to their delegates in Congress,

cannot comply with
the coinrautation]

,

"The General Assembly

.

requisition of this kind [referring
to
because the measure tends to a military
a

establishment in time of peace."

He also cited several

other reasons the Assembly refused to make
funds available
for the commutation.

At a Farmington, Connecticut,

meeting early in August,

a

town

resolution was adopted accusing

the officers of attempting to profit at the expense
of the
people. '^^ This attitude General McDougall described
as a

"dishonorable Spirit."

1

S7

This dishonorable spirit was

certainly not held by the non-commissioned officers of the

Connecticut Line, who, during April, began demanding

a

half-

pay pension for themselves; upset only the officers were

getting this special provision.

15R

They, as well as the

other soldiers, were also upset during the spring that they
had not received the pay they had been promised.

The offi-

cers were as much, if not more, concerned about having their
'"^^William Greene to the Connecticut Delegates at
Congress, May 10, 1783, Bartlett, Re cords of Rhode Island
9 :703

,

.

•^^^

The Connecticut Courant

,

August 12

157

Alexander McDougall to
3:23.
1783, Ford, Samuel B lachle y Webb
[

]

,

1783

.

Wyllys, July 27,

,

15 8

George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22,
1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:351; Henry
Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783, Merrill Jensen,
ed States Dur i ng the
The New_Na t ion: A History of the Unit
"
80
Conf edeFatTon 17 8r^r7 89
.

o
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accounts settled as they were about receiving
the back pay
due them.
They were especially concerned that
they were to
be discharged before the accounts were settled ""-^^
.

These concerns of the military caused several
officers to believe that the army could still turn
against
tne civilians. 160

Since there was little prospect of relief,

this remained a continuing threat.

Early in May, one officer

described the soldiers as "loud and insolent" and the
officers "broken, dissatisfied and desponding ."
feelings,

Such

and the belief the nationalists could still stir

the army to violence, prompted Washington to observe,

"How

far nen, who labor under the pressure of accumulated distress,

and are irritated by a belief that they are treated with
159

George Washington to Theodorick Bland, April 4,
1783, Fitzpatrick, V\frit ings of Washington
26:285-291
George VJashington to the President of the Continental
Congress, June 7, 1783, ibid., 478; George Washington to
Joseph Jones, March 18, 1783, ibid., 232-233; George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 4, 1783, ibid., 292;
Same to same, April 22, 1783, ibid., 352; Edward Dunscomb to
Peter Gansevoort, June 10, 1783, Feinstone Collection ^291;
William Irvine to Arthur St. Clair, April 17, 1783, Smith,
The St Clair Papers, 1:582; Arthur St. Clair to William
Ifvlhe, May 6, 1783, ibid., 583.
,

;

.

Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29,
178 3, Paul David Henson, General H o ratio Ga tes: A Bio graphy
p. 279; Henry Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783,
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A Histor y of t he United
^^^^1 D u y i g t h eHc n f e d e r a t i on _ l_7_81jj. 78 9 p. 80; Jedediah
April 16, 1783, ibid.;
iTun^a^'ngtorr'to George' Washington
Nathanael Greene to Joseph Trumbull, April 21, 1783, Joseph
Truirtbull Collection, vol. 2, CSL.
''^'^John

,

,

"'^^John Armstrong,

1783, Burnett,

Jr.,

LMCC, 7:160n.3.

to Horatio Gates, May

9,

,

755

neglect, ingratitude, and injustice
in the extreme, night
be worked upon by designing men,
is worthy of very serious
consideration. ••-'-^^

Because of this unsettled state of
the army,
Washington decided to stay with the army,
rather

than retir-

ing from military service, and required
other officers to
remain with the army to ensure that discipline
was main-

tained.

16

3

Additionally, he and other officers informed
the
civilian leaders of the continued uneasiness of
the
army and

the necessity of their fulfilling their obligations
to the
military. 164 Washington wrote a member of Congress
that
.

.

although the late "disturbance" had been quelled, the officers were too much pressed by their present condition and

past sufferings to maintain their forbearance much longer.

Early in April, he wrote Hamilton the suspicions of the
officers were high.

Any attempt to discharge them before

their accounts were settled, he wrote,

"will convey the most

unfavorable ideas of the rectitude of Congress."

The next

month, Steuben wrote Lincoln that the "Officers and soldiers
162

George Washington to Lund V/ashington, .March 19,
1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
26:246.
,

16

3

George Washington to Tench Tilghinan, April 24,
1783, ibid., 358; George Washington to Henry Knox, May 14,
1783, ibid., 429-430.
164

George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, March 19,
1783, ibid., 240-241; George Washington to Alexander
Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 352; Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, April 23, 1783, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:395.

.

.
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are discontented in the highest degree,"
and stated "The

officers can not stand it any longer."

almost fear some-

"I

times that the suffering lot of these brave
men will prove
too hard for their patient virtues," Jonathan
Trumiull, Jr.,

wrote his father early in June.

"Yet," he concluded,

experience we have had of their patriotism

"the

firm attachment

&

to their duty hitherto gives us confidence in their
perse-

verance to the end." 16 5

Other officers shared the belief the military would
persevere without turning on the civilians

"^^^
.

But to make

certain, commanding officers constantly urged their officers

and soldiers to remain peaceful and disciplined until the

civilian governments could fulfill their obligations to the
army

167

George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 18, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, VJritin gs of W as hington 26:2 32-2 33; George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 3, 1783, ibid., 292;
Baron von Steuben to Benjamin Lincoln, March 25, 1783, Kapp,
Steuben pp. 491, 492; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan
Trumbull, Sr., June 4, 1783, MHSC 7th ser., 3:423.
,

,

,

^^^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, February 6,
1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers,
Arthur St. Clair to William Irvine,
LC (Microfilm Reel #1)
May 6, 1783, "Letters of General St. Clair to General Irvine,"
HM 7, no. 5 (May 1863): 154-155.
;

1 fi

7

Baron von Steuben to Elias Dayton and the officers
of the New Jersey Line, July 19, 1783, PNJHS 1st ser., 5,
General Orders, Whiting, Rev olutio nary
14
no. 1 (1850)
Orders of General W ashington p. 171 General Greene s
1783 Ryan, A Salute t o Co u rage
Gene Fa'iTo'rde r s 7" June
pp. 286-287
,

:

;

*
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,
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Most civilians hoped, now
that the war appeared
over
the army would melt peacefully
away.
"We have no reason to
apprehend," the Virginia Delegates
to Congress wrote Governor
Harrison, the army "will forget
they are Citizens as well
as
soldiers; or be dissatisfied with
the best provision that
can be made for them during the
distress of the war.-^^^
The belief the army would be
disbanded without
resorting to violence was not held by
all the civilian
leaders.
Many still feared the army would
turn violent.
Violence, they knew and feared, could
result in anarchy and
military tyranny, the things the revolutionary
leaders
feared most.^'^^ Thus, for many revolutionaries,
the spring
of 1783 was the most critical period of the war,
as the
168^,

.

.

The Virginia Delegates at Congress to Benjamin
Harrison, February 11, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
~
Madison 6:219.
.

—

,

Edmund Pendleton to James Madison and Joseph
Jones, June 30
1783, Mays, L^tite^s _£nd^apers__qf Edmund
Pendle ton, 2:454 Abigail Adams to 'John Adams, June~2y7"l78
3
Butterfield, Th^_^oo]^of _ A^bigaiJ^ _and _J^
p. 35 3
,

;

.

170

John Jay to Philip Schuyler, September 16, 1783,
Jay, John Jay 2:129; John Chester to Joshua Huntington,
March 21, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923):
171; Richard Peters to Charles Thomson, October 20, 1783,
NYHSC, 11 (1878): 178; Jonathan Trumbull's Farewell Address,
October
], 1783, Trumbull, Jon athan Trumbull
pp. 304-312;
VJilliam Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot April
], 1783,
"Letters from Wm. Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot, on the
Suspension of Hostilities Between the United States and
Great Britain," PNJHS 4, no. 3 (1849): 122; Jeremy Belknap
to Ebenezer Hazard,' July 1 3
178 3
MHSC 5th ser., 2:232
,

[

,

,

,

,

,

[
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things they were fighting for
could be lost.^^^
The likelihood of the military
subverting the
civilian governments or in some
other way undermining the
Revolution during the last nine
months of the war was minimal, as will be shown in the
next chapter.
For the most
part, the military were occupied
with thoughts of home, land
acquisition, and post-war careers. With
few exceptions,
the

officers and soldiers gave little or no
thought to demanding
by force what was owed them, believing
they would eventually
be compensated.
Nevertheless, many revolutionary leaders
still believed their restless and uncompensated
army posed
a threat to the Revolution.
171

James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson
Papers of James Madison, 6:348; James Madison to Edmund
Randolph, March 18, 1703, ibid., 356; Nathanael Greene
to
Gouverneur Morris, April 3, 1783, Sparks, Go^uve£neur_Morris
'

CHAPTER

XII

THE REVOLUTION SAFELY CONCLUDED

Because of the fears that the army
could still turn
violent and undermine the Revolution,
and because the cost
of keeping the army in the field
was
such a strain on the

limited resources of the continent,
most civilian and military leaders wanted to have the army
disbanded

as soon as it

could safely be done.

Discussion about disbanding the army actually
began
after Yorktown as peace seemed assured and
therefore
the

army unnecessary.
and early 1783

And

som.e

disbanding did occur during 1782

.''"

During the early part of 1783, there was apparently
some thought given to weakening the power of the army by

decentralizing it to various parts of the country until such
time as peace was finally concluded.

Alexander McDougall,

late in February, writing under the name "Brutus," informed

Knox there were some members of Congress who were considering

dividing the army up by dispersing units to different parts
of the country to lessen their influence and the threat of

^Ford, JCC, 22:209

,

210-212
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,

451-452

;

23:797

^
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a

military tyranny.

as during April,

To some degree, this was actually
done,

Congress ordered the Virginia, Maryland,

and Pennsylvania Lines, as well as the
artillery and cavalry

units under Greene's command be removed to their
home
states

.

The first major congressional concern about
disbanding the army came with the news on March 23,

provisional treaty of peace had been signed.

1783,

that a

Immediately

after receiving news of the peace, a congressional committee
asked Washington his opinion of their proposal of disbanding
the army with the promise to do them justice, reminding him

how expensive it was to keep the army in the field, particularly if it were until their accounts were settled and

permanent funds raised."^

Expense was

a

very important consideration for

Congress, as Robert Morris continually reminded them of the
lack of finances and the cost of keeping the army supplied.^

Fear of what the army might do was another important consider
ation in congressional decisions with respect to disbanding
2

"Brutus" to Henry Knox, February 27, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Champagne, Alexander
McDougall p. 195; Ford, JCC, 24:275-276.
,

3

John Francis Mercer to George Weedon or William
Fitzhugh, March 24, 1783, Burnett, LMCC 7:97; Theodorick
Bland to George Washington, March 25, 1783, ibid., 106-108.
,

^Robert Morris to Alexander Hamilton et al., April 14,
3:323.
1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Ha m ilton
,

"

.
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the army.

it was a consideration that was
also shared by

the military leaders.

Because of the continued unrest in the
army after
the Newburgh incident, Knox and Huntington
notified

Washington on the sixteenth of April the
sooner the "for the
war" soldiers were discharged, the better.
The next day,

Washington informed Congress about the continued
unrest and
a week later wrote Hamilton that he wished
all the
troops,

except those to be retained under

discharged.

a

peace establishment, be

If the army was not disbanded, he believed

their claims would only increase, and "our perplexities

multiply

.

5

Many officers and soldiers wanted to be discharged.
Anxious to resume their civilian careers, they were unwilling to remain in camp until Congress fully compensated them.^
5

Henry Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783,
Merrill Jensen, The New N ation: A Histo ry of the United
States Duri ng the Conf ederatTon 1 7 83^1^7^7' p"7 SOT'j'ed'ed'iah
Huntington to George Washington, Aprif 16 1783, ibid.;
George Washington to the General Officers of the Army,
April 17, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:328329; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783,
,

ibid

.

,

351

^George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22,
1783, ibid., 350-351; George Washington to the General Officers of the Army, April 17, 1783, ibid., 328-329; George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
April 18, 1783, ibid,, 330; George Washington to Nathanael
Greene, May 18, 1783, ibid., 443; George Washington to
Jedediah Huntington, May 14, 1783, ibid,, 429; Jedediah
Huntington to George Washington, May 11, 1783, ibid.,
429n.53; John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29,
1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:144n.3.

.
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Thus, beginning during the

suininer

of 1782

,

and especially

after April 1783, when news of peace arrived
in camp, many
soldiers deserted, not waiting to be formally
discharged.^
Most officers and many soldiers, however,
did not want to be
discharged until they were compensated, or at
least their
o
accounts settled.
Some civilian leaders also did not want
extensive

discharging to take place, for several reasons.

Among them

was the continued nationalist desire that the uneasiness
of
the army would compel the states to agree to their
financial

program; the practical necessity of the army as long as the

enemy remained on the American shores; and the usefulness of
a

m

strong army as a bargaining chip to the American diplomats
their negotiations.

9

7

Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, August 4,
7th ser., 3:370; William Heath to Benjamin
1782, MHSC
Lincoln, July 24, 1782, ibid., 5:379-390; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., September 21, 1782,
ibid., 3:383; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
July 21, 1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 454;
General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 25:118119, 212-213, 222, 252-253, 424; Edward McCrady, The History
of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783 pp^. 701-702
Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals pp. 389-390;
Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1783, Palmer,
Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:486; Nathanael Greene
to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17, 178 3, Nathanael Greene Collec,

,

;

,

,

tion, vol.

77,

WLCL.

g

Baron von Steuben to Henry Knox, February 25, 178 3,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 14, 1783, Timothy Pickering
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1)
9

"Brutus" to Henry Knox, February 12, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).

on April 11,

1783, Congress proclaimed an end
to

hostilities, and four days later they
ratified the peace
agreement.
Nothing was said to Washington about
demobilization, for Congress at this point did
not know what they
wanted to do. They did know, however,
as the Rhode Island
delegates wrote their state's governor, "The
disbanding
of

the army is a matter of great consequence."

On the twenty-

third of April, Richard Peters wrote Steuben
the problem
previously had been one of how to raise an army,
"The only
one which now embarrasses us is how to dissolve

it."-'-^

Compromising on the twenty-third of April, Congress
decided that although the soldiers enlisted "for the war"
would not be officially discharged until the ratification
of the definitive treaty of peace, Washington, at his own

discretion, could grant furloughs to them.

Madison observed, was

a

This decision,

compromise "between those who wished

to get rid of the expence of keeping the men in the field,

and those, who thought it impolitic to disband the army

whilst the British remained in the

U.

S.

""'""'"

During May, Congress frequently debated the question
of disbanding the army, and Morris constantly reminded them

Ford, JCC, 24:238-240; John Collins and Jonathan
Arnold to William Greene, April 23, 1783, Burnett, LMCC,
7:143; Richard Peters to Baron von Steuben, April 23, 1783,
ibid
150
.

,

.

24:269-270 James Madison's "Notes on
Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:486.
"'""'"Ford,

JCC,

;

3

;
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of the cost of keeping the
army in the field.
the twenty-sixth of May,

Finally, on

Congress unanimously agreed
to
furloughing the "for the war" soldiers,
and a proportionate
number of officers.
They would receive their
discharges
upon the ratification of the
definitive peace treaty. Additionally, they agreed that the
North Carolina troops who had
enlisted for eighteen months and a
proportionate number of
officers also be furloughed, a provision
that had already
been made for the Virginia, Maryland,
and Pennsylvania troops
under Greene.
^he latter decision had been made
because
of the continued unrest in the southern
command throughout
the spring. 1
Congress, realizing they could not let the army
leave without a reward, decided to give each
soldier three

months pay,

a

figure that had been suggested by Washington

as appropriate.

Three months pay, however, was

a

sizeable

sum: estimated around $750,000--an amount that Congress
did
12

James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 109n.l3;
7:53-54, 66-67, 67n.2, 80; Robert Morris to the President of'
the Continental Congress, July 18, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence 6:563-566; Morris's Diary,
ibid., 432n; Ford, JCC, 24:358, 364-365.
,

13

Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 16,
1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the
United States During the Confederation 1781-1789 p.~80
Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1783, Palmer,
Calendar of Virginia State Papers 3:486; Nathanael Greene
to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17, 1783, Nathanael Greene Collection, vol. 77, WLCL; Hugh Rankin, The North Carolina
Continental s p. 389
,

,

,

.
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not have access to, without Morris
issuing notes on his
personal credit. Morris, however,
had detern^ined to resign
by the end of May if no permanent
source of revenue had been
agreed to, and it had not. Nevertheless,
he was prevailed
upon to issue notes on his personal
credit, in anticipation
of loans. "'^
On the second of June, Washington,
having received

news of Congress's twenty-sixth of May
resolution, issued
furlough orders to the "for the war" soldiers
and a proportionate number of officers.
Upset that the army was being

released without pay, nor

permanent source of revenue to

a

pay them, as V7ell as to commutate the officers' half-pay
pension, a committee of general officers and commanding

officers of regiments met on the fifth of June and drew up
a

petition to Washington.

In it they requested that no

14

George Washington to Robert Morris, April 9, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, Writ ings of Washing ton 26:309; George Washington to Theodorick" Bland, April 4', 1783, ibid., 285-291
George VJashington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783,
ibid., 351-352; Robert Morris to a Committee of Congress,
April 14, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:376-377; Same to "same. May T5",~T7 8"3~^b^dT7~4 29432; Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, May 1
ibid., 399-403; Same to same. May 3,
1783
1783, ibid., 405-406; Robert Morris to Alexander Hamilton
et al., April 4, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton
3:323; Ford, JCC, 24:295-297, 283-285; 25:906-907; Young,
Robert Morris pp. 150-151; E. James Ferguson, The Power of
the Pur s e A History o f A merican P ublic Finance 1776-1790
(Chapel hTII: University of North ~Carol ina "Press foF the""
Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1961), p. 169
,

;

,

,

,

,

:

Fitzpatrick, \7ri tings of Washington 26:463-465; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan
Trumbull, Sr., June 4, 178 3 VAISC, 1th ser., 3:422.
"'"^General Orders,

,

,
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forced furloughs take place until
Congress had a chance to
hear of their plight and that Washington
urge Congress to
ascertain balances, liquidate accounts,
and provide adequate
funds for all payments, including commutation
Washinaton
responded the next day by informing the army
in his general
orders that if the "for the war" soldiers
did not want to be
furloughed they would not, provided soldiers
enlisted for
.

three years took their place, and informed the army
that

three days previously he had called upon the Superintendent
of Finance to provide the three months pay that had been

promised

'^'^
.

Washington made this unauthorized decision based on
the fear that the army might revolt if it appeared they were

being forced home without any hope of payment.

VJith

respect

to those soldiers who might turn violent if they v;ere not

released, Washington, on the fourteenth of May, issued

orders to Knox and Huntington, that if any soldiers showed
1

a

Petition to Washington signed by William Heath
on behalf of the generals and officers corimanding regiments
and corps in the cantonment of the Hudson River, June [5],
1783, Sidney Kaplan, "Pay, Pension, and Pov/er: Economic
Grievances of the Massachusetts Officers of the Revolution,"
BPLQ 3, no. 2 (April 1951): 139-140.
17

General Orders Fitzpa trick Wri tings o f
Washington 26:471-472 George V7ashington to the Superintendent of Finance June 3, 1783, ibid., 463-467.
,

,

;

,

,

8

.

.

mutinous disposition because of

.

,

.

desire to be discharged,

a

they were to be immediately furloughed

Washington's fears about his army revolting
were
relieved as many officers and soldiers,
eager to
return

home, peacefully disbanded, not waiting to
receive their
three months pay.
By June 20, 1783, when Washington

re-organized his army and ordered them to march to
West
Point, most of his army had melted away.

The same was true

of the general officers, with only Knox, Paterson,
Greaton,

Huntington, and Howe still remaining with the northern
19

army

Late in April 1783, Steuben had called on Washington
to have the discharging done with dignity, with appropriate

discharges presented to the soldiers.

20

This did not happen,

as the officers and soldiers were simply released.

As

Colonel Stev7art observed, "the dissolution of our army was
unexpected, as it was sudden, and

been

a

I

can assure you had you

spectator of the scene, your heart would have bled

for the poor fellows who were in so disgraceful

a

manner

1

George Washington to Jedediah Huntington, May 14,
429
1783 ibid.
George VJashington to Henry Knox, May 14
1783, ibid., 430.
,

,

;

19

George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 24, 1783, ibid., 27:34; Boynton,
General Ord ers of G eo. Wa shing ton p. 75
,

20

1783

,

Baron von Steuben to George Washington, April 26,
Kapp, Steuben pp. 511-512
,

o
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turnea off.'.^l

The

sarne

was true of the southern
and

western armies.
By late June, when Greene
received news of Congress's
eleventh of June resolution ordering
the furloughing of those

soldiers of the Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and
Virginia Lines agreeable to their
resolution of the twentysixth of May, a good portion of his army
had already

departed peacefully, not waiting to be formally
discharged.
The rest would drift away during the summer,
some waiting
for water transportation home, others not.
Greene,
once

Charleston was re-occupied and the rest of his army
furloughed, left the south on the eleventh of August.
During
mid May, General Irvine arrived back at Fort Pitt and
seeing
the troops were restless because of the lack of supplies,

furloughed most of them on the first of July.
of October,

By the first

Irvine and the remainder of the western army,

except a small garrison at Fort Pitt, had departed the west
and were furloughed. 22
21

Walter Stewart to Horatio Gates, June 20, 1783,
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A Hi st ory of t he United
States During the Co nfederati on 1 781-1789 pT' 8T~s^'~^s
Timothy Pickering to" Samuel Hodgdon June 7, 1783, Pickering,
Timothy Pickering 1:473; Same to same, June 12, 1783, ibid.,
Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, June 17, 1783, ibid.,
474; Timothy Pickering to
Pickering, June 18, 1783,
ibid.; Baron von Steuben to
], 1783, Kapp,
Steuben Appendix, pp. 686, 688,
,

,

,

[

]

[

]

[

,

22

Ford, JCC, 24:390; Hugh F. Rankin, The Nort h Carolina Contin entals, pp. 389-39 0 Edv;ard McCrady, The His tory
p "TO 2T"
o f South Carolina in the Revolut ion 1780-1783
Wi 1 1 iam Irvine to Benjamin Lincoln, August 17, 1783,
;

,

.
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For the .ost part, the
disbanding was peacefully
done, as Washington and the
other officers ensured
it was
done with strict discipline
enforced, with soldiers
leavino
on furloughs properly
officered.
There was so.e concern
about letting the soldiers carry
their ar.s with the., but
Washington successfully prevailed
upon Congress durxng
April
to let the soldiers leave with
their arms and accoutrements
There were several reasons and
factors why the disbanding was peacefully accomplished,
and why the army
remained relatively peaceful the last
year of the war. One
of the most important factors was
the appearance that the
civilian authorities were attempting to
make good on their
promises.
This was the result of the improved
economic
condition of the states during the last years
of the war.^^

Butterfield, Washi^gton-Tr^^^

appendix

B,

23

General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington 26:471; John Lamb to George""ClTnton May
2,
1783, Hastings, Public P apers of George Clinton, 8:163-164.
,

~

,

2 4^,

Ibid.; George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, April 18, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington 26:332-333; Ford, JCC, 24:269-270 jE^i
Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James
—
Madison 7:53-54.
,

;

,

Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in th e
Southern States to I860, 2:589, table 167 Ebenezer Hazard to
John Eliot, June 13, 1783, Andrew-Eliot Collection, MHS;
Christopher Crittenden, The Commerce of North Carolina 1763 178_9, Yale Historical Publications, Miscellany 29 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1936), pp. 7, 157; William Columbus
Hunter, "The Commercial Policy of New Jersey under the
Confederation 1 78 3-1 789 " (Ph D. dissertation, Princeton
University, 1922), pp. 27-29; Charles Henry Ambler,
.

—
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And, although the finances
of Congress

were,

for all

practical purposes, non-existent,
there were reasons for
the
n^ilitary to be optimistic about
eventually receiving
all

that was due them.

Among them were the decision
by Robert

Morris not to resign at the end of
May, as he had intended
to; the adoption of the impost
by Congress
in April;

and the

late March decision to commutate the
officers' half-pay to
a fixed one time payment.
The military were also pleased
by receiving, in early June, three months
pay, and by the
efforts, during the summer, of the Paymaster
General to

settle their accounts.

Particularly gratifying to the

officers were the issuance that fall of commutation

certificates and the decision by Congress in September
to
promote all officers who had served over five years
without
a promotion.

payment
,

This decision meant a larger commutation

26

Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), p. 48; RIHSC 6 (1867): 87;
Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Between the American a nd the'
French Revolutions (1783-1789) (Chicago: UniversitT""^
Chicago Press, 1950), p. 27; Brunhouse, Counter-Re volut ion
in Penn s ylvania p. 150; David Rich Dewey, Financial Histor
y
of the Un ited States, p. 47; Bullock, "The Finances of the
United States from 1775 to 1789," p. 147; William G. Sumner,
The Financier and the Finance s of the American Revolution,
1:293-295.
,

,

26

Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, July 18, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence 6:563-566; Elias Boudinot to the Ministers
Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, July 15, 1783,
ibid., 546; Ford, JCC 24:256-262, 268, 284-285; 25:632;
Raphael P. Thian, Legislative History of the General Staff
of the Army of the United States (Its Organization, Duties,
,

,

,

,
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farm will satisfy my ami.ition," he
wrote.

^^^^^^

the whole war, Washington was
especially eager to return
home, to "the pleasure of a little
repose and retirement
In June 1783, he wrote that he was
awaiting the definitive
treaty, for it would end his military
service, thereby

allowing him to spend the rest of his life
"in that kind of
ease and repose which a man enjoys that is
free
from the

load of public cares."

3

Domestic concerns filled

a

large part of the minds

of the military during the last two years of the war.

Many

officers were eager to marry and settle down to peaceful
pursuits.

Some officers, early in the war, decided they

would not consider the questions of love and marriage until
29

William North to Benjamin Walker, [November 1783]
Feinstone Collection #1031; Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob
Morris, December 10, 1781, "Letters to General Lewis
Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 497; John Lamb to Henry Knox,
December 20, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel
#10); Sebastian Bauman to Henry Knox, November 7, 1782,
ibid
.

30

George Washington to Tench Tilghman, April 24,
1783, Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Wa sh ingt on, 26:358; see
also George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, April 30,
1783, ibid., 369; George Washington to William Heath,
February 5, 1783, ibid., 97; George Washington to James
McHenry, December 10, 1783, ibid., 27:266.
31

George Washington to John Augustine Washington,

June 15, 1783, ibid., 27:12.
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,
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the war ended. ^2

^.^^ York town behind ihom,
such
considerations absorbed the attention
of many.
Courtships
began in earnest, with some officers
even set on courting
and marrying well-to-do widows as
a means of diminishing
their financial plight. '^^ ^^^^
courtships and
lengthy engagements culminated in marriage
during the last
two years of the war, as many officers did
not want to wait
until the army was disbanded before beginning
life in a

married state.

And most of these officers left

tl)e

military

service to do so. 34
32

Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington,
September 10, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20
(1923)
367; "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His LetteFi7 from 1768
to 1781, Including his 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop "

HM,

2d ser.,

8,

no.

(September 1870):

3
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129-146.
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John Pratt Collection, vol. 1, CSL: Isaac Van Home to
Reading Beatty, May 18, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., [ed.],
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1781-1788," PMHB 54, no. 2 (]930): 157; Same to same,
October 4, 1782, ibid., 169; "Letters from Col. Lewis Morris
to Miss Ann Elliott," S_CHGM 40, no. 4 (October 1939): 122136; ibid., 41, no. 1 (January 1940): 1-4; Nathanael Greene
to Lewis Morris, Sr., August 26, 1782, "Letters to General
Lewis Morris," NYj^lSC, 8 (1876): 506 Thad[deus] Kosciuszko
to O[tho] H[olland] Wi 1 iams, February 11
1783 Calendar of
the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland
"
Historical Society p. 78; Lily Lee Nixon, James Burd
Frontier Defender 1726-1793 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1941) p 18 2.
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Blackwell P. Robinson, Wi 1 am R. Davi e p. 131;
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Reading
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Joseph M, Reatty, Jr., "T,e(ters of
the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army,
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Ibid., 44, no. 3 (1920): 233, ibid., 47, no. 2 (1923)172-173n.272; White, Hi storical Collections of Georgia,
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others were just as concerned
about the health and
well-beinc,
of their wives, some of
whom died the last year
of the war
Gates even left the army in
March to take care of his
sick
Wife, Who died that .une.^^
,13,
and interest of the fathers
in uniform, was the
birth, wellbeing, and education of their
children.
Some officers, such
as Rufus Putnam, left the
army to be with their
pregnant
wives; while others
ui-iers, such
^uc^h as Sebastian
c^k-^^jBauman remained at
camp, anxious about the impending
birth of their children.
And all fathers must have simply
missed their children.
General Greene certainly did. Although
his wife joined him
during 1782, their children remained
in Rhode Island.
He
wrote a friend late that year how much
he missed his children
and his desire to return home.^^
•

,

36^

§-?ig^:£-^^Y.^Jii^tory, p. 62; John Austin
qtPvPn.
Stevens,
Ebenezer Stevens: Lieut. Col. of Artillery in
the
Continental Army," MAH 1, no. 10 (October 1877): 609Patterson, Horatio_Gates, pp. 332, 334-346,
347; Paul David Nelson,
General Horatio Gate s: A_Bio^graphy pp. 268, 2 76
277.
.

,

37

James Minor Lincoln, The Paper s of Captain Rufus
Mas s. Compile d _from thi^O Fi^THa JTR^^d
^jjiB^^jjL-^Ljl^Ejhgm
Mary C. Doll Fairchild, ["idT] MemoTFi~^f~C^T^l
pp. 43, 55
S_ebastian Bauman an d His__ Descendant s. With
SeTec ti^HTTFom
his Co rresponden ce, p. 38; Francis S. Drake, Memorials of
the
Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts p. 2 4 27~Dav'rd
Cobb to Robert Treat Paine, June 19, 1782, Robert Treat
Paine Collection (Xerox copies), MHS Same to same, August 28,
1782, ibid.; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering,
October 31, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel n)
^
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38

Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Jr., December 21,
1782, Clifford P. Monahon and Clarkson A. Collins, 3rd, [eds.],
"Nathanael Greene's Letters to 'Friend Sammy' Ward," RIH 17,

no.

1

(January 1958):

18-19.
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Washington also had personal
and domestic concerns,
which increased his desire to
return ho.e
of immediate
concern was his health, as both
his eyesight and teeth
had
worsened during the war.^^ His
family and relatives were
also of great concern.
When his stepson died late
.

in 1781,

he left behind

a

wife and four children.

became Washington's responsibility.
Washington, had to be educated.

So,

They,

in part,

His nephew, Bushrod
in 1782, Washington

arranged for him to study law under James
Wilson.
concerned about the debt his brother, Samuel,

He was

had accumulated

and that Lund Washington had not done an
adequate job of
managing Mount Vernon during his absence, especially
his
not forcing the tenants to pay their rent.

Although Martha

being with him must have been of some comfort, he
still

worried about her, as she was sick with the fever during
the
summer of 1783.
financial plight.

Washington was most concerned about his
Despite having made purchases of land in

New York, which he was anxious about, he believed he had
suffered considerably during the war.
was true as, with the

6

To some degree this

percent interest on money he laid

out himself during the war, Washington was owed over $400,000
by Congress.

For these reasons, he greatly desired to return

39

George Washington to William Stephens Smith,
May 15, 1783, Fitzpatrick, VJri tings of Wa shington 26:434;
George V^ashington to Tlndrew Billings, June 17 1783 ibid.,
27:19.
,
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to Mount Vernon,

to ta.e care of

Ms

fa.ily,

°

and himself.

Ms

affairs,

Jedediah Huntington observed
early in 1783 fro. his
west Point ca^p that .'The Peace
will undoubtedly brin,
about
a great Revolution in
Conferee; it will
difficult to know
where , how to take Advantage
of rt.""
indeed,

^

„,any

officers' attention during the
last years of the war
focused
on their economic futures.
Some officers and soldiers,

already by 1781, had started planning
their post-war
pursuits. 42 Others had business
plans, such as Pickering,
for a mercantile business and General
Greene, for becoming
40

Washington to Henry Knox, September
1783
lbid''''°^I^
Ibid.,
1783,
165; George Washington to Georqe Clinton 23,
August 12, 1783, ibid., 99 -100 George
Washington to Lund
;

^^^^^ 2?3rSame tS
same February 12, '^lll^
slTe'TeTrLrTL
1783, ibid., 26:126-127; George
Washinaton to John Augustine Washington, January
i6, 1783
ibid
41; George Washington to Bushrod Washington
Janua;yj5
1783, Ibid., 38-40; George Washington to James
March 22, 1782 ibid., 24:88; George Washington Wilson
Jo
Alexander Hamilton, April 22 1783, ibid., 26-35'^-353.
Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull
Sr"
1783, MHSC
7th ser., 3:438; Same to same Auaust Julv7R 30
7
Ibid.
W. E. Woodward, Ge_orge Washington:
440
The image
and the_Man, p. 391; Marvin Ki tman~G^F^-Wiihii^ton
^s
Expense Account (New York: Simon and"^hIIitil:T'
lT7"0")TT. 31.
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Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington
February 24, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20
(1923)
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a

rice planter.

See

officers and soldiers started
their
business ventures at or near the end
of the war/^ Colonel
Walter Stewart, for example, during
1782, set up a shipping
company, and upon his discharge early
in 1783, sent out ships
for Havana and France/^ Private
Samuel Smith, of Providence,
upon his discharge during mid 1783, shipped
out on a whaling
brig bound for the Brazilian coast
During the spring of
1783, Washington allowed Colonel Matthias Ogden to
go to

France to begin

a

business venture on behalf of

New Jersey officers.

^"^

a

number of

Also that spring. Lieutenant

Colonel Samuel Ward, having left the military, sailed
on the
"George Washington" out of Providence for Canton, in hopes
of beginning a trade with the orient.
43

The following

.

Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, January
1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, r4HS (Microfilm Reel #1)
Timothy Pickering to George Williams, February 17, 1783,
Pickering, Timothy Pick ering 1:401; Thayer, Nat_hanael
Greene p. 405.

4,

,

'

,

44

Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge

,

p.

85.

45

Joseph A. Goldenberg, "The 'William' and 'Favorite':
The Post-Revolutionary Voyages of Two Philadelphia Ships,"
PMHB 93, no. 3 (July 1974): 325-328.
46

Charles I. Bushnell, [ed.]. Memoirs of S amuel
Smith, Soldier of the Revolution, 1776-1786. Writ ten by
Himself (Nev7 York: privately printed, 1860)
pp. 22-23
,

47

George Washington to Matthias Ogden, April 7,
1783, Fitzpatrick, Writi ngs of W ashi ngton, 26:305; Same to
same, April 19
1783, ibid
3T0l rToiIis Gottschalk,
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February, he and another '-^Lj-xcer
officer sailr-H
sailed r.,,^
out of^ Imgw York City
on the "Empress of China" with
a similar view in mind/^
While many in the army thought
about their families
and post-war pursuits, many others
turned their attention to
obtaining the land they had been promised.
Land was a major
factor in preventing the military from
taking other property
from their fellow citizens.
it served as a safety valve to
the frustrations of the military.
Instead of plotting a
military overthrow of the central government
or the state
governments, many in the military during the last
two years
of the war, spent hours discussing their plans
for the land

they would obtain upon the peace.

Before the end of the

war, many even left for the new lands, frequently in
the
far west.

This removed from the scene many

v/ho

might have

abetted, encouraged, and participated in some form of

military tyranny.
Actually, some began consideration of moving west-

ward as early as 1778

,

even before the war terminated.''^

Despite objections that to open the western lands to
48

(1867)

:

Qumcy, Samuel Shaw,

pp.

110-112, 133; RIHSC,

6

87.
49

William Russell to William Fleming, October 7,
1778, Merrill Jensen, The Articl es of C onfederation; An
Interpretatio n of the Socral-C onstitutional ~Hrstory"~"of~ the
American Revolu tion 1 774-1781 ^pp. 19 9-2 0'o7"~Samuel ~H7"^Parsons
to George Clinton, February 21, 1780, Hastings, Public P
of Geor ge Clinton 5:505; Francis Lewis William^FToyd /"jolirT"
Jay, and James Duane to George Clinton, February 3, 1779,
Morris, John Jay, pp. 548-549.
,

,

,
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settlement before the war ended would
deplete the armies
and provide an asylum for deserters,
by the end
of 1781,

several states had not only set aside
lands for their
soldiers, but established land officers
to distribute the
land
The actual exodus to the west began
after George

Rogers Clark's success in the Illinois country,
and continued
at an increasing pace once land was opened
for settlement
in Kentucky and Tennessee.^'''

During 1782 and 1783, more land was opened and
more
land offices were established
During those years a
land

.

rush to the west took place, as many veterans took advantage

Mordecai Gist to Robert Munford, October 24, 1780
"Letter of Genl. Gist to Col. Munford," MHM 4, no. 4
(December 1909): 371; Merrill Jensen, "The~Cession of the
Old Northwest," MVHR 23, no. 1 (June 1936): 37; Hening, The
Statutes at Larg e: gejj^g__a_Co l lection of aH _th£_Laws of
Virginia 10:50, 445, 565; Brunhouse," Counter -ReVoTut lon in
"~
Pennsylva n ia pp. 9 8-99.

"

,

,

^"'"Clarence Walworth Alvord, The Illino i s Country
1673-1818 vol. 1 of the Centennial History of niinois
,

(Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Centennial Commission,
1920), p. 340; Patricia Watlington, The Partisan Spi rit:
Kentucky Politics, 1779-1 792 (iJew York: Atheneum for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, 1972), pp. 18, 23; Jack M. Sosin, The
Revolutionary Frontier 1763-1783 p. 133; William Davies to
R. H. Harrison, March 20, 1780, Stewart, William Woodford
2:1158; Lem 1 Baritt to Thomas Sim Lee, September 26, 1780,
Browne, Maryland A rchives 45:123.
,

,

'

52

Hening, The S tatutes at Large: Be ing a C olle ction
of all the Laws o f Vi rginia7^474T9^T2"2 7~ ATe>r~MT~H iTz"^
"Georgia'Bounty Land Grants " GHQ 38, no. 4 (December 1954):
,

340

.

of settling the lands they had been
granted.

Interest in

settling in the west picked up dramatically
after the socalled Newburgh incident, as many officers
believed their
only future lay in the western lands owed them.
If they
were not to imnnediately receive their pay and
pensions, at
least they would receive their land.

Many officers undertook to have

tract of land set

a

aside in the v/est specifically for veterans.

over two hundred officers signed

During May,

petition, requesting that

a

Congress set aside the Ohio country for the veterans, and
that it eventually be admitted to the Confederation as
state.

a

Early in June, Washington forwarded the petition to

Congress, with the endorsement of it, reasoning that such an
53

Jos. A. Waddell, Annals o f Augusta Count y, Virginia,
from 17 26 to 187 1, p. 315; Louise Frederick Hays, Hero of
Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elija h Clark 1733 to~r79"97~"
p. 171; John M. Roberts, [ed.]. Autobiograp hy of a Revolutionary Soldier (Clinton, Louisiana: Feliciana~Democrat~
Printers, 1859), pp. 68-72; Russell J. Ferguson, Early
Western Pennsylvania Politics (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 19 38)
p. 42; Dorsey Pentecost to James
Wilson, June 26, 1783, E. Douglas Branch, "Plan for the
Western Lands, 1783," PMHB 60, no. 3 (July 1936): 288-289;
Samuel Cole VJilliams, Te nnesse e D uring the Revolutionary War,
pp. 225-231; Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio
1778-1779," pp. 386n.3, 402n.l; James Ripley Jacobs,
Tarnished Warrior: Ma jor- General James Wilk inson, p. 69;
,

Anderson, Sold ier and Pioneer: A Biographical Sketch
of Lt.-Col. Richard C. Anderso n of the Continental Army
18 79), pp
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Son's
41, 43; William
Irvine to the Secretary at VJar, October 28, 1782, Burnett,
LMCC, 6:542n.2.
E.

L.

,

.
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Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, April 7,
1783, Pickering, Timothy P ickering 1:457; see also ibid.,
appendix 3, 546-549."
,
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area would protect their boundaries,
especially since it
would be primarily settled by veterans.
His lobbying
efforts were joined by many officers,
who no longer desired
to reside in the east once the war
ended.

Washington also kept himself busy
during the spring
and surmner thinking about the development
of the western
lands, particularly since he owned
approximately 58,000
acres of land beyond the Alleghenies and
was in the process
of purchasing several thousand acres in
the Mohawk Valley.

Congress did not accept the plan endorsed by
Washington, in part because Virginia's cession of
her western lands had not been accepted and peace had not
been made

with the Indian tribes in the Ohio country.

Thus, by the

time the army was disbanded, no arrangements had been made
by Congress for the settlement of the west.

Nevertheless,

the veterans made other arrangements, involving themselves
in other pursuits or going west on their own.
55

Copy of the petition in Buell, Rufus Putnam
pp. 215-216; names of signers in William Parker Cutler and
Julia Perkins Cutler, Life[,] Journals and Correspondence of
Rev. Manasseh Cutler, LL.D.
2 vols.
(Cincinnati: Robert
Clarke and Company, 1888), 1:160-167; Rufus Putnam to Henry
Knox, June 10, 1783, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Rufus Putnam
to George Washington, June 16, 1783, Buell, Rufus Putnam
p. 217; Henry Knox to George Washington, September 17, 1783,
Drake, Henry Knox p. 85; George Washington to the President
of the Continental Congress, June 17, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 27:16-18.
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,

,

,

,

"^^George VJashington to James Duane

September 7,
1783, ibid., 133-140; Charles H. Ambler, George VJashington
and the West (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1936), pp. 173-174.
,

The various factors just
discussed kept the military
busy, giving them less time to
contemplate their concerns
and problems, as well as less
time to foment violent
means
of redressing their grievances.
Also keeping the military
occupied the last year of the war
were another set of
factors.
These involved the mxlitary
engaging in a variety
of domestic, social, political, and
military activities.
With respect to social and domestic
activities, many
officers kept themselves amused in a variety
of ways.
Several had their wives join them at camp,
such as Washington and Greene. ^"^ Others found women for
company wherever
they could. 5 8 Steuben spent many hours fishing
and playing
chess.

One young officer, quartered near York, Pennsyl-

vania, during 1782 and 1783, bought

a

flute with the

intention of learning how to play it.^°

Some officers,

including Washington, spent time reading and purchasing
books.

^"^

Others, including Gates, Pickering, and David
57

Greene, Nathanael Greene

,

3:486.
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Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, October 19,
1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #15).
59

Mabel Lorenz Ives, Washingto n's Headquarters

60
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Erkuries Beatty to Reading Beatty, September 12,
1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty
Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," PMHB 44,
no.
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(1920)
61

,

:
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Bray, Diary of A Common Soldier, p. 2 6 9; George
V7ashington to William Stephens Smith, May 21, 1783, Fitzpatrick. Writings of V7ashinqton, 26:449-4 50; Same to same,
June 20, 178 3, ibid., 27:24-25.
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Humphreys, wrote poetry and essays.

Although Washington

did not write poetry, he did correspond
on the subject during
the summer of 1783.
He also spent time corresponding
about
food, furnishings, and furniture for Mount
Vernon. And once
New York City was occupied, he shopped for
adornments with
which to furnish Mount Vernon.
He also spent many hours
during 1782 and 1783 writing thank you letters to
American
and foreign officers.

Several officers kept amused during

1783 by being tourists.

During the fall, Pickering and

several other officers took a tour of the northern battlefields.

During the summer, Washington, Governor Clinton,

and most of V7ashington

'

s

aides took

ling some 750 miles during

a

a

similar tour, travel-

three week period.

That fall,
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Colonel Hu m phreys pp. 11, 32.
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,

,

6

,

1783

,

785

Washington made plans for

a

grand tour of America the

following spring.

Another thing keeping the officers busy was their
political careers, as many contemplated entering or

re-entering the political world upon their discharge.

Early

in 1784, Edmund Randolph wrote Jefferson that "the elections

for this year have proved the readiness of the citizens to

incorporate the military with the civil." 6 9

This was indeed

true of the elections held during the fall of 1783 and the

winter of 1783-1784.

70

Jackson Turner Main, in his studies

of political parties before the Constitution, found that

over 40 percent of those elected to the Massachusetts

Assembly between 1784 and 1788 served in the military during
the war, and nearly 60 percent of those elected to the

Virginia House for the same period were veterans.
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He did
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Constitution, pp. 93, 246; for similar statistics for other
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not disti.ujuish betwoon Continonlal
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Borvice,
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tlu>re

is sufficient evidence to
indicate nu.ny wore Conti-

nontn-1

offi.ors.

The afterglow of apotheosis of
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service ondow-nl many veterans vv
political prestige.
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A year later,

he reported that Maryland preferred to
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government 72
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recently
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783 and 1784, many officers, havnuj

jnr.t

the military, were elected sheriffs and
(lu-m

wore Calnm^lr, David Cobb, Samuel Elbert,

George Ilandley,

i;i)luaiu)

Marinus WiLlett.

73

Brown, John Faiioliorand Ciimko, and

other officers were oJccted to

state legislative bodies.

tlioir

Among them were GontMals Waynt>,

Morgan, McDougall, Maxwell, and Colonels Kdward Carrinyton,

James Jackson, and John

B.

Ashe, and Surgeon Ebenezer
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El.er.^^

So.e officers were elected
to the executive branch
of the state governn^ents
Pennsylvania, for example,
during 1783, the Council of Censors
was composed of Generals
St. Clair, Wayne, Irvine, and
Major James Moore.
Georgia,
during 1784, Major John Habersham
became President of the
Executive Council.
other officers were elected to
less
important positions. General John
Paterson in 1784 became
town moderator of Lenox, Massachusetts,
and Colonel Richard
Varick, who would be elected to the state
legislature during
1784, served during 1783 and 1784 as the
Recorder of the
City of New York.^^ other officers were
appointed to

m

.

m

civilian positions.

Major John Armstrong, Jr., and Lieuten-

ant John Rose served as secretary and clerk
respectively

during 1783 for the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive
Council
74

[Rufus W. Griswold]
Was hington and t he Generals
^LJ^^_^?:i£^^e vol u ti on 1:12 6; Don HigaiFb^thiH7~DiHii'l
Morgan: Revolutiona ry Rifleman (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, 1961), p 175BDC, pp. 527, 912, 1371; J. H. Griffith, "William Maxwell of'
New Jersey, Brigadier General in the Revolution," PNJHS, 2d
ser., 13, no. 2 (1894): 121; Garland Evans Hopkins, Colonel
Carri ngton of Cumberland (Winchester, Virginia: Drivately
printed, 1942), p. 33; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of
Major General James Jack son, p. 50.
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,
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Charles Colcock Jones, "A Biographical Sketch of
the Honorable Major John Habersham of Georgia," MH extra
,

no.

2,

no.

7,

pt.

2

(1886):

246.

^^Egleston, John P aterson
child of Washington, p. 21'2.

,

p.

146;

Baxter, A God-

.

and the Council of Censors.

.

.

;

The for.er body appointed

colonel Andrew Porter as
commissioner to run the boundary
lines with Ohio, Virginia and
New York.^^
the latter
state, right after the war.
Colonel John Lamb was made
the
collector of the Port of New York
and the Chief Geographer
of the Army; Simeon DeWitt was
made Surveyor General
Washington and the other conmianding
officers attempted
to keep the minds of their officers
off their problems

m

and

prospects by

a

alliance.

Other celebrations were held at Newburgh, such

variety of social and military activities.
A public building was built during the
winter of 1782-1783
at NGwburgh.
Besides keeping the soldiers busy building
it,
Washington had it built so it could be used
for both military and social events.
It was used for religious services,
and such social gatherings as the anniversary
of the French

as on April 19,

1783, when the declaration of

the cessation

77

Robert D. Arbuckle, Pennsylvania Speculator and
Patriot: The Entre preneuria l John Nicholson, 1757- 1800, p.
Linn, Penns ylvania in" the War of the Revolutio n, lT60Tn
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David R. B. Nevin, Con t inental Sketches of
Distinguished Penns ylvanians pp. 135-136.

"

,

79

Jones, History of New York 2:342-343; Albert H.
Heusser, ed & Intro, by Hubert G. Schmidt, George
Washington's Mapmaker A Biography of Robert Er ski n e (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. "185-I86n 6
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General Orders, Boynton, Gener al Orders of Geo.
V7as hing ton
General Gates's Genefal'~Order¥^
pp. 5 3-59
January 6, 13, 1783, Peter Casper Order Book, Special
Collections, USMAL; Th e Ne w-York Packe t, January 16,
February 13, 1783.
,
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Of hostilities was proclaimed,
and previously, on May
31,
1782 upon the news of the birth of
the dauphin of France.
During the su^^er of 1783 at West
Point, soldiers were kept
,

busy erecting a colonnade and
creating fireworks for the
anticipated celebration of the news of
the definite treaty
.

army.

82

Celebrations were also held by the
southern
On April 23, 1783, Greene had a
fireworks

P^^^^-

display at

James Island for the soldiers and civilians
from Charleston.

Other social activities were also engaged
in by

both the southern and northern armies.

For example, at

the headquarters of the southern army at Ashley
Hill, South

Carolina, during 1782, the comedy, "Much Ado About
Nothing,"

was performed by a cast composed of officers.

December 1782, some officers held

a fox

During

hunt and dinner near

their camp at New Windsor with citizens of the nearby

General Orders, Boynton, Gener al Orders of Geo.
Washington pp. 2 0-22 66-69 Jonathan Trumbull," Jr.,'To~
Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., April 23, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser.,
,

;

,

3:414.
82

Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon
1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering 1:476.

,

August 21,

,
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Greene, Nathanael Greene

3:489.

,
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[Feltman]
Journal of William Feltman p. 40;
[Denny], Military Journal, pp. 50-51; Hugh F. Rankin, The
North Carolina Continentals, p. 38 7 Robert VTharry to Reading
Beatty, February 5, 1782, Joseph M, Beatty, Jr. [ed.],
"Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty
1781-1788," PMHB, 54, no. 2 (1930): 163; Samuel Story to
Reading Beatty, March [6]
17 82, ibid.
164.
,
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^^Will iam Pierce to St George Tucker, July 10, 1782,
"Original Documents," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 442.
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communities.

Social gatherings at Washington's
headquarters were frequent occurrences,
with Washington playing
host to foreign visitors and to a
weekly levee of officers
and daily dinners for different officers.

Another social activity were Mason
meetings, which
were held at Newburgh, West Point, Fort
Pitt, and other
military sites.
Throughout the war, freemasonry brought
a stability to the revolutionary army,
with its built-in
prohibition against political participation.^^ Its
primary
influence was furthering the concept of. an aristocratic
and

benevolent revolution

Order was the hallmark of masonry.

.

The 1723 Mason constitution stated "a Mason is
86 ^
The

December 12

,

a

peaceable

New York Packet and ~American Advertiser
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~
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Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, October 6, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #15); Clement Biddle
to Henry Knox, October 7, 1783, ibid.; Count Wengieski to
Henry Knox, October 17, 1783, ibid.; J. T. Headley, "Last
Days of Washington's Army at Newburgh," Harper's New Monthly
Magazine 67, no. 401 (October 1883): 6527~65TT
8 8

Hugo Tatsch, Freemasonry in the Thirteen Colonies
(New York: MaCoy Publishing and Masonic Supply Company, 1929),
Washington and His Masonic Compp. 202, 215; Sidney Hayden
peer^, pp. 85-87; Butterfield, Washing t on-Irvine' Correspondence pp. 172-173n.l; Carl H. Claudy"^ "Washington's Home and
Fraternal Life," Pamphlet no. 14 in Albert Bushnell Hart,
ed
[In] Honor to George Washington and Reading about
George Washington (Washington DC: United States George
Washington Bicentennial Commission, 1932), p. 177.
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Ibid., p. 168; Bernard Fay, Revolution and
Freem asonry 16 80-1 800 p 315.
,

Ibid

.

,

passim

.

^

subject to the Civil Powers,
wherever he resides or works,
and is never to be concern'd
in Plots and Conspiracies
against the Peace and Welfare of
the Nation."^!

Masonry was popular in the
American Continental Ar.y
throughout the war. The first lodge
was established in New
York during July.
all, ten or eleven

m

organized during the war.

lodges were

Washington, who had joined the

Masons during 1752, encouraged the creation
of the military
lodges and personally participated in
^
their
act ivi ties

.

During the spring of 1783, several officers,
including Knox, Steuben, and Huntington, organized
the Society of
the Cincinnati, as an institution that would
perpetuate

friendship among the officers once the war ended,
and would
provide funds for their future relief. Meetings were
fre-

quently held during April, May, and June at the Public
Building and at Steuben's headquarters near Fishkill, to

draw up

a

constitution and elect officers.

The first

officers included Washington, as president; McDougall, as
treasurer; and Knox, as secretary.

During the summer and

Ibid., appendix B, p. 320; for other masonic
statements on the subordinate role of the individual to
the civil magistrates, see ibid., appendix C, p. 321, and

appendix D,

p.

322.

92

Ibid., pp. 245, 250; Hugo Tatsch, Fr eemasonry in
the T hirteen Colonies pp. 202-222; Sidney Hayden,
Washington and His Masonic Compeers pp. 42-45, 5 2, 73-74.
,

,

,
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fall, most state Lines formed
their state chapters of the

organization.

9 3

Keeping the military occupied during
the last year
and a half of the war, was the war
itself.
Victory at
Yorktown did not bring an end to hostilities
or the threat

of such.

During 1782 and 1783, the British
still occupied
wide tracts of land in the west, Savannah,
Charleston, New
York City, and Fort George, in Maine. The
Indians were
still of great concern, as warfare continued
with them on
all the frontiers during 1782 and 1783.^^ The
domestic war
93

Drafts of the Institution and other related
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(Boston: n,p., pRnted for the North Carolina Society of
the Cincinnati, 1907), pp. 5-7, 24-26, 30, 32; Baron von
Steuben to Henry Knox, November 11, 1783, Francis S. Drake,
Memorials of the Soc iety o f the Cincinnati of Massachusetts
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Barbara Graymont, The Iroq uois in the American
Revolut ion pp. 252-253; William Irving to Benjamin Lincoln,
April 16, 1783, C. W. Butterfield, An Historical Account of
the Expedition Against Sandusky under Col. William Craw ford
in 1782
p. 2 80; Stevens, A History of Georgia
2:412-4T5T~
Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary
War, pp. 236-240; Joseph Doddridge, Notes on the Settlement
and Indian Wars of the Western Parts of Virgi nia from 176 3
to 1783, Inclusive, Together v;ith a Revl^ew of the State of
Society and Manners of the First Settlers of the v-Jestern
Country. Republished with the addition of new and valuable
materiaT (Pittsburgh John S Ritenour and Wm. tT Lindsey
1912), pp. 188, 207, 217, 232; Bodley, Our First Gr eat West,
p. 208; Isaac Craig to William Irvine, April 5, 1783, "Notes
and Queries," PMHB 36, no. 4 (1912): 507; Isaac Craig to
William Irvine, April 5, 1783, Ryan,
A Salute to Courage,
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continued as well, especially in New
Jersey and in New
York.^^

Washington kept actively involved in
the preparation
of the army for action, keeping them
disciplined
and plan-

ning future strategies should the need
arrive.

Realizing

the army,

long-suffering, might take matters into
their own
hands if not properly controlled, Washington,
Greene,
and

other commanding officers attempted to maintain
of discipline during 1782 and 1783.

a

high state

And, for the most part,

the army was better organized, clothed, fed, and
was better

disciplined that at any other time of the war.^"^
95

.

Richard J. Koke ed., "War, Profit, and Privateers
Along the New Jersey Coast: Letters of 1782 Relating to an
Obscure War Front of the American Revolution," NYHSQ 41
,

no.

3

(July 1957): 279-337.
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Benjamin Lincoln to Artemas Ward, February 18,
1783, Artemas Ward Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3).
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Samuel Cogswell to Mason Cogswell, August 29, 1782,
Ryan, A Sal ute to Courage pp. 272-273; Peter Clayes to
Lieutenant
], January 24, 1783, Feinstone Collection
#171; Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, October 23, 1782, ibid.,
#1207; The New Yo rk Packet and the American Advertiser,
[Fishkill]
January 16, 1783; E. W. Balch, trans., "Narrative of the Prince de Broglie 1782," MAH 1, no. 5 (May 1877):
Revolutionary Journal of Baron Lu d wig von Clo sen
30 7; Acomb
John Smith Hanna, A History of the Life and Services
p. 2 39
of Captain Samuel Dewes p. 159; Brown, Revolutionary War
Journals of Henry Dearborn p. 236; Joseph Reed to Nathanael
Greene, March 14, 1783, Kirkland, Letters on the American
Revolutio n 2:95; Silas Goodell to Joshua Huntington,
November 11, 1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHS^, 20 (1923):
166; George Washington to John Jay, October 18, 1782, Fitzpatrick. Writings of VJashington, 25:275; George Washington
to Benjamin Harrison, November 13, 1782, ibid., 336; George
Washington to William Heath, February 5, 1783, ibid., 26:97;
George V.'ashington to John Armstrong, Sr., January 10, 1783,
ibid., 27; Baron von Steuben to George Washington,
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TO n^ake sure discipline was
enforced, despite pleas
for furloughs, Washington lin^ited
the number of officers he
allowed to be away from camp.^^ He
decided to stay with
the troops, as well, explaining
to James McHenry that he'
would "try like a careful physician
to prevent if possible
the disorders getting to an incurable
height. "^^ To keep
the troops at Fort Pitt under strict
discipline, during the
spring of 1783, he sent General Irvine
back to that post
to take con^and.l°°
To maintain discipline at his own
army,

Washington provided for

a

provost and two field officers of

the day to superintend the police of the army;
and to keep

the army confined to camp, he provided for
patrols, few

passes, and roll calls at irregular hours at night.

"''^-^

Another way Washington kept the army occupied, as
well as instilling discipline, was by encouraging church

service attendance.

During the spring of 1783, he provided

there would be no fatigue duty on Sundays, and that the

January
], 1782, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 484-485; Baron von
Steuben to George Clinton, April 10, 1782, Spaulding, Georoe
Clinton p. 137.
[

~

,
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General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings
Washington 25:421-423.
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George Washington to James McHenry, October 17,
1782, ibid., 269-270; see also George Washington to Joseph
Jones, December 14, 1782, ibid., 430.
Washington to William Irvine, April 16,
1783, ibid., 26:322.
''"^^George

"'"'^'"General
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Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp.
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army would maintain a sense
of decorum and order on
the
sabbath.
Many of the sermons preached
during

the last year

Of the war discussed decorum and
order, not just on Sundays,
but every day of the week, and the
necessity for remaining
subordinate to civil and military
leaders and avoiding any
seditious or mutinous behavior """^^
.

To keep the military occupied,
Washington also

authorized officers to engage in minor military
adventures,
if it appeared they would be successful.
Most
of these

involved sending troops into the neutral area
of New York
and allowing officers to participate in special
projects,
such as

a

contemplated capturing of Prince William Henry,

who was serving in New York City with the British navy.^°^
Even after news of peace arrived, Washington still

actively involved himself in military affairs, especially

making arrangements for the transfer of prisoners, property.
General Orders, Boynton, General Orders of Geo.
Washington p. 62; Patrick J. Furlong, "A"Sermon for the
Mutinous Troops of the Connecticut Line, 1782," NEQ, 43,
no. 4 (December 1970): 624-631; William B. WeedenT^ed
"Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900):
100-106.
,
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Peter Clayes to Lieutenant
], January 24,
1783, Feinstone Collection #171; George Washington to
Matthias Ogden March 28, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 24:91; Thos. F. De Voe
"Prince William Henry
in New York," HM, 2d ser., 5, no. 2 (February 1869): 130-132;
Lord Stirling to Marquis de Bouille, June 25, 1782, Duer,
Stirling pp. 248-249; Katharine Metcalf Roof, Colonel
William Smith and Lady: The Romance of W ashington's Aide and
Young Abigail Adams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929),
36-37.
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and territory.

During the suim.er of 1783, he
sent Ephraim
Douglass to Detroit and Niagara to
get the British to vacate
the posts there, and Steuben to
Canada to request
the

British to turn over their western
posts to the United
states.
Neither were very successful. However,
Washington was successful in his dealings
with Guy Carleton
in making arrangements for the exchange
of prisoners, keeping fighting to a minim.um, and arranging for
the evacuation
of New York City.^°^
Developing a recommendation
for the

post-war military establishment was another activity
that
kept Washington busy.

Throughout the spring and summer, he,

assisted by several officers, including Knox, Heath, and
Pickering,

formulated a recommendation for Congress to

106
^
consider
•

104^ ^
Instructions to Baron von Steuben, July 12, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 27:61-63; Ephraim
Douglass to William Irvine, July 6, 1783, "Notes and Queries,"
PMHB 37, no. 1 (1913): 126; Ephraim Douglass to Benjamin
Lincoln, August 18, 1783, Hazard, Pennsylvania Arch ives, 1st
ser., 10:83-90.
,
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"Substance of a conference between George
Washington and Sir Guy Carleton," May 6, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington 26:402-406; Richard Varick to Henry
Glen, May 18, 1783, "Original Documents," MAH 14, no. 5
(November 1885): 513-515; Douglas Southall Freeman, George
Washington: A Biography 5:441.
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Henry Knox to George Washington, April 17, 1783,
(draft), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Lewis
Nicola to Henry Knox, October 26, 1782, ibid. (Microfilm
Reel #10)
"Thoughts on the Military Establishment Proper
for the United States at the Conclusion of the War in 1783,"
draft by Timothy Pickering, April 22, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); George Washington to
Alexander Hamilton, April 16, 1783, Fitzpatrick, VJritings of
;

With the army relatively busy
and peaceful, occupied
with thoughts of their post-war
lives
and careers, most

civilian and military leaders
believed that disbanding the
army would be done without
incident.
This did not happen.

Although most officers and soldiers
believed they would
eventually be compensated after leaving
military service,

a

few did not.

They believed the best time to
obtain what was
owed them was while in uniform, united
and armed.
They were
fearful that once they were disbanded
the civilian governments would renege on their promises of
pay and other
benefits.

Acting on these beliefs during the summer,
some
soldiers decided to demand by force of arms
that the
civil

governments immediately give them what they were owed.

During mid May, about one hundred troopers of
Virginia's first regiment of cavalry marched off from their
South Carolina camp to Richmond to lay their grievances

before the legislature.

Greene sent an officer after them

to coax them back with a promise of a full pardon and wrote

the chief executive of Virginia, warning him of the troops
and urging that he punish them if they threatened the

Washington, 26:323; Washington Sentiments on the Peace
Establishment in Letter to Alexander Hamilton, May 2, 1783,
ibid., 376; Observation on an Intended Report of a Committee
of Congress on a Peace Establishment, September 8, 1783,
ibid., 27:140-144; William Heath to George Washington,
April 17, 1782, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:386; Buell, Rufus Putnam,
pp. 205-209.
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civilian government.

Governor Harrison, after consulting

with the legislature, had General Morgan
and Colonel Baylor
visit the mutineers in hopes they could
bring their, under
some form of discipline.

Additionally, he had foodstuffs

sent to them, believing this would keep them
from plundering.

Although these measures quelled the mutinous
spirit

of the soldiers, it was not until the legislature
late in

June provided three months pay be given to them, as
well as
all other Virginia Line soldiers returning from the
south-

ward, that they were satisfied, and peacefully

f urloughed

.

"^^^

Also during May, another unit in Greene's command exhibited

mutinous behavior, but did not march from camp.

A more

serious incident happened the first days of June, when

many Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia troops threatened
to resolve their grievances by force.

Greene had the ring-

leaders taken into custody and quelled the mutinous soldiers
by drawing up the army into battle formation and threatening
107

Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21,
1783, Palmer, Cale ndar of Virg inia State Pape rs, 3:486;
Same to same. May 27 17 8 3 ibid.
493; Ben5"amrn Harrison
to the Virginia Delegates at Congress, May 31, 1783,
Hutchinson, Pa pers of James Madison 7:96-97, 99n.l2;
Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia. Genera l
Assembly Begun and Holden at the Public Buildings in the
i n the Year
C ity o7~ Ric hmond, o n Monday the Fifth of May
o f Our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighth-Three
(n p. :~nTd
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Late

m

November, an officer of the
Maryland Line
warned Governor Paca that a body
of soldiers planned to
surround the legislature and seize the
state treasury in
hopes their grievances would be
resolved.
Paca reacted to
this news by ordering a company of
militia to stand by to
put down any insurrection.
None happened.
This was not the case with the
Pennsylvania troops.
On June 13,

1783,

some Pennsylvania troops at Lancaster,

most of whom had been enlisted during late
1782, upset by
the news of being furloughed and not
receiving

the pay that

was due them, sent

a

memorial to the Secretary at War stating

they they would not disband until their grievances,
particularly pay, were met.

When it appeared to these soldiers

they would be marched further away from Philadelphia,

approximately eighty of them marched on Philadelphia to
lobby the civilian authorities.

There they v/ere joined by

several hundred other soldiers then in town.
sent

a

Together they

memorial to Congress threatening to take action if

that body did not act to meet their grievances.

To demon-

strate the seriousness of their demands, they surrounded the
108,,

^,
^
Nathanael
Greene
to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17,
1783, Nathanael Greene Collection, vol. 77, WLCL; Nathanael
Greene to Joseph Egleston, May 17, 1783, ibid., Nathanael
Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, June 3, 1783, ibid., vol. 78.
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William Paca to the General Assembly, Bro\-me,
Maryland Archives, 48:483; VJilliam Paca to James Brice,
November 25, r78 3, ibid., 4 8 3-4 84; Scharf, Hi s tory of
Maryland, 2:502, 502n.l.
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State House, where Congress sat,
with their bayonets fixed.
Since the Pennsylvania government
was too weak to stop these
soldiers. Congress vacated Philadelphia
and relocated in
Princeton, New Jersey.
Before leaving, on the twenty-first
of June, they ordered Washington to
send troops to put down
the mutiny.

When Washington received news of the
mutiny, he
inmediately ordered General Howe with fifteen
hundred
soldiers and a detachment of artillery to
Philadelphia to
put down the mutiny.

This force reached Philadelphia the

first week of July, to find the mutiny had failed,
its

leaders having left the city, and probably the country.

The

mutiny had collapsed once the mutineers realized the civilian

authorities would not consider their grievances until they
disbanded and that the Pennsylvania militia, supported by
Continentals, would be used against them.

Although the

mutiny had been quelled, Congress called on Howe to bring to
trial all the mutineers and to examine all the circumstances

related to it.

In doing so, he was directed to consult with

the Pennsylvania Council on all matters touching on civil

authority.

Howe and his force remained in the Philadelphia

area for several weeks, ensuring that there would be no

further outbreaks and rounding up and court-martialing the

^
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mutineers .^'^^
Not only did the military not
turn on the civilian
authorities at the end of the war,
with the exception just
mentioned, they, as they had the
whole war, upheld the
civilian governments and contributed
greatly to the peaceful
transition from war to peace.
This prevented military
tyranny and anarchy, two things they shared
the same fear
of as their civilian brethren.

And,

like many of their

civilian brethren, the military wanted stronger
governments,
which would prevent military tyranny and anarchy.
As

Ebenezer Huntington wrote during the summer of
1783, "God
grant us Government, as States, free & independent,

or give

us a king, even tyranny is better than Anarchy-

[.]"-'--'-

comprehensive study of the mutiny, see
Kenneth R. Bowling, "New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny
of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the Close of the
War for Independence," PMHB 101, no. 4 (October 1977): 419450; see also George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 24, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington 27 32-33; Instructions to Robert Howe"7~
June 25, 1783, ibid., 35-36; Arthur St. Clair to George
Washington, July 2, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers
1:588-589; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson,
Papers of James M adison, 7:141; James Madison to Edmund
Randolph, July 8, 1783, ibid., 216; Elias Boudinot to
George Washington, June 26, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:200; Same
to same, June 21, 1783, ibid., 194; Same to same, July 1,
1783, ibid., 208; John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates,
June 16, 1783, ibid., 189n,4; Ford, JCC, 24:410, 411-413;
Jonathan Trumibull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., July 2,
1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:432; Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan
Trumbull, Sr., July 10, 1783, ibid., 433.
"'""'''^For
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Huntington to Z-^ndrew Huntington,
August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Let ters W r itten by Ebenezer
Huntington, p. 106.
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Many in the military shared the
nationalists' belief
that only a strong central government
would prevent those
conditions which made for military
tyranny and anarchy, both
of which seemed possible if America
continued to be governed
by the weak Articles of Confederation
One officer at
West Point during December 1782, wrote that
unless power
was "vested in some suprem.e head, sufficient
to enforce a
.

compliance with such regulations as are evidently
calculated
for the general good, adieu to all government- [.] "
He

believed that "Thirteen wheels require

a

steady and powerful

regulator to keep them in good order, and prevent the

machine from becoming useless

'''^

Early in 1783, Knox

wrote Gouverneur Morris that something must be done about
improving the government before

would be in

a

a

peace takes place or they

worse situation than they were in at the

beginning of the war.

"As the present Constitution is so

defective," he wrote, "why do not you great men call the
people together and tell them so; that is, to have
tion of the States to form a better Constitution."

wrote Congress that "some alteration
or ruin must follow."

.

.

.

a

convenGreene

must take place

Lafayette told Washington he could

spend his time in no better fashion than inducing the people
112

Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 8,
1783, Nathanael Greene Papers (Read Collection), 1:27, WLCL
113

Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782,
Quincy, Samuel Shaw. p. 100

.

BO

3

of America to strongthen their union,
by revising the

Articles of Confederation.

"it is," he wrote,

referring to

stronger union, "the finishing stroke that
is wanting to
the perfection to the Temple of Liberty."
Agreeing,
a

Washington was quite active the last year of the
war
urging a stronger central government. Competent

in

powers

must be given Congress, he wrote, "or Anarchy and
Confusion
will soon succeed." In the same vein, ho wrote James
Duane

during the summer of 1783, suggesting

a

government be estab-

lished in the west so as to maintain order among the

frontiersmen

.'^'^^

Although the military were unable to

liave

a

stronger

central government created before the war was over, they
were able to ensure the weak state governments were

strengthened by active military participation, much as they
had throughout the war.

And they were able to prevent

anarchy
114

Henry Knox to Gouvorneur Morris, February 21,
1783, Drake, Henry Knox p. 77; Nathanael Greene to the
President of the Continental Congress, March 11, 1782,
Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC
Marquis de Lafayette to George Washing(Microfilm Reel #1)
ton, February 5, 1783, Louis Gottschalk, od
The L etters of
Lafayette to W ashingto n 1777-1799 p. 261; George Washington
to John Augustine Washington, June 15, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of W ashing ton 27:12; George Wasliincjt on to James
178 3, ibid., 13 3-1 '10; see also George
Duane, September 7
Washington to William Gordon, July 8, 1783, ibid., A9-S2;
George Washington to Alexander Hamillcm, March 31, 1783,
ibid., 26:277; Same to same, March 15, 1783, Syrett, Papers
of Alexander Hamilton, 3:310.
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In the South, Wayne was responsible
for ensuring the

orderly transfer of authority in Savannah from
the British
to the Georgia officials on July 11, 1782.
He did

this by

making sure the property and people of Savannah
were not
depredated and insulted by his soldiers, and by
maintaining
good order in Savannah and its vicinity until the
civil

government was re-established

.

^

The South Carolina

officials, wanting the evacuation of Charleston and the

re-establishment of government in their state to go as
smoothly, requested Washington to have the southern army

remain in their state until such time as Charleston was

re-occupied and government re-established.

Washington refer

red this request to Congress who ordered it be

done.'''"'"^

Because of the concern of the inhabitants of Charleston
that when the city was evacuated there would be anarchy,

Greene was adamant about keeping both the military and

civilian populace under control until the civilian
'"'"^General VJayne s General Orders,
'

Stevens, A History of Georgia

July 11

,

1782

,

2:288.

,
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John Rutledge, Ralph Izard, David Ramsay, Arthur
Middleton, and John Lewis Gervais to George Washington,
August 17, 1782, Burnett, LMCC 6:446; The South Carolina
Delegates at Congress to John Mathews, September 10, 1782,
ibid., 469; John Mathews to the South Carolina Delegates at
Congress, August 17, 1782, Charles Gregg Singer, Sout h
Carolina in the Con fede ratio n, p. 110; George Washington to
the Secfet'ary at War, September 2, 17 82 Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, 25:105-106, 107; George Washington
to the South Carolina Delegates at Congress, September 2,
1782, ibid., 109-110; Thayer, Nathanael G reene p. 410.
,

,

,

government was re-established

.

Charleston was evacuated

on Deceraber 14, 1782, and was
quickly occupied and secured
by a force comnianded by Wayne.
Once the governr.ent was

re-established, Greene maintained his
army of fourteen
hundred at James Island, near Charleston,
where they were
available to assist the civilian authorities,
if necessary.
While the army remained in Charleston's
vicinity,
the town

remained relatively peaceful, but once the
army began disbanding during the spring and summer of
1783, bitter hatreds,
generally involving Tories, erupted into riots
and violence.
Fortunately, a small military force led by Colonel
William
Washington and Major Thomas Pinckney were able to
keep the
mob actions to a

minimum."'""'"^

The military were also successful in keeping peace
in the west and in New York.

During the sumjner of 1783,

General Irvine and Colonel Hull ensured their soldiers were

correct in their dealings with the civilians in the Fort
Pitt area and Westchester County, respectively.

Hull,
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Thaddeus Kosciuszko to Nathanael Greene,
November 14, 1782, Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko i n the
American Revolution p. 137; Nathanael Greene to FrFhcTs
Marion, November 15, 1782, "Madison-Gadsden Correspondence,"
SCHGM 41, no. 2 (April 1940): 55.
,
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Richard Walsh, Charleston s Sons of Liberty: A
Study of the Artisans 17 6 3-178 9 (Columbia -"UniversityoT"
South Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 117-121; Marvin R. Zahniser,
Cha rles Cot esv;or th Pinckney Founding Father, p 7 5; The
South Carol ina Gaz ette and General Advertiser, June 10,
22";~y9, 30r7"'r7"8^37 GazeTt
July 12, 1 5 ,""19
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assisting New York's chief justice,
administered justice,
and protected the inhabitants
of the county from Tories
until the civil government was
re-established.
To provide
for the orderly transition of
New York City from British
to
Ai^erican control, Washington had
nine hundred soldiers under
General Henry Jackson occupy the city
upon the British withdrawal on the twenty-fifth of November.
This force remained
in the city for a month, giving
security to its inhabitants
until elections were held and the
civilian leaders assumed
their offices."'"-'-^
'

With the peaceful re-establishment of
the governments
and the expected news of the definitive
peace, all
that

remained for Congress to do with respect to the
army was to
disband it, except for the peacetime establishment.
On the

nineteenth of June, Congress endorsed Washington's decision
to make the furloughs voluntary for his army, and
two months

later directed the Secretary at War to furlough those troops
119

George VJashmgton to Commanding Officer of the
troops in Westchester County, May 21, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
Writings o f VJashington, 26:447; George Washington to Ralph
Izard, June 14
1783; ibid., 27:10; Francis S Drake, Memorials of the Societ y of th e Cincinnat i of Ma ssach u s e 1 1 s
p. 345; Council of the State of New'York to Henry^Knox,
December 18, 1783, ibid., pp. 554-555; Timothy Pickering to
Samuel Hodgdon, November 16, 1783, Pickering, T imothy Pickering 1:485-486; Alexander C. Flick, ed.. History of the"
State of New York, 4:268-270; Theodore Oscar Barck, Jr., New
York City During the War for Inde pen dence. With Special
Refer e ce to the P e riod of British Oc c upatTon (New^ork
ColumbTa University' Press 1931), pp'r"'22"0^2T; Inhabitants
of Pittsburgh to William Irvine, September 13, 1783, C. W.
Butterfield, An Historical Ac count of the Ex pediti on Against
Sandusky under Col. William Crawford in 1782 p .~'30T.
,

,

:

,

,

in Maryland and Virginia.

^^^^^^^ Washington wanted

to discharge the army, believing it
was cheaper and safer

than furloughing. 121

Agreeing with Washington, Congress on

the twenty-fourth of September authorized
him to discharge
such part of the army as he deemed proper and
expedient, and
two days later authorized the furloughing of those
general,

medical, staff, and engineer officers no longer needed.

""-^^

These decisions prompted the North Carolina delegates
at

Congress to write their state's chief executive that had
they kept the army in the field

a

few weeks longer, they

might have been faced with the army demanding at the point
of

a

bayonet what was owed them.
On the last day of July, Congress requested

Washington personally give them his advice on the peacetime
military establishment and discuss the disbanding of the
remainder of the army.

About three v^eeks later, Washington

turned over command of the army to Knox and departed for
Rocky Hill, New Jersey, where Congress had assembled after
120

Ford, JCC, 24:403, 496; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress June 7, 1783, Fitzpa trick Writings of Washington 26:478.
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,
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George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, June 15,
1783, ibid., 27:14; George Washington to Samuel Huntington,
September 25, 1783, ibid., 167-169; Fitzpatrick, Spirit of
the Revolution p 210
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Ibid., p.

211;

Ford, JCC,

25:606.
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Benjamin Hawkins and Hugh Williamson to Alexander
Martin, Septerb)er 26 1783, Burnett, LMCC 7:310.
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leaving Philadelphia as

a

result of the June .utiny.

while

there. Congress, learning that
Carle ton planned to evacuate
New York City, on the eighteenth
of October issued a
proclamation announcing the definitive
peace and provided for
discharging the officers who had
been furloughed.
This

discharging would take effect on
the third of November in
the north and, on the twenty-ninth
of October, Congress
provided that on the fifteenth of
November all

the troops in

Pennsylvania, except for a small detachment
at Fort Pitt,
and the southern command would be
discharged.
Congress
expected the only military that would still
be serving by
the end of November would be small
detachments at Fort Pitt
and West Point, and the force that would
assist in
the

re-occupation of New York City.^^^
At Rocky Hill, on the second of November, Washington

issued his farewell orders to the army.

In them,

he urged

the arm.y to go back to civilian life with conciliatory
dis-

positions and to maintain a disciplined steadiness of
conduct, and to be virtuous and useful citizens

"^^^
.

The

army responded by an address to Washington on the fifteenth,

thanking him for his efforts on their behalf and promising
124

Ellas Boudmot to Robert Morris, October 23,
1783, ibid., 348; Ford, JCC, 24:452; 25:702-703, 753; George
Washington to Henry Knox, October 23, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
VJritings of Washing ton, 27:206
.
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not to turn on the civilian
authorities ^^6
.

Washington returned to West Point
during the latter
part of November and led what
remained of

his army into New

York City.

After seeing the town was
peacefully occupied,
and the civilian government
re-established, Washington

bid

adieu to the army, leaving what remained
of it under the
command of Knox. 12 7 Leaving New York the
first week of
December, Washington traveled to Annapolis,
where Congress
was sitting to resign his commission, now
that the war was
won and the army peacefully disbanded.

Arriving in Annapolis on the nineteenth of
December,
Washington the following day asked Congress to resign.
Congress agreed that he tender his commission to them
on
the twenty-third in a formal ceremony.

At noon on the

appointed day, Washington entered the senate chamber of the
State House where Congress was sitting, and in
fied manner tendered his resignation in

a

very digni-

short address.

a

"Having now finished the work assigned me," Washington stated,
"I

retire from the great theatre of Action; bidding an

Affectionate farewell to this August body under whose orders
I

have so long acted,

I

here offer my Commission, and take

my leave of all the employments of public life."

The

12 6

Signed by Alexander McDougall, Henry Knox, and
Timothy Pickering, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:488-491
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George Washington to Henry Knox, December
Fitzpatrick, Writings of I-Jashington 27:259.
,
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,
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ceremony was a solemn spectacle,
with almost not a dry eye
among those present. Even the usually
unflappable Washington
was moved by the event, his hands shaking
as he read his

address and once almost losing his composure.

President

Mifflin, on behalf of Congress, thanked
Washington for
everything he had done, observing that he had
"conducted the
great military contest with wisdom and fortitude,
invariably

regarding the rights of the civil power through all
disasters
and changes." With this said, Washington retired
from
the

chambers and the next day left Annapolis, in hopes of
spending Christmas day at Mount Vernon.

"""^^

With Washington retired and most of the army
disbanded. Congress now had to make arrangements for its

peacetime military establishment.

necessity of such

The question of the

force was discussed and debated fre-

a

quently during 1783, both in and out of Congress.

At

12 8

Washington's Address to Congress Resigning his
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2 84-2 85
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Bedford, December 25, 1783, ibid., 285-286n.68; Ford, JCC^
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178 3, Steiner James McHenry pp. 6 9-70
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Yale, in March, seniors
were reaniT-^rq
required to give an extempore
disputation on "Whether
^netner a standing
c+--,r^^^
array would be dangerous
in America?"
Thomas Welsh, in his Boston
Massacre oration,
•

p,

certainly believed it was
dangerous to rely on a standing
army.
Using all the cliches regarding
standing armies,
welsh explained that reliance
upon standing armies could
result in a military tyranny.
^any Americans
agreed,

believing it was safer and cheaper
to rely on the militia,
the natural safeguard of a free
people.
g^^^ ^^^^
questioned the legality of a peacetime
standing
array

the Articles of Confederation

under

Despite opposition,

.

raany

desired a strong standing army to protect
the frontiers and
to deter any foreign power from making
war upon the weak
Araerican states.

Such difference of opinion prompted

130^
^
Dexter,
Literary Diary of E zra Stiles, 3-63Niles, Principles a^^T^^tF'"^FTh^^¥^7?VhTFrnn in a^^^^^;
~
pp. 56-57\
131^.

^
Richard
Henry Lee to James Monroe, January 5
1784, Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Le e, 2-223C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, Amer
ican Military'
~
Policy: Its Development Since 1775 p. 44~
.

,

132

.

William Ellery and David Howell to William Greene
September 8, 1783, Staples, Rhode Island i n the Continental
~
Congress pp. 444 445
'

,

,

.
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Edmund Pendleton to observe
"The question touching
Garrisons
in ti.e of peace, is in its
nature delicate as well as
difficult and therefore I don
t wonder there should be
diversity
of opinions about it."
standing armies, he wrote
Madison,
"seem useful , indeed necessary
, yet have their
certain
evils, among which not the least
considerable is
'

that they

lead to a standing Army, that bane
of Society; nor is it
less difficult to decide the question,
if they are admitted,
whether they ought to be Continental,
or supported
by

&

under the Government of the respective
States where they
are kept. "-^^^

Congress took up the question of the peacetime

military establishment during the spring of
1783.

During

that time, they had the military give their opinion
on the

subject and appointed a committee to make recommendations
The issue was hardly discussed during the summer as
Congress

was involved in other issues and was frequently on the
move.
By the fall, however,

it was a major issue of debate, as the

army still numbered over one thousand officers and soldiers;
134

Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, October
1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison
7:372.
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,
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Committee's report in Ford, JCC, 25:722-744; see
also Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, April 9, 1783,
Syrett, Papers of Al exan der H a milton 3:322; James McHenry
to George Washington, July 31, 1783, Varnum Lansing Collins,
The Continental Cong ress at Pri nceton (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1908), p. 95;' James Madison to Edmund
Randolph, June 17, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of Jame s Madison,
,

7:159.

figure that seemed too high
to many members of
Congress.
The Virginia delegates reported
to their state's chief
executive on the first of November
that Congress would
only probably make a temporary
provision for the peacetime
military establishment, as "permanent
measures on so important & delicate a subject, will no
doubt be postponed untill
our Constituents have time to
deliberate & to express their
sense on such plans as may be submitted
to their considerations."^^^
a

After the British evacuation of New York
City,
Congress, having not made a definitive
decision on the
peacetime army, allowed Washington to make
arrangement.

a

temporary

Washington, late in November, began disbanding

his army, and on the third of December discharged
all the

soldiers in New York except for five hundred; those
with the

longest time of service remaining.

As 1784 began, the Con-

tinental forces numbered less than seven hundred.

This

figure declined during the winter as those that closed out

their accounts were discharged.

Thus, by the spring, the

Continental Army was virtually non-existent."'"'^^
136

The Virginia Delegates in Congress to Benjamin
Harrison, November 1, 1783, ibid., 393.
137

Washington's Proclamation, November 20, 1783,
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Congress finally provided for the
peacetime
establishment on June 2, 1784, when they
voted

for a stand-

ing army of eighty, doing so on the
premise that "standing
armies in time of peace are inconsistent
with the principles
of republican governments, dangerous
to the liberties of a
free people, and generally converted
into destructive
engines for establishing despotism." The
following day,

however, in a realistic vein, Congress
called on four states
to furnish seven hundred soldiers for one
year frontier
service. 138

With the army disbanded the American revolutionaries
had come full circle.

Fear of standing armies, and the

desire for civil control of them, were important factors
in

bringing about their revolutionary war.

They were even more

important factors during the war itself, influencing greatly
the civil-military relationship.

Now with the war concluded,

these same concerns played an important role in shaping the

post-war army, the constitution, and the army established
Reel #16); Henry Knox to George Washington, January 3, 1784,
Drake, Henry Kn ox, p. 86; William Lee, "Record of the
Services of Constant Freeman: Captain of Artillery in the
Continental Army," MAH 2, no. 6 "(June 1878): 355.
13 8

Ford, JCC, 27:518-519, 530-531.
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under it. 139

And they remained important
considerations in
the Ainerican mind throughout the
nineteenth century,
influencing military policy until the
first world war.
Throughout this dissertation the
factors that prevented the Revolutionary War from
collapsing from anarchy
or being subverted by military tyranny
have been discussed.
What follows in the concluding pages is
an analysis of those
factors in the context of several current
studies of

civil-military relations and revolutionary
armies.
In order for military forces to subvert
the civilian

authority in any society, the opportunity has
to exist, and
the military has to have the ability, motive,
and desire
to take advantage of the opportunity.

To some degree, the

opportunity was always present during the American Revolution in that Congress and the state governments were weak
and ineffective most of the war, and in several instances

barely functioning.

Thus, they relied heavily on the army

for their existence.

According to Samuel Finer, the oppor-

tunity for military intervention in civil affairs increases
139

John K. Mahon, The Amer ican Militia: Decade of
Decision, 1789-1800 University of Florida Monographs^
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with the increased dependence
upon the military and with
the
increased popularity of the military.
studies by Morris
Janowitz and Samuel P. Huntington
make similar observations
regarding the status and prestige
accorded
the military.

AS was discussed in this dissertation,
the civilian governments relied heavily on the military,
but the army was not
very popular with the American people
except for brief
periods during the war.
For the most part, they were
viewed
as a necessary evil, and often in a
worse light, as they

infrequently violated the lives, liberties,
and properties
of those they were supposed to protect.
This, in
addition

to the belief in civil supremacy, resulted
in the limiting
of the power and authority given the military.

And, although

the military was heavily relied upon, it was done
so in a

limited and controlled manner.

Thus, the opportunity for

military intervention in civilian affairs was greatly
limited
during most of the war.

Also limiting the opportunity for military involvement in and interference with civil affairs was the
overv/helming public attachment to civilian institutions.

no means was revolutionary America
140

a

.

militaristic society,

Finer, Man on Horseback pp. 72-80; Morris
Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959), p. 34; Huntington,
Soldier and State, pp. 88-89.
,

By

.

.

dominated by military institutions
and values.
America
was very much a civilian society,
with no history of a
professional standing army, other
than that
forced upon

them by the British.

Finer makes the point that
where

public attachment to civilian institutions
are weak or
non-existent, military intervention in
the political life
of the country will find wide scope,
both in manner and in
1
substance. 4 2 As has been discussed in
the early chapters
of this dissertation, revolutionary
Americans put great
faith in their civilian institutions, and
the concept of
civil supremacy, for they realized to do
otherwise was to
provide an opportunity for anarchy or military
tyranny, the
two things they feared most and wished to avoid,
probably

even at the expense of renouncing their declaration of

independence
M.

D.

Feld states

realtions is that the need

general rule of civil-military

a
a

society assumes it has for an

armed force is inversely related to the degree of control
it can exercise over its operations,

i.e.,

141

the greater the

For brief discussion of what constitutes a
militaristic society, see Alfred Vagts, A History of
Militarism: Civilians and Military rev. ed. (New York:
Meredian Books, 1959), pp. 11-12.
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dependence the lesser the controls.

The Ai^erican

Revolution presents an exception
to this rule, as the
civilians were able to exercise a
great amount of control
over the n^ilitary, despite their
great dependence upon them.
The revolutionary leaders knew,
as studies by Bengt
Abrahamsson have shown, that the extent
to which the
civilian authorities wish to avoid military
interference in
politics they themselves would have to
interfere
in

strategy. 14 4

As we have seen, the ,^erican civilian
govern-

ments not only involved themselves in strategical
decisions,
but all facets of military activity. And, as
important,

the

military leaders allowed themselves to be controlled
and
directed by the civilians with a minimum of objection.
"The one prime essential for any system of civilian

control," according to Samuel

mizing of military power.

""'^^

P.

Huntington,

"is the mini-

One major way this was

accomplished by the American civilians was by relying on
the militia and limiting the size of the Continental Army.

Another way the military power was minimized was by the
14

3

Feld,

"Professionalism and Pol i t icization
Notes on the Military and Civilian Control," M. R. Van Gils,
ed., The Perceived Role of the Military Contributions to
Military Sociology no. I (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University
Press 1971)
p. 275
M.

D.

,

,

,

14

4
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p.

84.
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civilian leaders ensuring
whenever possible that the
officers were selected, and later
promoted, based on their
political, economic, and social
backgrounds.
The civilian
leaders realized, as Kurt Lang's
study shows,
that one of

the most effective controls over
an army of revolutionary
origin requires that it be penetrated
by men ideologically
committed to the new regime at every
level.
gtanislav
Andreski states the military is likely
to be a decisive
factor in politics in a society where
there are no crystallized and universally accepted beliefs
about the legitimacy
of power. 14 7 As has been discussed in
the earlier chapters
of this dissertation, the officers accepted
the legitimacy
of the civilian governments, and for the most
part, complied
with the principles of civil supremacy. And, as
has been
shown, the civilian leaders ensured that their
control, and

civil supremacy, was complied with, thereby lessening
the

opportunity for military intervention in or interference
with the civilian governments.
146,

Lang, !li-Jii::t^y_j:jT^t i t^ut
p. Ill; see also C.
Robert Kemble, T he Image" of the Army O fficer in Am erica:
Ba ckground for Current Views
Con t rTbutions in Military'
History no. 5 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973),
p. 21; Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of
Social Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1966), p. 364; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power
a nd Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven
Yale University Press, 1950), p. 262.
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Another factor limiting
the opportunity for
military
intervention during the revolution
was the .ini.al a.ount
of
social unrest and anarchy that
took place.
According to
Kurt Lang, the relative absence
of popular unrest will
keep
the military politically
neutral.
This certainly
was

the case with respect to the
American Revolution, particularly as the military was used to
ensure that social unrest
and anarchy was kept to a minimum.

Although there was little social
unrest and anarchy,
there were many sectional and local
differences in American
society.
According to Edward Luttwak societal
differences
are an obstacle to military interference
in the political
process, particularly in the form of a coup
d'etat involving
the central government
Even if the army had
,

seized the

.

central authority from Congress, it would have
been impossible to have all the states give their allegiance
to them,
for they barely even gave it to Congress, let alone
each

other.

America at this time was by no means a nation.

Yet,

according to one scholar, this lack of nation state development is

a

major factor in allowing military intervention in

civil affairs, as the military fills the political vacuum
148

Lang, Military Institutions

149

,

p.

110.

Edward Luttwak, Coup D' Etat: A Practical Handbook
(London: Allen Lane, 1968), p. 42; see also John EHTs7
Arm ies in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1974)

,

p.
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.
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and beco.es the central
authority and power.
aohn Ellis,
writing about the American
Revolution, observes "the
essential military features
of the War of Independence
derive fro. the fact that
feelings of nationalise
were
.ost significant by their
absence
Indeed, nationalistic feelings were, for the
.ost part, absent during
the
American Revolution. The ar.y was
not fighting to create a
national government, thus they did
not feel the need to
intervene in the political process
to create or foster a
national government, or to establish
themselves as the
central authority.
.

.

.

The American army was basically a
conservative

instrument, as has been discussed throughout
this dissertation.
But in any revolution there is social
and political
unrest, and there was some in the army during
the war.
Not
only did the civilian leaders expend their
energies to keep
this unrest in check, but so did the military
leaders, pre-

venting the opportunity for any form of anarchy or
military
tyranny
The officers kept the army in check by their profes-

sionalism and by their discipline.
150

R.

D.

Although neither the

McKmlay, "Prof essionalization

tion and Civil-Military Relations." M.
Perceived R o le of the Militar y, p. 26 2.

151,
^
John
ullis. Armies
,
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,
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Revolution,
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military nor the civilians came to
see the army as a distinct professional body, especially
since the members of the
army came and went with regularity, the
American
army did

become

professional body, especially its officer
corps.
And professional bodies, as studies have
shown,
a

tend to be

more conservative than liberal in their
political behavior.
Studies by Huntington, Abrahammson, and
Katherine
Chorley indicate the longer the service, the
less likely the

officer corps would be amenable to influence from
the
political left. 15 3

This is especially true of those offi-

cers, having risen in status, are not eager to
undermine a

system that provided the opportunity for them to rise in
status.

In the American Revolution,

many officers came from

middle and lower classes and they had risen in prestige by
their military service, if only in their own

eyes."'^^^

They

152
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Ibid., pp.
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certainly did not want to lose the
reputation and status
they had gained by subverting
the system that had given
them
their reputation and status.
The military leadership, composed primarily of the relatively
well-to-do, did not want
to undermine their own social
status by undermining
the

political and social status quo.

As one scholar has

observed, the Continental Army was "the
bastion of conservatism and privilege. "1^5 And as has been
sho^^ the officers
ensured the army was well-disciplined, not
only to be militarily successful, but also to keep the army from
contributing to any form of anarchy or military tyranny.

John Ellis

observes that discipline was used during the American
Revolution "as

counter-revolutionary tool to suppress any

a

radical tendencies among the rank-and-file ." '''^^

Besides no real opportunity for the military to
intervene in or interfere with the civilian governments, the

military also lacked the ability.

For the military leaders

to have imposed their will upon the civilian governments,

they would have had to have the support of their own
soldiers, been able to defeat the British and the militia,
as well as to neutralize the French forces on the continent.

With respect to the latter, Luttwak observes that
155
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coup d'etat is not worth attempting
if

a

great power has

significant military forces in the
country.
The French
looked to congress as their best
guarantee that the war
would be conducted and concluded
to their best interest and
that their loans would be repaid.
Had the American army
turned on Congress, the French army
might have not only
fought the Continentals, but used
America's internal dispute
to seize part, if not all, the American
states.
Defeating and neutralizing all these military
forces
was unlikely primarily because the Continental
Army
lacked

the necessary human and economic resources;

resources

according to Huntington the army must have to be
able to
influence the political life of a country.
As

for econo-

mic resources, the army certainly lacked them.

And had they

attempted to obtain them by force, the revolution would
have
collapsed, as the Continental Army would have replaced Great
Britain as America's primary enemy.

As for human resources,

the military was never that large or concentrated, except

during the first and last years of the war.

Additionally,

the army did not have that much control over the militia.

Abrahamsson states the closer and more intimate the connections of the army with the other military forces, the
157
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greater the military's resources for
the exertion of
159
power.
Although America's military forces
were closely
intertwined, at least from an individual
standpoint,

had the

army threatened the state governments,
the militia would
have fought them.
As for a pretorian military intervention,
such

a

force, under Washington or some other
officer, would have
had to have been not only completely loyal
to their commander,

but of sufficient size to seize power.

And, as pointed out

by Andreski, such a force would not have to be
imbued with
any particular ideology.

Additionally, they would have

had to count on the other military forces remaining
neutral,
if they did not join them.

This is the most important

prerequisite for a successful military coup d'etat according
to D. J.

Goodspeed. 161

All of these conditions were not

likely during the American Revolution.

With some exceptions,

most of the army shared the republican ideology which did
not lend itself to military coups.

Had

a

military force

threatened the governments, not only would have the state
forces opposed them, but so would have the remaining Conti-

nentals.

With respect to
159
160
161

a

sufficient force loyal to

Abrahamsson, Military Prof essiona l ization

,
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,
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Goodspeed, The C o nspir ato rs: A Stu dy of
(New York: Viking"Press7~r961
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military conunander, few officers
cominanded such a force.
Washington's personal guard rarely
numbered over a hundred
soldiers and the independent
corps cor^anders rarely
had a
force of .ore than two hundred
soldiers, often foreigners,
subject to their orders.
;.nd these soldiers
were .ore
often than not .ore loyal to the
republican revolutionary
ideology than they were to their
com.anding officer,

especially the native born soldiers.
But even if the military had the
ability, and even
if the opportunity existed, rarely
did the American army

have the motive or desire to intervene
in or interfere with
civilian affairs, especially overthrowing
the state governments or Congress. """^^
For the most part, the military had little
motive

because they shared the same goals and the means
of achieving them as the civilians, and because the goals
were not

betrayed by the civilian governments.

Unlike many revolu-

tions, the American one was not begun to obtain social
or

unrealistic goals, such as "Peace, Bread, and Land," or
"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

Therefore, the American

Revolution never experienced the "revolution betrayed" phase
16 2

Carlos E. Godfrey, The Conunander-In-Chief s
Guard: Revolutionary War (Washington DC Sevenson-Smith
Company, 1904), pp. 14-103.
,
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For a brief^ discussion of motives and desires of
the military intervening in civil affairs, see Finer, Wan
on Horseback pp. 2 3-24
,

,
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other revolutions would, where
the military interjects
themselves into the political process
to ensure the initial
revolutionary goals were obtained.

Another important reason why the
American military
did not attempt to undermine the
civilian governments was
their belief that to do so would bring
about the collapse of
their revolution and result in anarchy and
military
tyranny.

For the most part, the military were
content to let the

civilians direct the course of their revolutionary
struggle.
In part this was due to the reasons just
mentioned,
and in

part, because of their faith in the civilian
leaders and

General Washington.
The American army, for the most part, was composed
of civilians in uniform; not professional soldiers, who
had

few or no ties to the civilian life of the country.

The

officers were particularly tied to the civilian society and

many soldiers, by v;ar's end, were, as they were given
stake in society in the form of land.

a

Huntington maintains

the "principle focus of civil-military relations is the

relation of the officer corps to the state.

""'"^^

As has been

shown in this dissertation, the TVmerican officers, in many
instances, were closely tied to the civilian leadership at
all levels.

Not only were they closely integrated

v/ith the

civilian leadership because of personal connections, but
164

Huntington, Soldier and State,

p.

3

:
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also because they themselves
often held civilian
positions
Of leadership before, during,
and after their military
service.
This close association tended
to support and
reinforce conservative political
values, keeping with the
findings of Abrahamsson and Lang,
who observe that the
military will remain politically
neutral if there is a close
integration of the officer corps with
the governing stra165
^
tum.
Abrahamsson
also points out the military will
have
no desire to undermine the political
system if they have
direct access to the civilian leadership.
.

A^^erican

military did have access, by their
personal contacts, by
their lobbying efforts to generally
receptive civilian
bodies, and by their ability to take positions
in government
This access, particularly the ability to
leave military
service for a position in the government, according
to

Chalmers Johnson, is a very important factor in
giving
greater strength to the concept of civil supremacy and

military subordination."*"^^
165,
Lang, Mil itary Ins titutions, p. 110; Bengt
Abrahamsson, "Elements of Military Conservatism: Tradition
and Modern," Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds
On Military Ideology pp. 71-72; Abrahamsson, Milita ry
"
Prof ess ionalization pp. 106, 111.
.

.

.

,

,

,
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Ibid., p.

141.

16 7

Chalmers Johnson Revolutiona ry Change (Boston
Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. lOl-ioT^
,

Thus, being able to bring
thoir needs and desires
directly to the civilian leaders,
the military found it
unnecessary to bring undue
pressure on the yovern,„e„ts
nor
the need to supplant or
replace the™, things that
would
happen in uti.er revolutions,
particularly those involving
less mature political culLurc^sJ^^
,

The other major factor in keeping
the military from
desiring to interfere with or inLc.vcne
in civil affairs was
Washington's lack of desire. Washington's
role in keeping
the army within bounds should not
be underplayed by anyone
studying the American Revolution.
Washington, for many
civilians and most of the army, was the
revolution itself.
Many would have followed him in whatever
direction he took
them, even down the path of military tyranny.
Hut fortunately for the revolutionary Americans, Washington
shared
the same goals as the civilian leaders, and
more importantly,
the same means to obtain them.

recently written,

As two historians have

"Above all else, Washington did not want

to see the republican cause undermined by

a

military dicta-

torship, and that turned out to be one of his greatest

contributions to the Revolution

cjnd

168^.
Finer, Man on Horseback

,

its legacy

p.

""'"^^
.

139.

169,
James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A
Respectable Ar my: The Military Or igins of (lie Republic,'
1763-1789, p. 42.
,

.
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Because the niilitary leaders
were so closely tied
to the civilian governments
and because the military
shared
the same goals as the civilians,
as well as the means
to

obtain them, the army exhibited
little desire to interven e
in or interfere with the civilian
governments. And when
they did, it was relatively
insignificant and was usually
condemned by both the civilian and military
leaders.

There was no one factor which kept
the military from
subverting the civilian governments during
the American

Revolution, but a number.

These factors, when viewed in

the context of the revolutionary Americans'
fear of anarchy
and military tyranny go a long way in
explaining why the

American Revolution was successful; successful in
that the
same men who began the revolution and who conducted
the

course of the Revolutionary War, were able to conclude
the

war without their revolution being undermined by the military
as had happened and would happen in other revolutionary

struggles

Perhaps the most important factors in explaining
the success of the American Revolution was the insistence

by the revolutionary leaders that their military forces

subordinate themselves to civilian control, and the willingness of those forces to be guided by the principle of civil

supremacy.

That the Continental

Array

remained subordinate

is perhaps one of the greatest legacies of the American war

for independence.

Since that ti^e, civil
supremacy has been
the guiding principle for
American civil-.ilitary
relations.
It is something we now take
for granted.
Because America
has never been dominated by
militarism, nor has the martial
spirit long prevailed, most Americans
are willing to assume
their military forces will ever
remain subordinate
to

civilian control.
Few Americans are sufficiently

supremacy is only

a

av/are

that civil

concept, one requiring constant
atten-

tion if we are to avoid military power
subverting or

supplanting civilian authority.
aries certainly realized that.

The American revolution-

They believed that in

delicately balancing liberty and security,
civilian control
would have to be maintained if both liberty and
security
were to be achieved.
Before the point is reached where militarism has

undermined civilian control, under the guise of "national
security," Americans will have to have not only lost sight
of their republican and revolutionary heritages, but also

have become complacent about the role of the military in
their society.

The likelihood of this happening will always

be minimized if Patrick Henry's warning that "Eternal

vigilance is the price of liberty" is remembered.
certainly was by the revolutionary generation.

It

BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
In writing this dissertation

I

have relied on

hundreds of primary and secondary
sources.

As most of the

secondary sources are cited only once,
with full publication
data provided in the footnotes, and
because the frequently
cited printed primary sources are included
in the Short
and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently
Cited, with full
publication data, I have not provided a standard
bibliography.
More useful for anyone studying the
civil-military

relationship during the American war for independence
is an
analytical bibliographical essay.
For those who want

standard bibliography, John

a

Shy's volume on the American Revolution in the Goldentree

Bibliographies in American History and the bibliography
published by the United States Army's Center for Military
History are excellent."'"

Don Higginbotham

'

s

essay in his The_JVar_of^_Amerd^can_^
Attitudes, Policies, an d Prac tice, 176_32l789

Macmillan Company, 1971) is

a

bibliographical
Military
(New York:

valuable supplement, as is

comp. Th e American R evol ution (Northbrook,
Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1973); Robert W.
Coakley and Stetson Conn, The W a r of the Ame rican Revolution:
Narrat ive, Chronology, and Bibliography (Washington',"~D"."c71
Center for Military History, 1975').
"""John

Shy,

832

833

the note on sources in Ja.es
Kirby ^,artin.s and .ark
Edward

5£Pl^Mi£^^Z63^1Z89 (Arlington Heights, Illinois:
Harlan
Davidson, 1982).

Also useful are the essay on
sources in

Richard H. Kohn's

E^gl^_and_S^^

^^^^^-^^^^^^-^^-^^^^-^^^^
(New York:

Free Press, 1975), and the standard
bibliography
in Lawrence Delbert Cress's Citizens_i^^^

^^^^-^^i^-^--A!L^^^££i^^

(Chapel

Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1982).
As

indicated in the preface, there are very
few
works on the American war for independence
that comlDine
I

civil and military attitudes, activities, and
relationships.
The best works doing so are those by Higginbotham
and Martin
and Lender.

Although Jonathan Gregory Rossie's Politics of

Command in the Ame rican .ReX^l^jtion

University Press, 1975), and Kohn

'

(Syracuse: Syracuse
s

work address important

aspects of the civil-military relationship, they are limited
to the 1776-1777 and 1782-1783 periods, respectively.

Charles Royster's A Revo luti onary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of
Early American History and Culture, 1979), although providing valuable insights into military attitudes, is limited
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by the

that it concentrates on
the early years of the
Revolutionary War.
r,-,ct

The host sources for studying
the civil -n.i li tary
relationship during the Revolutionary
War are still the
primary docun.ents.
This is particularly true
with respect
to the congressional-military
re

1

.

,

n.nship

have been numerous books and articles

wM

l

Although there

.

l

on about Congress

and its members during the American
Revolution,

adequately addressed questions relating

t.o

few have

how Congress

conLrolled and directed the military and
how it responded
to acts of military insubordination
and threats of military
tyranny.
To answer those questions one must
go back
1o the

journals and papers of Congress and the letters
of its
members
The journals of Congress contain

a

wealth of

information about the congressional-military relationship
during the war.

Unfortunately, the one-volume index to

the journals is of minimal usefulness.

Thus,

to fully

exploit this source, one must patiently read over ten
thousand pages.

The official papers of Congress, which

are available on microfilm, until 1978 were, because of

their volume and complexity, difficult to use without an

adequate index.

Tn

that year, the National Archives and

Records Service produced

a

comprehensive five-volume index

.

^
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which rnakos their use
more accessible.

Although Edmund

C.

^

Bornetfs edition of the
writings

Of the me^^ers of Congress
is current!, being
superseded by
a nev; edition, it is still
still the best^ single
collection of the
letters and diaries of the
congressional members.
The
letters are particularly
useful in the explanations
given
for congressional policies
and actions.
Such explanations
are also included in Francis
Wharton's edition of diplomatic
correspondence, which contains, among
other things, letters
from Congress to its representatives
abroad.

Other collections of letters and
diaries of members
of Congress contain a wealth of
information about the
congressional-military relationship, as well
as providing

^Worthington

^n
;2^en^tal_Congre

Ford et al., eds. Journals of the
ss 1774-1789 ed ited f rom-Th-F^ff^^f^if^
C.

Li^y o^C^Hg^^

in the
U.S. Government Printing Office,

1904-1937)
KenAeth e'
Tilley, comps
Index: Journals of 'the
g2£t^'l^ntal_C_ongress 1774-1789 (Washn^t^iTT^C— N^tj^-^f
Archives and Recor-di-sFFVi^ig 76
The P^pe^sof ?^e
Continental_Coi^
204 R^rs~-<SrTn:^7FfiTm
(Washington, D.C.: Nationil Archives and
Records Service,
1959); John P. Butler, comp. Index: The Papers of
the

Harris and Steven

D.

;

.

)

;

Continent_aJ^_C^ongre_s^l^

National Archives and Records Service, 1978)

,

^Edmund C. Burnett, ed.
Letters of Members of the
Continental Con gress. Carnegie Institution of Washington
Publication No. 229.
8 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1921-1936); Francis VJharton, ed.
The Revolutio n^y_Di^p]^omat^i
of the United
St ates
6 vols.
(Washington; D.C.: U.S. Government Printinq
^
Office, 1889)
.

.
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-Sights into the private
relationship between the
.e.bers
of congress and the military
leaders.

Most of these collec-

tions are well-.nown and
utilised by scholars/
A.ong those
that are not, and which can
be used to advantage
are the
letters, diaries, and
autobiographies of Elbridge
Gerry,
Benjamin Rush, Samuel Huntington,
Caesar Rodney, Samue/
Holten, John Fell, and Elias
Boudinot.^

There is much significant
information about
congressional policies,
attitudes, and activities in
several secondary works.
Among the more useful, with
respect to a better understanding
of the civil-military
4

^^^^^ publications see my Short and Abbreviated
ofZ?.""
Works Frequently cited under Adams,
Ballagr Bo5d
Butterfield, Gushing, Ferguson, Hutchinson,
ind Sy^Iti.^
5^
^' "^^Y^y Gardiner, A Study in Dissent, The Warrenn
Corres_pondence^

T^Mo
Titles

G^y

South Illinois University Press, 1968);
George W

Corner
t2_biography of
Tr a vel s through
Togeth_e_r_with Jiis_' Coii^onplace B6^F*~f^r789^^1813
^ili^
(Princeton: Princeton University" Pre
sF^fbT-thi-ASiB^iHSociety, 194 3); "The Huntington Papers," CHSC
.n^no??^''^^
20
(1923); George Herbert Ryden ed. Letters to and froi^i
Caes_a_r ^odne yj^6^ ]^
(Philadelphia TlJ^i^eTsTt^ of Penn syl4
yania Press for the Historical Society of Delaware,
1933)Journal of Samuel Holten, M.D. While in the Continental
Congress, May 1778, to August, 1780," HCEI 55-56 (July 1919April 1920)
passim; Donald W. Whisenhut, ed. Delegate from
New Jersey: The Journal of John Fell (Port Washi ngton, New
York: Kennikat Press, 1973); Elias Boudinot, Journal or
Historical Recollections of American Events During the
Revolutionar y War by Elias Boudi not; President of the Contiin the Army
of Ameri ca d uring the Revoluticma y War, D i rector of the
Mint, etc. Copied fr om His Own Manuscript (PhiladelphiaT
Frederick Bourquin "1894
'

,

'

:

,

)
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relationship, are Edmund Cody Burnett's The
Continental
Congress (New York: MacmiUan Company,
1941), Lynn Montross's
The ReluctanJb_Rebels_^jIj^e^to^^ the
Continental C onares^
1774-1789_ (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1950),

Jennings

B.

Sanders's Evoluti^n_of_th ^xecutive Depart
ments

of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789

(Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 1935),

E.

James

Ferguson's The Power of the Purse j_A_His torv of American
Public Finance, 1776-1790

(Chapel Hill: University of North

Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History
and Culture, 1961)

and Herbert James Henderson's Party

,

Politics in the Continental Congress
1974)

(New York: McGraw-Hill,

.

The journals of the provincial congresses, committees
of safety,

legislative, and executive bodies, as well as the

correspondence of the executive and legislative leaders, are
the best sources for the state government-military relationship.

A wealth of this material has been published, often

being included in state record collections and archives.^
For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Bartlett, Bouton,
Browne, Chandler, Clark, Hazard, Hemphill, Hoadly, Lincoln,
Mcllwaine, Saunders, and Walton. Also, Minutes of the
Council of t he Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792 (Dover:
James Kirk and Son, Printers, 1886); Minutes o f the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety o f the State of N ew
Jersey (Trenton Naar, Day and Naar, 1879); Minutes of the
Council of Safet y of the State of New Jersey (Jersey City:
John H"T~Tyon, l¥7 2)
:

.

.
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The state government-military
relationship is,

unfortunately, documented in very
few secondary sourcls.
Two which can be used to advantage,
despite

their age, are

American Rev olution (Cleveland: Winn
and Judson, 1904),
and Margaret P.urnham MacMillan's
Ainerican Revolution

TheJ^ar_Gov^^

(New York: Columbia University
Press,

1943)

As the state official who most
often dealt with the
military, the chief executives were in
a key position to

direct and influence the military, as well
as to be
influenced by them.
Thus, their correspondence

is a very

important source for understanding the dynamics
of the
civil-military relationship. Many of the chief
executives
have had their official and private correspondence

published.

The private correspondence is especially valuable,
in that
some chief executives, such as Joseph Reed and Thomas

Jefferson, were very candid in their letters to the military."^
7

For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Boyd, Browne, Chandler, Clark, Hastings, Hazard, Henry, Mcllwaine, and Reed.
Also, Selections from the Correspondence of the Exec utive
of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786 (Newark: Newark Daily
Advertiser Office, 1848); "Official Letters of Governor John
Martin, 1782-1783," GHQ 1, no. 1 (December 1917): 281-335;
Matt B. Jones, [ed.], "Revolutionary Correspondence of
Governor Nicholas Cooke 1775-1781," PAAS, new ser., 36
(April 14-October 20, 1926): 2 31-352
Helen Lee Pcabody, cd.
"Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49-50 (March 1954-June 1955):
passim.
;
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The public and private
correspondence of the general
officers of the Continental Army
provides another valuable
source for studying the civil-military
relationship. Many
of the general officers, including
Washington, Greene,
Lafayette, Sullivan, Clark, Irvine,
Parsons, Stirling,
St. Clair, Mcintosh, Lee, and
Huntington, have had, or are
having, their letters published.^
Unfortunately, three

valuable collections have not been published.

writings of Knox, Lincoln, and Gates.

They are the

They are, however,

available on microfilm.^
Also meriting attention is the correspondence
of the
field grade and staff officers.
In the writings of Samuel
B.

Webb, James McHenry

,

John Laurens. Philip Van Cortlandt.

Alexander Hamilton. Timothy Pickering, Rufus Putnam,
Ebenezer Huntington, Lewis Morris, Jr., and Alexander
Scammell, one will find a wealth of material about the civil-

military relationship.

In part, this is because several of

these officers, especially Laurens and Hamilton, were very
g

For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Fitzpatrick, ShouTnan,
Idzerda, Hammond, James, Butterfield, Hall, Duer, and Smith.
Also, Lilla M. Hawes, ed. "The Papers of Lachlan Mcintosh,
1774-1799," GHQ 38-40 (June 1954-June 1956): passim; "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4-7 (1872-1875); "The Huntington
Papers,' CHSC 2 0 (1923).
9

Henry Knox Papers, MHS 55 Reels of Microfilm;
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS, 13 Reels of Microfilm; and
Horatio Gates Papers, Microfilming Corporation of America,
20 Reels of Microfilm.
,

"
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opinionated, particularly with respect
to the shortcomings
of the civilian governments "^^
.

The diaries and memoirs of several
general and field
grade officers, including Artemas Ward,
William Hull,

William Moultrie, Marinus Willett, Henry
Dearborn, and
Israel Angell, provide many interesting
observations

about,

and insights into, the civil-military
relationship.

Probably the most valuable is Moultrie's memoirs,
as it
provides a wealth of information about the
problems
the

military had with the South Carolina government
throughout
the war.

The correspondence, journals, diaries, and
memoirs

of the field grade officers and enlisted personnel are

a

relatively untapped source for studying the military's
attitude towards the American governments and people.

Among

those that can be used to advantage are the journals and

these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Ford, Kite, Steiner,
Simms, Judd, Syrett, Pickering and Buell.
Also, "The
Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923); "Letters to General
Lewis Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 433-512; "Colonel Alexander
Scammell and His Letters, from 1763 to 1781, Includina His
'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM 2d ser., 8, no. 3
(September 1870): 129-146.
"""^For

,

these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Abbatt, Campbell,
Moultrie, Willett, and Brown. Also, Edward Field, ed.
Diary of Colone l Israel Angell Commanding the Second Rhode
Island Continental Regimen t during the American Revo lution
1778-1781 (Providence: Preston and Rounds Company, 1899TT~~
'''"For
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diaries of Ebenezer Hitchcock,
Jere.iah Green.an
Ebenezer Denny, willia. Felt.an,

™rs

,

Cavid How,

and James Thacher; the

of Alexander Graydon

,

Alexander Garden, and Joseph

Plum Martin; and the correspondence
of Herbert Wade,
Robert A. Lively, Ebenezer David,

Samuel Shaw, Enos Reeves,

and the Beatty brothers.

"^^

There are several secondary works
on the military
which can also be used to advantage as
was mentioned in the
preface and the beginning of this essay.
Additionally,
some older works still provide useful
insights into the

attitudes and activities of the military.

They include

Allen Bowman's Th e Morale of th_^Amerj^an_^evo]^^
Army (Washington, D.C.: American Council of
Public Affairs,
1943), Louis Clinton Match's The Administration o f the
Re volu tionary Army

(New York: Longmans, Green and

Company, 1904), Lynn Montross's Rag, Tag, and Bobtail:
The
12

For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Bray, Dawson, Denny,
Feltman, Graydon Garden, Quincy, Scheer, Thacher, Wade, and
Black; Also. William B. Weeden, ed. "Diary of Enox Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Armv. With a
Memoir," RIHSP, new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 87-134, 147-194,
207-231; John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-Books of
Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB
20-21 (1896-1897): passim; Joseph M. ^Beatty, Jr., "Letters
of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 17741794," ibid., 44, no. 3 (1920): 193-263; Joseph M. Beatty, Jr.,
"Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty,
1781-1788," ibid., 54, no. 2 (1930): 155-174.
,
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.

story of the Continental Army

,

1775-1783

(New York: Harper

and Brothers, 1952), and Charles K. Bolton's
Th ^ Private

Soldier under Washington

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1902)

The observations recorded by the foreign
officers

and diplomatics are a relatively untapped source for
those

studying the civil-military relationship during the

Revolutionary War.

Among those providing the most interest-

ing observations and insights are the journals of Baron

Ludwig von Closen and Claude Blanchard; the memoirs of the

Marquis De Chastellux, the Abbe Robin, and the Prince De
Broglie; the autobiography of Peter Stephen Du Ponceau; and
the letters of Conrad Alexandre Gerard.

and opinions, besides providing

a

Their observations

unique perspective for

studying the relationships between the American civil and

military leaders, greatly add to our understanding of

Washington's political and symbolic roles.

1

A wealth of primary source material for studying
the civil-military relationship is contained in various

collections of published letters.
13

Many of these are

For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Acomb, Balch,
Chastellux, Robin, and Meng. Also, E. W. Balch, trans.
"Narrative of the Prince De Broglie 1782," MAH 1, nos. 3-4
(March-June 1877): 180-186, 231-235, 306-309, and 374-380;
James L. Whitehead, ed. "The Autobiography of Peter Stephen
Du Ponceau," PMHB 63-64 (April 1939-April 1940): passim.

]
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well-known and utilized by scholars
of the American
Revolution. 1^ Not so well-known,
but containing

many

significant letters and other information,
are Frederic

^tJlK^rolfred,:;^

(2

R.

vols.; Philadelphia: privately
printed,

1941; New York: Coward-McCann

,

1952), Robert Wilson Gibbes's

Documentary_jUstory_of_Ui^^
of Letters and_^aper^^Re]^ting_t^^^

Chiefly in South Carolina^_fro^
of the Editor, and Other Sourc es^_[r7 6 4-178
2

(3

vols.; New

York: D. Appleton and Company, 1853-1857),
Gaillard Hunt's

Fragments of Revolutionary History. Being Hitherto
Unpublished Writings of the Men of the American Revolution,

Collected and Edited, under the Authority of the Di strict
of Columbia Society, Sons of the Revolution (Brooklyn:

Historical Printing Club, 1892), John Durand

'

s

New Materials

for the History of the American R evolution translated from

Documents in the French Archives and Edited (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1889), W.

T.

R.

Saffell's Records o f the

Revolutionary War: Containing the Military and Financial

Correspondence of Distinguished Officers 3d ed.
14

(Baltimore:

For several of the better known collections see
my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited
under Commager, Force, Kellogg, Niles, Palmer, Sparks, and

Thwaites
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Charles C. Saffell, 1894), and Dennis

P.

A^lut^

Ryan's

C ourage: The American R evcjAaion^a_s_Se^

Writings of Officers of the Continental
Army

,.n^

^..-^

,no„

York: Columbia University Press,
1979).

Several periodicals and historical
society publications also contain a wealth of primary
source material
useful for studying the civil-military
relationship. Many
letters and diaries have been published in the
Pe nnsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography Maryland Historical
.

Magazine, The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical

Magazine

,

Historica l Collections of the Essex Institute

Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society
Historical Magazine

,

of American History

,

T he Magazine of History

Willia m

a nd

,

The

The Magazine

and the various publications of the

Massachusetts Historical SocietyHistorical Review

,

,

,

Surprisingly, The American

The Journal of American History

,

and The

Mary Quarterly contain few articles or documents

that contribute to our understanding of the civil-military

relations during the American war for independence.
Over forty years ago in the preface to

a

book on

democracy and military power Charles A. Beard observed that
"To find in American literature a realistic discussion of

this vital theme,

it is necessary to go back to the Fatliers

of the AjTierican Republic," because "They had the advantage
of poignant experience, and intelligence enough to see the
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intimate relations between civil
and military establishi.ents."15

I,

^^.^ dissertation,

I

have found that

in a literal sense Beard was
correct in his observation.

The primary documents of the
Revolutionary generation are
still the best source from which to
understand the American

civil-military relationship, and in
understanding it, having
a clearer understanidng why the
American Revolution
was not

undermined or subverted by military tyranny.
Silas Bent McKmley, Democracy and
?^ilitary Power
new and enlarged ed. (New York
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